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Abstract 
 
This dissertation is motivated by two research questions: (1) how can food act as a means of 
reimagining, recreating, reaffirming, and expressing, sometimes complicated and contested 
identities for minority religious immigrant communities in highly secular contexts? (2) What 
impact does the context of reception, particularly the host society’s unique and complex history 
and interaction with colonialism, immigration, secularism, and nationalism, have on these 
identity negotiations? To examine these questions, I conducted a comparative ethnographic study 
of the foodways of North African Muslim immigrants in Paris, France, and Montréal, Canada, in 
2012-13.  
 The results presented here show that food is often the most important symbol of identity 
engaged by my informants. By choosing which religious/cultural food practices to continue and 
which ones to alter, by choosing to label them in precise ways, by relegating these practices to 
specific places and times, my informants reveal the complex and varied ways that Muslims 
negotiate their identities in transnational context. In settings such as Paris and Montréal, where 
outward/public signs of religiosity can be seen as problematic, and food culture is central to 
national identity, I argue that these kinds of actions take on particular importance for immigrants 
living in these cities.  
In line with scholarship in religion and migration, I show how reception directly 
influences the practices and identities of its immigrant communities. While the fear may be that 
by maintaining or even increasing practices that indicate difference, that highlight the 
“homeland” side of one’s transnational identity, immigrants may not integrate fully into the host 
culture, my research shows the exact opposite effect. In Canada, within multi- and inter-cultural 
contexts my Montréal informants felt more Canadian or had a greater desire to “be Canadian,” 
and on the whole felt free to express and engage their individual identities, whether religious, 
ethnic or cultural, In France, the opposite was true. I use food as the lens to reveal that France’s 
universalistic and assimilationist immigration policies undermine its efforts to emphasize 
equality. 
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Chapter 1: Why, What and Who? 
 
1.1 Scholarly Grounding: The Why of the Research Project1 
 
It was a windy November day in 2010 and the Metro station that I was running through in Paris’ 
Marais district was bustling with activity. People were speed walking from one train to the next 
in that very Parisian way that screams, “I am late for something important, don’t get in my way” 
without ever lifting one’s head or saying a word. Taking a brief reprise from my own fast paced 
trek across the city of lights I stopped to take it all in, smiling with utter contentment that I was 
once again in the city that I love. I ran onto my train just before the doors closed, spun around 
and was immediately faced with a clear sign that there were individuals who did not belong in 
Paris (according to some). In front of me was a sign for a piece of theatre contrasting pork-eating 
French with the “non-pork-eating other.” I had read about the infamous “sausage and wine 
party”2 that had caused a great deal of controversy just a few months before, but I had convinced 
myself—wanting to see multi-religious/ethnic acceptance among the French—that such a thing 
was not a common occurrence. This poster, in my face, in the Metro, on just a regular work day, 
let me know that something bigger was going on. In that moment, and the many others that 
occurred over the next month of my trip, it became obvious to me just how prevalent the tension 
between Muslims and non-Muslims in France was, a tension often communicated through food. 
I came to this project out of an obsession with all things food and all things French. On 
my many visits to France, like the one I describe above, I noticed that how and what the Muslim 
community in France ate was a point of interest for media, politicians and in everyday 
conversation on the street between friends and neighbours. This led me to question why people 
cared so much about what, and how, people ate. Why were the foodways3 of this religious group 
																																																						
1	I	follow	French	style	and	format	by	using	numerical	headings	throughout	this	work.	
2	Sophie	Taylor,	“Banned	Paris	“sausage	and	wine”	party	goes	ahead	at	Arc	de	Triomphe,”	last	updated	June	19,	
2010,	http://blogs.reuters.com/faithworld/2010/06/19/banned-paris-sausage-and-wine-party-goes-ahead-at-arc-
de-triomphe/.	
3	Throughout	this	work	my	use	of	the	term	“foodways”	is	reflective	of	Marie	Dallam’s	definition	of	the	term	in	her	
“Introduction:	Religion,	Food,	and	Eating,”	in	Religion,	Food	&	Eating	in	North	America,	eds.	Benjamin	E.	Zeller,	
Marie	W.	Dallam,	Reid	L.	Neilson	and	Nora	L.	Rubel	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2014),	xvii-xxxii.	There	
she	states	that	foodway	“refers	to	a	set	of	beliefs	and	practices	that	govern	consumption.	In	other	words,	a	
foodway	is	an	expression	of	our	“ways”	around	food:	how	we	grow	or	acquire	it,	how	we	prepare	it,	how	we	
display	or	use	it,	and	how	and	when	we	consume	it.	To	talk	about	the	foodways	of	a	group,	then,	is	to	talk	about	
	 2	
interesting to the population at large? What vested interest would media, government, and 
regular citizens have in talking about this so frequently and in so many contexts? Was France, 
the mecca of culinary identity, the only place where these issues came to light or would the food 
practices of Muslims be an issue in other secular, western contexts as well, such as Québec? 
I went into the field with these open questions, but ultimately the main questions that 
emerged from my fieldwork were: How can food act as a means of reimagining, recreating, 
reaffirming, and expressing, sometimes complicated and contested identities for minority 
immigrant religious communities in highly secular contexts? Does food emerge as a more 
“politically/culturally correct” avenue for religious expression than other religious practices? In 
secular contexts, where public signs of religiosity are often seen as problematic, could 
subtler/more private expressions of religious identity help the minority religious immigrant to 
engage with and express their identities in meaningful ways. Additionally, in contexts like 
France and Québec, which have strong and distinct food cultures, by taking up some of the 
foodways of the host context, and/or leaving some of the home food practices that are seen as 
especially in conflict with the host context behind (i.e. the restriction on alcohol and pork), could 
my participants claim and demonstrate their Québécois/French side of their transnational 
identity? Would they even want to? Finally, what is the impact of these societies’ unique and 
complex histories and interactions with colonialism, immigration, secularism, and nationalism on 
these foodways and their affiliated identities? 
 
1.1.1 Lay of the Land in the Study of Islam in France and Canada4 
I found support for my curiosity when I began to examine the literature on Islam in France and 
Canada. While this field is growing, multifaceted and rich, when I began pursuing this topic, the 
field was still largely in its youth.5 Authors such as Jocelyne Cesari and John Bowen were 
																																																						
what	people	consider	food,	what	they	do	with	food,	what	they	think	about	the	food	and	the	eating,	and	their	ideas	
about	what	the	food	means	to	them”	(Dallam,	“Introduction,”	xviii).	
4	I	reserve	discussion	of	the	other	two	fields	with	which	I	am	in	conversation,	namely	religion	and	migration	and	
religion	and	food,	for	Chapter	9,	showing	how	I	discovered	many	of	my	academic	interlocutors	after	I	conducted	
my	field	work	and	allowed	my	informants	to	direct	my	findings.	This	choice	comes	out	of	an	intentional	decision	to	
structure	the	dissertation	as	a	chronological	reflection	of	my	ethnographic	process	itself.	That	being	said,	I	address	
many	of	the	scholars	in	these	four	fields	throughout	the	dissertation	itself.	
5	While	the	English	sources	about	Islam	in	France	and	Canada	were	emerging	at	the	time	I	began	my	dissertation	
work,	the	French	field	was	further	along	on	this	topic.	There	are	also	undoubtedly	many	excellent	sources	written	
in	Arabic,	which	I	did	not	have	access	to	due	to	the	language	limitations	I	discuss	in	Chapter	9.	
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publishing important works which often highlighted the political policies, especially secularism, 
that influenced the integration of Muslims in France. Cesari’s works, When Islam and 
Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and the United States6 as well as Why the West Fears 
Islam: An Exploration of Islam in Western Liberal Democracies,7 are foundational for insight 
into the study of European Islam and Muslim integration in “Western” secular liberal 
democracies.8 Her work was essential in my early inquiries into this topic in order to see what 
were the larger topics and trends in the field. As I read her work, I began to wonder, though, how 
the trends and issues that she was highlighting played out on the ground in France, and 
specifically in relation to the most “grounded” of all practices: food. For example, in When Islam 
and Democracy Meet Cesari suggests that Muslims in Europe have three modes of integration 
open to them: acceptance, avoidance, or resistance.9 I wondered, in light of my observations on 
the ground in France, how Muslims would see their own integration, and which of Cesari’s three 
modes of integration would be most prevalent. I posited that the food practices of Muslims in 
France may be one way to gain insight into the various modes of integration at work in this 
context. Furthermore, since Cesari’s When Islam and Democracy Meet is a comparative project 
between Europe and the U.S, my project would add nuance to this North American/European 
comparison by focussing in on two specific locations within these broader continental settings: 
France and Québec, and more specifically, Paris and Montréal.  
																																																						
6	Jocelyne	Cesari,	When	Islam	and	Democracy	Meet:	Muslims	in	Europe	and	in	the	United	States	(New	York:	
Palgrave	Macmillan,	2004).	
7	Jocelyne	Cesari,	Why	the	West	Fears	Islam:	An	Exploration	of	Islam	in	Western	Liberal	Democracies	(New	York:	
Palgrave	Macmillan,	2013).	
8	See	also,	Elizabeth	Shakman	Hurd’s	The	Politics	of	Secularism	in	International	Relations	(Princeton	and	Oxford:	
Princeton	University	Press,	2008),	for	an	exploration	of	the	very	question	of	Western	“secularism.”	Of	particular	
note	is	Hurd’s	exploration	of	the	relationship	between	secularism	and	Islam	in	Chapter	3	of	her	work.	Hurd	
suggests	that	French	secularism	in	particular	was	constructed	in	direct	contact	with	Muslim	society	through	the	
French	colonial	project,	such	that	the	“othering”	of	Muslims	becomes	foundational	to	the	very	notion	of	French	
Laïcité.	I	return	to	Hurd’s	understanding	when	I	discuss	laïcité	in	section	2.4	of	Chapter	2.	Joan	Wallach	Scott	
similarly	argues	that	Islam,	and	in	turn	Muslims,	are	set	up	as	the	counterpart	to	the	French	Republic	and	
consequently	to	its	form	of	secularism	in	her	work	The	Politics	of	the	Veil	(Princeton	and	Oxford:	Princeton	
University	Press,	2007).	She	argues	that	this	construction	of	Muslims	as	outside	the	realm	of	what	it	means	to	“be	
French”	inevitably	has	an	impact	on	“the	reaction	of	Western	European	leaders	to	Muslim	immigrants	in	their	
midst”	(Scott,	Politics	of	the	Veil,	9).	
9	Cesari,	When	Islam	and	Democracy	Meet,	175.	
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 John Bowen’s work was also foundational in creating this project. The main questions of 
both his Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space10 and his 
Can Islam be French?: Pluralism and Pragmatism in a Secularist State11 piqued my interest in 
the study of Islam in Francophone, secular contexts. Bowen states that in Why the French Don’t 
Like Headscarves his main question is “whether Muslims who wish to publicly practice their 
religion can make their way in French society without having to pretend to be something other 
than Muslims,” and in Can Islam be French the question is “Can Islam become a workable 
reality for Muslims who wish to live fulfilling social and religious lives in France?”12 In both of 
these works Bowen shows how the answer to both of these questions is a complicated “yes and 
no.” He argues that while  
perhaps an Islam of faith and properly circumscribed devotions could be French, but an 
Islam of schools, mosques, and people whose everyday demeanor marked themselves off 
from others and who sought religious knowledge outside the country – that was a 
different story.13 
 
Joan Wallach Scott in her work The Politics of the Veil posits questions similar to Bowen’s.14 
Rather than looking at integration as assimilation, Scott suggests that the way forward is to 
consider the negotiation of difference. For her this means asking the following questions: “how 
can individuals and groups with different interests live together? Is it possible to think about 
difference non-hierarchically? On what common ground can differences be negotiated?”15  
In line with these questions and conclusions, presented by both Bowen and Scott, I 
sought to explore how the things of “everyday demeanor” that Bowen discussed above, 
specifically food, could help to answer his main questions. By exploring how and what Muslim 
immigrants in France and Québec ate, I see this project as giving another possible viewpoint on 
the questions that Bowen asks in these two works, as well as the questions that Scott poses about 
the negotiation of difference. I wanted to examine “whether Muslims who wish to publicly 
practice their religion, by fasting for Ramadan, buying and eating halal meat, not drinking wine 
																																																						
10	John	R.	Bowen,	Why	the	French	don’t	like	headscarves:	Islam,	the	state,	and	public	space	(Princeton:	Princeton	
University	Press,	2007).	
11	John	R.	Bowen,	Can	Islam	be	French?:	Pluralism	and	Pragmatism	in	a	Secularist	State	(Princeton:	Princeton	
University	Press,	2010).	
12	Bowen,	Can	Islam	be	French,	5.	
13	Ibid,	16.	
14	Scott,	Politics	of	the	Veil.	
15	Scott,	Politics	of	the	Veil,	19.		
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with friends and colleagues, etcetera could make their way in French/Québécois society, without 
having to pretend to be something other than Muslims.” Related to this, I wanted to examine 
what it meant for the identity negotiations of my informants if they thought that they did have to 
pretend to be something other than Muslim, and if food was one of the ways in which this 
“pretending” got worked out. Furthermore, taking Bowen’s question from Can Islam be French I 
wondered to what extent food played a role in the “workable reality” of Islam in the French 
context, and whether or not it could be one piece of evidence for the ability, or restriction on, 
people of difference being able to live together. Could it be, in response to Scott’s questions, part 
of the common ground on which differences could be negotiated? Ultimately, while both of these 
authors examine these questions around the symbol of the veil, I wanted to draw light to some of 
the other signs of difference between Muslim and non-Muslim French highlighted by numerous 
people on the ground in France. 
 The field of Islam in Canada, although relatively new, was also gaining significant 
momentum when I began this project. While there were general sources before the 21st century, 
it is in a post 21st-century context where there has been a significant rise in scholarship in this 
area.16 This dissertation, alongside these other texts, helps to fill a gap in the scholarly literature 
in providing an insight into the daily lived religious practices of one group of Muslim 
immigrants in one Canadian city.17 Since undertaking this study an important book was 
																																																						
16	Howard	Adelman	and	Pierre	Anctil,	eds.,	Religion,	Culture,	and	the	State:	Reflections	on	the	Bouchard-Taylor	
Report	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	2011);	Natasha	Bakht,	ed.,	Belonging	and	banishment:	being	Muslim	
in	Canada	(Toronto:	TSAR,	2008);	Lori	Beaman,	ed.,	Reasonable	Accommodation:	Managing	Religious	Diversity	
(Vancouver:	UBC	Press,	2012);	Peter	Beyer	and	Rubina	Ramji,	eds.,	Growing	up	Canadian:	Muslims,	Hindus,	
Buddhists	(Montréal		&	Kingston:	McGill-Queen’s	University	Press,	2013);	Paul	Eid,	Being	Arab:	Ethnic	and	Religious	
Identity	Building	Among	Second	Generation	Youth	in	Montréal	(Montréal:	McGill-Queen’s	University	Press,	2007);	
Karim	H.	Karim,	“Crescent	Dawn	in	the	Great	White	North:	Muslim	Participation	in	the	Canadian	Public	Sphere,”	in	
Muslims	in	the	West:	From	Sojourners	to	Citizens,	eds.	Yvonne	Yazbeck	Haddad	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	
2002),	262-277;	Sheema	Khan,	Of	hockey	and	hijab:	reflections	of	a	Canadian	Muslim	woman	(Toronto:	TSAR,	
2009);	Anna	C	Korteweg	and	Jennifer	Selby,	eds.,	Debating	Sharia	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	2012);	
Haideh	Moghissi,	Saeed	Rahnema	and	Mark	J.	Goodman,	eds.,	Diaspora	by	design:	Muslims	in	Canada	and	beyond	
(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	2009);	Meena	Sharify-Funk,	“Muslims	and	the	Politics	of	“Reasonable	
Accommodation”:	Analyzing	the	Bouchard-Taylor	Report	and	its	Impact	on	the	Canadian	Province	of	Québec,”	
Journal	of	Muslim	Minority	Affairs	vol.	30,	no	4	(2010):	535-553;	Jasmin	Zine,	Canadian	Islamic	Schools:	Unravelling	
the	Politics	of	Faith,	Gender,	Knowledge	and	Identity	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	2008).	Jasmin	Zine,	ed.,	
Islam	in	the	Hinterlands:	Exploring	Muslim	Cultural	Politics	in	Canada	(Vancouver	and	Toronto:	UBC	Press,	2012).	
17	As	I	was	finishing	up	my	data	collection	in	Montréal,	Beyer	and	Ramji’s	essential	edited	work	Growing	up	
Canadian:	Muslims,	Hindus	and	Buddhists	was	published.	My	dissertation	research	supports	many	of	their	findings	
and	in	fact	fills	an	essential	gap	in	their	work	as	their	sample	contained	absolutely	no	Francophone	Muslims	and	
mine	is	focussed	on	this	group.	
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published on the so-called “Muslim Question” in Canada.18 Abdolmohammad Kazemipur 
examines both Canadian and Muslim exceptionalism in regards to multiculturalism and 
immigrant integration in his impressive work The Muslim Question in Canada: A Story of 
Segmented Integration.19 He suggest that  
in the global debates on multiculturalism, special places are occupied by Canada and by 
Muslims: Canada is used as evidence that multiculturalism works; Muslims are used as 
evidence that it does not. Given this, it is important to examine the experiences of 
Muslim immigrants in Canada.20 
 
Like Kazemipur’s work, this dissertation is an effort to “examine the experiences of Muslim 
immigrants in Canada,” specifically in Québec, and even more specifically in Montréal. 
Kazemipur goes on to suggest that there is poor awareness of Muslims’ lived experiences in 
Canada,21 and that scholars must go beyond the voices that appear in the media and in 
organizational Islam, as this often leads to a “politically correct image that may or may not 
reflect the realities of the lives of Canadian Muslims.”22 My research helps to fill these two gaps 
in the literature on Islam in Canada by focussing on the lived experiences of Muslims and by 
giving voice to some members of the Muslim population outside of the media/Muslim 
organizations.  
Finally, in his effort to complicate the notions of Canadian and Muslim exceptionalism 
Kazemipur highlights the experiences of Muslims in Québec to show how these exceptionalisms 
may not capture the whole picture. He shows that, statistically speaking, the “responses of 
Muslim in Québec in regards to the various indicators of attachment to and comfort in Canada 
present a more negative picture than the rest of Canada.”23 This statistical finding, among the 
others that Kazemipur highlights in his work, supports the idea that the experience of Muslims in 
Québec are potentially more similar to those in France than to the Rest of Canada (ROC). My 
																																																						
18	Very	recently	(April	2016)	a	special	issue	of	the	journal	Critical	Research	on	Religion	came	out	addressing	the	
very	idea	of	a	“Muslim	question”	in	Canada.	See	Critical	Research	on	Religion,	vol.	4,	no.	1	(April	2016):	“The	
Muslim	Question.”	
19	Abdolmohammad	Kazemipur,	The	Muslim	Question	in	Canada:	A	Story	of	Segmented	Integration	(Vancouver:	
UBC	Press,	2014).	
20	Kazemipur,	The	Muslim	Question,	7.	
21	Ibid.,	83.	
22	Ibid.,	90.	
23	Ibid.,	112.	
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work questions these statistical findings, and provides insight into the way that attachment to, 
and comfort in, Canada gets worked out in the everyday practices of Muslims in Montréal. 
While quantitative work abounds, exploring trends and statistics and overarching themes 
present in work on Islam in France and Canada, as we see in Kazemipur’s book, qualitative 
ethnographic work is still fairly new. Concerning France, qualitative ethnographies have 
increased and are prevalent, they tend to focus on what I call the three Ss: scarves, schools and 
suburbs. John Bowen’s work on the headscarf,24 Tricia Danielle Keaton’s important work on 
young Muslim women in the Parisian suburbs,25 Jennifer Selby’s work on gender politics and 
Islam in France,26 Mayanthi Fernando’s work on the contradiction of secularism,27 are all 
examples of impressive ethnographic accounts of Muslims lives in France and their negotiations 
of identity in light of French secularism. My work expands on these foundational works by 
showing how these negotiations happen around food instead of scarves, in all settings of the 
community’s life instead of just in the school system (or other organizational structures), and in 
central Paris instead of the suburbs.  
Taking the study of Muslims in France out of the suburbs and locating it firmly within the 
twenty districts of central Paris is one of the most significant contributions of this present work.28 
Jennifer Selby describes the “tremendous juxtaposition in sights, smells, language, ethnicities, 
and social services between the two spaces” (i.e. Paris and the banlieues, or suburbs).29 In fact, 
most work done on North African Muslims in France focusses on the banlieues, in these 
tremendously juxtaposed spaces. Unlike Selby’s experience of travelling from her apartment in 
central Paris to her field site in Petit Nanterre, going from my apartment in the Marais to my 
field work site, or to any of my 33 interview sites, did not lead to an experience of juxtaposition. 
Considering that most work had been done in the suburban setting of Islam in France, I set out to 
explore how the kinds of negotiations that my informants undertook might be different from or 
similar to those presented in the works from Bowen, Keaton, Fernando and Selby. How might 
																																																						
24	Bowen,	Why	the	French	Don’t	Like	Headscarves.	
25	Tricia	Danielle	Keaton,	Muslim	Girls	and	the	Other	France:	Race,	Identity	Politics	&	Social	Exclusion	(Bloomington,	
IN:	Indiana	University	Press,	2006).	
26	Jennifer	Selby,	Questioning	French	Secularism:	Gender	Politics	and	Islam	in	a	Parisian	Suburb	(New	York:	Palgrave	
MacMillan,	2012).	
27	Mayanthi	L.	Fernando,	The	Republic	Unsettled:	Muslim	French	and	the	Contradictions	of	Secularism	(Durham	and	
London:	Duke	University	Press,	2014).	
28	I	discuss	the	decision	to	conduct	my	fieldwork	in	central	Paris	below.	
29	Selby,	Questioning	French	Secularism,	14.	
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the position of my informants in central Paris lead to more or less conflict? How much would the 
juxtaposition between cultural and religious frames of references be more or less prevalent in 
central Paris? Without the juxtaposition of physical space would my informants’ own bodies and 
experiences become the exemplars of juxtaposition in Paris?  
These contrasts of space and experience often lead to feelings of conflicting identities. 
All of the above-mentioned studies on Muslims in France consequently address  
the dilemma of how to be Muslim French in a world in which Muslim means not French 
and French means not Muslim—that is, how to inhabit an identity that is unintelligible in 
the terms of dominant discourse, and how to be recognized as oneself when one is 
unrecognizable as what one is.30 
 
While these other ethnographic accounts examine this dilemma often in relationship to the broad 
political movements and moments that influence this experience, I look at how this dilemma is 
worked out in my informants’ every day, mundane lives and practices.  
The women of Jennifer Selby’s project confound expectations regarding this dilemma, 
showing how some Muslim women in France interact with secular institutions and policies while 
at the same time publicly demonstrating their religious faith, i.e. they show how Muslim can 
mean French and French can mean Muslim. Over six chapters, Selby shows how articulations of 
secularism in France as well as articulations of feminism “affect the lives of visibly religious 
banlieuesarde Muslim women in France.”31 She highlights the three main themes, and 
consequently conclusions, of her work by showing that, (1) in commissions and feminist 
activism, “French secularism is justified and articulated as paramount to ensuring Muslim 
women’s equal access and full rights in France,” and at the same time leads to these very women 
being excluded from public debate;32 (2) “national identity concerns emerge through discussions 
of the appropriateness of women’s bodies in the public sphere;”33 and (3) the “polarizing focus 
on women’s bodies (by men and women) establishes a fetishism of the hijab that masks broader 
questions and issues.”34 Directly related to this third theme/conclusion is Selby’s example of the 
Affaire du Porc which she discusses in Chapter 3 of her work. In this chapter she shows how her 
informants are not particularly concerned with the 2004 law banning conspicuous religious 
																																																						
30	Fernando,	The	Republic	Unsettled,	37.	
31	Selby,	Question	French	Secularism,	170.	
32	Ibid.,	170.	
33	Ibid.,	171.	
34	Ibid.,	172-173.	
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symbols (i.e. the hijab) in public schools, something that both she, and her readers, would have 
expected. This does not mean that Muslim women in Petit Nanterre are not invested in 
discussions of secularism; they just invest in other ways, e.g. in the Affaire du Porc. In this 
discussion Selby shows how the women in her study are concerned not solely with the offence to 
their religious practices in this event, but in the affront to secular neutrality: “the teacher 
transgressed the students’ right to choose not to eat religiously inappropriate foods.”35 In this 
Selby positions the real lived experiences of her informants in opposition to the picture that one 
may get from the commissions she discusses in her work, namely, the Stasi and Debré 
commission. She shows how the women of her study live publicly religious lives while being 
politically involved in the secular Republic. Selby argues that, in fact, the 
Affaire du Porc reminds us that sometimes these commissions fail to consider the way 
they pejoratively and uniformly position visibly religious women, and how they may 
overemphasize headscarves at the expense of noting other kinds of political engagement, 
which might refute portrayals of the same women as overtly “oppressed.”36  
 
It is my hope to add to the picture that Selby paints in her work, providing further nuance to the 
ways that Muslims in highly secular contexts interact with, and sometimes profess, both 
secularity and religiosity.37 
My project also adds to the new and growing ethnographic work being done in the field 
of qualitative ethnography of Muslims in Canada. Paul Eid’s impressive work on Arab youth in 
Montréal provided me with a solid understanding of how ethnic and religious identity 
negotiations happen on everyday levels for Arab Muslim immigrants in Montréal.38 In this work 
Eid shows the importance of ethno-religious identity for second generation Arabs in Montréal, 
and how this identity is often less contested than in a place such as France. In fact, in his 
conclusion he suggests that “further comparative research is needed to get a better understanding 
																																																						
35	Selby,	Questioning	French	Secularism,	94.	
36	Ibid.,	97.	
37	Although	Selby	does	use	a	food	example	to	show	how	these	negotiations	take	place,	i.e.	in	her	exploration	of	the	
2005	Pork	Affair	(showing	how	her	informants	were	invested	in	the	discussion	around	non-halal	food	in	public	
schools	as	a	means	of	protecting	secular	neutrality),	in	this,	and	in	her	other	examples,	she	concentrates	on	the	
interaction	of	Muslim	women	with	various	secular	organizations.	There	is	consequently	a	gap	in	the	picture	of	how	
religion,	gender,	identity,	secularism,	etcetera	in	the	suburbs	is	played	out	in	more	everyday	contexts.	My	work	is	
generally	outside	of	the	secular	organizational	realm	and	located	more	firmly	in	the	everyday,	lived,	mundane	
moments	of	my	informants’	lives.	It	fills	this	gap	and	uses	food	as	its	principal	means	of	illustration	and	
investigation.	
38	Eid,	Being	Arab.	
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of how France’s and Canada’s respective approaches to integration and diversity affect their 
Arab minorities’ responses to discrimination and stereotyping.”39 I see the present work as an 
answer to this call by Eid, showing how Arab, in this case, Maghrébine, minorities respond to 
discrimination and stereotyping (or lack thereof) through the ways that they interact with, alter 
and redefine their foodways in both Paris and Montréal. It also offers new insight into how these 
negotiations take place not only in the second generation, but also for first generation immigrants 
in both locations. 
Another ethnographic study of Muslims in the “West” which influenced my construction 
of this project is Rima Berns McGown’s Muslims in the Diaspora: The Somali Communities of 
London and Toronto.40 Like McGown, who compares London and Toronto in her work, I believe 
that the “opportunity to understand the process of integration” is “enriched by the comparative 
perspective.”41 McGown’s work highlights the two levels of integration possible for any 
immigrant: external and internal, and emphasizes the fact that because neither Islam nor the West 
are monolithic entities, the way that any given individual engages these two integration processes 
is not monolithic either. Because of this, McGown states that it is her intention “to illustrate the 
complexities of the process of individuals’ renegotiating identity as Muslims in the West.”42 My 
work expands this illustration by demonstrating how these complex negotiations happen in two 
other Western contexts, namely, Paris and Montréal. 
 
1.1.2 Religious Studies Research Philosophy 
So there were gaps to be filled, questions to be answered and conclusions to be expanded upon in 
the field of Islam in France and Canada. As I hinted at above, the more that I thought about the 
kind of project that might help to achieve some of these goals, the more it became clear that I 
would take a lived religion approach. 
Coming out of an early academic background in textual studies, I have studied religion in 
drastically different ways over the years. I have paid close attention to the “institutional 
representation” of a religious tradition as it is presented in that tradition’s scriptures and in recent 
																																																						
39	Eid,	Being	Arab,	188.	
40	Rima	Berns	McGown,	Muslims	in	the	Diaspora:	The	Somali	Communities	of	London	and	Toronto	(Toronto:	
University	of	Toronto	Press,	1999).	
41	McGown,	Muslims	in	the	Diaspora,	x.	
42	Ibid.,	8.	
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years I have paid close attention to the lived experiences of religious individuals who are in daily 
conversation with their various institutional beliefs and practices.43 In my work, I have taken 
seriously both the so-often-labelled “institutional, normative, authoritative, great” side of religion 
as well as the “everyday, popular, mundane, little” side of religion. The idea that religions “have 
a strongly normative character, offering compelling ways to act, to live, to be and to perceive the 
world—and yet how people actually live religious lives appears to be a very different business”44 
sets up a clear dichotomy between text and lived experience, institutional and popular, grand 
schemes and daily practice. This is a false dichotomy, though, as religion is all of the above; it is 
located “exactly in that moment where daily practice and grand schemes come together.”45 
Samuli Schielke and Liza Debevec suggest that in fact grand schemes are not separate from daily 
life, but are in constant communication with it, and are therefore continuously under 
construction.46 Peter Beyer similarly states that  
we cannot appreciate what is happening religiously if we concentrate only on the 
systemic or lived manifestation, because the systemic if most often an integral aspect of 
the lived and because the lived is most often more than a simple manifestation of the 
systemic.47 
 
Work that examines the daily lived practice of religious individuals and communities can 
consequently give insight into the grand schemes, or the systemic manifestations, of religion.  
 
1.1.2.1 Lived Religion and the Dissolution of Dichotomies 
Lived religion shows how these two facets of religion are not dichotomous but are in fact 
congruous. Orsi suggests that everyday religion calls into question three other dichotomies on 
which the study of religion has been historically shaped: (1) sacred/profane, (2) us/them 
																																																						
43	I	address	my	academic	background	further	in	section	1.1.3	below.	
44	Samuli	Schielke	and	Liza	Debevec,	“Introduction,”	in	Ordinary	Lives	and	Grand	Schemes:	An	Anthropology	of	
Everyday	Religion,	eds.	Samuli	Schielke	and	Liza	Debevec	(New	York:	Berghahn	Books,	2012),	1-2.	
45	Schielke	and	Debevec,	“Introduction,”	2.	
46	Ibid.,	5.	When	using	food	as	a	means	to	explore	religion,	Martha	L	Finch	similarly	suggests	that	it	becomes	
obvious	that	sacred	beliefs	about	food	cannot	be	separated	from	what	people	actually	do	with	food,	the	two	go	
hand	in	hand.	Martha	L.	Finch,	“Foreward,”	in	Religion,	Food	&	Eating	in	North	America,	eds.	Benjamin	E.	Zeller,	
Marie	W.	Dallam,	Reid	L.	Neilson	and	Nora	L.	Rubel	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2014),	xi.	
47	Peter	Beyer,	“Growing	up	in	Canada,	the	United	States,	and	Western	Europe,”	in	Growing	up	Canadian:	Muslims,	
Hindus,	Buddhists,	eds.	Peter	Beyer	and	Rubina	Ramji	(Montréal	&	Kingston:	McGill-Queen’s	University	Press,	
2013),	306.	
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(insider/outsider), and (3) presence/absence.48 Lived religion challenges the sacred/profane 
dichotomy by showing that the two are “never distinct in an absolute way, but are braided in 
people’s everyday experience.”49 It challenges the us/them dichotomy by showing that the 
scholar of religion is not all that different from those religious practitioners whom he/she studies. 
In fact, according to Orsi lived religion reveals that both “us” and “them” “are contending with 
similar life challenges and that all of us equally must deal with the inevitable doubleness of being 
both agents of our own lives and experiencing ourselves as powerless, determined, of having 
chosen and of having no choice.”50 Finally, every day/lived religion dissolves the long-held 
dichotomy of presence/absence of the gods in people’s lives. Orsi explains that historically the 
practices that were oriented toward engaging the “presence of the gods in particular things or 
particular times and places...were taken by modern religious theorists as evidence of the most 
‘primitive’ and ‘savage’ level of religiosity...‘good’ modern religion did not include real 
presences.”51 Everyday religion challenges the notion that “good religion” must exclude real 
presence. 
Throughout this dissertation I will show how food is a perfect emblem of lived religion as 
it serves to break down these dichotomies in tangible ways. Eating, one of the most profane and 
mundane activities, can also take on sacred meanings; it breaks apart the dichotomy between 
sacred and profane. As a common experience to almost every living being, our consumption of 
food serves to break down the distinction between “us” and “them,” which Orsi suggests is 
essential in a lived religion approach. Finally, food helps to disband the dichotomy between the 
presence and absence of the gods in people’s lives as it often serves as a symbol of the god(s)’ 
presence in a given situation, or even within a given practitioner. One only needs to look to the 
Catholic understanding of the Eucharist to appreciate how food can make the idea of the absence 
of the gods in one’s life an absurdity. The Eucharist is the Christian sacrament/ritual which 
involves the consumption of bread and wine. While this ritual is understood and symbolized by 
Christians in various ways, Catholics hold the doctrine of transubstantiation, which means that 
the bread and the wine consumed in the Eucharist are transformed into the actual body and blood 
																																																						
48	Robert	A.	Orsi,	“Everyday	Religion	and	the	Contemporary	World:	The	Un-Modern,	of	What	Was	Supposed	to	
Have	Disappeared	but	Did	Not,”	in	Ordinary	Lives	and	Grand	Schemes:	An	Anthropology	of	Everyday	Religion,	eds.	
Samuli	Schielke	and	Liza	Debevec	(New	York:	Berghahn	Books,	2012),	154-155.	
49	Orsi,	“Everyday	Religion,”	154.	
50	Ibid.,	155.	
51	Ibid.,	156.	
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of Christ, which the practitioner then takes into him/herself through consumption. As Michel 
Desjardins and Ellen Desjardins state, this gives “believers direct corporal access to God through 
food.”52 You do not get much more “present” than that. According to scholars of lived religion, 
religion must be taken as a sum of all these dichotomies: institutional and popular, sacred and 
profane, us and them, presence and absence, grand schemes and daily practice.  
One problem is that when one examines lived religion in the hopes of gaining some 
insight into the grand schemes of religion, or vice versa, one is often confronted with 
ambivalence and inconsistency. Individual religious practitioners may act in completely 
contradictory ways to the commonly understood, and even personally understood, “institutional, 
authoritative,” grand schemes. For example, an informant may tell me that he/she eats only halal 
meat but then may order chicken from a restaurant without checking if it is halal certified or 
not.53 A lived religion approach allows the anthropologist to take this sort of inconsistency 
seriously, rather than just trying to solve it.54  In fact, by focusing on the daily lived practices of 
religious individuals we can see how the stuff of the everyday can serve as intentional space, 
things that people use to “make sense of their often confusing and troubled experiences and 
expectations.”55 Schielke and Debevec suggest that 
if we ask people about their specific concerns, experiences and trajectories, and if we 
look at the way people live their lives of which religious beliefs and practices constitute a 
part, we gain an image in which religion is a highly immediate practice of making sense 
of one’s life, coming to terms with fear and ambivalence, all-present at times and absent 
at other times, very sincere in some moments, and contradictory in other moments.56 
 
Believing that one can gain insight into all sides of the religious equation by examining daily 
religious practice—daily lived practice is not as apparent in the study of grand schemes alone – I 
focus on lived religion.  
Before I continue I must pause to describe what I mean by religion, and relatedly lived 
religion. I agree with Meredith McGuire’s definition of these two concepts, namely that religion 
																																																						
52	Michel	Desjardins	and	Ellen	Desjardins,	“The	Role	of	Food	in	Canadian	Expressions	of	Christianity,”	in	Edible	
Histories,	Cultural	Politics:	Towards	a	Canadian	Food	History,	eds.	Franca	Iacovetta,	Valerie	J.	Korinek,	and	Marlene	
Epp	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	2012),	71.	
53	I	describe	such	a	situation	in	Chapter	5	and	discuss	the	implications	of	such	an	event	in	Chapter	6.	
54	Schielke	and	Debevec,	“Introduction,”	11.	
55	Ibid.,	12.	My	informants	use	food	as	an	intentional	space	to	make	sense	of	their	confusing	and	troubled	
experiences	as	Muslim	immigrants	in	highly	secular,	often	hostile,	contexts.		
56	Ibid.,	1.	
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“consists of how people make sense of their world—the stories out of which they live.”57 If 
religion is about making sense and living out of stories, then, according to McGuire, lived 
religion is “constituted by the practices people use to remember, share, enact, adapt, create, and 
combine the stories out of which they live. And it comes into being through the often-mundane 
practices people use to transform these meaningful interpretations into everyday action.”58 I 
argue that food is one of those “often-mundane practices” that people can use in the process of 
transforming the invisible to the visible.59 Food acts as a means of crossing and dwelling60 within 
and between all these realms. According to Graham Harvey food may in fact define religion.61 
 
1.1.2.2 Making Homes and Crossing Boundaries: Food in Tweed’s Theory of Religion 
The other orienting philosophy of religion and religious studies with which I entered into the 
field revolves around Thomas Tweed’s theory of religion as found in his work Crossing and 
Dwelling: A Theory of Religion,62 specifically as this theory applies to food practice. While 
Tweed’s entire theory can be applicable to a project such as mine, I am going to focus primarily 
on the last five words of his definition of religion, namely, that religions “make homes and cross 
boundaries,”63 as this part of his theory was influential in constructing my dissertation project.  
																																																						
57	Meredith	B.	McGuire,	Lived	Religion:	Faith	and	Practice	in	Everyday	Life	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	
2008),	97-98.	This	is	in	line	with	the	definition	of	religion	presented	in	the	quotation	from	Schielke	and	Debevec	
above:	religion	is	about	“making	sense”	of	one’s	life/the	world.	
58	McGuire,	Lived	Religion,	98.		
59	Similar	to	McGuire’s	definition	of	religion	found	above,	Robert	Orsi,	a	famous	proponent	of	lived	religion,	argues	
in	his	Between	Heaven	and	Earth:	The	Religious	Worlds	People	Make	and	the	Scholars	who	Study	them	(Princeton,	
NJ:	Princeton	University	Press,	2005)	that	religion	is	the	“practice	of	making	the	invisible	visible,	of	concretizing	the	
order	of	the	universe,	the	nature	of	human	life	and	its	destiny,	and	the	various	dimensions	and	possibilities	of	
human	interiority	itself,	as	these	are	understood	in	various	cultures	at	different	times,	in	order	to	render	them	
visible	and	tangible,	present	to	the	senses	in	the	circumstances	of	everyday	life”	(73-74).	
60	Thomas	A	Tweed,	Crossing	and	Dwelling:	A	Theory	of	Religion	(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	
Press,	2006).	
61	Graham	Harvey,	“Respectfully	eating	or	not	eating:	putting	food	at	the	centre	of	Religious	Studies,”	Scripta	
Instituti	Donneriani	Aboensis,	Vol	26	(2015):	32-46,	http://ojs.abo.fi/index.php/scripta/issue/view/74/showToc.	
Harvey	suggests	that	“foodways	are	so	frequently	central	to	religious	acts	(even	if	they	are	insufficiently	
recognised	as	such)	that	they	may	‘define’	religion	as	much	as	they	differentiate	between	religions”	(32).	He	argues	
that	religions	are	generally	about	“the	continuous	relational	interactions	of	social	beings”	(33)	and	food	is	the	
realm	within	which	many	of	these	interactions	happen.	Moreover,	because	taboo	and	religion	are	practically	
synonyms,	and	foodways	are	usually	at	the	heart	of	taboo	systems,	then	food	too	should	be	a	synonym	for	religion	
(40-43).	
62	Tweed,	Crossing	and	Dwelling.	
63	Ibid.,	54.	
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Tweed tells the reader that religions are about situating people in time and place, about 
creating boundaries and then showing people how to cross those very boundaries. He breaks this 
part of his definition of religion into two parts and theorizes that religions are about dwelling and 
crossing. In relation to dwelling practices, people attempt to situate themselves in four different 
areas, which he calls chronotopes: the body, the home, the homeland and the cosmos64 (food 
practices can be tools to situate in all these areas). Dallam suggests that Tweed’s concept of 
dwelling is “helpful for discerning ways that people understand their physical and spiritual 
world(s) and position themselves within it/them. By extension, these concepts help us conceive 
of foodways as expressions of identity within a constructed sacred cosmos.”65 Tweed suggests 
that religions and religious practices, of which foodways are a part, I would add, act as watch and 
compass, they situate people in time and place.66 In his work Tweed uses the example of the 
mural and the cornerstone in the temple of Our Lady of the Exile in Miami to show how artifacts 
can be used to situate people. By looking at the mural people can see where they sit in relation to 
the larger community and can be transported back to the Cuba of memory and desire simply by 
looking at it.67 I understand food as serving a similar purpose, it can aide in people’s 
transtemporal and translocative practices. By eating a particular home food, the religious 
immigrant taps into times and places where he/she ate that food before, and imagines him/herself 
in line with those who ate/eat that food as well. 
My placement of food within Tweed’s understanding of religion as a means of “crossing” 
and “dwelling” finds support in the work Remembrance of Repasts: an Anthropology of Food 
and Memory by David E. Sutton.68 Sutton suggests that food can “hide powerful meanings and 
structures under the cloak of the mundane and the quotidian.”69 His work dissects exactly how 
food acts as a powerful tool for those trying to cross borders of time and space, specifically 
through food’s relationship to memory. He suggests that food “has the effect of placing one in 
time,” that it “evokes wholeness,” creates links with imagined communities, and most 
importantly it “does not simply symbolize social bonds and divisions; it participates in their 
																																																						
64	Tweed,	Crossing	and	Dwelling,	97.	
65	Dallam,	“Introduction,”	xxiii.	
66	Tweed,	Crossing	and	Dwelling,	85-98.	
67	Ibid.,	87-89.	
68	David	E	Sutton,	Remembrance	of	Repasts:	An	Anthropology	of	Food	and	Memory	(Oxford	&	New	York:	Berg,	
2001).	
69	Sutton,	Remembrance,	3.	
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creation and re-creation.”70 Food acts as a tool in an individual’s transtemporal and translocative 
efforts; something that becomes especially important for immigrants. 
In Lynne Christy Anderson’s work Breaking Bread: Recipes and Stories from Immigrant 
Kitchens there are many examples of immigrants who see food as the way to situate themselves 
within a community with a past, both temporally and geographically.71 Many of Anderson’s 
informants speak of feeling like they are in their homeland again simply by eating the food of the 
homeland. On the transtemporal side of things, other examples from Anderson’s work show how 
it is through food practice that people feel connected to those who ate the same food in the past 
and those who will eat the food in the future. A Moroccan subject in her study stated that it is by 
eating Moroccan food that she remembers that she is Moroccan, and it is also how she teaches 
her children that they will be welcomed by other Moroccans when they return; if they all eat the 
same food.72 Sarah Sussman similarly states that, no matter whether her informants are in Paris 
or Montréal, as long as they continue to cook their food they remain connected to a long history, 
and place themselves within that history and ensure its survival.73 Food connects these 
practitioners to the past and moves that past into the future. I show throughout my work how my 
informants, like those mentioned in Tweed, Sutton, Anderson, and Sussman, use food and 
foodways as transtemporal and translocative symbols in their everyday religious lives to make 
homes for themselves in their immigrant contexts. 
But Tweed states that religions are not just about dwelling, they are also about crossing. 
In this he deals with terrestrial, corporeal and celestial crossings.74 He shows how religions help 
followers to cross the ever-present boundaries that are in our lives. Two of the important 
crossings that often involve food are the life cycle transitions that are often dealt with in religious 
traditions, and the mapping of the celestial crossing. First, as we human bodies age and change 
religions address and regulate how these changes happen. Food is representative of these 
crossings. For example, Tweed explains that when a baby is born into a Muslim family the 
																																																						
70	Ibid.,	28,	82-84,	102.	
71	Lynne	Christy	Anderson,	Breaking	Bread:	Recipes	and	Stories	from	Immigrant	Kitchens	(Berkeley:	University	of	
California	Press,	2010).		
72	Anderson,	Breaking	Bread,	85.	
73	Sarah	Sussman,	“Jews	from	Algeria	and	French	Jewish	Identity,”	in	Transnational	spaces	and	identities	in	the	
francophone	world,	eds.	Hafid	Gafaiti,	Patricia	M.E.	Lorcin	and	David	G.	Troyansky	(Lincoln:	University	of	Nebraska	
Press,	2009),	228.		
74	Tweed,	Crossing	and	Dwelling,	76.	
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Shahadah is whispered in his/her ear and then a chewed-up date is placed in his/her mouth.75 The 
Muslim life, in this case, begins with God and food and the transition, the crossing, from spirit to 
human, from fetus to child, is represented through food. Furthermore, as was made evident 
throughout my time in the field, major life cycle events, such as marriage, were heavily entwined 
with food. Food was a means of highlighting the transition from one stage to the next. 
Tweed goes on in his exploration of religion’s ability to help the practitioner “cross” by 
discussing transporting and transforming teleographies. Transporting teleographies result in a 
movement in location, a crossing of the various outside boundaries in our lives, whereas 
transforming teleographies are more about a movement in inner orientation or condition.76 One 
can see how food aides in the crossing of celestial boundaries. In many religious communities, 
food not only situates and connect people with the broader living community, but it can also 
cross the celestial boundaries and connect the living community to those who have passed from 
this realm of existence. As I explained above, Orsi suggests that everyday religion highlights the 
possibility for real presence of the supernatural in the lives of religious practitioners, and food is 
one means of crossing the boundary between presence and absence.  
Going in to the field, I wondered how much of Tweed’s theory would hold up when 
examining the “real lives of real people.” I wondered how much my informants would use their 
religious and cultural food practices in tangible ways to “create homes and cross boundaries.” 
While I was not seeking direct answers to this question in my project, this theory/philosophy of 
religion oriented my early thinking about what was happening and what I was observing. 
  
1.1.3 About the Author 
My interest in addressing these questions, issues and scholarly gaps emerges from my academic 
background in the study of religion. My undergraduate degree in religious studies at the 
University of Waterloo provided me with my foundation in the study of religion; through this 
experience I not only gained an important knowledge base in numerous religious traditions, but I 
also learned of the various approaches to studying those traditions. After completing an honour’s 
undergraduate thesis in textual studies, I pursued a Master’s degree in Early Christianity and 
																																																						
75	Ibid.,	145.	
76	Tweed,	Crossing	and	Dwelling,	152.	
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Early Judaism, where I continued to focus on scriptural analysis and the consequent textual 
representation of Christianity in the context of the McMaster University program.  
As I finished my Master’s degree I began to question how religious individuals may 
interact with these texts that I was studying in their everyday lives. I knew what the texts said 
about a given topic, but I wanted to know what religious individuals thought about those texts, 
and how they enacted what was presented in those texts in their “real lives.” Having studied the 
complex relationship between the “law” of the Hebrew Bible and the “law” as presented in the 
Christian New Testament I was acutely aware of how individuals across traditions might interact 
around shared (and often conflicting) religious perspectives. Because of this, and because of my 
various interests in my undergraduate degree, I applied to a doctoral program at Wilfrid Laurier 
University with the intention of examining a topic in interreligious dialogue. I was curious to 
explore the ways in which religious individuals interacted with, and informed, various “others” 
about their religious lives, and how religious “others” came together to pursue mutual 
understanding within small, local organizations for interreligious dialogue. The doctoral program 
in which I enrolled focused on “religious diversity in North America,” thus providing an ideal 
educational background in which to study how individuals located within the diverse North 
American context, and specifically within Canada, come together in conversation and 
collaboration.  
As I entered in to coursework in religion in North America, I saw that these kinds of 
negotiations between and amidst various religious (and irreligious) actors and communities 
happen on more mundane levels and in more everyday contexts than the interreligious 
organizations I was hoping to study. People were meeting the “other,” and moreover, presenting 
themselves through their everyday religious practices, and food was one such practice that 
seemed to be utilized in this process. Although many of the texts that I was reading in those early 
days of my doctoral work did not explicitly mention food as part of this process, I could see 
examples of it abounding in the literature, yet very few people were seeming to take it seriously 
as a means of access to larger questions of how people live out their religious lives in highly 
diverse North American societies. Leaving a concentrated study of interreligious dialogue 
behind, I began to pursue how people negotiated their religious identity through food in 
religiously diverse, and highly secular contexts. 
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This academic trajectory provides a position within which to study a topic which explores 
Islam in the “French” “West,” religion and migration and lived religion, specifically food and 
religion. Having pursued early graduate studies in textual analysis I have taken seriously the 
position of religious texts not only within religious organizations but also for the individual 
religious actor. When my informants interact with, profess, and reimagine the textual grounding 
for their food practices, I can understand the complexities that are present within those texts as 
well as the transmission and utilization of them by a given religious community. My interest, 
openness to, and knowledge of interreligious dialogue provides me with the necessary tools to 
effectively engage with my informants in those everyday moments of encounter that would 
inevitably occur in the field. Finally, my doctoral studies in religious diversity in North America 
provides me with extensive preparation not only in the reality of diversity in various Western, 
secular nation states, but also relevant histories, policies and experiences which govern or 
influence the everyday lived religion of minorities in those contexts. 
 
1.1.4 Scholarly Grounding: Summary 
In this section I have highlighted the scholarly context out of which my dissertation project grew 
and the many reasons for taking on this research. I began with an overview of key works in the 
field of Islam in the West, specifically Islam in France and Canada, and showed how the work 
that is to follow is my attempt at answering some of the questions which arose for me out of my 
reading of these sources. I discuss how my work aims to fill some of the gaps present in the 
literature on Islam in France and Canada and to provide a qualitative view of some of the 
quantitative trends that have been underscored in past work. Furthermore, I argued that this work 
is an effort to expand on the qualitative work which already exists, by showing how negotiations 
of religious, national, secular, etcetera, identities for Muslims in France and Canada happen 
outside of the context of the three Ss: scarves, schools, and suburbs.  
 Next I turned to what I call my “philosophy of religion/studying religion” and gave a 
brief overview of lived religion. I argued that lived religion allows the researcher to see religion 
as a sum of all possible dichotomies, including institutional and popular, sacred and profane, us 
and them, presence and absence, grand schemes and daily practice. Furthermore, religion is 
about making sense of these dichotomies and constructing stories out of the experiences of living 
within them. I showed how I see religion, in agreement with McGuire, as a means of making 
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sense and living out of stories. More importantly I showed how my work is situated within the 
understanding of lived religion as the “the practices people use to remember, share, enact, adapt, 
create, and combine the stories out of which they live. And it comes into being through the often-
mundane practices people use to transform these meaningful interpretations into everyday 
action.”77 Food is one of these mundane, everyday practices/actions that transforms the invisible 
to the visible. 
 More than just transforming the invisible to the visible, food plays a significant role in the 
religious process of crossing and dwelling. Because of this, I outlined Tweed’s theory of religion 
as found in his work Crossing and Dwelling and situated my research project within that frame. I 
focused on the last five words of Tweed’s definition of religion, namely that religion, “makes 
homes and crosses boundaries,” to show how food might be a tangible means of enacting this 
home making and boundary crossing.  
 Finally, I closed this section with an overview of my own personal scholarly background 
that led me to this study. My diverse experiences in the study of religion have provided me with 
familiarity with a wide variety of approaches to, and understandings of, religion that proved 
particularly helpful in this project.  
Before I describe the methods which I engaged to try to fill these gaps, expand on these 
fields, and address these questions/hypotheses, I must address a “gap” in this introduction itself. 
While I hinted at the fields of food and religion and religion and migration throughout this 
“scholarly grounding” section I did not directly address those two fields here, but instead reserve 
that discussion for my concluding chapter. This was a conscious decision that I made for two 
reasons. First, placing this discussion at the end of the dissertation allows me to bring my 
research, after I have presented it, in conversation with key studies and research areas. It allows 
me to “bring it home,” so to speak, by showing exactly how my findings fit with these two key 
areas of research. Second, I have purposefully constructed the writing of my ethnography as a 
reflection of the ethnographic experience itself. The fields that I engage in this introductory 
chapter are the fields out of which my study emerged; they were the works that were on my radar 
before I went in to the field. I then present the “stuff” of my research in the main body chapters, 
illuminating the work that I conducted during my ethnographic research experience itself, hinting 
at the important works in the relevant fields throughout. Finally, I spend some dedicated time 
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situating my work within the most relevant fields at the end of this dissertation because this is 
when I did this situating effort. Once I had finished my data collection, analysis and writing, I 
then examined the fields of religion and migration and food and religion to see where my work 
fit. While this is an unconventional structure, it is the natural outworking of my attempt to give 
voice to my informants without imposing overly restrictive theories or ideas about religion and 
food and religion and migration on to their daily lived experiences. It was an effort to stay true to 
my methodology, and the structure of the dissertation reflects that. 
 
1.2 Context/Methodology/Method: The What and How of the Research Project 
 
My philosophy of studying religion as lived religion and the idea that lived religion is about the 
various ways in which people “make homes and cross boundaries” inevitably affects the kind of 
methodology, as well as the specific methods, I utilized in this project. In line with Birks and 
Mills, I see methodology and methods as two separate, although often related, things. According 
to Birks and Mills, methodology is “a set of principles and ideas that inform the design of a 
research study,” while methods are “practical procedures used to generate and analyse data.”78 I 
address my specific methods below, but first a word on my chosen methodology: ethnography.  
As I mentioned above, Schielke and Debevec suggest that “if we look at the way people 
live their lives of which religious beliefs and practices constitute a part, we gain an image in 
which religion is a highly immediate practice of making sense of one’s life.”79 To understand 
how this “practice of making sense” gets worked out it is essential to learn from the people doing 
the living. Ethnography is an effective approach to gaining insight into the ways in which people 
live their lives, in the case of this ethnography their religious and cultural lives, and consequently 
into the resultant “practice of making sense” that occurs. According to James Spradley, 
ethnography is the methodology that “aims to understand another way of life from the native 
point of view.”80 Ways of life, ways of knowing, are the focus of ethnographic research, whether 
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the ethnographer shares those ways of life/knowing with his/her informants or not. Spradley goes 
on to suggest that ethnography is not about studying people, but instead about “learning from 
people”; the researcher becomes a student and his/her informants become teachers, instructing 
the research either directly or indirectly in the meanings of actions and events.81 This 
understanding of my informants as teachers was essential to my project. As I discuss in detail 
below, I came in to the field with few preconceived notions about the religious and cultural lives 
of my informants. This context allowed me to easily take on the necessary role of student in my 
interactions with the community.  
Spradley emphasises the importance of learning culture by living culture with one’s 
informants. Just as a child learns “culture by observing other people, listening to them, and then 
making inferences,” the ethnographer engages in the same process in the field, “going beyond 
what is seen and heard to infer what people know.”82 The ethnographer makes his/her 
“inferences from three sources: (1) from what people say; (2) from the way people act; and (3) 
from the artifacts people use.”83 Spradley suggests that one can evaluate the adequacy and 
authenticity of the description that one gains from these inferences if one considers the 
ethnography as a set of instructions for how to act appropriately in that cultural context.84 This 
idea becomes complicated in a study of a community that has various understandings of their 
cultural context; in a community that has many different teachers teaching the researcher 
different things. For example, in a study such as mine, where diversity of experience is the 
overwhelming norm, especially in Paris, I imagine that someone picking up my work would have 
a hard time reading it as instructions on how to behave if celebrating Ramadan with any given 
Maghrébine Muslim immigrant in Paris; the Montréal side of things may fall more in line with 
practice. Regardless, because the ethnographer makes his/her inferences from people’s words, 
																																																						
with	their	informants.	In	Spradley’s	work,	he	places	these	sorts	of	studies	in	the	category	of	“Ethnographic	Novels”	
in	which	native	authors	describe	the	insider’s	point	of	view	(24).	For	a	discussion	about	the	emergence	of	
“anthropology	at	home”	and	some	examples	of	it,	see	Peter	Collins	and	Anselma	Gallinat,	eds.	The	Ethnographic	
Self	as	Resource:	Writing	Memory	and	Experience	into	Ethnography	(New	York:	Berghahn	Books,	2010),	especially	
the	chapters	in	Part	1:	Being	Self	and	Other:	Anthropologists	at	Home.	
81	Spradley,	Ethnographic	Interview,	3-5.	While	being	the	student	and	learning	from	one’s	informants	as	teachers	is	
the	ideal,	this	does	not	mean	that	the	influence	of	the	researcher	is	not	still	prevalent.	One	cannot	remove	one’s	
biases	completely	and	the	researcher	inevitably	influences	what	s/he	learns,	what	s/he	includes	or	excludes,	and	
how	s/he	interprets	what	s/he	does	include.	
82	Ibid.,	8.	
83	Ibid.,	8.	
84	Ibid.,	8.	
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actions and artifacts, ethnography does not just equal participant observation; there are many 
methods used, all employed alongside the pure “challenge of just getting by from day to day.”85 I 
address some of my challenges of “getting by from day to day” in section 1.4.2 below, but for 
now I turn to the methods that I employed in my ethnographic study. 
 
1.2.1 Grounded Theory Methods 
While I did not use a classic Grounded Theory (GT) approach/methodology I did apply GT to 
my ethnography. GT goes beyond mere description and exploration. According to Birks and 
Mills, grounded theory 
differs from other approaches to research in that it serves to explain the phenomenon 
being studied…. [It] explicates a phenomenon from the perspective and in the context of 
those who experience it. Theory as the product of the investigative processes is the 
hallmark of grounded theory research.86 
 
My study is thus a modified and selective GT approach. I was interested in explicating the 
phenomenon from the perspective and in the context of those who experience it, so I came into 
the field with few preconceived notions or theories to do so, but I did not create a theory per se to 
explain the phenomenon I was studying. I figured out which theoretical frames, bodies of work, 
or areas of study it fit once I was home from the field.87 Because I selectively employ GT 
methods, rather than specifically generate a grounded theory, Birks and Mills suggest that my 
work is more descriptive and exploratory research, more in line with qualitative data analysis 
(QDA) by Glaser (2004) or the generic inductive qualitative model (GIQM) by Hood (2007).88 
While I use many of the elements of GT, I do not use them all, a necessity for pure GT according 
to Birks and Mills; GT is a methodology that requires using specific methods to a specific end. 
																																																						
85	Peter	Collins,	“The	Ethnographic	Self	as	Resource,”	in	The	Ethnographic	Self	as	Resource:	Writing	Memory	and	
Experience	into	Ethnography,	eds.	Peter	Collins	and	Anselma	Gallinat	(New	York:	Berghahn	Books,	2010),	229.	The	
methods	that	Collins	lists	are:	direct	and	indirect	participant	observation,	interviews,	mapping,	diaries,	quantitative	
strategies,	collection	of	visual	material,	plans	and	diagrams,	and	learning	of	native	skills.	Of	these,	I	used	direct	and	
indirect	participant	observation,	interviews,	diaries,	and	learning	of	native	skills:	language	and	cooking.	Which	I	
discuss	below.	
86	Birks	and	Mills,	Grounded	Theory,	16.	
87	While	it	is	common	practice	to	include	a	literature	review	or	to	situate	my	study	within	a	theoretical	framework	
in	an	introductory	chapter,	I	do	not	do	that	here.	Instead,	in	line	with	the	way	that	my	project	came	to	be	and	was	
enacted,	I	discuss	where	my	work	is	situated,	to	what	fields	it	applies,	in	Chapter	9	of	this	dissertation.	
88	Birks	and	Mills,	Grounded	Theory,	16.	The	authors	refer	to	Barney	G.	Glaser	and	Judith	Holton,	“Remodelling	
grounded	theory,”	Forum:	Qualitative	Sozialforschung/Forum:	Qualitative	Social	Research,	vol.	5,	no.	2	(2004),	and	
Jane	C.	Hood,	“Orthodoxy	vs.	Power:	The	Defining	Traits	of	Grounded	Theory,”	in	Sage	Handbook	of	Grounded	
Theory,	eds.	Antony	Bryant	and	Kathy	Charmaz	(London:	Sage,	2007):	151-164.	
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My end goal was not to generate theory, but to describe and explore the possibilities of what 
might be happening for my informants who were living out their religious and cultural lives 
amidst a seemingly hostile backdrop. 
Some of the philosophies present in GT did in fact inform my approach in the field. For 
example, and as I mentioned above, I tried to enter the field with relatively little orienting theory. 
Although I entered my fieldwork right out of my comprehensive examinations, and thus 
inevitably had some orienting theoretical principles in my mind, I was not trying to impose the 
data that I found on the ground into a theoretical framework.89 I allowed my informants to direct 
how I viewed their experience, rather than trying to direct them into distinct categories or boxes. 
In this way, I fell in line with another of the principles of GT, unlike studies where the “research 
question directs how the study proceeds. In grounded theory, it is the research process that 
generates the question.”90 While I had curiosities that led me into the field, and “broad” research 
questions, as I described above, the overarching question that I was seeking came out after the 
fact. For example, it was not until February 2016, two and a half years after I left the field, that I 
wrote down the ultimate “questions” that my work addresses. Overall, I utilized “the value of 
grounded theory methods” for my research design.91 
I engaged several of the essential methods for a GT study around which Birks and Mills 
write their work. I used an adaptation of the initial coding process they outline.92 This helped me 
to identify important words or groups of words and concepts while I went along. While I did not 
transcribe and analyze my interviews as I conducted my fieldwork, I did write memos (another 
of Birks and Mills essential methods)93 and journals which helped me to do this initial coding 
work. This brought up thought-provoking and unexpected themes as I was conducting my work 
and led me to engage in one of the essential GT methods, namely, theoretical sampling.94 While I 
did not select specific people to interview, or drastically change the kinds of questions I was 
asking my informants, I did make some subtle strategic decisions to access topics that were 
emerging in the field. For example, while in Paris, my informants spoke a great deal about the 
																																																						
89	Birks	and	Mills	suggest	that	a	formal	literature	review	is	delayed	in	a	GT	project	in	order	“to	prevent	the	
researcher	from	imposing	existing	theories	or	approaches	on	the	study.”	Birks	and	Mills,	Grounded	Theory,	22.	
90	Ibid.,	20.	
91	Ibid.,	31.	
92	Ibid.,	9-10,	93-100.	
93	Ibid.,	10,	40-47.	
94	Ibid.,	10-11,	69-73.	
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difference in “goût” (taste) between home food and host food.95 While I did not have a fixed 
question on this in my original list of questions, I ended up adding this to the questions that I 
would use to further probe my informants when the opportunity arose. When I finished my data 
collection, I engaged in “constant comparative analysis,” comparing incident to incident, incident 
to codes, codes to codes, codes to categories, and categories to categories, to bring things 
together that had never been associated before.96 While normally this method would be used as 
data is generated, I used it to help me analyze my data once it was all collected and transcribed. 
Finally, the last method that I used in my study was “theoretical sensitivity.”97 Theoretical 
sensitivity according to Birks and Mills is the “ability to recognize and extract from data 
elements that have relevance for your emerging theory,”98 or in my case, my emerging 
description. One’s theoretical sensitivity grows the longer one is engaged in the research, and is 
highly dependent on the researcher’s own history and knowledge. This theoretical sensitivity is 
reflected in section 1.4 below. 
 
1.2.2 Spradley’s The Ethnographic Interview 
Alongside, and in conjunction with, these GT methods, I also leaned on James Spradley’s classic 
method for ethnographic interviews (step two in his twelve step developmental research 
sequence).99 Spradley shows how this interviewing method is different from simple friendly 
conversation in four key ways.100 First of all, “turn taking is less balanced.”101 While in a 
friendly conversation the two people involved take turns asking and responding to questions, in 
the ethnographic interview model the ethnographer asks almost all of the questions and the 
informant does almost all of the responding. Furthermore, the turn taking is asymmetrical as 
well, because the informants’ responses take up most of the time in the conversation. The second 
difference that Spradley highlights is the role of repetition. While in a friendly conversation 
																																																						
95	I	explore	this	argument	in	Chapter	4	in	section	4.4.2.1.	
96	Birks	and	Mills,	Grounded	Theory,	11,	94.	
97	Ibid.,	11,	58-63.	
98	Ibid.,	59.	
99	For	an	overview	of	the	twelve	elements	in	the	ethnographic	interview	see	Appendix	A.	
100	While	it	is	important	to	note	that	the	ethnographic	interview	is	different	from	friendly	conversation,	both	kinds	
of	conversations	were	important	elements	of	my	work.	While	I	conducted	semi-structured	interviews	that	
generally	followed	Spradley’s	pattern	of	ethnographic	interviews,	I	also	engaged	in	hundreds	of	friendly	
conversations	that	make	up	an	important	part	of	my	data.	
101	Spradley,	Ethnographic	Interview,	67.	
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repetition is used infrequently, it is a hallmark of the ethnographic interview. The ethnographer 
not only repeats things the informant has said but also restates and repeats questions over and 
over again.102 The third difference between the ethnographic interview and friendly conversation 
is another one that highlights the asymmetry of the ethnographic interview. Unlike friendly 
conversation where both parties may express interest and ignorance in what the other person is 
saying, in the ethnographic interview it is primarily the ethnographer who engages in these 
efforts.103 Finally, while it is common in the context of friendly conversation to abbreviate one’s 
stories or responses to questions, in the ethnographic interview “the ethnographer encourages 
expanding on what each person says.”104 The questions which I asked, and the way in which I 
asked them, in my semi-structured interviews were much more specific and elicited a great deal 
more detail than the kinds of questions that would arise in a given conversation on the street, in 
the mosque or in the living room of my informants’ homes. 
 
1.2.3 Methods Applied  
What did all this look like on the ground in the field, though? To try and understand how my 
informants addressed their immigrant religious experiences, specifically through foodways, I 
engaged in extensive participant observation. I also conducted semi-structured interviews, 
interviews that have a fixed set of questions with enough flexibility in the question to take the 
conversation where the informant leads. 
 First, I would like to briefly situate the two fields in which I conducted this work as they 
relate to this project. Both Paris and Montréal are large urban centres, and as such have high 
concentrations of immigrant populations. As I will describe in more detail in Chapters 2 and 6, 
both Paris and Montréal are home to many Maghrébine Muslim immigrants. While it is difficult 
to know the exact numbers of Muslims in both locations, especially thanks to the fact that France 
does not document religion in its census information, there are some helpful estimates on which 
we can draw to start to paint a picture of the demographics present in both locations. According 
to some estimates, 40 percent of France’s Muslim population lives in and around Paris.105 This 
																																																						
102	Spradley,	Ethnographic	Interview,	68.	
103	Ibid.,	68.	
104	Ibid.,	68.	
105	Jonathan	Laurence	and	Justin	Vaisse,	Integrating	Islam:	Political	and	Religious	Challenges	in	
Contemporary	France	(Washington:	Brookings	Institution	Press,	2006),	22.	
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means that, of the estimated 6 million Muslims who live in France, approximately 2.4 million 
Muslims live in the greater Paris area. This equates to roughly 24 percent of the total population 
of that region. In Montréal, according to the 2011 National Household Survey (NHS), 9.6 
percent of the population of Montréal reported themselves as Muslim.106 While there is a greater 
concentration of Muslims in Montréal than in the Canadian population overall (sitting at 2.8 
percent according to the 2011 NHS data),107 this percentage is still less than half of the 
proportion of Muslims living in Paris. 
Before heading in to these fields, I successfully applied for research ethics approval from 
Wilfrid Laurier University’s Research Ethics Board (REB).108 To be granted ethics approval I 
created, submitted and subsequently revised a set of preliminary interview questions which 
became the outline for my semi-structured interviews.109 Considering my informants’ safety and 
comfort to be of utmost importance I also created an informed consent form which each of my 
65 informants signed.110 
The results from my fieldwork in Paris are based on the data that I collected from July 8 
until December 20, 2012, in Paris, France, much of it centered at the Grande Mosquée de Paris, 
the most well-known, central mosque in Paris, and in France. Like Selby, I began in the field by 
undertaking what she calls “extreme volunteerism,”111 principally by volunteering in the Mosque 
kitchen each day during the month of Ramadan, helping to prepare the iftar (the breaking of the 
fast meal during Ramadan). Through these volunteer activities I made myself and my project 
known, which provided me with the necessary credibility and trust within the community to 
conduct my fieldwork. For over five and a half months I spent over 800 hours interacting with 
people at the mosque and elsewhere, talking with people about food, helping the women in the 
mosque kitchen, eating meals at restaurants, drinking many cups of mint tea, attending a 
																																																						
106	Statistics	Canada.	2013.	Québec	(Code	24)	(table).	National	Household	Survey	(NHS)	Profile.	2011	National	
Household	Survey.	Statistics	Canada	Catalogue	no.	99-004-XWE.	Ottawa.	Released	September	11,	2013.	
http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/2011/dp-pd/prof/index.cfm?Lang=E	(accessed	February	4,	2016).	
107	“National	Household	Survey	Profile,	Canada,	2011.”	Statistics	Canada.	Accessed	March	7,	2016.	
http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/2011/dp-
pd/prof/details/page.cfm?Lang=E&Geo1=PR&Code1=01&Data=Count&SearchText=Canada&SearchType=Begins&S
earchPR=01&A1=All&B1=All&Custom=&TABID=1.	
108	REB	approval	#3257.	
109	See	Appendix	B	for	the	list	of	interview	questions	that	were	approved	by	the	REB.	
110	To	protect	the	anonymity	of	my	informants	I	gave	each	interview	a	code	number.	I	use	the	unique	code	number	
for	a	given	interview	when	quoting	from	it	throughout	this	dissertation.	
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wedding, sitting in the park outside of the mosque, celebrating the major religious festivals, 
etcetera. The participant observations were recorded in extensive field journal entries. This early 
engagement with the community at the Grande Mosquée provided me with initial contacts whom 
I began interviewing and who in turn provided other contacts for me to interview; this led to a 
snowball method of generating interviews.  
I conducted 33 semi-structured interviews over this period. My interview subjects ranged 
in age from 18 to 64 and were relatively evenly split between males (14) and females (19). All 
33 of the informants were either born in one of the three countries of the Maghreb that are the 
focus of this study (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) or as second generation Maghrébines in 
France. The largest group of informants was born in Algeria (20) followed by French-born 
informants (6), Moroccan informants (4) and finally, Tunisian informants (3). Eighty-one percent 
of my interview data comes from first generation Maghrébine Muslims in France. Furthermore, 
all but one of my 33 informants live and/or work within the 20 districts of central Paris, not in 
the banlieues, and all my interviews were conducted within the city centre.112 This is an 
important difference from many previous ethnographic studies conducted on Muslims in France, 
most of which are conducted in the suburban context.113 
The results from my fieldwork in Montréal are based on the data that I collected there 
from February 8 until August 11, 2013, with a brief return trip to Montréal for the Eid Al-Adha 
celebration on October 15, 2013. In Montréal I took a similar approach to that of Paris, starting 
with a well-known mosque and proceeding from there, although most of my participant 
observation was done in people’s homes. Unlike in Paris, where I was kept firmly on the outside 
and given close but restricted access to the community and to individuals, in Montréal I was 
quickly invited in to the inner circles of the community and spent most of my time researching in 
the home context.114 Over those six principal months I spent over eight hundred hours partaking 
in participant observation, talking about food with people in the mosque, their homes and on the 
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to	make	any	useful	comparative	conclusions.	
113	I	discussed	many	of	these	works	in	section	1.1.1	above.	
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streets, preparing food and eating meals at my informants’ homes, volunteering at the mosque 
during Ramadan for one of the iftar meals, discussing food with a group of women at another 
mosque, drinking many cups of mint tea and eating many North African sweets, having long 
conversations about the nature of Islam and Christianity on my informants’ couches, etcetera. 
My initial contacts in Montréal came from my early visit to the mosque, as well as a contact of 
one of my informants in Paris who lives in Montréal.  
I conducted 32 semi-structured interviews in Montréal. My 32 informants ranged in age 
from 22 to 73 and were made up of two-thirds female informants (22) and one-third male 
informants (10). Almost all my informants were first generation Maghrébines with 31 of the 
informants being born in one of the three countries of the Maghreb that are the focus of this 
study (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia). Only one informant was a second generation Maghrébine 
(Tunisian) born in Canada. Of the first-generation informants, the largest group was born in 
Algeria (20), followed by Morocco (9), and finally, Tunisia (2). All my informants lived either 
directly on the island of Montréal or in one of its adjacent neighbourhoods, namely Laval. 
Once my year of fieldwork was completed, all 65 interviews were individually 
transcribed and the field journals were compiled into electronic format. Using the GT methods 
that I describe above, I then used the data analysis program NVivo to code and perform analysis 
on all my data. The results of all that data gathering and analyzing are what I present throughout 
this dissertation, especially in chapters 3 through 8. 
 
1.2.4 Important Terminology 
Before I continue, I would like to clarify some of the terms that I use throughout the work. Let 
me first make some preliminary comments about my choice of the word “informant” in my 
work. Spradley suggests that informants are (1) native speakers and (2) a source of information, 
i.e. teachers for the ethnographer.115 Furthermore, work with informants is categorically different 
from work with subjects and respondents. Informants are different from subjects, as, according to 
Spradley, “work with subjects begins with preconceived ideas; work with informants begins with 
a naïve ignorance.”116 Since my relationship with the individuals in the community that I was 
studying began from relative ignorance, as I discuss throughout this chapter, subjects would not 
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be the right term to use. Informants are also different from respondents, according to Spradley. 
Respondents tend to answer surveys or queries using the ethnographer’s language and culture, 
while research with informants depends more fully on the language of the informant.117 While I 
did not conduct my research in Arabic, the maternal language of most of my informants, I did 
not conduct it in English either (my maternal language) but in French, which is the secondary, 
often used, and sometimes maternal language of my informants. 
In searching out my informants I had two criteria for their self-identification: they had to 
claim first or second generation Maghrébine identity and they had to claim Muslim identity in 
some way. Let me describe how I approached both these terms/identities in turn. First, it is 
essential to address what I mean by the term(s) Maghreb(ine). When referring to the Maghreb I 
generally follow the Oxford Dictionary of English definition of the Maghreb as “a region of 
North and NW Africa between the Atlantic Ocean and Egypt, comprising the coastal plain and 
Atlas Mountains of Morocco, together with Algeria, Tunisia, and sometimes Tripolitania.”118 For 
the purposes of my project, Tripolitania is not included and only the three countries of Morocco, 
Algeria and Tunisia comprise what I refer to as the Maghreb. I limit the Maghrébine region to 
these three countries since they were all either protectorates or colonies of France and 
consequently provide the largest numbers of Muslim immigrants to both France and Québec. 
Furthermore, when discussing the Maghreb with my informants these three countries were the 
ones that they mentioned. My informants never included Libya in their definitions or 
understandings of the Maghreb, but always mentioned one/all of the three which I include in my 
definition. In fact, regional identity was quite important to my informants and was often used 
interchangeably with their homeland national identity.  
My informants would sometimes talk about being “Algerian” or “Moroccan” or 
“Tunisian” and sometimes talk about being “Maghrébine.” They would say things like “coming 
from the Maghreb” as a blanket statement, knowing that I was aware of which specific country 
in the Maghreb that they were from. The only times that the distinction became important were 
in brief moments when my informants would speak about the specific recipes that varied across 
the Maghreb. For example, they would make a distinction between Moroccan harira and 
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Algerian chorba (soups commonly made for the iftar during Ramadan). Other than these specific 
differences in national dishes, my informants did not seem to see any problem with using their 
regional and specific national identities interchangeably.  
My use of Maghrébine throughout the text refers to an individual who comes from one of 
the three countries I include in my definition above (Algeria, Morocco or Tunisia), either as a 
first or second generation immigrant, and someone who continues to identify with their 
homeland national identity, regional identity or both. Throughout the text when I refer to 
“Maghrébine identity” I mean either (1) one of the three national identities that make up the term 
Maghrébine (rather than listing all three I use Maghrébine as a blanket term to cover the 
possibility of all three national identities, as my informants did in their interviews), or (2) 
regional identity, which my informants often use interchangeably with their national identities. 
Finally, it is important to address what I mean when I use the term “Muslim” throughout. 
Falling firmly in line with Spradley’s category of “standard ethnography” I attempted as often as 
possible to allow for the concepts and meanings, and definitions for that matter, of my 
informants to permeate the ethnographic description.119 Therefore, I did not impose a specific 
definition of Muslim on to my informants, nor did I ask about, or restrict, the sectarian 
background of my informants.120 In agreement with Baumann, that “by stereotyping informants 
as ‘belonging to’ or even ‘speaking for’ a pre-defined ‘community’, one runs the risk of 
tribalizing people, instead of listening to them, and might end up studying communities of the 
researcher’s own making,”121 I did not look for a specific “kind of Muslim” to interview but 
allowed my informants to define what being a Muslim meant to them.122 
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University	Press,	1996),	8.	
122	Talal	Asad	takes	issue	with	this	kind	of	definition	of	Islam	in	his	“The	Idea	of	an	Anthropology	of	Islam,”	Qui	
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not	help	us	to	understand	any	better;	indeed,	it	proceeds	on	the	basis	that	we	cannot	understand	any	better	since	
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The definitions of what is meant to “be Muslim” were vast and varied.123 Natash Bakht 
states that “many Muslims would be outraged by the contention that one is not a Muslim if one 
does not pray five times a day. They would rightly argue that what it means to be a Muslim 
depends on numerous personal, cultural, and religious choices.”124 As a result, I had informants 
who suggested that being a Muslim meant practicing the five pillars of Islam. Some posited that 
the five pillars were not enough, and one must do more to “be a Muslim,” i.e. fast on other days 
of the year than just Ramadan, pray more than five times a day, study and read the Quran often, 
restrict even more foods than just the commonly understood food restrictions, etcetera. Others 
proposed that it was a born identity, something someone did not choose but simply was, based on 
the circumstances of one’s birth. Others still stated that being Muslim was a cultural identity, one 
that one absorbed from one’s surroundings and enacted as it related to one’s cultural preferences 
and practices. My informants addressed the ideas of “good Muslim” versus “bad Muslim,”125 and 
																																																						
there	is	no-thing	there—which	means:	no	coherent	thing	there—to	be	understood”	(Ahmed,	What	is	Islam?,	269).	
By	allowing	my	informants	to	define	themselves	as	Muslim	in	whatever	way	was	true	them,	it	does	not	mean	that	I	
take	these	definitions	as	the	basis	of	defining	what	Islam	is	as	a	concept.	Instead,	by	including	all	people	who	
labelled	themselves	as	“Muslim,”	no	matter	what	sectarian	background,	ethnic	variation,	or	theological	
understanding	of	that	identity	they	posited,	provides	insight	into	the	many	ways	that	one	can	“be	Muslim.”	
Because	of	this	the	definitions	of	what	it	meant	to	“be	Muslim”	that	my	informants	held	were	vast	and	varied	
which	will	become	obvious	throughout	this	work.		
123	For	an	excellent	exploration	of	the	many	ways	scholars	and	individuals	alike	have	tried	to	define	what	is	“Islam”	
and	consequently	“Muslim”	see	Shabab	Ahmed’s	work,	which	I	mention	in	the	previous	footnote:	What	is	Islam?:	
The	Importance	of	Being	Islamic	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	2016).	In	this	work	Ahmed	presents	the	
various	“conceptualizations	of	Islam—whether	as	religion,	as	culture,	as	civilization,	as	discursive	tradition,	as	core	
beliefs,	as	whatever-Muslims-say-it-is,	as	a	law-centered	phenomenon,	as	so	plural	and	various	as	to	be	“islams-
not-Islam,”	etcetera”	which	he	suggests	have	all	“failed	to	convey	the	fullness	of	the	reality	of	what	it	is	that	has	
actually	been	(and	is)	going	on	in	historical	societies	of	Muslims	living	as	Muslims”	(542).	He	offers	his	own	
conceptualization	of	Islam	“in	terms	that	map	only	the	human	and	historical	reality	wherein	Muslims	have	
authored	and	lived	with	contradictions	as	Islam,”	and	he	seeks	“to	locate	the	logic	of	difference	and	contradiction	
as	coherent	with	and	internal	to	Islam”	(542).	He	also	suggests	that	there	is	a	“mutually	constitutive	relationship	
between	Islam	and	Muslims:	on	how	Islam	makes	Muslims	as	Muslims	make	Islam”	(543).	He	offers	a	definition	of	
“Islam	as	meaning-making	for	the	Self	in	terms	of	Pre-Text,	Text,	and	Con-Text	of	Revelation,”	which	“enables	us	to	
recognize	that	all	acts	and	statements	of	meaning-making	for	the	Self	by	Muslims	and	non-Muslims	that	are	
carried	out	in	terms	of	Islam—that	is,	in	terms	of	any	Pre-Text,	Text,	or	Con-Text—should	properly	be	understood	
as	Islamic”	(544).	
124	Natasha	Bakht,	“Veiled	Objections:	Facing	Public	Opposition	to	the	Niqab,”	in	Reasonable	Accommodation:	
Managing	Religious	Diversity,	ed.	Lori	Beaman	(Vancouver:	UBC	Press,	2012),	97.	
125	For	a	discussion	of	how	these	terms	are	sometimes	used	see	Alexandre	Caeiro,	“Religious	Authorities	or	Political	
actors?	The	Muslim	leaders	of	the	French	representative	body	of	Islam,”	in	European	Muslims	and	the	Secular	
State,	eds.	Jocelyne	Cesari	and	Sean	McLoughlin	(Burlington,	VT:	Ashgate,	2005),	71-84;	Jocelyne	Cesari,	“Islam,	
Secularism	and	Multiculturalism	after	9/11:	A	Transatlantic	Comparison”	in	European	Muslims	and	the	Secular	
State,	eds.	Jocelyne	Cesari	and	Sean	McLoughlin	(Burlington,	VT:	Ashgate,	2005),	39-51.		
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“practicing Muslim” versus “non-practicing/believing Muslim,”126 but there was no consensus as 
to what any of these terms meant. Remarkably, my informants were engaged in various 
“meaning-making” endeavors that had some relationship to the “Pre-Text, Text, or Con-Text” of 
Islam.127 I interviewed any “Muslim” who understood him/herself as “Muslim” within this 
context. 
Furthermore, speaking of “context,” there is one last term I would like to address here: 
“the West.” The “West” is a highly-contested term, with many scholars arguing against the 
binary understanding of “the West” versus any variety of other terms that are so often placed in 
opposition to it. With the advent of Samuel P. Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations, these binaries 
and essentialisms have become problematic. My use of the term throughout the work is mostly 
about a particular orientating location. When speaking of “Islam in the West,” I am referring 
primarily to any manifestation of Islam outside of majority Muslim contexts and within generally 
European, North American or Australian Muslim minority contexts. It has nothing to do with the 
long-held understanding by some that “West” and thus “Westernization” equals “modern” and 
thus “modernization.” 
 
1.3 Subjectivity: The Researcher’s Ethnographic Self 
 
There are some key components to myself as a researcher that inevitably influenced the data that 
I was able to gather during my fieldwork (ethnographic discovery) and on the way that I present 
that data here (ethnographic description).128 Someone with a different background, both personal 
and academic, with a different set of strengths and weaknesses, most likely would have wound 
up with an entirely different set of findings. These personal idiosyncrasies affected how I 
gathered my data, what I paid attention to, what I probed further on, what I missed, etcetera, and 
																																																						
126	This	distinction	can	sometimes	refer	to	the	distinction	between	those	who	practice	AND	believe,	versus	those	
who	don’t	practice	but	still	believe,	OR	between	those	who	practice	but	don’t	believe	and	those	who	don’t	
practice	but	still	believe	(or	don’t,	but	still	see	themselves	as	Muslim),	etcetera.	Bowen	briefly	addresses	the	first	
distinction	in	his	article	“Does	French	Islam	have	Borders?	Dilemmas	of	Domestication	in	a	Global	Religious	Field,”	
American	Anthropologist,	vol.	106,	no.	1	(March	2004):	45,	suggesting	that	how	often	one	prays	is	the	indicator	of	
which	side	of	this	dichotomy	one	falls	on	and	that	labelling	someone	as	“’pratiquant’	often	carries	with	it	an	
implication	of	fanaticism.”	
127	See	Ahmad’s	conceptualization	of	Islam	as	found	especially	in	the	conclusion	to	his,	What	is	Islam,	542-546,	
which	I	describe	in	the	footnote	above.	
128	Spradley	describes	the	difference	between	ethnographic	discovery	and	ethnographic	description	in	Chapter	2	of	
his	The	Ethnographic	Interview	(Belmont,	CA:	Wadsworth,	1979).		
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they affected how I understood that data and consequently communicated it in this ethnographic 
account. It is important to note these identities that I carried with me into the field shaped, and 
were shaped by, my informants throughout this ethnographic endeavour. 
 
1.3.1 Ethnographic self as resource 
Prior to the 1970s the “person or self of the anthropologist remained unseen and mostly 
unheard.”129 The ethnographer was meant to keep him/herself out of the equation as much as 
possible with the hope of maintaining as close to absolute objectivity as possible; this was the 
positivist model. According to Peter Collins and Anselma Gallinat, a paradigm shift occurred 
within the field in the mid-1980s. This shift was from complete separation and consequent denial 
of the role of the researcher self, to a “new self-conscious and critical anthropology.”130 Since the 
time of this paradigm shift, which Collins and Gallinat largely attribute to Writing Culture: The 
Poetics and Politics of Ethnography,131 any ethnographer is quick to note the ways that his/her 
history, background and personality affects his/her research. Still, this transparent self-
consciousness is often relegated to the introduction of the work, and in many cases the 
ethnographic self is left there. The ethnographer acknowledges his or her own particularities, 
stressing the importance of reflexivity, but then the reader never sees him/her again. While I 
address my “self” and its influences on my study in-depth below, I try to incorporate my own 
voice throughout the whole dissertation. I present insights into my life in the field to show how 
my own set of experiences inevitably affected my field work, the collection of my data and 
ultimately the writing up of my ethnography.132 
Before I address those specific elements of my ethnographic self that most strongly 
influenced my work, I would like to make a quick note about memory. Our memories and our 
																																																						
129	Peter	Collins	and	Anselma	Gallinat,	“The	Ethnographic	Self	as	Resource:	An	Introduction,”	in	The	Ethnographic	
Self	as	Resource:	Writing	Memory	and	Experience	into	Ethnography,	eds.	Peter	Collins	and	Anselma	Gallinat	(New	
York:	Berghahn	Books,	2010),	1.	
130	Collins	and	Gallinat,	“Ethnographic	Self:	Introduction,”	3.	
131	The	original	work	to	which	Collins	and	Gallinat	refer	is	James	Clifford	and	George	E.	Marcus,	eds.,	Writing	
Culture:	The	Poetics	and	Politics	of	Ethnography	(Berkeley	and	Los	Angeles:	University	of	California	Press,	1986).	A	
new	edition	was	published	in	2010	with	a	foreword	by	Kim	Furton	which	addresses	the	ways	that	this	book	has	
influenced	the	field	over	the	previous	25	years.	
132	Collins	and	Gallinat	suggest	that	the	experiences	of	the	anthropologist	are	highly	relevant	for	all	stages	of	the	
ethnographic	endeavor.	In	fact,	they	see	the	ethnographic	self	as	“the	incubator	of	ethnography”	(Collins	and	
Gallinat,	“Ethnographic	Self:	Introduction,”	11).	
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ability to remember, or lack thereof, influence our fieldwork experience. As stated by Simon 
Coleman,  
recalling the field and not just fieldwork itself, involves a combination of the 
serendipitous and the structured. The mediations of memory can act as ghosts in the 
ethnographic machine, and these can affect both ethnography as data-gathering process 
(writing down) and ethnography as authorship (writing up).133 
 
In terms of the influence of memory on data-gathering, one’s memories can change one’s 
approach to a given situation. The experience or recall of one site or one ritual can activate 
memories from another. For example, after weeks of preparing the iftar meal with the women at 
the Grande Mosquée in Paris, the memories of these experiences may have clouded my later 
experiences of the iftar preparation. I may not have paid close attention to the intricacies of that 
specific day, acting almost on autopilot fueled by my memory of what the preparation process 
was supposed to look like. Secondly, and more importantly, memory offers some semblance of 
insider status. Coleman suggest that re-entry into a familiar field “implies a movement across 
this threshold from outsider’s to insider’s view as memory of past involvement is engaged.”134 
For example, he describes how going back to a service of the community that he studied flooded 
him with memories of his time in the field and as a result provided him with some comfort and 
familiarity with the situation that he would not normally have had. His memories provided him 
with instructions on what to do and how to behave, making him feel and appear much more like 
an insider than an outsider.  
While I do not have multiple field sites of which to remember, a similar situation arose 
for me when entering the field in Montréal. Having spent six months in a Maghrébine Muslim 
community in Paris, I was familiar with the sights, sounds, tastes and daily rituals of life. These 
memories travelled with me to Montréal and inevitably affected my approach to the community I 
met there. Entering an informant’s home and smelling mint tea, as I discuss in the introduction to 
the Montréal case study, put me at ease and made me feel like an insider from the beginning of 
my time in the field in Montréal; a feeling I did not really experience at all during my time in the 
field in Paris, as I discuss below. I went through the process which Coleman calls “embodied 
forgetting,” in that this “sense of being at home” within the ritual lay latent until it was 
																																																						
133	Coleman,	“On	Remembering,”	216.	
134	Ibid.,	220.	
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“reinvoked, with a jolt, by re-entry into the field.”135 Memory has a real effect on the fieldwork 
experience. 
The other influence that memory can have on an ethnography is in the writing up of that 
project. While ethnographers are often “concerned with how to translate an ‘authentic’ sense of 
‘being there’ to the reader, we can also add that ethnographies also contain tensions linked to 
how ‘being then’ can be worked into a text that may be written many years later.”136 How does 
one effectively communicate what it was like to be in the field, what the informants’ lives were 
actually like, etcetera, when the fluid process of memory making and recall is constantly 
changing? Collins suggests that “narrative memory” is essential in the writing up of ethnography. 
Narrative memory, according to Collins, is the idea that “memory is largely a matter of being 
able to tell the right story at the right time.”137 In fact, he goes on to say that what we hold on to 
in our memories is merely a skeleton of a story that we then tell in the way we want, often 
manipulating our own experiences to fulfil our needs.138  
Given these realities, it is my hope that I have told, not only the “right story,” but the 
story that best reflects my informants’ understanding of their experiences. I do acknowledge, 
though, that my storytelling is inevitably affected by the things that I “remembered,” that seemed 
interesting to me. These memories, the making and recalling of them, were clearly influenced by 
who I am as a person.  
 
1.3.2 Reflexivity/My Ethnographic Self 
First, while no one comes into the field as a completely blank slate, we all bring distinct 
philosophies and theories about life and our work with us, I entered the field with a great deal of 
openness and a general lack of preconceived notions about my subject. I was a new 
ethnographer. Coming from graduate studies in biblical studies, not only was this my first time in 
the field, but the social scientific study of religion and the ethnographic methods that I described 
above were new territory for me. This methodological novelty proved to be both helpful and 
difficult. My newness to the world of fieldwork led to a great deal of insecurity in my early days 
in the field. I struggled with questions of “where do I start? What approach do I take? Will 
																																																						
135	Coleman,	“On	Remembering,”	220.	
136	Ibid.,	215.	
137	Collins,	“The	Ethnographic	Self,”	237.	
138	Ibid.,	238.	
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people think I am not a serious researcher? How do I prove to the communities that I want to 
study that I know what I am doing when I am feeling so lost?” These overwhelming feelings left 
me almost depressed in my first weeks in the field, unable to convince myself to get out and start 
taking the necessary first steps to building rapport with my informants. I am sure that this early 
self-consciousness led to missed opportunities and inevitably shortened my already limited time 
in the field in Paris.  
Despite this self-consciousness, and thanks to helpful conversations with my colleagues, I 
realized that, no matter what you know (or do not know) ahead of time, nothing can fully prepare 
you for the fieldwork experience. Context is key. Every community is different. Every 
underlying history, every cultural context, every researcher adds nuance to the fieldwork 
experience that makes it impossible to fully prepare for what one will experience in the field. 
Reading about a fellow scholar’s study, listening to a conference presentation on the topic, taking 
the best ethnographic fieldwork class in the world, while all valuable for tips and tricks of 
fieldwork, cannot possibly provide a framework and expectation for a specific study in a specific 
context. For example, a study on evangelical youth in a southwestern Ontario university, such as 
Paul Bramadat’s The Church on the World’s Turf,139 is going to look completely different from a 
study on Maghrébine Muslims in Paris and Montréal. So many influencing factors are different, 
and so, while stories of conversion attempts may be familiar and thus encouraging, my response 
to such conversion attempts was going to have to be different than Bramadat’s. I think the 
realization that fieldwork is something that one cannot fully be prepared for, because of the 
absolute unexpected nature of fieldwork, was a helpful one for me to make early on in my 
research in France. No matter what level of training I would have had, it could not have possibly 
prepared me for what I would actually meet on the “ground” so to speak. Once I realized this, I 
could relax into the process a bit more and the daily unexpected events that arose in the field 
provided me comfort in the fact that there really was no preparing for such an experience.  
																																																						
139	Paul	Bramadat,	The	Church	on	the	World’s	Turf:	An	Evangelical	Christian	Group	at	a	Secular	University	(New	
York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2000).	Bramadat’s	work	was	influential	for	me	in	my	early	days	of	learning	about	
ethnography.	His	clear	explanation	of	his	methods	and	personal	experiences	in	the	field	gave	me	an	essential	
insight	into	what	fieldwork	can	look	like.	Furthermore,	Courtney	Bender’s	Heaven’s	Kitchen:	Living	Religion	at	
God’s	Love	We	Deliver	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2003)	was	another	ethnographic	work	from	which	I	
took	many	cues	when	learning	about	what	fieldwork	looks	like	and	how	to	write	up	an	effective	ethnographic	
account.	
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If my experience is any indication, being good at fieldwork is not necessarily about how 
much you know about a particular topic or the training you have to conduct a particular kind of 
research, but about how good you are at relating to people. Furthermore, in line with grounded 
theory methods, I had a blank canvas on which to paint not only my experiences but my method. 
I was not coming in to the field with preconceived notions of how the fieldwork process would 
work, and honestly this worked out in my favour on several occasions. I could build rapport 
much faster with my informants since I was not limiting myself to a particular way of doing 
things. Not knowing how fieldwork was supposed to work allowed me to learn what fieldwork 
is—like not having a definition of religion that we impose on a religious group but allowing 
them to define what religion is for them—and being in the field defined what fieldwork is for 
me.  
The second area in which I approached my research topic with very few preconceived 
notions was in relation to Islam. I am not a classically trained scholar of Islam. While I am 
trained in the tradition, having completed course work on the subject in my undergraduate and 
graduate studies, I was not an expert in the topic when I began my fieldwork. This relative 
unfamiliarity with the religious tradition of my informants provided a fertile ground for learning 
from them exactly what Islam was to them; Spradley suggests this unfamiliarity is beneficial to a 
good ethnographic study. He suggests that isolated societies with which we have absolutely no 
prior contact, knowledge or shared cultural understandings are the ideal setting for ethnographic 
studies because they are settings where “all the assumptions we often share with those we study 
are absent.”140 This lack of expert grounding can allow the researcher to learn more fully from 
the informant. While my informants and I had much in common, including a common secondary 
language that we spoke together,141 my general naïveté about Islam allowed me to function in 
some ways as an ethnographer in a semi-isolated society. I had no detailed, fixed notions about 
what Islam was, or should be, about which food practices were “essentially religious” and which 
were cultural, and therefore my informants could fully teach me about what these things were to 
them in their own terms. 
Similarly, because I am not a scholar of Islam, my informants did not get thrown off by 
my repetition of simple questions about their daily religious lives and practices. My efforts to 
																																																						
140	Spradley,	Ethnographic	Interview,	20.	
141	I	address	the	limitations	of	using	French	as	a	research	language	in	Chapter	9.	
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understand their lives on a simple, everyday basis made sense to them. This also meant that they 
tended to express every little detail about their lives and traditions, knowing that I had not heard 
it before. Just as much as I would not feel the need to explain my understanding of the religious 
reasons behind my Christian practices to a scholar of Christianity, if I had been a scholar of 
Islam my informants may not have felt like they needed to explain things in any real depth to me, 
assuming that I already knew why they would do or believe such and such a thing. Because I did 
not have this scholarly knowledge, and asked questions accordingly, my informants gave rich 
explanations in their own terms about what they understood Islam to be, and what they 
understood Muslim or Maghrébine food practices to be. 
My identity as a religious outsider, then eventually a semi-spiritual-insider, were essential 
aspects of myself that influenced my study as well. I knew going into the field that I was going to 
be seen as an outsider, I am not Muslim after all. What I was not expecting was 1) how much I 
would feel like an outsider, 2) the benefits of being made to feel like a complete outsider, and 3) 
the surprising things that provided me with what I call semi-spiritual-insider status. First, there is 
a difference between telling yourself that you are an outsider because you do not share all of a 
group’s convictions, and actually feeling the fact that you are an outsider. Like I said, I knew I 
was not going to have complete insider status, that I would not understand some of the things 
that happened at the mosque because I am not a follower of Islam, but what I did not know was 
how isolating of an experience it was to be an outsider. I can handle not understanding certain 
rites and rituals. I can handle not following certain conversations. I can handle not experiencing 
things on the same level as an insider might. What was difficult to handle, in Paris in particular, 
was the feeling that my outsider status made me bad, made me on some level not trustworthy, 
made me someone of whom to be suspicious. I had never felt that way in my life. I was not 
prepared to feel that way. This experience constantly led me to question my own morals and 
values. Maybe if I was being treated like an outsider and all the suspicion that goes along side 
that, I might actually be a bad person. It took me a while to acknowledge what was my own 
emotional baggage and what was being put on me because I was not “one of them.”142   
																																																						
142	Collins	and	Gallinat	suggest	that	it	is	in	the	moments	where	we	are	most	uncomfortable,	where	we	feel	at	fault,	
or	we	struggle	with	ourselves	and	others	that	provide	the	fodder	for	our	most	important	insights.	These	moments	
usually	occur	when	we	straddle	cultural	conventions.	Collins	and	Gallinat,	“Ethnographic	Self,”	15.		
	 40	
This othering was happening for very particular reasons and it is important to note that I 
did not feel at all like an outsider when I was in Montréal. Paris was a different story. Despite 
making up a far more significant percentage of the overall population than they do in Canada, 
Muslims in France are seen as an ultimate “other.” Whether it be from the difficult colonial 
history that is made evident by their presence in France, or the challenge that many of their 
practices and beliefs pose to the principle of laïcité that is mentioned daily in media and 
conversation on the street, they are a “they.”143 I heard many stories from friends and informants 
about being made to feel like an outsider by those “non-Muslims” around them. I witnessed with 
my own eyes French women being told to go back to their country simply because they were 
wearing Islamic dress. I saw dear friends of mine being asked if they were disguising 
themselves, being looked upon with looks of disgust simply because you could only see their 
faces. I felt peering eyes and looks of judgement when I wore my veil out of the mosque and on 
the subway on my way home. I had non-Muslim friends look at me with frustration when I 
would arrive to meet up with them in my veil from the mosque and tell me “enlève ça!”144 and 
friends who would be frustrated with me because I was wearing “too much clothing” for the 
season. It was not just women who experienced this prejudice, although their stories were more 
frequent. I also met men who decided to shave their beards because if they kept them people 
would immediately think that they were “dangerous salafists.”145 I had informants tell me that it 
was just easier to shave than to deal with one more thing that made them feel like an outsider. I 
saw constant news reports about the problem of immigration from Muslim countries, about the 
halal food market taking over France and French people having “no other choice” but to eat halal 
and thus support the industry. I heard friends talk about how inappropriate it was to have a 
permanent exhibit on the “art of Islam” open at the Louvre, because it “did not fit with the 
principles of France.” I heard, saw, and read politicians claim that Islam was taking over France 
																																																						
143	I	address	both	France’s	colonial	history	and	its	approach	to	secularism,	laïcité,	in	Chapter	2.	
144	“Take	that	off!”	
145	Jennifer	Selby	explains,	in	her	article	“Islam	in	France	Reconfigured:	Republican	Islam	in	the	2010	Gerin	Report”	
Journal	of	Muslim	Minority	Affairs,	vol.	31,	no.	3	(2011):	383-398,	how	the	term	“Salafism”	has	been	employed	in	
France,	particularly	in	French	politics	and	policy,	as	a	synonym	for	fundamentalist,	extreme,	radical	Islam.	Once	set	
up	in	this	way,	it	is	then	used	as	the	ultimate	representation	of	“otherness”	or	difference	from	French	values.	This	
term	plays	an	important	role	in	discussions	around,	and	legal	projects	involving,	the	banning	of	the	niqab.	She	goes	
on	to	explain	that	while	Salafism	is	not	widespread	in	France,	reports	such	as	the	Gerin	Report	paint	this	tradition	
as	one	that	“must	be	feared	and	contained”	(389).	The	description	above	shows	how	my	informants	interact	with	
and	are	impacted	by	this	kind	of	rhetoric.		
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as was made obvious by the “fact” that Muslim children were stealing chocolate croissants from 
their non-Muslim school mates during Ramadan. Unfortunately, the list of examples of Muslims 
being “othered” in France can go on and on and on. 
I did not witness many of these things right away, though. I did not have conversations 
with Muslims about the prejudice they were experiencing, about how journalists would want to 
talk to them just to get a good story, about how hard or easy it felt to “integrate” into French 
culture, simply because all of this prejudice, the history of feeling on the margins of the French 
society, of not quite fitting in, led most Muslims in France to mistrust anyone who was not a 
Muslim. I had a hard time getting people to talk to me. I struggled with gaining acceptance from 
the people I was meeting. As I started to make inroads people started to use the verb “se méfier” 
to describe Muslim responses to anyone outside of the community. I would hear this word 
multiple times a day, every single day, early on in my work in France, and by the end of my time 
there found myself using it to explain what was going on in the interactions of Muslims with 
non-Muslims in France. I had no idea what the verb viscerally meant at first and people were 
throwing it at me all the time. People would tell me this is why I was having a hard time really 
getting into my work, because Muslims have learned, through many hurtful experiences, to “se 
méfier” of others. I learned that this word meant more than simply “to mistrust” or “to be wary 
of”; it has a gut-wrenching edge to it. This was clearly the lens that I was being viewed through. 
While I understood why, especially after viewing all of the above-mentioned examples, Muslims 
had developed this approach to outsiders, it was sad to see. It was sad, I thought, that people’s 
initial response to someone who wanted to talk to them would be one of suspicion. It was sad 
that no matter how many times I said “je ne suis pas une journaliste” I still sensed that that was 
exactly what many people thought I was.146 It was sad that even after months in a community, 
building up friendships, offering help, and gaining trust and trusting others, that people still 
mistrusted me. While building trust is a hard enough task for any fieldworker, breaking into the 
circle of trust in a community that has “mistrust first” as its motto made for exceptionally 
difficult work.  
																																																						
146	Spradley	suggests	that	the	informant-ethnographer	relationship	is	frequently	confused	with	other	relationships	
(Spradley,	Ethnographic	Interview,	26).	While	some	may	have	to	convince	their	informants	that	they	do	not	work	
for	a	government	agency,	or	the	police	force,	or	any	such	thing,	I	had	to	convince	my	informants	in	France	on	an	
almost	daily	basis	that	I	was	not	a	journalist.	
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Despite how uncomfortable of an experience my religious outsider status continued to be 
for me throughout my six months in Paris, it was an exceptionally beneficial fieldwork 
experience to have. As someone who studies an “othered” group, a group that is viewed as 
“outsiders” and feels like “outsiders” in their current setting, it was a valuable experience to feel 
that myself. To feel the confusion of not being able to follow a conversation, to feel like my 
outsider/other status made me not as good from the get-go, to feel like even after putting a lot of 
effort forward I was still not quite “one of them” was all eye opening for me. It helped me to 
gain even the slightest bit of empathy for the daily experiences that immigrants and especially 
marginalized immigrants have in their host countries. In the moments when I wanted to cry, 
when I did cry, I tried to hold on to those feelings and use them to understand my informants 
better. Once I got to the interview stage of my research these experiences helped to add a depth 
of understanding to my informants’ responses about integration and accommodation, identity and 
need for community that I would not have been able to really grasp had I not struggled through 
similar issues in my attempt to get into the community in Paris. Empathy is key to understanding, 
and while I could not empathize with the actual details of the tradition, this experience of being 
“othered” allowed me to empathize at least on some level.147 
Since I was not a Muslim, I could not participate in some of the rituals, and thus missed 
out on some opportunities to observe and listen to what people had to say about their food 
practice in the early days in the field. Slowly but surely, though, I was able to break down some 
of those barriers and be brought into the community on a deeper level. I found fairly early that 
there were things that helped me to gain access to the community in ways that others probably 
could not. While I was technically a religious outsider, there were things that gave me semi-
spiritual-insider status in the community. The most significant of my identities which seemed to 
have the greatest effect on bringing down the “outsider” persona was my Christian identity. 
Upon meeting me people would ask if I was a Muslim. I anticipated that this would happen and 
wondered how best to respond to this inquiry. I knew ahead of time that my religious identity 
would most likely help rather than hinder my position in the community, so I would say no and 
explain that I was a Christian. My preconceived notion proved to be correct: my Christianity 
																																																						
147	I	do	not	want	to	equate	my	brief	experiences	of	feeling	like	an	outsider	to	the	real	struggle	that	many	of	my	
informants	go	through	on	a	daily	basis	in	their	lives	in	France	and	Québec.	For	some	the	experience	is	mild,	much	
like	mine,	while	for	others	their	experiences	of	being	“othered”	are	pervasive,	overwhelming	and	sometimes	even	
violent	(both	emotionally	and	physically).		
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gave me some level of spiritual street credibility. I belonged to the people of the book, I was not 
that far off from truth, there was hope for my soul, and there was a conversion possibility.148 I 
discovered quickly that if I had not been a “person of the book” I probably would not have been 
given the same initial access, or the depth of access that I was granted. Sharing the basic 
understanding of one God, sharing the same basic spiritual history, gave me an immediate boost 
in trust points. I was not fully an insider but I was also not completely an outsider.  
I wonder if some of the importance placed on my Christian identity came from the fact 
that we were in France, in a country where people were either not religious or would at least not 
talk about their own faith convictions with strangers. My openness to talk about this made me 
more like my Muslim informants who tended to be quite open about their religious identity, often 
wearing symbols of it on their heads, in a culture which is generally not open about such things. 
It was always interesting to me to see how people, usually in the mosque, would respond to me 
when I was being introduced to them and how my introducer would respond in turn. After 
answering that I was not a Muslim, and getting a somewhat negative look in return, my 
introducer would often retort on my behalf with “but she is a practicing Christian” and the tone 
would immediately change. Shoulders would relax, conversation would continue normally, and I 
would be “allowed” to stay. Throughout my fieldwork I struggled with how much to use my own 
spirituality as a way in to the community. I ended up not thinking about it too much and allowing 
myself to answer naturally, not lying at any point—and if that helped me, then so be it. 
To this point in the discussion, in relation to my identity as a religious outsider/semi-
spiritual-insider I have primarily addressed the Paris side of my fieldwork. The noteworthy point 
to be made here is that these aspects of my own religious life/identity had a different effect on 
my work in Montréal. While I had to struggle with my outsider identity in the community in 
Paris, even while gaining some “spiritual street cred” by being Christian, my different religious 
identity was never an issue for the community in Montréal. I was granted full access to people 
and rituals right from the beginning of my time in the field in Montréal. While the door was open 
for me from the beginning, my Christian identity granted me semi-spiritual-insider status in this 
community as well.  
																																																						
148	These	were	various	responses	that	informants	professed	when	hearing	about	my	Christianity,	or	responses	that	
became	obvious	over	time	spent	in	the	field.	
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Again, in a context like Québec where religion is sometimes presented as problematic 
and often presented as fully private, my willingness to talk about my own faith provided a 
rapport between myself and my informants from the beginning. They too would ask if I was 
Muslim, and they too were pleased when I responded with my Christian identity. While in 
France my religious identity simply provided the ground for some level of trust to be present, in 
Montréal my Christianity not only helped to build trust, but also allowed me to engage in much 
deeper strains of theological conversation with my informants. My informants were interested in 
learning about Christianity and thus would spend hours with me discussing the similarities and 
differences between the two traditions. These moments of interfaith dialogue between my 
informants and me inevitably led to me getting a longer, and deeper glance into their daily lives, 
not to mention many more dinner invitations. 
The final identity that influenced my data collection and writing is my identity as a 
woman. There are two aspects of this identity that I feel are important to present here. First, 
because this study is a study of food, and food is often the domain of women, I, as a woman, was 
able to gain access to places and events that a male researcher would not have been able to 
access. While men came in and out of the kitchen at the Grande Mosquée in Paris, the 
preparation and cooking of the iftar meal during Ramadan was understood as women’s work. I 
easily fit in to this setting. In Montréal, during my many visits to informants’ homes, I was 
invited in to the kitchen to see the food preparation in action, something that my male colleagues 
would not have been able to do given the cultural constraints placed on gender interactions in 
this community. Furthermore, because of some understandings of, and approaches to, gender and 
sexuality among some of my informants, I was able to conduct interviews with both women and 
men, again an option that would not necessarily have been open to a male ethnographer.  
Conversely, because I was a woman, I did not necessarily have equal access to men’s 
experiences. For example, at various iftars during the month of Ramadan (not all) and at the 
celebration of the Eid al-adha that I attended in Montréal, the men celebrated/ate in another room 
in the home. Since I am a woman, it was expected that I would stay with the women, so I do not 
know what kind of experience the men were having during these celebrations. I was told it would 
have followed a similar pattern to the women, but I missed out on the conversations that were 
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had around the table; consequently, my participant observations of these moments are highly 
skewed to the female perspective.149 
The other aspect of my identity as a woman that influenced my ethnographic experience 
is the role of sexuality in the ethnographic process. I knew that gender issues would come up in 
my fieldwork, that being a woman was going to affect my work in specific ways, as I discussed 
above, but I did not expect sexuality to play such a large role in my work. I even expected, given 
what others had told me, that I would receive some marriage proposals but did not think that I 
would receive the kind and number of proposals I did. Unfortunately, my Paris fieldwork 
experience was not the first time I came across the issue of having to let someone down gently 
and carefully to not affect my future research. When I was in Paris earlier, in 2010, to lay the 
groundwork for what would become my dissertation fieldwork, an Algerian journalist took quite 
the liking to me and took advantage of my vulnerable position and my eagerness to get to know 
the community in order to attempt to grow closer to me. He knew people of influence in the 
community, and just as easy as he could open those doors for me he could also close them off. I 
can remember feeling off, feeling like I may be in a dangerous situation, but having to tread 
carefully with how I refused his advances because I was afraid he would destroy my chances of 
researching in the community before they even began. I hated that I had to deal with that. I hated 
that I felt like I had to almost take the abuse because I did not want to lose out on data and 
connections. I hated that I was in a position that made me feel beyond uncomfortable, even 
violated. As seen in Gwen Sharp and Emily Kremer’s article “The Safety Dance: Confronting 
Harassment, Intimidation, and Violence in the Field,” this problem is especially prevalent for 
novice researchers who are “often more concerned with their methodology and response rate 
than ensuring their own safety.”150 I can remember hearing the voices of imagined fellow 
academics and professors in my head convincing me that getting the data was the most important 
thing—more important than my gut telling me to get out of there. 
Those feelings of unease arose again during my fieldwork in Paris when I received a 
marriage proposal from someone who held a very important role within the community I was 
studying. Although I was not afraid for my safety like the first time, I still felt like I needed to be 
																																																						
149	I	was	able	to	attend	a	couple	of	iftars	in	Montréal	where	the	men	and	women	ate	and	celebrated	together	as	a	
family,	which	provided	me	with	some	insight	and	access	to	the	men’s	experiences	of	these	important	events.	
150	Gwen	Sharp	and	Emily	Kremer,	“The	Safety	Dance:	Confronting	Harassment,	Intimidation,	and	Violence	in	the	
Field,”	Sociological	Methodology,	vol.	36	(2006):	321.	
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especially careful with how I would turn down this proposal in order to protect all of the work 
that I had put into my fieldwork over the preceding month. I wanted to respond with a laugh and 
a “are you serious? You cannot propose to someone after only knowing them for a month!” But 
instead I had to watch my words, and feign interest. If I offended this person I could very well 
lose everything that I had built towards. He could turn the entire community against me, could 
make it impossible for me to continue there and need to start over somewhere else. Having 
already spent a great deal of time in the community building rapport and connections, starting 
over was simply not an option for me. His proposal made me appreciate that I had not fully 
realized that the sexuality and relational impulses of my interviewees could affect my work in 
such a way. It is quite possible that because this man was interested in me I was able to gain 
access that I would not normally get. It would have also been possible that, if I had offended him 
in my refusal, all my access would go away. A broken heart is bad in any circumstance and can 
lead the broken hearted to react in harsh ways. I remember being frustrated that I had to deal 
with such a thing. Of course I was flattered, flattered that someone of such status, who could 
propose to any one, would ask me, an outsider, but I was upset that I had to be so careful with 
my response. I was aggravated that I had to think hard about how to express honestly my refusal 
without offending. I was discouraged by the idea that my male colleagues most likely never had 
to deal with such problems. I was annoyed that the idea of possible marriage proposals was a 
joke to many people, something funny and not to be taken too seriously. I remember hearing 
comments from colleagues and friends alike “it might not have been a serious proposal,” “he was 
probably just trying to compliment you,” “I’m sure he wasn’t trying to make you 
uncomfortable,” etcetera. I was irritated that people seemed to think that it was his intentions that 
seemed to matter, not how they made me feel. I was frustrated that they presumed to tell me that 
I got it wrong, that I was being too sensitive, that it could not possibly have been that tough. I 
was bothered that in my academic career I was dealing with what felt like a version of the 
slut/prude paradox that many young women face. If I was harsh and closed off I may not have 
gained access to certain experiences, but at the same time, if I had used my sexuality to my 
advantage there would be another ethical dilemma at hand. 
I do wonder how much of this issue of sexuality and the slut/prude paradox relates to my 
specific situation though. I was a young, seemingly unattached, Western woman researching 
highly male dominant communities where marriage is exceptionally important. If I were a man I 
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probably would not face the same level of advances. If I were an older woman, or a woman 
whose husband was always with her, would it have been the same? Regardless, even though I 
can reason why this may have been the case, it still led to complicated situations that I had to 
navigate in the field. Not only were marriage proposals an uncomfortable situation that arose 
within my fieldwork, but the feeling of being flirted with, and in some circumstances harassed 
were also present. At first I wondered why I was getting a better response rate from men than 
from women, whom I or my previous interviewees approached for an interview. Topics that 
would not come up for others in the field came up often in my work, especially with men. My 
relationship status, my thoughts on marriage, my physical appearance, etcetera, were constantly 
questioned and commented on.  
A significant problem in our field, and many others for that matter, is that there is no 
upfront training in how to be safe in the field. Sexual and emotional safety is a topic we seem to 
ignore, or are too afraid, or perhaps too embarrassed, to talk about. I remember many instances 
of feeling exceptionally uncomfortable but pushing myself through the interview any way to get 
the “much needed data,” because I thought that was the most important thing. That was what was 
emphasized in my dissertation proposal defense, that is what is emphasized in conversations 
about our research process. I was able to find some suggestions of how to avoid such danger, but 
not until after the fact, once I knew that my safety had already been compromised and I wanted 
to figure out if I was the only one that had experienced such a thing. That being said, the 
suggestions that are out there of how to avoid said danger are not always helpful either way.151 
The suggestion to dress conservatively not only reinforces the “blame the victim” attitude, but in 
my case it made no difference at all. Dressing conservatively, even veiling, did not help me. This 
often led to more comments being made about “how beautiful” I was. Other suggestions about 
making sure other researchers know where you are, that you are in contact with members of the 
research team, etcetera, do not help those field workers who are alone in the field, quite possibly 
in another country. 
It is fascinating to me that our ethics forms ask what are the risks to our informants but 
not to us as researchers. Furthermore, we tell our interviewees that they can end the interview at 
any time, but we do not necessarily know this to be true for ourselves as well. I did not know this 
																																																						
151	To	see	a	summary	of	some	of	the	various	suggestions	that	have	been	made	for	staying	safe	in	the	field,	
including	a	list	of	realistic	strategies	that	the	authors	present,	see	Sharp	and	Kremer,	“Safety	Dance,”	324-326.	
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was really an option for me until I got home and read Sharp and Kremer’s work. Trusting your 
gut in the field is essential. When I was with the Algerian journalist I knew it was wrong. His 
physical advances were wrong, but my fear of losing out won over my gut feeling that I was in 
danger. This is problematic.  
Not only did the sexuality and relational desires of my informants have an influence on 
my work, but my own sexuality did as well. While my own interests seemed to be generally kept 
at bay, I could not help but notice how my tone and approach changed a bit when interviewing 
men versus women. Almost innately, in the presence of a strong male character or an attractive 
one, I would somewhat revert to a slightly meek, more giggling version of myself. I did not 
notice this in the moment, but could hear it when I listened back to my recorded interviews. Why 
did this happen? Did that affect my data? Did I ever allow myself to be distracted by attraction 
and subsequently not probe into responses to my questions enough? Or did I ask more questions 
and extend the interview out of sheer interest to keep talking to the attractive person on the other 
side of the cafe table? When dealing with other humans, when placed in close quarters over long 
periods of time with them, when experiencing highly emotional and personal moments with 
them, when talking about important and stimulating topics with them, closeness and attraction 
seems almost inevitable. The question becomes how to address this inevitability and to create 
healthy and safe environments in which to do our work. Sometimes I feel like we think that as 
researchers we can check our humanity at the door and not have such things affect us, but the 
truth of the matter is that we cannot. We cannot leave our identities at the door, but we must be 
aware of them, and acknowledge the potential effect that these identities might have on the 
outcome of our work.152 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
152	For	matters	of	space	I	cannot	fully	address	some	of	the	other	identities	that	influenced	my	work	in	the	field.	
Another	interesting	one	that	I	will	mention	briefly	here	was	my	Canadian/non-Québécois	identity.	In	France,	my	
identity	as	a	Canadian	helped	to	separate	me	from	the	what	my	informants	saw	as	the	unaccepting,	racist,	and	
judgemental	French	majority	population.	Not	only	that,	but	it	placed	me	outside	of	the	realm	of	laïcité,	and	in	my	
informants’	eyes	firmly	within	the	multicultural	camp;	being	Canadian	was	a	beneficial	identity	claim.	Similarly,	
being	a	non-Québécois	Canadian	was	also	beneficial	for	me	in	my	Montréal	fieldwork.	My	informants	saw	me	as	a	
fellow	“outsider,”	as	someone	trying	to	figure	out	how	to	function	within	intercultural	Québec.	
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1.4 Summary of the Dissertation 
 
In the chapters that follow I attempt to answer the questions: How can food act as a means of 
reimagining, recreating, reaffirming, and expressing, sometimes complicated and contested 
identities for minority immigrant communities in highly secular contexts? Does food emerge as a 
more “politically/culturally correct” avenue for religious expression than other religious 
practices? In secular contexts, where public signs of religiosity are often seen as problematic, 
could subtler/more private expressions of religious identity help the minority religious immigrant 
to engage with and express their identities in meaningful ways? Additionally, in contexts like 
France and Québec, which have strong and distinct food cultures, by taking up some of the 
foodways of the host context, and/or leaving some of the home food practices that are seen as 
especially in conflict with the host context behind (i.e. the restriction on alcohol and pork), could 
minority immigrants claim and demonstrate their Québécois/French side of their transnational 
identity? Would they even want to? If they did, how would “French/Québécois Maghrébine 
Muslim immigrants” create and maintain their hybrid transnational identities in contexts that are 
seemingly hostile toward them because of those societies’ unique and complex histories and 
interactions with colonialism, immigration, secularism, and nationalism? 
My study shows not only that the host contexts have unique histories and interactions 
with “the other” but that “the others” also have unique responses to these contexts. Québec is not 
a mini-France, as some may assume, and there is no unified way that Muslims across or even 
within cultures and contexts respond to the challenges to identity that they face.  
While the way my informants negotiated these identities was remarkably diverse, I 
demonstrate how food played a significant role in all of their negotiations; food was often the 
most important symbol of those identities, whatever those identities were. By highlighting food 
and foodways I show the importance of lived, everyday religious practice as a means of creating 
and maintaining transnational identity for minority immigrant communities in highly secular 
contexts. Food is often a more “politically/culturally correct” avenue for religious expression 
because of the malleability of categorizing a foodway as cultural rather than religious, and the 
general private (versus public) nature of foodways. In contexts such as Paris and Montréal, 
	 50	
where outward/public signs of religiosity are often seen as problematic,153 and food culture is 
central to national identity, these kinds of actions may take on importance for the minority 
immigrant individuals living in these cities.  
In this chapter I addressed the why, what and who of this project. I began with a brief 
overview of the foundational works on Muslims in France and Canada which oriented the 
development of this project. I presented the kinds of questions, gaps and calls for research in this 
field which my work directly addresses. I then discussed what I am calling my philosophy of 
religion and religious studies. I see religion as a means of making sense of the world/one’s life 
and I believe that people engage in this sense-making in their everyday lived practices which 
help them to both “make homes and cross boundaries.” Because of this, I believe that one can 
gain significant insight into how people make sense of their worlds, their often conflicting, 
uncomfortable, difficult worlds, by examining the “stuff” of people’s lives, specifically food. In 
this I showed how this dissertation expands upon the field of lived religion and Tweed’s 
definition of religion to explore religion and movement specifically through the lens of food. 
Next I turned to a brief explanation of my academic background in the study of religion to show 
how I was uniquely situated to undertake this work. Throughout this dissertation it will become 
clear how my training in religious studies, textual studies, interreligious dialogue and religious 
diversity in North America helped me to understand the religious lives of my informants and 
even helped me in my field work. I then described my broad methodology, and the methods I 
employed to enact this methodology. In this I presented my approach to and understanding of 
ethnography as a means of learning from one’s informants in their own words, and outlined the 
Grounded Theory methods that I used in my field work and analysis. I also briefly addressed 
																																																						
153	Both	France	and	Québec	have,	in	the	recent	past,	proposed	or	implemented	various	laws	to	ban	the	wearing	of	
religious	symbols	in	public	spaces.	In	France	there	was	the	2004	ban	of	the	headscarf,	along	with	crosses	and	
turbans	and	other	symbols	of	religious	identification	in	state	schools	in	France,	as	well	as	the	2011	ban	on	the	
niqab	in	all	public	places.	Recently,	the	French	Prime	Minister	suggested	that	the	headscarf	should	also	be	banned	
in	universities	(it	is	not,	at	the	time	of	this	writing,	banned	in	university	settings).	In	Québec,	in	2013	the	then	PQ	
government,	under	the	leadership	of	Premier	Pauline	Marois,	proposed	the	now	infamous	“Charter	of	Québec	
Values”	(Bill	60).	This	Charter	would	ban	the	wearing	of	overly	conspicuous	religious	symbols,	i.e.	the	kippah,	
turban,	hijab,	or	large	crosses,	for	public-sector	employees,	such	as	teachers,	nurses,	doctors,	civil	servants	and	
police	officers.	Bill	60	was	never	implemented	in	the	province,	as	Marois	called	an	election	and	lost,	but	its	ripple	
effects	are	evident	in	the	province.	In	2015,	Liberal	leader	Philippe	Couillard	proposed	a	new	religious	neutrality	
legislation	in	Bill	62.	In	this	Bill,	reminiscent	of	Bill	94	which	was	tabled	in	2010,	people	giving	and	receiving	public	
services	would	need	to	have	their	faces	uncovered,	making	the	niqab	and	burka	banned	in	these	contexts.	Overall,	
overt	symbols	of	religious	identification	are	problematic	in	both	of	these	contexts.	
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James P. Spradley’s ethnographic interview structure, with which my interviews fell in line. 
After presenting the specific details of my ethnographic study in Paris and Montréal, I addressed 
three important terms that I use throughout this work: informant, Maghreb(ine) and Muslim. I 
finished this chapter by describing my ethnographic self which was, and continues to be, in 
constant communication with my informants and data. 
I break the body of the dissertation into two parts: 1) the Parisian case study, and 2) the 
Montréal case study. Comparative studies which are situated in two, or more, distinct cultural 
settings inevitably provide insight into the ways that context affects individuals and communities 
living therein. While I was expecting minor differences between the experiences of my Paris 
informants and my Montréal informants because of this fact, I could not have predicted how 
different their experiences would be. Because of this, it is essential to describe the cultural and 
historical contexts within which my informants were living their transnational lives. Chapters 2 
and 6 directly address this issue by presenting the unique histories of both France and Québec in 
relation to four essential topics that influence a study such as this, namely, colonialism, 
immigration, secularism and nationalism. 
In Chapter 2 I present France’s colonial history in the Maghreb and show how that 
history leads to a wide variety of “colonial memories,” or lack thereof, present in France today. 
These colonial memories have both negative and positive effects on the relationship between 
Maghrébine Muslim immigrant communities and the non-immigrant, non-Muslim majority 
French population (which can be worked out in the realm of food). I then go on to explore the 
immigration history of Maghrébines to France showing how this history sets the stage for a 
variety of conflations of terms in France, i.e. “immigrant” with “Muslim,” “Muslim” with 
“Maghrébine,” and vice versa. These conflations often lead to the immigrant individual feeling a 
great deal of pressure to show how he/she is different from these identities and falls in line with 
the secular national identity in France.  
These two terms, secular and national, orient the second half of Chapter 2. I present 
France’s understanding of secularism, namely, laïcité, and describe both the strict and soft forms 
of laïcité. I argue that, because of France’s approach to secularism, the Muslim immigrant in 
France may find him/herself under more pressure to label religious food practices as cultural 
food practices in order to not offend the secularist sentiments that rule the nation. Finally, I close 
this chapter by investigating what it means to “be French” as well as who is seen as having 
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access to this national identity. I suggest that food and drink, specifically wine drinking, are 
particularly important aspects of the unified culture that is essential to the Republican national 
tradition. I question if individuals or communities who do not engage in these essential national 
identity practices can really claim that identity, e.g. can a Muslim who does not drink wine really 
“be French?” Thus, I conclude this chapter with an exploration of the concept “French Islam.” I 
posit that ultimately having a “French Islam” leads to hyphenated identities for those who claim 
membership in this group. This hyphenation often leads to conflict arising out of the pressure 
from both sides to prioritize each side over the other.  
In the next three chapters I present the results from my ethnographic case study in Paris. 
Each chapter explores one significant theme that arose out of my Parisian data. In Chapter 3, I 
address the spectrum of approaches to identity consolidation taken by the Maghrébine Muslim 
community in Paris, and the role that food plays in these negotiations. Chapter 4 investigates the 
presence and influence of transnationalism on my informants. I argue that food can serve as the 
symbol par excellence of both similarity and difference between “us” and “them,” and can 
consequently be used by the immigrant to aid in or detract from their “integration” into the 
French culture. Finally, Chapter 5 presents an overview of the ways that my informants practice 
their religion every day in a relatively secular France, and address how they justify these 
seemingly problematic practices in light of French laïcité. In this chapter I show how my 
informants’ attitudes toward their food practice change depending on whether they understand 
and label a given practice as cultural or religious.  
Overall, in these three case study chapters I show a glimpse into the varied and complex 
approaches to daily life that are present in the Maghrébine community in Paris and how their 
approach to their food practices changes or remains consistent with what they did in the 
homeland. I challenge simplistic notions of Muslim identity formation in France. This case study 
shows how my informants’ food practices reveal that categories of “good and bad Muslim,” 
“practicing or believing,” simply do not cover the diverse identities present in this immigrant 
location. 
Part 2 takes a similar structure to Part 1, with one historical/contextual chapter, followed 
this time by two case study chapters. Chapter 6 takes the identical structure to Chapter 2, 
providing an overview of the impact of colonialism, immigration, secularism and nationalism on 
the Québécois context within which my Montréal informants live. While Québec did not play a 
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colonizing role in North Africa, as France did, its own identity as a “colonized nation” imparts 
essential characteristics to the Québécois context; characteristics that lead to symbols of 
Québécois identity taking root, namely, religion (and eventually secularism) and the French 
language. Because of this history, any individual or community which differs from either of 
these identities is seen as threatening and unwelcome in the eyes of the majority Québécois 
population. I then go on to present the immigration patterns and history of Muslims to Canada, 
and then specifically to Québec. I address the reasons that Maghrébine Muslims have immigrated 
to Québec, alongside the distinct immigration policies in the province that have clear 
consequences for this community, specifically the emphasis on the French language.  
In my attempt to address Québécois secularism I present what church/state relations 
looked like in the province before 1960 (Catholicism had a prominent role in Québec politics and 
culture), the Quiet Revolution, the Bouchard-Taylor Commission, rigid versus open secularism 
and Québec’s unique approach to multiculturalism, which is called interculturalism. Because of 
Québec’s intercultural approach to laïcité I argue that while the province is seen as a highly 
“secular” setting, religious minorities in the province do maintain a great deal of freedom to 
practice their religious traditions and live out their religious identities, leading to less pressure to 
alter such practices. In this context, specific foodways take on added cultural and religious 
importance.  
I close this chapter with an examination of Québécois nationalism and national identity. 
The fact that there is a common national culture with which any immigrant is expected to 
interact, and be changed by, à la interculturalisme, makes the situation in Québec distinctive in 
Canada. I argue that that common national culture is based on the French language and a secular 
mindset. Maghrébine Muslim immigrants in Québec, who are by and large French-speaking 
thanks to the immigration policies present in the province, feed into one aspect of the Québec 
common culture; but they are also seen as a threat to the secular characteristic of that common 
culture. I respond “both yes and no” to the question: Can a Maghrébine Muslim living in Québec 
claim both sides of a potential “Québécois(e) Muslim” identity? 
The following two chapters examine the experiences of my informants through the 
exploration of three themes: identity, transnationalism and practice. Chapter 7 reviews the 
various ways that my informants identify themselves, interact with, and present those identities 
through their food practice in Montréal. I show how, in line with the idea that “everyone is an 
	 54	
immigrant in Canada” and it is the origins that make you different that ultimately make you fit 
with the national identity, my informants would stress their Maghrébine identity in word and 
action. Food plays an important role in defining and presenting my informants’ Maghrébine 
identity; it is part of the communal identity that must be protected. Religious identity is also 
essential for my Montréal informants; it was an actively chosen identity made up of the things of 
everyday. Food played a vital role in one’s religious identity; in fact, in this chapter, I show how 
in Montréal my informants often felt the need to “go further” in their practice, to go beyond the 
traditional Muslim food practices in order to demonstrate their Muslim identity in this context. 
After discussing all these various identities that my informants claim, I then address how my 
informants see themselves as holding different identities from the non-Maghrébine/Muslim 
Québécois(es) that surrounded them: there is a distinct “us” and “them,” and food is the realm 
within which my informants demonstrated these identity differences. I show how food can also 
act as a powerful means of bridging the gap, often perceived as being larger than it actually is, 
between these different communities.  
In the second section of Chapter 7 I investigate the many ways in which my informants 
attempt to bridge the transnational gap between homeland and host land. I show how my 
informants use specific foods and food practice to help gain access to both sides of their 
transnational identity. They use food to access memory and consequently recreate “home” in the 
host land. They also engaged in food practices that allow them to tap into the host land side of 
their transnational identity; they prepare and consume “Québécois” food. I then present the idea 
that food can be a tool that both sides use to aide in the process of immigrant integration.  
Chapter 8 addresses how my informants defined, and consequently interacted with, 
culture and religion through their food practices. When considering food practice the lines 
between these two categories often become quite blurry. By examining the specific foodways 
that make up the four categories of food practice that I explore in both Chapter 5 and Chapter 8, I 
show how an individual’s understanding of a practice as cultural or religious will alter his/her 
interaction with it. My informants would not shy away from labelling a practice religious, but 
would almost always give another, more scientific, or logical reason for why they engaged in 
such exercises. True to Québec interculturalism, my informants kept their religious identities but 
also adjusted them, and their reasoning and understanding of them, to fit into the common 
culture of Québec. 
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I return to some of the overarching themes of this dissertation in Chapter 9, the 
conclusion. After briefly outlining those themes, I compare the data that I collected in Paris and 
Montréal, to show the effect of context, which I outlined in Chapters 2 and 6, on the immigrant 
experience of my informants. I show how differences in the host land’s approach to nationalism 
leads to significant differences in the desire/ability of my informants to claim French/Québécois 
national identity. Consequently, often as a direct result of this national contextual disparity, I 
show how my informants interact differently with the concepts of religion and culture in Paris 
and Montréal. I then explore the real practical impact of these differences on some of the 
everyday lived religious/cultural practices of my informants. I close this section of Chapter 9 by 
examining one of the similarities that are found in both my Paris and Montréal data set, namely 
the use of logic to support one’s religious food practices.  
After this I acknowledge some of the limitations of my study: access to the communities 
and time in the field, not knowing the home context of my informants, using a research language 
that is not my native language (as well as the second language of many of my informants), and 
limitations in method such as the snowball method of sampling.  
I then take an unusual turn and discuss the scholarly context within which I situate my 
work. This situating work came at the end of my dissertation process, after I had collected, 
analysed and written my ethnography, and as I noted earlier, I therefore place it at the end of the 
dissertation itself. In this section I critique and commune with significant players in the fields of 
religion and migration, and food and religion.  
I close Chapter 9, and the dissertation, with the proposal of possible future avenues of 
research which largely emerge from the time and contextual limitations of my ethnographic 
fieldwork. The contexts in which my research takes place ultimately influence the kind of lived 
Islam which I encountered on the ground in both Paris and Montréal. By comparing these two 
distinct contexts through the lens of food practice I present the colourful and complicated picture 
of the everyday lives of Muslims in “Multicultural Montréal” and the “Secular City of Lights” 
(Paris). 
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PART 1: Everyday Islam in the City of Lights 
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Chapter 2: Colonialism, Immigration, Secularism and Nationalism: The Four Influential 
Factors of the Parisian Context of Reception154 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
It was the first week of my fieldwork in France and I was settling in to the city and situating 
myself as a young ethnographer in a foreign land. Within the first few days I had already had 
multiple conversations with my French friends, and their friends, about my research. Everywhere 
I looked, every conversation I had, I was reminded why I was there; there was clearly something 
complicated and notable happening in France in regards to the Muslim population living there. 
Within the first four days I had experienced both blatant and subtle expressions of racism and 
prejudice against people of Arab, and particularly Maghrébine, background. I had witnessed an 
uncomfortable situation in a cell phone shop where a man came in and made a scene, only for the 
people around me to quickly label him as an Arab, understood Muslim, before any other 
descriptive word, once he was out of the store. I had conversations with my non-Muslim French 
friends who spoke clearly about the “problem” of third generation Maghrébine youth in France. I 
had seen multiple posters in the Metro system imploring Muslims to “go home,” alongside more 
subtle posters promoting pieces of theatre which explored the Muslim “problem,” or propaganda 
against halal.155 I overheard multiple conversations on the train or in restaurants over dinner 
about “them” trying to take over France. Within four days it became clear to me that something 
was happening in France that was different than other places I had been, that caused a setting that 
would inevitably affect my potential informants. It was clear—on the ground, and not just from 
																																																						
154	I	use	the	term	“context	of	reception”	in	line	with	other	scholars	of	religion	and	migration	to	refer	to	destination	
societies,	or	host	societies/communities.	Specifically,	Wendy	Cadge	et	al.,	“Religious	Dimensions	of	Contexts	of	
Reception:	Comparing	Two	New	England	Cities,”	International	Migration	vol.	51,	no.	3	(2013):	84-98;	Philip	Connor,	
“Introduction,”	International	Migration	vol.	51,	no.	3	(2013):	1-7;	Philip	Connor,	Immigrant	Faith:	Patterns	of	
Immigrant	Religion	in	the	United	States,	Canada	and	Western	Europe	(New	York	and	London:	New	York	University	
Press,	2014);	Margarita	Mooney,	“Religion	as	A	Context	of	Reception:	The	Case	of	Haitian	Immigrants	in	Miami,	
Montréal	and	Paris,”	International	Migration	vol.	51,	no.	3	(2013):	99-112.	
155	Halal	is	an	Arabic	term	meaning	“permissible.”	While	in	the	case	of	Islamic	food	practice	halal	can	refer	to	all	
permissible	foods,	it	is	often	understood	by	outsiders	to	refer	solely	to	permissible	meat,	i.e.	meat	that	has	been	
slaughtered	according	to	the	rules	and	rituals	of	the	Islamic	tradition.	In	my	interviews	with	my	informants	we	
often	made	the	distinction	between	halal	and	halal	meat	to	be	clear	which	meaning	of	the	term	we	were	referring	
to.	
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my previous readings—that something, or some things, in France’s history had led to this type of 
outworking of prejudice that seemed to be present.   
Before I can present the findings from my ethnographic study it is important to situate my 
research in specific histories and contexts, which will inevitably influence how my data is 
presented and viewed. More importantly, it is essential to know the background context with 
which my informants are interacting in their daily lives. To understand what food practice may 
reveal about individual identities and integration efforts one must understand the historical and 
cultural contexts that set the stage for these negotiations for any immigrant community. The 
focus of this chapter is the specific history and context of France as it relates to the Maghrébine 
Muslim immigrants of my study.156 France’s unique history and interaction with colonization, 
immigration, secularism and nationalism all have a significant impact on any French citizen 
living in the Republic today, but even more so on the country’s immigrant population, especially 
people arriving from North Africa.157 The French context is a particularly remarkable one in 
regards to Islam in the West. As argued by Laurence and Vaisse,  
Because of the size of France’s Muslim population—the largest in Western Europe—and 
because of France’s secular sensibility and its all encompassing definition of citizenship, 
which aims to subsume other racial, ethnic, or previous national identities, the French 
experience with Islam is a particularly noteworthy example of the encounter of Islam and the 
West.158  
 
Because of these reasons, and the ones that I mentioned above, the French context provides a 
certain type of setting for life as an immigrant Muslim in the so-called “West.”159  
																																																						
156	Since	this	is	a	qualitative	ethnography	I	am	not	trying	to	situate	the	experience	of	all	Maghrébine	Muslim	
immigrants	in	Paris	(and	Montréal),	but	only	those	who	are	represented	in	my	data	set.	As	I	addressed	in	Chapter	
1,	by	Maghrébine	I	mean	anyone	who	claims	national	identity	from	any	of	the	following	countries:	Algeria,	
Morocco	and	Tunisia,	whether	first	or	second	generation.	By	Muslim,	I	include	anyone	who	claims	this	identity	for	
themselves	in	whatever	definition	they	understand	(although	all	my	informants	followed	Ahmed’s	definition	of	a	
Muslim	as	someone	who	engages	with	the	revelation	of	God	given	through	the	Prophet	Mohammad).	By	
immigrant,	I	mean	anyone	who	was	either	born	in	another	country	than	their	current	country	of	residence	(first	
generation)	or	the	children	of	such	individuals	(second	generation)	who	continue	to	identify	with	their	home	land	
identity.	
157		A	presentation	of	the	entirety	of	France’s	immigration	history	and	policy,	France’s	colonization	efforts	and	
effects,	France’s	form	of	secularism,	and	France’s	type	of	nationalism	all	require	books	in	and	of	themselves.	The	
focus	in	this	chapter	is	on	how	each	of	those	four	things	relate	specifically	to	the	Muslim	population	and	
experience	in	France.	More	specifically,	I	focus	on	the	parts	of	these	four	topics	that	relate	directly	to	the	
Maghrébine	Muslim	experience	in	France.		
158	Laurence	and	Vaisse,	Integrating	Islam,	1.	
159	As	I	briefly	addressed	in	Chapter	1,	my	use	of	“the	West,”	and	specifically	“Islam	in	the	West,”	here	is	in	
reference	to	a	particular	orientating	location,	namely	the	manifestation	of	Islam	outside	majority	Muslim	contexts	
	 59	
To “set the scene” for the France with which my informants interact I explore the four 
influential factors of French colonialism, immigration, secularism and nationalism. First, I 
briefly address the history of colonization undertaken by France, specifically as it relates to the 
colonization of North Africa, and the effects of this history on the attitudes towards and within 
the Muslim communities located there. Second, I outline the immigration history of Muslims to 
France, with a specific focus on the immigration history of Maghrébine Muslims to France. I 
answer questions such as, “Under what circumstances did Muslim communities come to 
France?” What are the specific orienting immigration policies present and how do they affect the 
Muslim immigrant experience? Third, I provide an outline of the historical relations between 
church and state in France and how these act as a base for France’s approach to secularism, i.e. 
laïcité. Finally, I discuss the notion of French nationalism that arises from all these other factors 
and that consequently affects the idea of “who can be French.” In this I explore whether it is 
possible to have a “French Islam.” All these historical and contextual considerations will lay the 
groundwork for understanding how my informants live their North African, Muslim and French 
lives out in France, a topic I address specifically through the lens of food practice in chapters 3, 4 
and 5 of this dissertation. 
 
2.2 France’s Colonial Presence in the Maghreb and its Affect on Maghrébine Muslims160 
																																																						
and	within	generally	European,	North	American	or	Australian	Muslim	minority	contexts.	Furthermore,	in	line	with	
Abdolmohammad	Kazemipur’s	exploration	of	“Muslims	and/in	the	West”	in	his	work	The	Muslim	Question	in	
Canada,	it	is	my	goal	to	show	throughout	this	work	that	neither	“Muslims/Islam”	or	the	“West,”	for	that	matter,	
are	monolithic	entities.	Instead,	each	is	composed	of	vast	and	various	ethnic,	cultural,	religious,	and	political	
entities.	Kazemipur	suggests,	at	the	very	least,	both	“Islam”	and	“the	West”	can	be	divided	into	three	identifiable	
variations.	For	“Islam”—Arab,	Turkish	and	Persian.	For	the	“West”—Southwestern	Europe,	east-central	Europe,	
and	North	America	(to	which	I	would	add	Australia).	My	work	examines	one	of	these	variations	of	Islam,	namely	
the	Arab,	and	more	specifically	the	Maghrébine	version	of	Islam,	and	two	of	the	variations	of	the	“West,”	namely	
Southwestern	Europe	and	North	America.	
160	For	general	overview	of	the	French	colonial	effort	and	its	effects	on	Maghrébine	immigrants	in	France	see:	
Bowen,	Can	Islam	be	French?;	Bowen,	Why	the	French	don’t	like	headscarves;	Mary	Dewhurst	Lewis,	The	
Boundaries	of	the	Republic:	Migrant	Rights	and	the	Limits	of	Universalism	in	France,	1918-1940	(Stanford:	Stanford	
University	Press,	2007);	Eid,	Being	Arab;		Frantz	Fanon,	The	Wretched	of	the	Earth	(New	York:	Grove	Press,	2004);	
Joel	S.	Fetzer	and	J.	Christopher	Soper,	Muslims	and	the	State	in	Britain,	France	and	Germany	(Cambridge:	
Cambridge	University	Press,	2005);	Jacques	Frémeaux,	“Les	ambiguïtés	de	l’idéologie	colonial”	in	Histoire	de	l’Islam	
et	des	musulmans	en	France	du	moyen-age	à	nos	jours,	ed.	Muhammed	Arkoun	(Paris:	Albin	Michel,	2006);	
Shahnaz	Khan,	Muslim	Women:	Crafting	a	North	American	Identity	(Gainesville,	FL:	University	Press	of	Florida,	
2000);	Laurence	and	Vaisse,	Integrating	Islam;	Todd	Shepard,	“Excluding	the	Harkis	from	Repatriate	Status,	
Excluding	Muslim	Algerians	from	French	Identity,”	in	Transnational	Spaces	and	Identities	in	the	Francophone	World	
(Lincoln:	University	of	Nebraska	Press,	2009);	Paul	A.	Silverstein,	Algeria	in	France:	Transpolitics,	Race	and	Nation	
(Bloomington:	Indiana	University	Press,	2004);	Jamel	Stambouli	and	Sonia	Ben	Soltane,	“Muslim	immigrants	in	
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The colonial history of France in the Maghreb has a direct impact on the lives of Maghrébine 
Muslims in France today. When examining food, one begins to get a glimpse into the ripple 
effects of this history. The French colonizers did not just bring “civilization” with them to North 
Africa, but they also brought baguettes. While regional styles of bread continue to be an 
important element to Maghrébine meals, baguettes are also found all over Maghrébine tables. 
For many of my informants, they could not eat couscous without baguette. It was an essential 
element to any meal experience, acting particularly well as a utensil to pick up morsels of meat 
or vegetable from the communal plate. I noticed baguettes on every plate that I helped to prepare 
at the mosque and on every plate that I ate with my informants in their homes or in Maghrébine 
restaurants in the city. Most people would acknowledge that this was a French colonial influence 
on traditional food practices, but was one that was thoroughly engrained in their understanding 
of their own religious and cultural meals.161 
Furthermore, the colonial influence on familiarity with, and ownership over, different 
food practices is obvious when one examines couscous itself. Not only did the French colonizers 
bring baguette to the colonized, but they were also introduced to the main food of the colonized. 
France’s role in colonizing Algeria meant that not only were Algerians French citizens, a notion I 
complicate below, but Algerian food practices were colonized and adopted into the French 
national food culture as well; one only has to consider the second place ranking of couscous 
among French nationals’ favourite foods. This leads to a potential for understanding and 
solidarity arising from shared food practice between the former colonizer and former colonized 
subjects in France. Unfortunately, the impact of colonization on relations between Maghrébine 
Muslims and non-Muslims in France has not always been so positive. 
																																																						
France:	Religious	Markets	and	New	Mechanisms	of	Integration,”	in	Gender,	Religion	and	Migration:	Pathways	of	
integration,	eds.	Glenda	Tibe	Bonifacio	and	Vivienne	S.	M.	Angeles	(Plymouth,	UK:	Lexington	books,	2010);	Elaine	
R.	Thomas,	Immigration,	Islam,	and	the	Politics	of	Belonging	in	France:	A	Comparative	Framework	(Philadelphia:	
University	of	Pennsylvania	Press,	2012).	
161	One	would	be	hard	pressed	to	find	support	for	the	words	of	Frantz	Fanon	when	examining	this	practice.	Fanon	
states:	“To	destroy	the	colonial	world	means	nothing	less	than	demolishing	the	colonist’s	sector,	burying	it	deep	
within	the	earth	or	banishing	it	from	the	territory.	Challenging	the	colonial	world	is	not	a	rational	confrontation	of	
viewpoints.	It	is	not	a	discourse	on	the	universal,	but	the	impassioned	claim	by	the	colonized	that	their	world	is	
fundamentally	different”	(Frantz	Fanon,	Wretched,	6).	The	continued	place	of	baguette	in	the	lives,	and	on	the	
plates	of	Maghrébines	challenges	the	idea	that	the	colonist’s	sector	is	buried	or	banished	in	the	Maghreb.	I	will	
further	address	the	ways	my	informants	do	NOT	reflect	a	Fanonian	approach	to	decolonization	below.		
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France’s colonial empire spanned from the seventeenth century until roughly the 1960s. 
Two aspects of France’s colonization efforts affect a study such as this: France’s colonization in 
North America (which I return to in my discussion of colonization in Canada/Québec in Chapter 
6) and France’s colonization of North and West Africa. After focussing its colonization efforts in 
North America and the Caribbean, France began its second colonial empire with its conquest of 
North Africa in the mid-nineteenth century. In becoming a “protector,” or colonizer, of Algeria 
between 1830 and 1847, Tunisia by 1881, French West Africa between the early 1880s and 
1912, and Morocco in 1912 (among many others), France had secured a stronghold in North 
Africa by the early twentieth century.162 By 1962, with the independence of Algeria being 
secured, the colonial era of France ended. Bowen states that it was the “histories of French rule 
in three North African States—Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria—that most sharply marked French 
Muslim policies and attitudes.”163 One then must take these histories into account if one hopes to 
understand these policies.    
France’s colonization of North Africa took on an air of moral crusade. As argued by 
Laurence and Vaisse,  
in the nineteenth century, the European powers considered Muslim countries as places to 
be ‘civilized’—especially Algeria, which was colonized after harsh military campaigns in 
the 1830s and 1840s and thereafter was periodically prone to violent uprisings and 
repression.164 
 
Colonial efforts in North Africa were then seen as a way to enlighten the Islamic world; it was 
seen as a humanitarian or civilizing mission.165 The French colonizers did not venture forth as 
explorers, as they may have done in their colonial efforts in North America, but as “liberators,” 
mostly of women who were seen as being oppressed in these contexts.166 The vision that North 
Africans were “both dirty and violent” was heightened when members of the protectorates and 
colonies began migrating to the metropole in the early twentieth century and local reports began 
to emerge of their behaviour in the cities and towns to which they were immigrating.167 Although 
the French saw their colonization work as a liberating, humanitarian and civilizing mission, 
																																																						
162	Bowen,	Headscarves,	35;	Laurence	and	Vaisse,	Integrating	Islam,	16;	Neal	Robinson,	“France”	in	Islam	outside	
the	Arab	world,	ed.	David	Westerlund	and	Ingvar	Svanberg	(Surrey,	GB:	Curzon	Press,	1999),	338.	
163	Bowen,	Headscarves,	35.	
164	Laurence	&	Vaisse,	Integrating	Islam,	50.	
165	Frémeaux,	“Les	ambiguïtés,”	529-531;	Hurd,	“Politics	of	Secularism,”	54;	Scott,	Politics	of	the	Veil,	46.	
166	Khan,	Muslim	women,	4;	Scott,	Politics,	61-67.	
167	Dewhurst	Lewis,	Boundaries,	196;	Scott,	Politics,	50-52.	
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Frantz Fanon, one of the most important voices representing the colonized, states that this is in 
fact not possible. He suggests that “colonialism is not a machine capable of thinking, a body 
endowed with reason. It is naked violence and only gives in when confronted with greater 
violence.”168 This greater violence, as represented in the Algerian war, only increased the 
negative stereotypes that many French held of North Africans (and vice versa). 
The French Algerian war began in 1954 and ended in 1962.169 Not only was this a war of 
decolonization between France and Algeria but it was also a civil war between Algerian 
loyalists, who wanted to maintain a French Algeria, and Algerian Muslims who did not. Fetzer 
and Soper suggest that “one cannot overemphasize the searing effects of the Algerian War of 
Independence on the psyches of both ethnic European and ethnic Arab or Berber residents of 
France and Algeria.”170 It was a bloody and lengthy war, which led to “Arab” being viewed by 
the majority of the French population as a “cowardly, blood-thirsty brute, the throat-slitter or the 
terrorist.”171 Furthermore, according to Fetzer and Soper, because the “Front de liberation 
nationale (FLN) drew much of its rhetoric and at least some of its motivation from Islam,” 
French colonizers and citizens alike linked Islam with violence, and consequently “developed a 
tremendous fear of this religion.”172 
																																																						
168	Frantz	Fanon,	Wretched,	23.	
169	For	further	reading	on	France’s	colonization	of	Algeria	and	the	Algerian	War	see:	Martin	Evans,	Algeria:	France’s	
Undeclared	War	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2012)—explores	the	history	of	France’s	colonization	of	Algeria,	
the	Algerian	War,	and	the	“legacy”	of	it	all;	Jo	McCormack,	Collective	Memory:	France	and	the	Algerian	War	
(Lanham,	MD:	Lexington	Books,	2007)—general	failure	of	France	to	“remember”	the	war	and	to	transmit	that	
memory	to	future	generations,	leads	to	racism	and	exclusion;	Patricia	M.E.	Lorkin,	ed.,	Algeria	&	France,	1800-
2000:	Identity,	Memory,	Nostalgia	(Syracuse:	Syracuse	University	Press,	2006)—collection	of	essays	that	looks	at	
the	formation	of	Franco-Algerian	identity,	how	the	past	is	remembered,	or	not,	and	the	use	of	nostalgia	to	come	to	
terms	with	that	past—especially	relevant	is	Jo	McCormack,	“Memory	in	History,	Nation	Building,	and	Identity:	
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In Algeria, Muslims were given the opportunity to apply for full French citizenship on 
the condition that they give up their right to be governed by sharia (Islamic law).173 Todd 
Shepard explains that 
the Senatus-Consulte of 14 July 1865 asserted that every “indigenous Muslim is French” 
(thus recognizing their French nationality) and extended French citizenship to a small 
number of “indigenous” men and their descendants. In exchange for full citizenship, 
these men abandoned their “local civil status”: the right, in personal or civil matters, to be 
governed by local laws, what the text termed “Muslim law” for “Muslim natives” and 
“personal status” for “Israelite natives.174 
 
While this offer was made to a few men in 1865, in 1919 a law was passed that extended 
naturalization to Arab men who were willing to relinquish this “indigenous” status, including 
their right to follow Islamic law.175 Because “some Islamic authorities in Algeria declared that 
crossing this legal line was tantamount to abandoning Islam,” many did not take this offer.176 As 
a result, Muslims in the French colony, in these early years, had what Shepard calls a 
“nationalité denaturé (denatured—or meaningless—nationality).”177 It was only in the mid-
twentieth century, in 1944, when all subjects of French colonies were granted full citizenship 
without having to renounce their religious identities/local civil status.178 With the end of the 
Second World War, “the Republic broke with the post-1789 insistence that citizenship be one 
and indivisible,” and as a result introduced “for what began to be called ‘Muslim French from 
Algeria’ the possibility of both full political rights and the maintenance of local civil status.”179 
Even with the political acceptance of Maghrébines, specifically Algerians, as full-fledged 
citizens180 of the French Republic they were still considered irreducibly “other,” and were held to 
the periphery of the labour market and other French social structures.181 Algerian French 
nationals in France in particular were often subjected to “summary arrests, lengthy detentions, 
repatriations” and other discriminatory actions that revealed “the formal nationality held by 
Algerians often came with fewer benefits than the foreign status of many Europeans.”182 This 
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could be further viewed by the fact that French Algerians were given citizenship cards that 
labelled them as “Français musulman(e)” (French Muslims), not simply “French.”183 This label 
of “Muslim” was more of a legal than a religious category but still had a significant impact.184 In 
fact, after the Algerian war of independence “French military personnel were ordered to 
discriminate ethnically between Muslim and other “French” refugees seeking passage to 
France.”185 By placing a label on their very citizenship documents that was different from the 
“European French” they were immediately othered.186 Because of the length and intensity of 
France’s colonial presence in North Africa, especially Algeria, and because it is historically 
recent, many North African immigrants express “contempt for France as represented by its 
symbols (its flag, its representatives, and its national anthem).”187 Many North Africans in 
France remember the colonial presence and the war of independence from personal experience 
(or from stories of the experience of their parents) and as a result still feel emotionally connected 
to that history. Symbols such as the flag, national anthem, citizenship cards, etcetera, 
consequently draw out raw emotions and responses from many in the country.188  
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The war itself was not recognized as a war until well after the bloody and brutal 
conclusion. For years it remained “the war without a name”189 and it was only in 1997 where “an 
official recognition of a state of ‘war’ in Algeria between 1954 and 1962” began to take shape.190 
This “official recognition” culminated on the 10 of June 1999 when a law was passed by the 
French Parliament to make the term “Algerian War” official in legal texts.191 The silence around 
this war for over 30 years understandably led to a mis-remembering of the events by many on an 
official level. Because there was a general failure by France to “remember” the Algerian War, 
this memory was not transmitted to younger generations.192 Thus a conflict of memory could be 
established on the ground in France between those who remembered their own experiences in 
this “war” and those for whom this “war” was non-existent in memory.193 
In addition, “signs of a colonial mind-set are abundant, from the headscarf ban of 
2004...to the social situation in the cités, especially housing discrimination and zoning, and the 
persistence of racial discrimination.”194 According to Stambouli and Soltane, the notion of 
colonial memory has a large effect on current immigrant integration issues. This debate “not only 
heightens individual memory for those who lived this epoch” but brings forth “issues loaded with 
memories” for many others as well.195 One particularly strong colonial memory is that of Islam 
as a force of resistance. Fremeaux, suggests that Islam has preserved a military role in North 
Africa and this is one of the major characteristics that the French remember of Islam out of their 
colonial interactions.196 North Africans could also remember Islam in this context, but with 
positive rather than negative connotations. Islam could be seen as a liberating force for the 
colonized North African people rather than a force of barbarism. Frantz Fanon, in his work The 
Wretched of the Earth, suggests that the equation of Islam with barbarism was the work of the 
colonizer to “convince the indigenous population it would save them from darkness.”197 He calls 
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for an awakening of Islam, a pointing to “the great chapters of Arab history” as a “response to 
the lies of the occupier”198 and as a means of claiming a separate identity from the colonizer.199 
One cannot help but assume that the projection of Islam, and thus of the North African 
people, as barbaric and militant negatively affects the image of Muslims in France, leading to the 
image of people who fight rather than integrate. An excellent example of this tension can be 
found in the “friendly” soccer match between France and Algeria that took place on October 6, 
2001. This match was the first between France and Algeria since Algeria gained independence 
from France in 1962 and while it was meant to show solidarity between France and Algeria, it 
ended with the opposite effect.200 Some soccer fans “booed the national anthem, threw objects at 
two government ministers and—once the French lead had reached 4-to-1—ran onto the field, 
forcing the game’s cancellation.”201 This event led to questions of whether or not Muslims from 
former colonies had successfully integrated into French culture or not, and who was responsible 
for the outcome. Moreover, the colonial history of France has a current effect on notions of 
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“French Islam.” Because of France’s colonization of much of Muslim North Africa it “found 
itself ‘a great Muslim power,’ aiming to encourage ‘moderate’ forms of Islam overseas and, as 
part of that effort, at home.”202 By colonizing large parts of the North African Muslim world, 
France had to interact with Muslims on a level that it had not done before; Muslims were now 
French citizens, often second rate citizens, but citizens none the less, in large numbers. With the 
colonization of Algeria in particular the notion of “French Islam,” or better yet, of “French 
Muslims,” became a reality that could not be ignored. 
 
2.3 The Immigration of Maghrébine Muslims to France: Migratory Movements and 
Demographics 
 
The colonial history outlined above has a significant effect on the immigration history of 
Muslims to France. While immigration from Muslim inhabited countries is not a recent 
phenomenon, the Muslim population that is present in France today “traces its direct or indirect 
origins to former French colonies in North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa and to Turkey” and 
most immigrated “in the wake of the colonial wars of independence.”203 Although there were 
other phases of Muslim immigration in France, the focus of this section is on immigration in the 
twentieth century. Moreover, this is not primarily a work on French immigration patterns and 
policy in general. Instead, in this section, I focus principally on the immigration of Maghrébine 
and Muslim communities to France in the twentieth century. 
 
2.3.1 Cesari’s Three Migratory Movements of Muslims to France 
Cesari outlines the three migratory movements of Maghrébine Muslims to France in the 
twentieth century in her article in Bramadat and Koenig’s International Migration and the 
Governance of Religious Diversity.204 The first wave which she describes began during the First 
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World War and continued through the interwar period. It was during this time that Maghrébine 
immigrants started coming to France in large numbers, to serve in the army205 and “fill a labour 
gap in the post-war reconstruction boom.”206 Factors in the home countries of these immigrants, 
such as political repression and economic hardship, also increased migration to France.207 Cesari 
points out that these “immigrants” were in fact not immigrants at all, but French nationals 
coming mostly from Algeria, which was part of France at the time.208 These immigrants were 
mostly male and both they and the French society thought that their stay in France would only be 
temporary. 
The second wave that Cesari mentions took place from the 1950s to 1974. Cesari 
suggests that this wave is similar to the first wave, merely an intensification of it, but with “one 
crucial difference: the workers were now nationals of newly independent states.”209 There was a 
severe labour shortage in the post-World War II era and French industries recruited or 
“regularized” workers from the highly Muslim populated and former French colonies or 
protectorates of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.210 In fact, a conscious policy of immigration was 
drawn up between industry and the state in order to supply the country with a sufficient labour 
force. France “signed agreements with Algeria in 1968 in addition to agreements with Morocco 
and Tunisia in 1963.”211 Because of this, between 1950 and 1974 the foreign population of 
France doubled; more specifically, according to Jo McCormack, in 1946 Maghrébines 
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“constituted 3 percent of the foreign population, but by 1990 they represent 45 percent.”212 Like 
in the first phase of migration from North Africa, these immigrants did not intend to stay in 
France. Rather, their goal was to “earn as much money as possible and then return home.”213 As 
a result, these migratory movements were seen by both the French host and the Muslim 
immigrant as temporary. As presented by Stambouli and Soltane, “these men were not recruited 
to engage the French public space, or to hold a place within it as social actors. Rather, there were 
only supposed to be workers in French industries.”214 Because these immigrants were seen as 
temporary, there was no real need to develop policies of integration. The French saw them as 
outsiders and the Muslim immigrants viewed themselves as separate as well, creating their own 
communities in the cités215 of Paris. Notions of French national identity are consequently not 
seen as threatened by the influx of immigrants during these first two phases. Consequently, the 
systemic segregation of these communities was started at this time; the foundation for separation 
between “us” and “them” was firmly established in physical and psychological ways, even if it 
was not labelled as such at this point in time. 
The third and final phase outlined by Cesari began after the oil crisis of 1973. It was with 
this phase that France closed the door to unskilled workers, and family reunification policies 
took over the immigrant dynamic.216 In fact, in 1974 France officially closed its doors to 
immigration. This did not mean that immigration halted completely, but “it did mean a 
movement toward selection and selective exclusion” in France’s immigration policies.217 While 
formal immigration stopped, family members of the unskilled workers that made up the second 
wave of immigration constituted the largest number of immigrants in France during this third 
phase. While the state wanted to limit family reunification as well at this time, in 1978 the 
Council of the State blocked the right of the state to control this process and thus this decision 
“enabled a constant number of North African family members to enter the country each year.”218 
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Formerly split up families were now being reunited and the Muslim population in France grew 
exponentially. In fact, 
the reunification of families became a continuing source of immigrants during the late 
1970s and early 1980s. Family reunification from all countries grew from 55,000 a year 
in the late 1960s to 81,000 in 1973, before decreasing over time to about 25,000 in 2004. 
The arrival of foreign spouses, meanwhile, increased from 23,000 in 1990 to more than 
60,000 in 2004.219 
 
This change in immigration dynamic also altered the Maghrébine Muslim community presence 
on the ground level in France. The community transformed from a generally separated, primarily 
single male populated community to one consisting of families that now interacted more readily 
with French public life. They moved from the “segregated environment of the workers’ 
dormitory to the integrated world of the public housing project, and they increasingly 
encountered representatives of the school system, members of the bureaucracy, and social 
workers.”220 It was with this third migratory phase that Muslims became much more visible in 
France. This visibility led to French society suddenly needing to interact with a group who had 
competing and sometimes contradictory “social, moral and religious values” to their own.221 In 
reaction to this, the subsequent French governments tried repeatedly to not only reduce 
immigration but “encourage” immigrants to return to their home countries. These efforts were 
largely unsuccessful and have thus left France as “one of the most multi-ethnic societies on the 
continent.”222 Moreover, due to this new ethnically diverse setting in France, questions of ethnic, 
religious and national identities, and conflicts between them, came to the fore. 
 Immigration remains high in France with 8.9 percent of the total population in France 
being immigrants as of January 1, 2014.223 The family reunification process continues to supply 
large numbers of immigrants from the Maghreb in contemporary France. Furthermore, many of 
these immigrants continue to come from the countries of the Maghreb. In fact, according to the 
INSEE, France’s national statistic body, in the year 2012 43.2 percent of immigrants had African 
birth countries (13.1 percent from Algeria, 12.1 percent from Morocco, 4.4 percent from Tunisia, 
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and 13.6 percent from “other countries in Africa”).224 In spite of policies that help to restrict 
immigration to France, there are still on average 200,000 immigrants arriving each year on 
French soil (roughly 59,200 Maghrébine immigrants in 2012). 
 
2.3.2 Demographics of Maghrébine Muslims in France Today 
Ultimately, the immigration pattern and history of Maghrébines to mainland France has led to a 
distinct view of this community on the ground today. Muslims in France represent 123 different 
nationalities, yet, nearly three quarters are from the countries of the Maghreb: Algeria, Morocco, 
or Tunisia.225 While it is difficult to evaluate the number of Muslims living in France due to the 
fact that the “French Republic considers ethnic and religious affiliation a private matter and 
therefore keeps no such official statistics on citizens of immigrant origin,”226 estimates range 
between 4.7 and 6 million Muslims living in mainland France.227 This equates to anywhere 
between 7.5 to 10 percent of the total population of France. As a result, Islam has a significant 
presence in France. Considering the fact that of the potentially six million Muslims living in 
France, approximately 40 percent live in and around Paris,228 the region of Paris is consequently 
home to approximately 2.4 million Muslims. This is significant because, while the population of 
Greater Paris is approximately ten million, the population of the city of Paris itself is roughly 2.2 
million.229 There are, as a result, as many Muslims living in the Greater Paris region as the 
general population of Paris itself. Taking into account that 75 percent of immigrants in France 
are Muslims,230 one can see how “Muslim” and “immigré(e)” become conflated terms in France. 
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In fact, Scott explains that largely due to these immigration patterns in France there is a 
conflation of “Muslim” with “North African” and “immigrant” with “North African,” such that 
immigrant = North African = Muslim, or any other variation of that equation.231	The continued 
use of the word “immigré(e)” to refer to second and third generation Maghrébines in France is 
one example of the refusal to accept this community as French.232 One who is an “immigré(e)” is 
on the outside, whether or not that term technically applies to them or not. Since the 1970s many 
other modifications have been made to immigration policies in France but most do not have a 
direct effect on the experience of Maghrébine immigrants in France, other than the “Loi 
Mehaignerie” which I discuss later in this chapter.233 This label is applied not only to those 
French nationals with what is considered “problematic” national heritage, but also to those who 
have “problematic” religious heritage as well. This otherness based on religious background is 
what I turn to next. 
 
2.4 The History and Development of French Secularism: Laïcité 
 
France has its own understanding of secularism, or laïcité as it is called, which significantly 
affects the context in which Maghrébine Muslim immigrants live. To understand the political 
policy of laïcité in France one must explore the history of the relationship between church and 
state in the country. Once one understands this history one can see how this policy, and others 
like it, develop and can have some understanding of how it influences the experience of those 
religious “others” that interact with it. The history of Church-State relations and secularization in 
France is especially rich and complex. The Catholic Church had a long history of ruling power 
over secular and sacred institutions in the country, and because of this and the subsequent 
rejection and relegation of the Church into the private sphere, the French context provides a 
complex backdrop for religious traditions to attempt to find space for themselves in the public 
sphere. Fetzer and Soper suggest that official and unofficial policies on Muslim integration are 
fully related to the church-state relations of a given country. They state, “public policy on state 
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accommodation of Muslim religious practices in Britain, France and Germany varies based in 
part on the inherited relationship between church and state in each nation.”234 The ghosts of the 
past are felt in the present. 
 
2.4.1 The Secular Republic 
The history of the relationship of the state with the Catholic Church in France is indeed well 
known. As Fouad Douai, the manager of the Strasbourg mosque in France, observed: “France 
was once the ‘eldest daughter of the Church.’ To stop being the ‘eldest daughter of the Church’ it 
was necessary to spill blood, which made...the French allergic to everything religious.”235 The 
battles were many and varied between the Catholics and the anti-clerics since the time of the 
French Revolution and thus a strict separation between church and state is held in high regard in 
France. Cesari suggests that the strict separation of church and state goes beyond “political 
independence of religious organizations” and is in fact “accompanied by the memory of 
antagonism between church and state.”236 The French have a strong collective memory of the 
time when everything was under the control of the church and they do not wish to return to that 
situation. In 1905, the French government passed a law that officially separated church and state 
in France. This law “took public status away from organized religions but allowed them to 
reorganize as private associations”; it “officially and explicitly ended the regime of recognized 
religions begun under Napoleon.”237 Religious action or symbols that seem to threaten that 
separation become highly problematic in the eyes of the French.238 It is important to note that it 
is not simply Islam that the French see as problematic, but religion in general is not popular in 
France.239 Margarita Mooney states that this is why “immigrants to France, whether they are 
Christian, Muslim, or another religion, encounter a hostile context of reception regarding 
religion.”240 
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In fact, freedom from religion was one of the founding principles of the Republic that the 
French hold in such high esteem.241 Religion is a highly private affair in France. The notion of 
“the Republic” is especially important in this regard. Bowen explains that,  
according to the Republican way of thinking, living together in a society requires 
agreement on basic values...French Republicans seek to rigorously and consistently 
justify policies according to this idea. To do so means adhering to a certain brand of 
political philosophy, one that emphasizes general interest and shared values over 
individual interests and pluralism.242 
 
This freedom from religion is an important distinction between the relationship between church 
and state in France than from that found in the United States.243 While in the United States 
secularism was established to protect religion from the state, in France, the drive for secularism 
was one of freeing “the state from undue religious influence.”244 This distinction between 
protecting the state versus protecting religion is an important one to keep in mind as we explore 
the notion of whether or not it is possible to have a “French Islam.” 
If Muslim immigrants can maintain the secularist way of life, that is, keeping the public 
and private realms separate, not only at a state level but in the lives of individuals,245 the issues 
are not as prevalent. In fact, Stambouli and Soltane argue that  
North African Muslims do not need to be integrated; they develop a sort of autarchic way 
of living in accordance with their faith. French public opinion accepts this situation as 
long as the tolerance zone instituted between discrete faith practice and secular French 
public space is not violated.246  
 
While it is primarily the non-Muslim majority French society that argues for a strict separation of 
church and state based largely on its historical fight for such a thing, there are influential 
members of the Muslim community in France that agree on this issue. The recteur of the Grande 
Mosquée de Paris is one such proponent of this separation.247 In an interview with researcher 
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Nathalie Dollé, Dalil Boubakeur states that there should be a separation of church and state, 
promoting leaving the things of God to God and the things of the State to the State.248 As an 
“integrated Muslim” he agrees with French Republican understanding of secularism, which 
creates the specific laïcité present in France. 
 
2.4.2 Laïcité 
In reading anything on the separation of church and state or secularization in France, one cannot 
avoid the term laïcité.249 While North Americans are more than familiar with the notion of 
secularization and even with the idea that France is a highly secular country many do not know 
that France has its own variation of secularization known as laïcité. Any discussion of Muslims 
in France, “French Islam,” or religion in France in general, must include some explanation of this 
term and its influence on French society.  
According to Bowen, laïcité is a “philosophy about religion’s place in politics and 
society” and it “can be translated as ‘secularism.’”250 One may say that laïcité is France’s version 
of secularization but then, like in any use of the term secularization, one must go on to explain 
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what that means in the French context. While at its base, like most definitions of secularism, 
laïcité refers to the separation of church and state, it is unlike other definitions in that it also 
“rests on the notion that the secular and the sacred can be divided in the lives of individuals.”251 
Hurd suggests that, unlike Judeo-Christian secularism, which stops at “the functional 
differentiation of the secular and the religious spheres,” laïcité “also adopts two corollaries to 
this differentiation argument, advocating the privatization and, in some cases, the decline or 
elimination of religious belief and practice altogether.”252 
Jean Baubérot is considered one of the main experts on laïcité, and most recent 
discussions of the term rely on his works for an exploration of its history and influence. In his 
works, Baubérot reveals a dual orientation toward religion in France. On the one hand, state 
religion had a long history in France. On the other hand, a withdrawal from religion to protect 
the right of individuals to make their own decisions on matters of faith was a well-established 
stance in post-Revolution France.253 This leads to an inherent contradiction in France’s approach 
to secularism. Like the colonial memory of France in North Africa and its influence on the 
stereotypes of Muslims in France, the Catholic Church’s involvement in bloody Revolutionary 
struggles influences France’s ability to gradually ease into a process of secularization.254 The 
constant back and forth between Republican and Catholic monarchical states throughout the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries led to a heightened tension between church and state, not 
found in other locales. This tension between Church and Republic came to a head during the 
Third Republic, and, with the series of laws that secularized the public classroom in the late 
nineteenth century, “laïcité became an object of struggle and emerged as a word.”255 Bowen 
emphasizes that although many view “laïcité as a guiding concept in French history, the word 
does not appear in the very law (of 1905) that is celebrated as its embodiment.”256 In fact, it was 
only made a “constitutional principle for the first time in 1946, and reiterated in the 1958 
Constitution.”257 While the groundwork was laid for this legal-political-social concept in the late 
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it was not actually solidified in law until the middle of 
the twentieth century. 
While laïcité is generally viewed as a strict separation of the public from the private, of 
the church from the state, it is possible to use the term to support a more open understanding of 
this relationship. According to Keaton, “la laïcité was intended to establish equal protection for 
all people under a ‘neutral,’ non-religiously influenced state, while allowing freedom of religious 
expression and free thinking within state institutions.”258 At its foundation, then, laïcité 
encourages religious freedom. Where tension arises is in the notion of what religious freedom 
entails. In many Western contexts, religious freedom is a matter of freedom of religious belief. 
Starting with the Protestant notion of “by faith alone,” it often followed that one is given the 
freedom to believe whatever one chooses. The tension arises when people from Muslim nations 
immigrate to these Western, Christian-based, contexts with the equally important emphasis of 
freedom of religious practice alongside freedom of religious belief. For many Muslims, the two 
go hand in hand and freedom of religion means not only believing what one chooses, but having 
the right to enact those beliefs in practice, and in public.259  
Fetzer and Soper suggest that there are two kinds of laïcité: strict laïcité and soft laïcité. 
While strict laïcité would advocate for the absolute rejection of all religious practice and belief 
from public institutions, soft laïcité allows for some indication of religious practice in the public 
sphere. What it does not allow is the government establishment of religion.260 Bowen also breaks 
laïcité into two forms: political and social laïcité. Political laïcité refers to the state refraining 
“from imposing a particular religion, or from allowing any religion to impose itself through the 
medium of the state.”261 Social laïcité also requires the 
separation of state and churches but also a further privatization of religious affiliation, 
such that even nongovernmental actors, when they inhabit the public sphere, refrain from 
doing so religiously. According to this idea, French citizens become complete political 
individuals by being socialized in public institutions, and they retain their citizenship 
qualities by continuing to interact in such institutions qua citizens—and not as Muslims, 
Protestants, or, perish the thought, Scientologists.262 
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If one applied Bowen’s typology of laïcité to Fetzer and Soper’s, then soft laïcité is the 
implementation of political laïcité alone, while strict laïcité is the implementation of both 
political and social laïcité.  
According to soft laïcité, “the state should respect all religious beliefs but also foster the 
free exercise of religion by, for example, funding private religious schools.”263 Proponents of 
soft, or open, laïcité criticize on a couple of fronts those who hold to strict laïcité. First, they 
criticize strict laïcité for trying to “make secularist laïcité the ‘state religion’ in France.”264 
Ironically, they argue, the very notion of laïcité has become somewhat of a religion in and of 
itself in France. It becomes the focus of French identity; that thing which makes France, France. 
France is a secular state and if you are French you are encouraged to be publicly and privately 
secular.265 Laïcité is held as central not so much because of firm legal and cultural frameworks 
but because of the fear over a loss of identity, a questioning of what it means to be French. As a 
result, any tradition that may threaten this perceived “state religion” is looked upon with caution. 
In fact, with the debate over religious signs in schools in 2004, the popular, mainstream media 
consented, with much of the French population, that “laïcité was in peril and that Islam was the 
cause.”266 Bowen explains that the legacy of combat between the church and the Republic helps 
to explain why the “contemporary presence of Islam in the schools” is seen “as threatening to 
turn back the clock on at least two struggles: the fight to keep religion from controlling young 
minds, and the struggle to forge a common French identity.”267  
A second criticism of strict laïcité by those who hold to soft laïcité is that laïcité is not 
necessarily hostile to faith, but instead fosters an environment where faith of every variety can 
flourish since there is no one tradition that has ultimate sway in French government and society. 
Furthermore, Fetzer and Soper argue that soft laïcité is a reaction against the sterilization of 
society that is a possible outcome of strict laïcité. Here they suggest that strict laïcité removes all 
“cultural diversity” and strips “public school students of all individuality.”268 In many of the 
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examples that Keaton gives of peoples’ responses to the question, what is laïcité?, we can see 
this stripping of cultural diversity. For teachers and students alike, laïcité can mean erasing 
differences and seeing everyone as the same.269 Strict laïcité then leads to cookie cutter versions 
of all French people. Finally, strict laïcité is seen, by those who hold to soft laïcité, as a violation 
of international human rights.270 The argument that is made is that the basic human right of 
freedom of conscience and religious liberty is violated by the maintenance of strict laïcité. Fetzer 
and Soper conclude that while soft laïcité can find support in French constitutional history, and is 
consistent with the integration of Muslims into French society, strict laïcité is not.271  
What makes the debate about laïcité difficult is that “laïcité remains one of those 
‘essentially contested concepts’ that is politically useful precisely because it has no agreed-on 
definition.”272 As we can see above, some hold that laïcité guarantees religious practice in the 
public sphere while others think it prevents it; some see it as the guarantor of religious identity, 
others see it as masking that identity.273 The question becomes, is it possible to be a secular, read 
“French,” Muslim? Both Hurd and Scott suggest that the concept of laïcité itself was built 
directly on a comparison to, or better, a contrast with Islam.274 
In the political imaginary of laicism, Islam is represented as an impediment to the 
rationalization and democratization of modern society. Laicism therefore reproduces 
itself and the national identities with which it is affiliated as legitimate, democratic, and 
modern by representing Islam as irrational, despotic, and antimodern…negative 
representations of Islam do not merely reflect the political authority of laicism. They help 
to constitute it.275 
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If laïcité is constituted via the idea that Islam is its opposite, how could Muslims in secular 
France have a hope to ever claim the national identity which is dependent on that secularism? 
 
2.5 French Nationalism: Who Can “Be French”?276 
  
France and its citizens have a strong notion of nationalism. The idea of “being French” is a 
central topic for anyone within the boundaries of the Republic, and in fact is highly based on the 
notion of the “Republic” and all that it stands for. Hargreaves, in his survey of discussions of 
French immigration, race and ethnicity expressed that the “prevailing conceptions of nationality 
and citizenship in France are rooted in the revolution of 1789.”277 Notions of “Frenchness” are 
consequently rooted in the Republican tradition. Freedman explains that the French Republican 
ideals of universalism, unitarism, secularism and assimilation dictate, to a large extent, French 
nationalism.278 It follows that, to “be French” is to be unified with other French people, to not be 
distinct.279 According to Scott, universalism is the key to French national identity and is based on 
the equation that universalism equals equality. She explains that in France “equality is achieved, 
in French political theory, by making one’s social, religious, ethnic, and other origins irrelevant 
in the public sphere; it is as an abstract individual that one becomes a French citizen.”280 So, 
anything that marks one out as distinct goes against what it means to be French. The question 
then arises: what universal attitude or background is the norm to which all others should 
assimilate? Who should have access to the title of “French national/citizen”?  
In her 2012 work Immigration, Islam, and the Politics of Belonging in France: A 
Comparative Framework, Elaine R. Thomas suggests five models of political membership; five 
ways of understanding who is a part of the national “we.” She explains that one can see 
citizenship in the national identity as a matter of descent, culture, belief, contract or monetized 
																																																						
276	For	works	that	address	nationalism	and	national	identity	politics	see:	David	Avrom	Bell,	The	Cult	of	the	Nation	in	
France:	Inventing	Nationalism,	1680-1800	(Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	2001);	Hargreaves,	
Immigration—specifically,	Chapter	4	“National	Identity,	Nationality	and	Citizenship,”	149-175;	Brian	Jenkins,	
Nationalism	in	France:	Class	and	Nation	since		1789	(London;	New	York:	Routledge,	1990);	Keaton,	Muslim	Girls;	
Schain,	The	Politics	of	Immigration;	Thomas,	“Keeping	Identity	at	a	Distance”;	Thomas,	Immigration;	Robert	Tombs,	
ed.,	Nationhood	and	Nationalism	in	France	(London;	New	York:	Harper	Collins	Academic,	1991).		
277	Hargreaves,	Immigration,	160.	
278	Freedman,	Immigration	and	Insecurity,	26.	
279	Natasha	Bakht,	in	“Veiled	Objections,”	states	that	“common	republican	identity	must	take	precedence	over	any	
divergent	aspect	of	an	individual’s	identity”	(82).	
280	Scott,	Politics,	11.	
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contract.281 All these notions of how one claims French nationality or citizenship are at play in 
France, but the first two have been powerful in dictating who, or who is not, “French.” While in 
the early twentieth century the descent arguments of both jus sanguinus (descent) and jus soli 
(territorial birth) tended to determine who “was French,” these notions came under scrutiny in 
the late twentieth century.282 Instead of French nationality being determined simply based off the 
fact that one was born on French soil (jus soli) and/or to French parents (jus sanguinus) debate 
began to arise in the 1980s over a need to make French citizenship a matter of choice and not just 
birth.283 This resulted in the passing of the Loi Méhaignerie in 1993 which required French born 
children of immigrants to request French citizenship between the ages of 16 and 21 instead of it 
just being granted to them automatically when they were 18 years old (the way it was before this 
law passed). The importance of the cultural way of understanding citizenship, as argued by 
Thomas, began to play a role in defining who could be “French.” It was not just about being 
passively given French citizenship, but actively seeking it, knowing all the cultural implications 
that it entailed. Hence, one’s national status was a matter of “express individual choice.”284  
To work out the universalism, assimilation, etcetera, of the French Republican tradition 
to which one was agreeing by claiming French citizenship there is often an “imposition of 
cultural unity in the form of a centralized and secular Republic with one language (as opposed to 
many regional languages) and a unified culture.”285 This unified culture is important when 
considering what it means to “be French.” Other than the form of French secularism (laïcité) that 
I discussed above, there are other clear examples of cultural beliefs or practices that form the 
basis for this “unified culture” that Freedman mentions. The question that is foundational to this 
study is if the food that one might eat and the liquid that one might drink contribute to the unified 
culture of the nation? In the case of France, the argument is often clearly stated in the 
affirmative. 
 
2.5.1 Wine and French National Identity 
																																																						
281	Thomas,	Immigration,	34-46.	
282	Schain,	Politics	of	Immigration,	76.	
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While one can look to political statements about who is “French” based on the “facts” of 
citizenship, these ideas often get worked out in distinct ways on the ground; how people within a 
nation view that nationhood is often different from the politics surrounding it. In fact, when 
speaking to the average French person, they may cite the Republican ideal of secularism, but 
shortly thereafter they may also cite the fact that they drink wine. Food and drink is in fact a 
foundational aspect of French nationalism, what it means to “be French” for many people on the 
ground in the Republic. French culinary identity in general is essential to French national 
identity. When considering what it means to “be French” many culinary images come to mind: 
wine, French cheese, the baguette, French pastries such as the croissant, the pain au chocolat, 
pâté, foie gras, charcuterie (cured meats, usually made from pork), cassoulet (southern French 
casserole of which pork is an essential ingredient), etcetera. Perhaps unlike any other country in 
the “West”, with the possible exception of Italy, France is known for its food; therefore, to “be 
French” is to be a part of this great culinary tradition. In fact, Michaela DeSoucey suggests that 
part of the idea of national identity is “the idea of the nation as a protector of cultural 
patrimony,” of which food is one of the most important aspects in France.286 She goes on to 
suggest that “Gastronationalism287 buttresses national identity against perceived threats from 
outsiders who wish to eliminate certain objects or practices.”288 While all of the above food 
products have been the focus of some attention in discussions around “Frenchness,”289 and have 
acted as fodder for Gastronationalism, I focus on wine in this section for a couple of reasons. 
First, unlike some of the other products in this list, wine is one of France’s top ten exported 
																																																						
286	Michaela	DeSoucey,	““Gastronationalism:	Food	Traditions	and	Authenticity	Politics	in	the	European	Union,”	
American	Sociological	Review,	vol.	75,	no.	3	(2010):	447.	
287	Desoucey	defines	gastronationalism	as	“the	use	of	food	production,	distribution,	and	consumption	to	
demarcate	and	sustain	the	emotive	power	of	national	attachment,	as	well	as	the	use	of	nationalist	sentiments	to	
produce	and	market	food”	(433).	
288	DeSoucey,	“Gastronationalism,”	448.	
289	For	example,	The	Sausage	and	Wine	Protest	Party	that	took	place	in	2010:	Sophie	Taylor,	“Banned	Paris	
“sausage	and	wine”	party.”	Or,	the	story	of	Jean	Francois	Copé’s	statements	about	the	stolen	pain	au	chocolat:	
“UMP:	Copé,	les	pains	au	chocolat	et	le	Ramadan,”	6	October	2012,	http://www.leparisien.fr/politique/ump-cope-
les-pains-au-chocolat-et-le-ramadan-06-10-2012-2209731.php.	This	event	is	particularly	interesting	to	explore.	
Copé	was	specific	in	his	statement.	It	was	not	just	any	snack	that	was	snatched	from	this	boy’s	hands	outside	of	
the	school	(a	problem	in	itself	seeing	as	Ramadan	had	taken	place	during	summer	holidays	that	year),	it	was	a	
“pain	au	chocolat.”	It	begs	the	question,	would	there	have	been	such	a	response	if	Copé	had	merely	said	“snack”	
or	better	yet	“baklava?”	By	using	a	“pain	au	chocolat”	Copé	clearly	marks	the	identity	of	the	boy	as	French	and	the	
young	“thugs”	are	seen	as	trying	to	take	away	just	one	more	thing	that	is	French.	Not	only	are	they	threatening	the	
strict	notion	of	laïcité	in	France,	but	now	they	are	going	after	our	croissants	as	well.	For	Copé	that	is	the	final	straw;	
the	perfect	representation	of	his	“anti-white	racism.”	
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products and France is one of the world’s leading producers and exporters of wine.290 Second, 
the French not only export a great deal of wine, but they consume it in large quantities as well; 
the average resident of France drinks roughly 42.5 litres of wine each year.291 Furthermore, while 
you may not find all of the products listed above on every French restaurant menu, you would be 
hard pressed to find an establishment that serves French cuisine without wine.292 Wine is big 
business, as well as often personally important, to the French. 
Marion Demossier in her 2010 work, Wine Drinking Culture in France: A National Myth 
or a Modern Passion, argues that wine is indispensable to French nationalism. In fact, she states, 
on the first page of her book that the 
majority of French people have little or no knowledge of wine. Yet, paradoxically, wine 
drinking and the culture associated with it are seen by many as an essential part of what it 
means to be French. For French people, wine, or more precisely the love of good wines, 
characterizes Frenchness in much the same way as being born in France, fighting for 
liberty or speaking French.293 
 
Wine consumption, or simply a passion for wine, takes up an emblematic spot in the definition of 
what it means to be “French.”294 There are many reasons why wine has taken up such an 
																																																						
290	France	Trade	Statistics,	accessed	14	Sept	2016,	http://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/france/tradestats;	Per	
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292	There	are	two,	well-known	halal	French	cuisine	restaurants	in	Paris:	Les	Enfants	Terribles	and	Le	Petit	Gourmet,	
where	French	cuisine	is	the	focus	without	wine	on	the	menu.	
293	Marion	Demossier,	Wine	Drinking	Culture	in	France:	A	National	Myth	or	a	Modern	Passion	(Cardiff:	University	of	
Wales	Press,	2010),	1.	The	centrality	of	wine	to	French	identity	was	evident	to	me	as	a	young	woman	travelling	to	
France	for	the	first	time	in	2003.	One	of	the	first	things	that	the	father	of	the	family	I	was	staying	with	showed	me	
after	I	had	settled	in	was	his	wine	cellar.	In	spite	of	my	obvious	lack	of	interest	in	wine	at	that	time,	he	walked	me	
through	his	cellar	collection,	showing	me	the	many	fine	bottles	he	had	with	a	great	sense	of	pride.	I	got	the	
impression,	even	then	as	a	young	woman	who	had	just	finished	high	school,	that	wine	was	essential	to	this	man’s	
self-understanding.	I	got	the	impression	that,	for	him,	showing	me	France	meant	showing	me	wine.	I	have	had	this	
experience	many	times	since,	whether	it	is	someone	showing	me	the	box	of	wine	that	they	keep	hidden	in	their	
closet	of	their	100	square	foot	apartment,	or	massive	collections	in	impressive	“caves”	under	the	streets	of	the	
Marais.	Wine	matters	to	the	French.	
294	The	importance	of	wine	to	the	French	identity	was	highlighted	in	an	event	that	occurred	during	the	recent	
(January	2016)	visit	of	Iranian	president	Hassan	Rouhani	to	France.	After	Rouhani	insisted	that	no	wine	be	served	
at	a	Presidential	luncheon,	French	President	Francois	Hollande	cancelled	the	lunch,	refusing	to	remove	this	
essential	aspect	of	a	French	lunch	from	the	menu.	While	he	was	willing	to	serve	halal	meat,	taking	wine	from	the	
table	was	a	step	too	far.	Hollande	offered	a	breakfast	meeting	instead,	which	Rouhani	refused.	This	event	reveals	
the	complexities	around	what	one	should	or	should	not	accommodate	for	the	“other”	and	the	related	expectations	
of	that	“other”	on	the	host.	Hollande’s	move	reveals	that	there	are	certain	steps	that	the	French	nation	are	willing	
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important place in French nationalism, from it being associated with French soldiers during the 
First World War, or the creation of the Comité de Propagande du Vin by the French government 
in 1931 which “embodied official views of wine in inter-war France,”295 or the fact that wine 
production is one of the most important branches of French agriculture, etcetera. Ultimately, for 
these and many other reasons, 
Wine has, therefore, deep historical resonances for French national culture, inspiring 
patriotic sentiments with its representations rooted in the essentialist concept of the 
nation, and it remains a powerful symbol of cultural continuity in the face of the changing 
relationship between global, national and regional identities in France.296 
 
If drinking wine is one of the many, and some would argue essential, ways to demonstrate one’s 
“Frenchness,” what happens for those individuals who do not consume wine, or even worse, 
view it as haram, sinful, problematic, in their efforts to claim French national identity? Can a 
“French Muslim” really be “French” without consumption of one of the national symbols of this 
identity? 
 
 
2.5.2 French Islam297 
This idea of “French Islam” is particularly important, to this study and to a greater understanding 
of what is “Frenchness” in general. As a result, to understand France’s notion of nationalism I 
explore the topic of “French Islam” here.298 Questions to be addressed in the subsequent section 
																																																						
to	take,	but	others,	ones	that	strike	at	the	very	nature	of	what	it	means	to	be	French,	that	it	is	not	willing	to	budge	
on.	For	a	comprehensive	perspective	on	this	event	and	the	nature	of	hospitality	and	national	identity	see	Adam	
Gopnik,	“France,	Iran,	and	the	Affair	of	the	Lunch	Wine,”	The	New	Yorker,	January	29,	2016,	accessed	February	3,	
2016,	http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/france-iran-and-the-affair-of-the-lunch-wine.	
295	Demossier,	Wine,	20.	
296	Ibid.,	20.	
297	For	an	extensive	history	of	Islam	in	France	from	the	8th	Century	C.E.	to	present	(early	21st	C)	day	see	
Mohammed	Arkoun,	Histoire	de	l’Islam	et	des	musulmans	en	France	du	moyen-âge	à	nos	jours	(Paris:	Albin	Michel,	
2006).	
298	For	works	that	specifically	address	the	possibility	for	a	national	form	of	Islam,	an	“Islam	de	France,”	see:	
Boubakeur	and	Dollé,	L'Islam	de	France;	Bowen,	Can	Islam	be	French?;	Bowen,	“Does	French	Islam	Have	Borders?”;	
Jocelyne	Cesari,	“Islam	in	France:	The	Shaping	of	a	Religious	Minority,”	in	Muslims	in	the	West:	From	Sojourners	to	
Citizens,	ed.	Yvonne	Yazbeck	Haddad,	36-51	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2002);	Cesari,	When	Islam	and	
Democracy	Meet;	S.	Draille	and	H.	Frade,	Islam	en	France,	Islam	de	France?	(Paris:	Mango	Document,	2003);	
Ramadan,	To	be	a	European	Muslim;	Tariq	Ramadan,	Muslims	in	France:	the	Way	Towards	Coexistence	(Markfield,	
Leicester,	U.K.,	Islamic	Foundation,	1999);	Gino	G.	Raymond,	“From	Islam	en	France	to	Islam	de	France:	
Contradictions	of	the	French	Left’s	Responses	to	Islam,”	Patterns	of	Prejudice,	vol.	43,	issue	5	(2009):	481-496;	
Robinson,	“France,”;	Yves	Charles	Zarka,	Sylvie	Taussig	and	Cynthia	Fleury,	eds.,	L’islam	en	France	(Paris:	Presses	
Universitaires	de	France,	2004).	
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are as follows: What does one mean by the term “French Islam?” What is the difference between 
“Islam de France” and “Islam en France?” How do the multiple and hyphenated identities of 
Muslim immigrants affect the notion of “French Islam?” Is there a spectrum of “French Muslim” 
identity? Should one speak of “French Islams” rather than “French Islam?”299 What does the 
identity of “French Islam” reveal about “French” nationalism more broadly? If French national 
identity is, as I described above, based on universalism which strives for equality, an equality 
that is based on the principles of laïcité, which in turn was constructed in direct opposition to 
Islam, is “French Islam” even possible? Relatedly, what impact does the colonial construction of 
what it means to be French, or better, who is excluded from “being French,” as we can see in the 
citizenship cards of the “Français musulman(es)” that I mentioned above, have on those who 
claim this identity? With an understanding of this essential topic, we can have a better 
understanding of the kinds of issues that my informants are constantly working out in their 
efforts to “integrate” into the French national identity, to claim both sides of a potential “French 
Muslim” identity.300 
 
2.5.2.1 “French Islam” Definitional Issues 
What exactly is “French Islam?” Is ‘French Islam” about a uniform Islam in France, a seeming 
impossibility considering the vast diversity of Muslims in the world, or any manifestation of 
																																																						
299	Ahmed	complicates	the	idea	of	using	the	word	“Islams”	to	cover	the	diversity	revealed	in	the	interaction	with	
Islam	in	any	given	context.	He	suggests	that	those	who	use	this	term	do	not	adequately	address	the	“Islam”	which	
is	the	root	concept	in	their	“Islams”	(Ahmed,	What	is	Islam,	130-152).	Always	trying	to	get	at	the	root	term,	he	
takes	issue	with	those	who	use	the	concept	“Islams”	as	a	means	of	expressing	that	“there	are	only	local	
phenomena/islams	which	are	unrelated	(except,	perhaps,	in	their	shared	illusion	that	they	are	each	Islam),	or	
which	are	regulated	through	a	medium	that	has	nothing	to	do	with	a	putative	singular	Islam”	(Ahmed,	What	is	
Islam,	131).	While	Ahmed	complicates	the	use	of	“Islam”	in	the	plural,	other	scholars	suggest	this	may	be	a	way	to	
come	to	terms	with	the	diversity	of	experience	present.	For	example,	Amir	Hussain	in	his	chapter	“Muslims,	
Pluralism	and	Interfaith	Dialogue,”	in	Progressive	Muslims:	On	Justice,	Gender	and	Pluralism,	ed.	Omid	Safi	(Oxford:	
Oneworld,	2003):	251-269,	states	that	“I	use	‘Islams’	in	the	plural	rather	than	‘Islam’	in	the	singular	as	there	are	
multiple	ways	of	being	Muslim	in	any	given	context”	(Amir	Hussain,	“Muslims,	Pluralism	and	Interfaith	Dialogue,”	
268,	note	14).	
300	The	very	idea	of	“French	Islam’	is	problematic	on	many	levels	but	is	also	essential	to	understanding	how	French	
nationalism	is	adopted	or	rejected	by	Muslims	living	in	France.	It	is	problematic	as	it	highlights	that	Islam	and	
Muslim	identity	are	things	that	need	to	be	altered,	or	interacted	within	particular	ways	in	order	to	“fit”	with	French	
notions	of	nationality.	The	very	fact	that	there	is	a	discussion	around	“French	Islam”	and	not	“French	Christianity”	
or	“French	Buddhism”	sends	a	clear	message	about	the	view	of	Islam	vis-à-vis	other	religious	identities	in	the	
Republic.	Regardless	of	its	contested	nature,	many	Muslims	in	France	feel	as	though	their	interaction	with	this	
national	form	of	Islam	is	important	in	showing	their	“French”	nationality.	My	informants	interacted	with	this	
notion	of	French	Islam	and	saw	themselves	as	fitting	within	it,	while	others	purposefully	reacted	against	it.	Either	
way,	the	idea	of	a	“French	Islam”	played	a	role	in	my	informants’	negotiation	of	national	identity.	
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Islam in this locale that fits with French values, approach to church-state relations, etcetera? Can 
only a certain kind of Islam be “French Islam?” To have a voice in the public sphere do Muslims 
need to unite into a single unit? Does that unit need to mobilize in a particular way? Does it have 
to be “French” to have any real effect? What needs to change about “Islam,” or the various ways 
that people enact “Islam,” for it to become “French Islam?”301 
“French Islam” often refers to manifestations of Muslim identity that are in line with 
traditional “French” ideals of laïcité, secularism and the modern Western nation-state. It is 
frequently used to refer to Muslims living in French societies who claim both a Muslim and a 
French identity. “French Islam” cannot insist upon a universal Muslim community in these 
locations; a diversity of ethnic identities is possible and inevitable. That being said, because the 
emphasis in France is primarily on national or “French” identity, these communities will often 
take on universal characteristics. This is most evident in the fact that the “French” part of the 
identity is stressed, mostly by the French host society, and consequently, other identities that 
may seem as threatening to this identity are regularly suppressed, or at least relegated to the 
private sphere. 
Tariq Ramadan, a leading albeit controversial302 scholar in the interaction of Islam and the 
West, addresses the question of what it means to be a European Muslim in his work To be a 
European Muslim: A Study of Islamic Sources in the European Context. His conclusions provide 
insight into specific European contexts, such as that in France. Ramadan suggests that there are 
four parts to Muslim identity: faith, practice and spirituality; understanding of texts and context; 
education and transmission; and action and participation.303 After explaining the central 
importance of these four aspects of Muslim identity, Ramadan then suggests that 
the great responsibility of Muslims in the West is to give an adapted European shape to these 
four dimensions of their identity in light of their Islamic sources which, as to their conception 
of life, death and creation, remain the fundamental reference.304 
																																																						
301	It	is	important	to	note	here	that	there	is	a	diversity	of	national,	sectarian,	ethnic,	cultural	and	religious	
manifestations	of	Islam,	and	consequently	of	Muslim	identity,	in	France.	While,	as	I	discuss	below,	most	Muslims	in	
France	come	from	the	Maghreb,	this	does	not	mean	that	they	all	interact	with	Islam	in	the	same	way,	or	claim	
Muslim	identity	in	the	same	way.		
302	Ramadan	is	a	fairly	polarizing	figure	across	the	globe.	While	some	see	his	work	as	representing	the	voice	of	
modern,	Western	Islam,	others	consider	his	rhetoric	subversive	and	actually	purporting	a	fundamentalist	Islamic	
stance.	See	Caroline	Fourest,	Brother	Tariq:	The	Doublespeak	of	Tariq	Ramadan	(New	York,	NY:	Encounter	Books,	
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According to Ramadan, Muslims in European contexts should not ignore or dismiss any of these 
four aspects of their identities but rather alter them in the necessary ways to hold both their 
Muslim and European identity. Ramadan suggests that through this process an “original Muslim 
identity” emerges that is “neither totally diluted within the European environment nor in reaction 
against it, but rather based on its own foundations according to its Islamic sources.”305 This leads 
me to the question how much can you alter these foundational aspects of identity and still claim 
authenticity. While the first two aspects of Muslim identity mentioned by Ramadan are adaptable 
to Western contexts, matters of individual belief and practice are supported by secular, 
democratic nations; the other aspects are where tension may arise. How one educates one’s 
children and lives out one’s identity in other public spaces, perhaps by what they do or do not 
eat, are the key issues in the negotiation process between Muslims and their European host 
countries. In fact, in many European nations, particularly France, these last two aspects are 
expected to remain private. Ramadan states that “the accomplishment of Muslim identity is to 
express and manifest one’s belief through coherent behaviour.”306 This coherent behaviour often 
includes things such as prayer, fasting, eating halal food, and wearing the hijab; many of which 
are contested in some way, shape or form in European countries. Bowen suggests that 
perhaps an Islam of faith and properly circumscribed devotions could be French, but an 
Islam of schools, mosques, and people whose everyday demeanor marked themselves off 
from others and who sought religious knowledge outside the country—that was a 
different story.307  
 
If Muslims in France are being asked to alter this aspect of their identity to a large extent, to keep 
it firmly within the private realm, can they still be seen as fulfilling this part of their identity and 
as a result maintaining their Muslim identity? Is it possible to have “coherent behaviour” without 
being able to wear the veil, or eat halal food at school, or pray in public places?308 Who decides 
what level of alteration is acceptable and what level is not? Can one be a part of this “original 
Muslim identity” if one removes her veil to attend public school, but insists on wearing it in 
other public spaces? Does this emphasis on behaviour in line with belief ultimately mean that 
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Muslims can be “Muslims in France” but not “French Muslims?” What is the difference between 
“Islam en France” and “Islam de France?” It is to this distinction that we turn our focus now. 
Cesari suggests that there is a new promotion of national forms of Islam, and “Islam de 
France,” that is, “French Islam,” is one example of such a thing.309 She goes on to suggest in a 
later publication that this “Islam de France” has a form based on the interaction with the French 
culture (which arises out of the history of France, its colonial and Republican past). She states 
that “to be Muslim in France means to lose one’s relationship to Islam as a cultural and social 
fait accompli, and instead to open it up to questioning and individual choice.”310 The question 
becomes whether it is possible for Muslims to live with Islam not being a “cultural and social fait 
accompli?” Based on Ramadan’s proposal of the four parts to Muslim identity above, one may 
argue it is, in fact, not possible.  
Whether it seems possible or not, according to Bowen most Muslims in France would claim 
that there needs to be an “Islam de France,” rather than simply “Islam en France.” While this 
may be a desire of Muslims living in France, how Muslims and non-Muslims alike understand 
this term varies. Bowen states, 
for some Muslims and many non-Muslims, the phrase “Islam of France” connotes an Islam 
of piety, without the antiquated trappings of Islamic law, and with less emphasis on the 
practices of prayer and sacrifice. For other Muslims it inspires an effort to rethink Islam in a 
European context without compromising on either its core principles or its norms and 
practices. For many non-Muslim French people, it means cultural “assimilation” to French 
language and culture or social “integration” into a “mixed” society—to be demonstrated by 
choosing designer headscarves over the Islamic kind, eating the same food as everyone else, 
or interacting regularly with non-Muslims. For many in the government, however, the phrase 
means an Islam regulated by the state and bounded by the state's borders, with French 
Islamic institutions and French-trained imams.311 
 
Many different understandings of the term lead to the possibility that everything, and at the same 
time nothing, is “French Islam.” It does appear that assimilation to French language and culture 
is an essential piece of creating an “Islam de France,” but it is difficult to know exactly what that 
entails. Ultimately, the centrality of the separation of public and private and the secular 
foundation of French identity leads to a major conflict between the two parts of the “Islam de 
France” identity. The apparent lack of separation of public and private life, and the emphasis on 
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coherent behaviour in line with belief in the Muslim tradition, are seen as a direct threat to the 
“French speaking culture.” For example, Hurd states that  
up to the present, being a French supporter of laicism has generally meant not being 
Muslim, at least not openly and publicly. One could be Jewish (at times) or Christian, but 
within the concept of “secular Muslim European” has been lodged an assumption that the 
“Muslim” part is subordinate to the “secular” and “European” parts.312 
 
What side of the identity one emphasizes, then, becomes a central question in the discussion of 
“French Islam.” As I argued above, emphasizing both identities may be a difficult task when 
both tend to require that each remains, using Cesari’s language, a “cultural and social fait 
accompli,” and when, according to Hurd, the Muslim side tends to be “subordinate” to the other 
side. 
 
2.5.2.2 “French Islam” Identity Issues 
There is a complicated situation that arises in the interplay of Republicanism in France, 
immigration and related notions of identity. Amselle suggests that the Republican model is in 
fact viable “only if it rests on the prior existence of a plurality of groups that, within the context 
of organic solidarity, are supposed to form a harmonious synthesis.”313 There needs to be a 
diversity of groups present, but the expectation is that those differences, at least visible 
differences, would be erased in a truly Republican, secular country. France needs immigrants and 
different groups to be present, but the expectation is that they will integrate to such an extent that 
an “organic solidarity” emerges. Because of the emphasis in the Republic that all are supposed to 
become one, any notion of “French Islam” is problematic because it highlights a diversity that 
should not be present in the Republican state. This tension leads to a complicated balancing act 
between recognition of a “plurality of groups” and an overarching unity present in France.314  
While most would not use the term “multiculturalism” to define the situation happening in 
France, Amselle does just that. He suggests that the French approach to multiculturalism 
“culminates in the division of the population into minority ‘communities’ on the one hand and 
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the majority ‘French ethnic group’ on the other.”315 This would seem to indicate that having a 
“French Islam” is acceptable under French multiculturalism, as long as the “French” part of the 
identity is emphasized and the “Islam” part of it is seen as the representation of the minority 
community of which one is a member. 
What becomes essential in French multiculturalism, and similarly in Québec 
interculturalism, as I present later, is the interplay between the rights of the individual and the 
rights of the collective; in France both are protected by Republican standards. One can hold any 
identity if that identity does not threaten others; when an identity does threaten others, limits are 
put in place. One may argue, that it is possible for a “French Islam,” if the second identity, Islam, 
does not threaten the first identity, French. This tends to be the argument given in the literature 
on “French Islam” and by politicians and Muslims alike: one can be a “French Muslim” if the 
religious identity does not challenge or interfere with what it means to be “French.” What is 
noteworthy is that, according to the French approach to national identity, any public expression 
of minority identity would innately threaten, challenge and interfere with what it means to be 
“French.” As Susan Worbs describes it,  
France has a tradition of “assimilation policy” that is rooted in the historical process of 
centralization and nation building…The very idea of “minorities” or even “races” and 
policies referring to such categories is rejected in French politics.316 
 
So even if Republican multiculturalism protects minority identities, it relegates them to a 
particular time and place; often in the privacy of one’s home. There seems to be a privileging of 
the collective identity over the individual identity and the question begs to be asked, what 
happens if the first identity, French, threatens the second, Islam? Is this not also a violation of 
Republican ideals? In fact, Scott suggests that the critics of French secularism see this approach 
as violating the democratic principles on which the Republic is founded. In “its claims to 
universalism” secular nationalism has “justified the exclusion or marginalization of those from 
non-European cultures (often immigrants from former colonies) whose systems of belief do no 
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separate public and private in the same way, do not, in other words, conform to those of the 
dominant group.”317  
Ultimately, having a “French Islam” leads to a hyphenated identity. The creation of 
hyphenated identities—Muslim French, French Muslim, etcetera—inevitably lead to questions 
about to which side of the hyphen one belongs.318 These questions become prevalent for second-
generation Muslim immigrants. As argued by Cesari, “while first-generation immigrants often 
live in a state of relative harmony with the religious, social and national aspects of identity, their 
children face a tension, if not an outright conflict, between the layers of individual, collective, 
and national identity.”319 Young French Muslims who have known no other country as home 
other than France are often forced to question their national identity because of the strong 
relationship between ethnic and religious identities. Thus, conflict will often arise over which 
part of one’s identity to emphasize. By stating that “the Republic does not recognize people 
based on their origin. You are French, and there are French people of all ethnic origins,” past 
president of France, Jacques Chirac, reveals the centrality of French identity above all other 
identities.320 Consequently, this centrality is represented by physical action, or inaction, by those 
who claim French identity. Evidence that one is French is found in outward manifestations of 
that identity, and when one’s outward manifestations of identity (what one eats, how one dresses, 
etcetera) highlight a different identity, problems may arise. After all, French universalism 
suggests that “in theory there is no possibility of a hyphenated ethnic/national identity—one 
belongs either to a group or to the nation.”321 While official statements or policies may indicate 
that certain identities (ethnic or religious) do not matter in the French context, it becomes clear 
that on the ground level this is not necessarily the case. Ethnic, religious and other national 
identities are often highlighted and the relationship between them is often misrepresented. 
It is critical to note the conflation of the term Islam, or Muslim, with many other identity 
labels in France. For example, as I noted earlier, immigrant and Muslim have become 
synonymous terms.322 Furthermore, increased numbers of Muslim or Arab immigrants, with no 
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real increase in interaction with those immigrants, leads to a tendency to place a “one-size-fits-
all” label on Arabs living in the West. The relationship between religion and ethnicity and the 
conflation of the two in many of these Western contexts is also important to note. Because the 
host society does not often separate ethnic from religious identity for the Muslim immigrants in 
their midst, difficulty often arises for the Muslim communities themselves to dissociate the two. 
The conflation of ethnic and religious identities is crucial in the discussion of “French Islam.” If 
both the majority French culture, and the Muslim immigrant communities, have a difficult time 
dissociating ethnic identity from religious identity how is a “French Islam,” as an overarching 
label, possible? If Islam in France is specifically Maghrébine Islam (Algerian Islam, Moroccan 
Islam, Tunisian Islam) how can there be a “French Islam?” More essentially if these ethnic 
identities are understood to be foundationally in conflict with “French” identity, how could these 
conflated identities fit with the French identity? If in the term “Muslim” in France the term 
Maghrébine is implicit is it possible to also be “French?” Is it possible to have what Zabel states 
of her mixed identity in Canada in France? She states: “I am an Arab. I am a Syrian. I am a 
Muslim. I am a Canadian. I am an Arab Muslim Canadian. I am very comfortable and proud of 
my identities”323 While these identities are separated out for Zabel, is it possible to do the same 
in France where the ethnic and religious aspects of identity are fused? Perhaps part of the fear of 
establishing a “French Islam” is that these two terms will become conflated as well. 
The fact that ethnic and religious identities are merged, or more specifically, immigrant 
and Muslim, or Muslim and other,324 leads one to the idea that this conflated identity is 
inherently different from one’s national identity. In France “people are increasingly concerned 
with their collective identities as either ‘Maghrebi’/‘Muslim’ or ‘French.’”325 In this quotation 
we can see the fusing of ethnic and religious identity (Maghrébine/Muslim) and the fact that this 
conflated identity is separate from national identity (French). Even if Muslim immigrants are 
acknowledged as being from France, they are often labeled as coming from the “‘other France.’ 
Rarely are they seen for what they are: French nationals.”326 If Muslim immigrants, no matter 
what their ethnic background, feel inherently foreign based on that identity, two possibilities 
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arise for French Islam: first, they hold onto their “foreign” identity and inherently remain outside 
of what it means to be “French,” and “French Islam” is not really a possibility. Or second, they 
sacrifice that “foreign” identity to become “French,” and “French Islam” is not really a 
possibility. Furthermore, this tie between ethnic and religious identity often leads to reluctance to 
take up French national identity on the part of many Muslims (particularly Algerian Muslims) in 
France. Cesari states that “they were reluctant to acquire French nationality, viewing that 
acquisition as a betrayal of their nation’s prior struggle against colonialism,” and “adherence to 
Islam is still one of their primary bulwarks against assimilation.”327 Holding on to identities that 
distinguish rather than integrate does not bode well for a “French Islam.” 
Overall, notions of conflated identities and religious and ethnic identities that are seen as 
in conflict with modern Western notions of the secular state make the idea of “French Islam” 
seem more like an ideal than a reality. The strength of this statement varies from location to 
location with the situation in Canada/Québec, as we’ll see, appearing more welcoming for 
Muslim immigrants to adopt such a hybrid identity, than for those same immigrants in France. In 
fact, Fetzer and Soper ask the question, “the situation for Muslims in some parts of France 
appears so bleak that one wonders why more do not emigrate to a more hospitable country such 
as Britain or Canada.”328 Regardless of which situation may be more welcoming it seems evident 
from the exploration above that the emphasis on “French” identity in France prejudices the 
debate of the possibility of “French Islam.”  
Perhaps the best way to describe Muslims in France, then, is as French and of Muslim 
faith.329 Ramadan actually suggests that it is in fact pointless to dispute over the “terminological 
choice between ‘a French Muslim’ or ‘a Muslim Frenchman.’”330 Instead, Bowen suggests that, 
rather than asking if one identity should be highlighted over another, the better question may be 
“Can Islam become a generally accepted part of French social landscape?...quick off the mark 
there are signs that suggest yes, perhaps, and others that indicate no, maybe not.”331 Whether or 
not there is, or can be, a “French Islam” does not take away from the fact that in the current 
globalized world, these two strong identities must be in negotiation to an extent that was not 
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needed before. Those who hold to both sides of this identity are in an especially problematic 
place, holding two identities that each requires absolute adherence and dedication; after all, how 
can one be both “French first” and “Muslim first”? These conflicts of identity are consequently 
worked out in the hybrid-identifier’s daily life. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
How Maghrébine Muslims live out their daily lives in France, especially as it relates to food 
practice, is the focus of this dissertation. To fully understand the experience of my informants, to 
understand how and why they may or may not change their food practice, and to understand the 
contextual pressures that they face in their daily lives, it is essential to understand the French 
setting that acts as the backdrop to their daily experience.  
To understand how it is that Maghrébine Muslims will find some French food practices a 
normal expression of their own food customs, one must understand the colonial relationship 
between the two locations. While the colonial past between France and the countries of the 
Maghreb leads to negative colonial memory and thus stereotyping behaviour by both sides, it can 
also have positive effects. In the section on colonialism, I began by presenting a brief exploration 
of the role of the baguette and couscous in the relationship between colonizer and colonized. I 
showed how baguette is brought by the French colonizers and becomes an essential element of 
Maghrébine food culture. On the other hand, the colonizer also picks up some of the local food 
culture through the experience of colonization, and thus couscous is enveloped in French food 
culture as well. I suggested here that these culinary familiarities may serve an important role in 
cross cultural understanding and solidarity in present day France. 
France’s colonization of North Africa not only has a direct influence on the familiarity 
with the food of the other, but also the prejudice against it. Thus, I addressed France and North 
Africa’s historical colonial relationship. After addressing a brief overview of that history, I 
discussed how France’s colonization of the countries of the Maghreb, and particularly Algeria, 
took on an air of moral crusade. The French colonist was seen as a liberator, of women in 
particular, in a backward and unenlightened Muslim world. The Algerian, Muslim colonial 
subject, although technically a French citizen during this time, was set apart as separate, as 
different, as not fully French, being given distinct citizenship cards that labelled them as 
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“Français musulman(e)” rather than simply “Français.” The situation was one of hostility, often 
based on the understanding that the Maghrébine Muslim subject was barbaric and violent. The 
image of Maghrébines as violent was concretized in the eyes of the non-Maghrébine French 
through the experience of the Algerian War between 1954 and 1962. Islam became directly 
affiliated with this bloody decolonization effort and thus for many non-Muslim French in both 
the colonies and the metropole, Islam was understood as a violent force; an understanding that 
was then applied to all Maghrébine Muslims, not just Algerians.332 This colonial history and the 
interaction between France and Islam in the colonial context means that a wide variety of 
“colonial memories” or lack thereof are present in France today. These colonial memories 
inevitably affect the relationship between Maghrébine Muslim immigrants and the majority, non-
Muslim French population. When events and situations arise that confirm these negative colonial 
memories, the situation becomes problematic for all sides.  
I followed the discussion of colonization with an examination of the immigration history 
of Maghrébine Muslims to France, and showed how one can see the tensions that may be present 
to transform one’s practice as a reflection of a French identity and not an “immigré(e).” Because 
of France’s colonization of North Africa, and the mere fact of geographical closeness, much of 
France’s immigration numbers come from the countries of the Maghreb. Hence, in the second 
section of this chapter, I discussed the migratory movements of Maghrébine Muslims to France 
and the effect of these immigration patterns on current relationships between immigrant and non-
immigrant French. I used Jocelyne Cesari’s 2009 chapter in Bramadat and Koenig’s work to 
present the three migratory movements of Muslims to France. This overview provides important 
historical context for some of the infrastructure that supports, or does not, the Maghrébine 
Muslim community in Paris. For example, during the first two waves of Muslim migration to 
France, the migrants expected to return to their home contexts and thus lived in temporary 
housing developments meant for single young men in the suburbs of Paris. With the third wave 
of migration, and the change from labourers to family reunification, the Muslim community on 
the ground level in France changed drastically, and yet the infrastructure was not in place to 
																																																						
332	This	view	of	Islam	as	a	violent	force	is	grounded	in	the	French	view	of	the	decolonization	process	in	Algeria,	but	
its	effect	is	often	felt	beyond	the	Algerian	community.	As	I	discuss	in	Chapter	3,	hybridization	of	identities	is	a	
common	occurrence	in	France,	and	Muslims	of	all	origins	are	often	painted	with	the	same	brush.	Moreover,	the	
focus	on	the	Algerian	case	is	particularly	important	for	this	study	because	the	majority	of	my	informants	have	
Algerian	origins,	either	first	or	second	generation	(22	are	Algerian	versus	6	Moroccan	and	5	Tunisian).	
	 96	
accommodate this change, thus creating the overcrowded banlieues that are common place in 
Paris today.  
After presenting these early migratory movements I outlined general demographics about 
Muslim immigration in France. I showed that while Muslims in France come from 123 different 
nationalities, the majority come from the countries of the Maghreb. Additionally, I presented the 
fact that approximately 75 percent of immigrants in France are thought to be Muslim, leading to 
a conflation between the term “immigrant” and “Muslim” (as well as Muslim and North 
African). Since there are roughly six million Muslims in France, and approximately 2.4 million 
of them live in the greater Paris region, a city that has a population of roughly 2.2 million within 
the bounds of the twenty “arrondissements,” one can see how the argument is made by some in 
France that “the immigrant community,” understood “the Muslim community” is overwhelming 
the city and consequently the country. Furthermore, because such a large proportion of Muslim 
immigrants in France are Maghrébine immigrants, one can understand how the conflation of 
cultural and religious food practice are a reality in the French context. “Muslim food” in France 
is often conflated with “Maghrébine food” and vice versa which may influence the interaction 
with and between Muslim and non-Muslim French.  
Moreover, because of France’s approach to secularism, the Muslim immigrant in France 
may find him/herself under more pressure to label religious food practices as cultural food 
practices to not offend the secularist sentiments that rule the nation. To understand the history 
and context that may lead to this kind of sentiment I spent the next section of this chapter directly 
addressing the French approach to secularization, namely laïcité. After a brief examination of the 
history around the separation of church and state in France, and the 1905 law which officially 
removed the power of the Catholic church, and any religion for that matter, from the state, I then 
presented the Republican notion of “freedom from religion.” In this, I showed how France has an 
official secularization policy which protects the state from religion and not the other way around.  
This official secularization policy is that of laïcité which I addressed next in this chapter. 
I showed how this term developed and how people have interacted with it since its imagined 
inception in the 1905 law; the term did not make its official constitutional debut until 1946. 
Laïcité is often argued to entail religious freedom, but as I presented in this chapter, the 
definition of religious freedom is often differently understood by various groups in France. To 
understand the numerous kinds of laïcité possibly active in France I presented Fetzer and Soper’s 
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strict and soft laïcité, and Bowen’s political and social laïcité. Within the criticisms of strict 
laïcité I suggested that laïcité itself has become somewhat of a religion in France, and a central 
orienting principle of French nationality.  
Finally, because of the emphasis on French national identity, and a particular 
understanding of that identity, Muslims in France may need to make more concerted efforts to 
show that they too are “French” and all that that entails. These efforts often include the outward 
manifestations of one’s identity, of which food is essential. I closed the chapter by exploring 
what it means to “be French” and who has access to this national identity. After briefly outlining 
Thomas’ five models of citizenship, and consequently nationality, I suggested that food may be a 
particularly important aspect of the unified culture that is essential to the Republican national 
tradition. In this effort, I explored wine drinking as an crucial aspect of French national identity. 
I asked the question in this section: If drinking wine is one of the many, and some would argue 
essential, ways to demonstrate one’s “Frenchness,” what happens for those individuals who do 
not consume wine, or even worse, view it as haram, sinful, problematic, in their efforts to claim 
French national identity? What effect might this have on the Muslim immigrant living in the 
wine-soaked French nation? Can he/she be both French and Muslim? 
To conclude, I investigated the concept of “French Islam.” Tto understand what might 
make up any European form of Islam, or French Islam in particular, I outlined Tariq Ramadan’s 
four elements of European Muslim identity. I showed that the first two characteristics of 
European Muslim identity according to Ramadan are in line with French notions of laïcité, 
namely (1) faith, practice and spirituality and (2) understanding of texts and context. These 
characteristics can arguably be pursued in private, thus not threatening the strict separation of 
religion and public life that is essential to the French national self-understanding. On the other 
hand, the second two characteristics of European Muslim identity as outlined by Ramadan are 
more in conflict with French understandings of French national identity as secular and 
universalistic, namely (3) the education and transmission of religious identity and (4) action and 
participation. I argued that how one educates one’s children and lives out one’s identity in other 
public spaces, perhaps by what they do or do not eat, are the key issues in the negotiation process 
between Muslims and their European host countries and between the consequent two sides of 
their transnational identity. Whether one can live out these four characteristics in France or not, 
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according to the literature, many Muslims in France would argue that there needs to be an “Islam 
de France” and not just an “Islam en France.”  
I presented the idea that ultimately having a “French Islam” leads to hyphenated 
identities for those who claim membership in this group. Conflict often arises out of the pressure 
from both sides of this hyphenated identity to prioritize one side over the other. One is expected 
to be both French first and Muslim first. Furthermore, with the common conflation of identities 
that is present in France, there is a problem in determining what exactly is meant by both 
“French” and “Islam” in this context. Generally, notions of conflated identities and religious and 
ethnic identities that are seen as in conflict with modern Western notions of the secular state 
make the idea of “French Islam” seem more like an ideal than a reality.  
Overall, in this chapter I have tried to show how the colonial, immigration, secularist and 
nationalistic histories and context of France have a unique effect on the daily lives of the 
Maghrébine Muslims of my study. This effect will be made evident throughout the next three 
chapters as I present the findings from my ethnographic case study of Maghrébine Muslims in 
Paris.   
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Introduction to the Paris Case Study: Food in Identity, Transnationalism and Religious 
Practice 
 
There I was, perched in the park outside of the Grande Mosquée de Paris on one of my first 
Friday afternoons in the city, watching as people filed into the mosque for prayer, young and old, 
men and women, from a variety of backgrounds. As I looked on the mosque filled to capacity 
and latecomers started to flow out of the large wooden front doors onto the stone steps, and then 
onto the concrete sidewalk in front of the mosque. Prayer mats were placed in front of them, 
turning the secular Parisian sidewalk into sacred space. I watched four police officers looking on, 
seemingly keeping things “in check.” I felt slightly uncomfortable by the police presence and 
wondered how this might make those people in attendance feel as well. I wondered how many 
churches had four police officers standing out front on a Sunday during their service. As the 
hundreds of people left the mosque that day, I wondered if I had gotten in over my head. 
The arguments made in the next three chapters are based on the data I collected during 
my six-month fieldwork trip to Paris, France in 2012. The themes that emerged from my data 
analysis of the foodways of my informants speak to three aspects of the Maghrébine Muslim 
experience in France: identity, transnationalism and practice. In Chapter 3 I explore how 
Maghrébine Muslims view themselves, and others in their French context. I address the spectrum 
of approaches to identity consolidation taken by this community, as is made evident by my data, 
and the role that food plays in these negotiations. I then investigate the presence and influence of 
transnationalism on the Maghrébine Muslim community in France in Chapter 4. To this end, I 
show how food functions as a tool for the transnational immigrant to maintain connection with 
the homeland, as well as “integrate” into the host land. Finally, in Chapter 5 I explore how both 
these issues, as well as others, affect the everyday food practice of North African Muslims in 
Paris. I address how the way one self-identifies can have a concrete effect on how one lives one’s 
life on the ground. I also consider how group identity, specifically a transnational one, can 
change one’s religious and cultural food practice outside of the homeland. 
In these three chapters I provide a glimpse into the varied and complex approaches to 
daily life that are present in the Maghrébine community in Paris and how their approach to their 
food practices changes or remains consistent with what they did in the homeland. I demonstrate 
how the individuals of my study address the potentially complicated process of religious identity 
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negotiation and integration in the seemingly unwelcoming context of Republican France by 
using food as a tool and symbol of these processes. 
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Chapter 3: “Et vous, comment voulez-vous que je vous identifie?”333: The Role of Food in 
Identity Negotiation and Presentation amongst Maghrébine Muslims in Paris 
 
3.1 Introduction 
  
Identity is complex and multivalent. We all claim various identities in our lives, some more 
strongly than others, and some more varied than others. While one individual may see himself as 
holding only one identity, another individual may see herself as holding many. Identities are 
claimed and constructed, acted upon and assumed, and every individual will engage with his/her 
own identities in unique ways. What this flexibility leads to is a wide range of identity 
consolidation processes and expressions in any given individual, let alone any community. It is 
impossible to speak of a single Maghrébine Muslim identity in Paris or of a single way that 
Maghrébine Muslims interact with, change or adapt their identities in their immigrant location. 
When dealing with human subjects, perfect typologies are impossible to present. 
While perfect typologies may not be within the realm of possibility, some categorization 
of the data can be useful. All typologies have flaws, but some are a helpful means through which 
to view various phenomena. For this reason, further on in this chapter I use Salman Akhtar’s 
typology of immigrant identity consolidation, which I adjust and expand, to understand the 
identity processes of the Maghrébine community that I studied in France.334 While none of my 
informants were a perfect fit to Akhtar’s four consolidation processes, good examples can be 
found of all. Specifically, I show how food and food practice play a significant role in these 
identity consolidation processes for the informants in my study. Through this analysis, I show 
how some Maghrébine Muslims in France claim a hyper-assimilated, ethnocentric, alienated or 
bi-cultural (what my informants would call a double cultural, and what I would call a 
transnational) identity.335 
Before I address these specific identity consolidation processes, I present some general 
themes that emerged in relation to identity out of my interviews. Information about the identity 
																																																						
333	“And	you,	how	would	you	like	me	to	identify	you?”	This	chapter	title	comes	directly	from	my	list	of	semi-
structured	interview	questions.	
334	Salman	Akhtar,	Immigration	and	Acculturation:	Mourning,	Adaptation	and	the	Next	Generation	(Lanham:	Jason	
Aronson,	2011).	
335	These	are	Akhtar’s	four	identity	consolidation	types.	I	will	address	each	of	them	further	below.	
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of my informants was gathered through specific interview questions related to identity, as well as 
in statements made by my informants to questions not specifically related to identity. What 
became clear, in fact, was that identity was a central concern for my 33 informants. Most 
conversations came back to this issue, to how one identifies oneself and is identified by others. 
One’s practice was influenced by one’s identity, and vice versa. One’s beliefs were influenced by 
one’s identity, and vice versa. One’s interaction with people who hold a similar identity or a 
different identity was influenced by one’s identity, and vice versa. Identity was a central concern 
for the Maghrébine Muslims I interviewed in Paris. 
 
3.2 Multiple Identity Claims: Primary Identity and the Influence of Context 
 
Considering what is known about the French approach to identity, this centrality is not 
surprising. To begin it is important to note some simple statistics on how people identify 
themselves when asked a straightforward question about their identity. When asked, “comment 
voulez-vous que je vous identifie?”336 a person’s first response is often telling of the primary 
identity that he/she holds. In the case of my informants in Paris, primary identity claims were 
quite varied. Of my 33 informants 15 claimed national identity first (46 percent), whether French 
(five informants) or nation of origin (ten informants), seven claimed gender identity as their 
primary identity (21 percent), five claimed Muslim identity first (15 percent), three identified 
their name as their principal identity (9 percent), two listed “world citizen” as their primary 
identity (6 percent), and one claimed his occupation first (3 percent).337 Because of the variation 
in first identities given there were no real patterns of identity claims based on country of origin 
or gender. Of the ten informants who claimed nation of origin as their first identity, nine were 
from Algeria, and one from Tunisia. None of the Moroccans in my study claimed nation of 
origin as their first identity. This does not mean that they did not mention this identity at all; it 
just was not the first identity that they professed. The other minor trend that I found was in 
relation to gender. Of those who claimed their gender identity first, six out of seven were female. 
Interestingly, not everyone who claimed French first were French-born (two were French born, 
																																																						
336	“How	would	you	like	me	to	identify	you?”	
337	One	must	wonder	how	these	responses	might	have	changed,	what	identities	my	informants	might	have	
highlighted,	or	presented	as	primary,	if	I	held	different	identities.	I.e.	if	I	weren’t	a	blond,	white,	Canadian,	woman	
speaking	French?	What	if	I	had	been	a	Muslim?	A	Maghrébine?	A	French	woman?	A	man?	Etcetera.	
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two were Algerian and one was Tunisian). Overall, the most significant first identity to be 
mentioned was a national one with almost half of all informants (with an even split between male 
and female) stating this identity claim first. 
In a country where one’s national identity is seen as holding utmost importance, it is 
understandable why one’s perception of oneself in relation to that identity, and others, is such a 
vital topic. The emphasis on national identity can be seen in the responses to my direct question 
about identity. In 31 of my interviews, the informants highlighted national identity as one of the 
most important identities they held. Moreover, as I just stated, in half of these interviews the 
informants gave either French or one of the Maghrébine national identities as their first identity, 
and if it was not the first identity mentioned it quickly followed the first. National identity was in 
the forefront of all these informants’ minds. One informant explained that this emphasis on 
national identity was the French approach to the question of identity: 
En fait ce que tu dis là, ce n’est pas une approche française de l’identité. Si [c’était] 
l’approche française, je te dirais que je suis Française, que j’ai la double nationalité et que 
je suis tunisienne. Je suis sur le territoire français, donc c’est la primo en France [la 
nationalité française est mise en avant]. Quand je suis en Tunisie, c’est ma nationalité 
tunisienne qui est avant ma nationalité française. Tu vois c’est inversé. Ensuite je te dirais 
que…mon identité s’arrête là.338 
 
National identity is seen as the most important, the only worthwhile identity to mention in the 
French context. It was only in two interviews where this emphasis on some form of national 
identity was not present. In these two cases, the informants referred to themselves as “citoyens 
du monde”339 and refused to label themselves with any strong nationalistic identity.  
In the above quotation, we can also see another theme that emerged in peoples’ responses 
to the question of which identities they presented, namely, that the context would affect how they 
would respond to such a question. I had informants who expressed that they felt more French in 
France and more Maghrébine340 in the Maghreb (i.e. more Algerian in Algeria, more Moroccan 
																																																						
338	121209_001—“In	fact,	what	you	say	there,	is	not	a	French	approach	to	identity.	If	it	was	the	French	approach,	I	
would	tell	you	that	I	am	French,	that	I	have	a	double	nationality	and	that	I	am	Tunisian.	I	am	on	the	French	
territory,	so	it’s	the	first	in	France	[the	French	nationality	is	placed	in	front].	When	I	am	in	Tunisia,	it’s	my	Tunisian	
nationality	that	is	in	front	of	my	French	nationality.	You	see	it’s	the	inverse.	After,	I	would	tell	you…my	identity	
stops	there.”	As	I	addressed	in	Chapter	1,	for	anonymity	I	exclude	all	personal	identifications	from	the	text,	and	use	
a	unique	code	number	for	each	interview.		
339	121108_001;	121124_001—“Citizens	of	the	world.”	
340	I	am	using	the	term	“Maghrébine”	here	to	refer	to	the	three	national	origins	of	my	informants.	Instead	of	listing	
“Algerian,	Moroccan	and	Tunisian”	every	time	I	talk	about	these	identities,	I	am	using	this	term	as	a	catch	all	for	all	
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in Morocco, more Tunisian in Tunisia), or that they would emphasize these identities in these 
locales more strongly.341 On the other hand, I had informants who expressed the exact opposite 
and stated that they felt more Maghrébine in France and more French in the Maghreb.342 When 
one’s identity is the minority, it is often highlighted. Elsewhere, I refer to this as the minority 
status effect; that is, “when one’s identity changes from being one that is shared with the 
majority to one that is representative of a minority, symbols of that identity start to play a more 
significant role for the migrant,” and food is one such symbol.343  
The influence of context on identity could also be seen in relation to religious identity for 
many of my informants. Like the need to emphasize one’s national identity where it is not the 
majority identity, the need to emphasize one’s religious identity when it is not the majority was 
also felt by my informants. One informant explained that, because of the lack of polemic in the 
Maghreb toward Islam, there is no need there to emphasize one’s Muslim identity. Islam is seen 
as “for everyone” and as a result it was not a distinct identity to be held and stated.344  
Furthermore, these informants argued that, in the Maghreb, “on s’identifie pas comme musulman 
car tout le monde l’est.”345 Regardless of polemics, the Muslim identity is presumed to be an 
inevitability and not worth mentioning in the Maghreb. On the other hand, where religious 
identity is not inevitable, i.e. in France, one may feel the need to hold and profess this identity 
more strongly. This falls in line with Steven Vertovec’s suggestion that one’s minority status 
leads to a great deal of self-consciousness, often leading immigrants to become more aware of 
their religion in the migrant context.346 
 
3.2.1 Born Muslim: “même si on ne le veut pas” 347 
The idea that everyone is born Muslim if they are born in the Maghreb presents another thorny 
aspect of the identity negotiations happening for North African Muslims in their immigrant 
																																																						
the	above.	While	regional	identity	is	important	to	my	informants,	as	I	argued	in	Chapter	1,	that	is	not	the	purpose	
of	the	term	here.	
341	121128_001.	
342	121124_001.	
343	Rachel	Brown,	“How	Gelatin	Becomes	an	Essential	Symbol	of	Muslim	Identity:	Food	Practice	as	a	Lens	into	the	
Study	of	Religion	and	Migration,”	Religious	Studies	and	Theology,	vol.	35,	no.	2	(Dec.	2016):	89-113.	
344	121123_001.	
345	121206_001—“We	don’t	identify	as	Muslim	because	everyone	is	one.”	
346	Steven	Vertovec,	Transnationalism	(London	and	New	York:	Routledge,	2009),	140.	
347	120917_001—“Even	if	we	do	not	want	it.”	
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locations. This raises the question of where the separation between innate and chosen identity 
lies. Once one claims an innate identity, an identity that one is “born with,” does that influence to 
what degree that identity is adaptable? Does one’s affinity with the identity grow or weaken 
based on the understanding of it being a “born identity?” Can innate identity be left behind? 
From examining my data, this notion of being “born Muslim” was a prominent idea expressed by 
my informants.  
Before exploring exactly how my informants spoke of this native identity it is important 
to note that there seems to be some conflation of the term Muslim and Maghrébine presented 
here. Peggy Levitt states that when migrants come from contexts where there is little separation 
between church and state, religion and nationality reinforce once another in the migrant 
context.348 This argument was presented by some of my informants, stating that because one is 
Maghrébine, coming from one of the countries of the Maghreb, or seeing oneself as holding this 
regional identity, one is inevitably Muslim as well. This conflation of national, regional and 
religious identities, then, is not merely something that comes from the outside and is projected 
onto members of those communities, but it is something that comes from within the community 
itself. One of my informants expressed that “Muslim” and “Arab” are being conflated in the 
West, yet went on to say that if you are born in the Maghreb, you are born Muslim, buying into 
the very conflation against which she was speaking.349  
This informant was not the only one to express the inherent characteristic of the 
Maghrébine Muslim identity. When speaking about their Muslim identity, 10 of my 33 
informants stated that because they were born in one of the countries of the Maghreb they were 
“born Muslim.” For example, when addressing her Muslim identity and explaining why she 
called herself Muslim in spite of her stating that “Je ne suis pas vraiment pratiquante,” one of my 
informants laughed and said “oui je le suis, mais en fait, à partir du moment où en Algérie on est 
née Algérienne, donc on est systématiquement musulmane même si on ne le veut pas. Voilà. On 
l’est.”350 The idea that one could hold an identity even if one does not want to hold said identity 
is an important aspect of the immigrant’s experience to take into account. Much of the conflict 
																																																						
348	Peggy	Levitt,	“You	know,	Abraham	was	really	the	First	Immigrant”:	Religion	and	Transnational	Migration,”	
International	Migration	Review,	vol.	37,	no.	3	(Fall	2003):	853.	
349	121123_001.	
350	120917_001—“I	am	not	really	practicing;”	“Yes	I	am,	but	in	fact,	from	the	moment	when	in	Algeria,	we	are	born	
Algerian	so	we	are	systematically	Muslim	even	if	we	do	not	want	it.	We	are	it.”	
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that arises around religious identity, and often religious practice, comes from the idea that one 
can choose one’s religious identity and resultant practice. What happens to this idea when 
religious identity is viewed as an innate identity, much like gender or race or even nationality—
and, for that matter, what happens to a Maghrébine immigrant to France when a secular identity 
is viewed as the national innate identity? If one cannot help but claim female, or white or 
Canadian identity based off of the circumstances of her birth how does this change her 
interaction with the world around her? From looking at the response from many of my 
informants that Islam is an inborn identity, could this help us to understand how some may view 
it as difficult to change? Just as it is incredibly difficult to change one’s gender identity in the 
eyes of those around you, could religious identity be just as tough to leave behind, even if one 
desires to leave it? Could this lead to the re-labelling of religious identity as something else, 
namely a cultural identity? 
 
3.2.2 Who Can Claim a Particular Identity? 
This was a significant point made by some of my informants as well, the notion that even if you 
wanted to claim a particular identity, certain contexts, or characteristics may prevent you from 
doing so. Just as much as certain facts would automatically include someone in an identity 
group, i.e. being “born Muslim,” some of my informants spoke of the fact that certain 
characteristics would preclude them from claiming particular identities as well. Something as 
simple as facial hair may trigger this response, as one of my informants explained: 
si quelqu’un, par exemple, il me voit avec la barbe, il dit: pas un Français. Il dit: 
un musulman. Donc moi, je dis musulman, donc je sais dans ma tête, et lui il 
me regarde comme un arabe, ou un musulman. Donc moi, je me sens musulman 
Arabe. 351 
 
He explained to me that because other people see a characteristic or trait, such as a beard, and 
immediately place him into a specific identity group, that he does the same. He does not even try 
to claim another identity because he argues that he would not be allowed to claim that identity 
anyway by most non-bearded French around him. Another of my informants reiterated this point 
when he said “Ça sert à rien de dire qu’on est Français, parce que ça se voit immédiatement sur 
																																																						
351	120726_001—“If	someone,	for	example,	he	sees	me	with	a	beard,	he	does	not	say:	a	Frenchman;	he	says:	a	
Muslim;	so	me,	I	say	Muslim.	So	I	know	in	my	head,	and	he	looks	at	me	like	an	Arab,	or	a	Muslim,	so	for	me,	I	feel	
Muslim	Arab.”	
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nous. Puisque les médias nous ont catalogués depuis x-temps, ça se voit immédiatement sur 
nous.”352 This informant explained that there is no point in claiming French identity when “it is 
seen on” him, i.e. it is clear from his appearance that he is not what is considered “French.” This 
informant went on to explain that he considered himself both, but at the same time explained 
how he did not “feel French” and thus was “not French.”353 While other informants mentioned 
their physical characteristics as limiting them from claiming French identity, some gave other 
examples of traits that precluded them from calling themselves French. For example, one 
informant mentioned their “façon d’être” (way of being) as a reason why “je passerai jamais 
pour quelqu’une qui est née en France. Quelqu’une qui est Française, jamais.”354 For many of my 
informants, food practice was one “façon d’être” which excluded them from being accepted as 
“French.” As one young, second generation Maghrébine woman expressed to me, “la France 
c’est vin, fromage et baguette. Je mange que la baguette. Donc voilà. Je ne suis pas vraiment 
Française, Française.”355 
Another informant claimed, alongside her physique that gave away her identity, that her 
name would not allow her to be viewed as French by the society. She explained that the majority 
non-Muslim French society “me renvoie en permanence le fait que je ne suis pas, de par mon 
physique, de par mon prénom, de par mon nom, Française.”356 Some of the members of the 
community told me of taking on more “French sounding” names in an attempt to avoid 
discrimination and/or to claim French identity more easily. Any symbol or sign of difference 
seemed to lead these informants to believe that there were excluded from the French identity, 
highlighting the idea that to “be French” is to be a part of a “nation one and indivisible.”357 
What is crucial to note about many of my informants who spoke of the inability to claim 
French identity is the fact that most of them have French citizenship. In fact, 20 of my 33 
informants actually had French citizenship. It seemed that whether or not my informants had a 
“right” to claim the French identity had little to do with their actual approach to this identity in 
																																																						
352	121130_001—“It	serves	no	purpose	to	say	we	are	French,	because	it	is	immediately	seen	on	us.	Furthermore,	
the	media	has	categorized	us	since	x	amount	of	time,	so	it	is	seen	immediately	on	us.”	
353	121130_001.	
354	121123_001—“I	will	never	pass	for	someone	who	was	born	in	France,	someone	who	is	French,	never.”	
355	120905_001—“France	is	wine,	cheese	and	baguette.	I	eat	only	the	baguette.	So	there	you	go.	I	am	not	really	
French,	French.”	I	will	return	to	the	role	of	food	in	presenting	identity	below.	
356	121203_006—“Constantly	reminds	me	of	the	fact	that	I	am	not,	by	my	physique,	by	my	given	name,	by	my	
family	name,	not	French.”	
357	Scott,	Politics	of	the	Veil,	2.	
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particular. Instead it was mostly based on perceived or real notions of who is allowed to claim 
this identity. 
While there were many of my informants who felt they could not claim French identity 
for a variety of reasons, there were others who held this national identity strongly, some who had 
citizenship as a reason and others who did not. For example, one informant expressed to me: 
Moi, par exemple, je me sens Français, je ne suis pas Français. Je n’ai pas la nationalité 
française mais je me sens Français. J’ai connu des Maghrébins qui sont Français de 
nationalité mais qui ne se sentent pas Français. Donc c’est vraiment une question difficile 
à répondre. C’est quoi être Français?358 
 
Unlike those informants mentioned above, who could claim French identity based on nationality 
but chose not to for various reasons, this young woman could not claim French identity based on 
nationality but wanted to claim it regardless. Unlike this one informant who could not claim 
French identity based on nationality or citizenship, there were a few of my informants who 
claimed French identity based solely on this fact. Others would claim it because of something as 
simple as time spent in France. One man explained to me that because he had lived in France 
longer than Algeria, and because he had done most of his schooling in France, he felt more 
French than Algerian.359 He had French citizenship, but his main argument behind claiming 
French identity was one based on what he felt rather than what was written on paper. Here we 
can see variations of Thomas’ five models of political membership that I discussed in Chapter 2. 
For some, “being French” was a matter of descent, for others it was a culture, and for others still, 
a contract.360 
 
 
																																																						
358	121206_001—“Me	for	example,	I	feel	French.	I	am	not	French.	I	do	not	have	French	nationality	but	I	feel	
French.	I	know	Maghrébines	who	are	French	in	nationality	but	they	do	not	feel	French.	So	it’s	a	very	difficult	
question	to	answer.	What	is	it	to	be	French?”	This	informant,	in	her	response	to	my	question	“when	you	hear	the	
word	integration,	what	comes	to	mind?”	kept	posing	the	rhetorical	question	“what	is	it	to	be	French?”	She	
discussed	how	the	answer	to	this	question	varies	depending	on	who	is	responding.	For	some,	she	suggested,	it	is	to	
be	Catholic,	for	others	it	involves	giving	up	one’s	nation	of	birth,	for	others	still	one’s	ability	to	speak	French	is	the	
key,	while	for	others	that	doesn’t	matter	as	long	as	one	is	white,	for	some	it	is	a	matter	of	papers,	and	others	it	is	a	
question	of	integration,	while	for	others	integration	does	not	matter	at	all	as	long	as	you	are	from	the	right	
background,	and	for	her	it	was	a	matter	of	adopting	French	culture,	which	included	picking	wine	and	cheese	and	
exploring	small	regions	of	the	country.	In	all	of	this,	this	informant	suggested	that	to	answer	the	question,	“what	is	
it	to	be	French?”	was	almost	impossible	considering	the	diversity	of	opinions.		
359	121202_004.	
360	Thomas,	Immigration,	34-46.	
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3.2.3 Informants’ Definition of French Identity 
Considering the multiple responses to French identity that I just outlined, the question becomes: 
What is French identity according to this group of Maghrébine Muslims in Paris? I have 
presented the fact that this identity is often seen as inaccessible to Maghrébine Muslims in 
France. If it is in fact accessible, I have shown how it is viewed as desirable by some, and 
undesirable by others. But is there consensus on what constitutes this identity? While no perfect 
consensus can be reached as to what French identity means, there are some characteristics 
presented by my informants that they view as evidence for “French” identity. One of the 
strongest pieces of evidence that one can present is citizenship/nationality. It was argued that if 
you were French on paper, it was an identity that you could hold. But, as seen above, sometimes 
this paper definition was not enough either for the Maghrébine Muslim trying to claim it, or for 
the non-Maghrébine, non-Muslim, majority French population.  
One common thread that was presented by my informants who spoke about French 
identity was the primacy of this identity in the majority French population’s eyes. In line with the 
universalistic approach to nationalism that Scott outlines in her work,361 my informants argued 
that French identity is viewed as the most important identity one can hold, and is in fact the only 
identity one should hold in France. All other identities that one may hold are relegated to the 
realm of “culture” or “origins” and even then, are meant to be kept private.362 For example, one 
informant told me that she was not French because she did not have French citizenship, but if 
one day she were to get French citizenship, she would then label herself “Française d’origine 
algérienne.”363 Although she proudly stated her Algerian identity at that moment, where she had 
not yet claimed French identity, she described the process of relegating her Algerian identity to 
one of simple “origins” if she were to claim the French identity.   
So the French identity, in this case, is seen as superseding all other identities, but what is 
this French identity? How is it understood by those North African Muslims who are trying to 
claim it? Although the terms were used interchangeably by my informants, there appears to be a 
difference between French citizenship and French nationality.364 This distinction can be seen 
																																																						
361	Scott,	Politics	of	the	Veil,	11-13.	
362	Ibid.,	11.	
363	121102_001—“French	of	Algerian	origin.”	
364	This	distinction	is	made	entirely	by	myself	to	separate	the	two	seeming	ways	that	my	informants	spoke	about	
French	nationality.	My	informants	themselves	would	use	the	words	“citoyenneté”	and	“nationalité”	
interchangeably.	One	person	would	use	what	I	label	“citizenship”	as	“nationality”	while	another	would	use	what	I	
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especially in those informants who have French citizenship and yet do not feel as if they have 
what is required to claim French nationality and thus French identity.365 In these cases, the 
informants would describe French citizenship as a simple legalistic or tactical aspect of their 
experience of living in France.366 For example, one young woman explained to me that she had 
French citizenship but would never call herself French. For her, because she was not born in 
France, it was not an identity but simply a bureaucratic fact of life; hers was a contractual 
understanding of French nationality.367 Similarly, another informant explained that he obtained 
French citizenship simply to help with gaining employment, not for “le patriotisme français.”368  
French citizenship can be a necessity rather than a cherished identity. This is distinct 
from French nationality, which is something that one is either born with or claims for oneself 
based on common culture. In the cases of those informants who are born in France, this identity 
is unquestioned. That being said, there are some circumstances where my informants did not 
have French nationality but did have French citizenship and saw it as much more than just a 
necessity; they saw it as an important identity. One of these informants, who claimed French 
identity based on the time he spent living in France and his lack of connection to the homeland, 
expressed the following about French national identity, 
c’est la notion de ce qu’on appelle l’identité nationale, qu’est-ce que être Français, c’est 
plutôt la question de qu’est-ce que être Français. Est-ce que être Français c’est boire du 
vin, manger de la charcuterie, avoir un béret, la baguette, etcetera? Non, est-ce qu’être 
Français c’est parler français, vivre en France, croire en certaines démocraties, en 
certaines, je dirai oui, en certaines idées, en certaines visions. C’est plutôt ça. 
Personnellement.369 
 
																																																						
label	“nationality”	as	“citizenship.”	The	point	is	to	show	how	this	identity	can	be	constructed	and	understood	in	
different	ways.	
365	As	I	explained	in	Chapter	2,	Elaine	R.	Thomas	presents	five	ways	of	understanding	the	national	“we”	that	are	at	
work	in	France	in	her	work	Immigration,	Islam,	and	the	Politics	of	Belonging	in	France,	34-46.	Because	descent	and	
shared	culture	are	the	two	strongest	ways	of	understanding	nationality	present	in	the	Republic,	even	if	one	has	a	
“contract,”	i.e.	citizenship,	with	the	French	Republic,	this	does	not	equate	to	a	feeling	of	belonging	in	the	national	
“we.”	
366	This	understanding	is	similar	to	the	“contract”	way	of	understanding	the	national	“we”	in	Thomas,	Immigration,	
34-46.	
367	121105_001.	In	line	with	Thomas’	discussion	of	the	5	types	of	national	“we,”	specifically	the	contract	citizenship	
(Thomas,	Immigration,	34-46).	
368	121129_002—“French	patriotism.”	
369	121202_004—“It’s	the	notion	of	what	we	call	national	identity,	what	is	it	to	be	French.	It’s	more	the	question	of	
what	is	it	to	be	French.	Is	to	be	French	to	drink	wine,	eat	charcuterie,	have	a	beret,	the	baguette,	etc?	No,	is	to	be	
French,	to	speak	French,	to	live	in	France,	believe	in	certain	democracies,	in	certain,	I	would	say	yes,	in	certain	
ideas,	in	certain	visions,	it’s	more	that.	Personally.”	
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For this informant being “French” was so much more than simply a matter of where one was 
born, or what one ate; it was about sharing ideas and cultures. Perhaps this is also why some of 
my informants who had French citizenship could not or would not choose to identify as 
nationalistically French, because they did not see themselves as holding the same culture. For my 
informants who professed Maghrébine identity as their primary identity this choice was 
particularly evident. These informants emphasized the fact that they were Algerian, Moroccan or 
Tunisian, and that it was an identity of which they were very proud and which clearly 
distinguished them from native-born French identifiers. These informants were happy to be 
excluded from the “French” identity and be called a “blédard.” This is a term used by the 
majority French population and by those whom they are labeling as such, to refer to someone 
who comes from the Maghreb. It can be seen as having a condescending connotation to it, 
attaching some notion of “country bumpkin” to those who are labeled with it. While the majority 
French population sees it as a negative label, there are those from the Maghreb who see it as a 
compliment, as evidence that they have not lost their culture from their homeland and as 
evidence that their Maghrébine identity remains strong.370 These informants emphasized that 
they were NOT French, and were proudly from “au bled” and this led to a confidence of identity 
that those who hold a “double culture” could not possibly have. Or so they would argue. 
 
3.3 Double Culture: The Benefits and Downfalls of Two National Identities 
 
The idea of “double culture” frequently arose in my fieldwork.371 Ten of my 33 informants spoke 
about the idea of “double culture” and its effects on either themselves or others in their 
communities. The basic notion presented by my informants was that someone who holds a 
“double culture,” who has a double identity, is someone who holds both French and Maghrébine 
identity.372 Commonly this “double culture” was seen as being held by second or third generation 
Maghrébines born in France. What was noteworthy from my data was that, in fact, my 
informants who were born in France did not outright mention this “double culture.” Four of my 
																																																						
370	I	will	return	to	the	ways	that	my	informants	use	this	term	as	a	point	of	pride	and	as	an	essential	identity	in	Paris	
later	in	this	chapter.	
371	I	explore	how	people	negotiate	their	“double	culture”	when	I	explore	Salman	Akhtar’s	typology	of	identity	
negotiation	later	in	this	chapter.		
372	Baumann	takes	issue	with	the	idea	that	someone	can	be	“between	two	cultures,”	as	this	reveals	the	difficulty	of	
seeing	“culture”	itself	as	reified	(Baumann,	Contesting	Culture,	14).	
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five French born informants did not see themselves as holding a Maghrébine identity at all. 
Instead this part of their lives was relegated to either “origins”373 or “l’identité de mes 
parents.”374 The traditions that these “origins” provided were clearly important to these second 
generation Maghrébines and would even become focal points of much of their daily lives, but 
according to them did not influence how they identify themselves. The one French-born 
informant who did claim both French and Maghrébine identity stressed all sides of her identity. 
She began by saying “je suis Française mais je suis Tunisienne, d’origine tunisienne.”375 If she 
had stopped at this identity statement, one may have been able to place her with her cohort of 
second generation Maghrébines mentioned above who relegate their Maghrébine identity to that 
of origins. Instead, she continued, calling herself “Française, musulmane, Tunisienne” and then, 
after emphasizing the centrality of her Muslim identity, “musulmane, Tunisienne, Française.”376 
All three identities were mentioned to varying degrees but all three were important. What is 
fascinating to note is that this informant’s sister stressed that she did not hold a Tunisian identity 
at all. This is just one of many examples that shows how identity is highly individual and 
influenced by a variety of factors. 
While my French-born informants did not speak of a ‘double culture,” many of my first-
generation Maghrébine immigrant informants did. It seems that the idea of a “double culture” is 
one that is imposed from outside the French context. It is what is used by Maghrébine 
immigrants to illustrate what identity they, or they assume others, hold. My informants who were 
born in the Maghreb, who claimed a “double culture” identity, often saw themselves as having 
some level of “French” identity before they even moved to the French mainland. For example, 
one informant explained to me: 
J’ai la nationalité française, tout à fait. Je me sens un peu franco-algérien, les deux. Je 
préfère prendre les deux cultures. La culture que mes parents m’ont donnée et la culture 
française que j’ai acquise ici, mais qu’aussi mes parents m’ont donnée. Mes parents, déjà, 
ils avaient cette culture française. Mon père était dans la marine française, il était 
canonnier; donc il nous a éduqué avec cette double culture avant que je vienne en France. 
Donc, les deux se mélangent.377 
																																																						
373	120905_001;	121031_001.	
374	121005_001;	121106_001;	121108_001—“My	parents’	identity.”	
375	120822_001—“I	am	French	but	I	am	Tunisian,	with	Tunisian	origins.”	
376	Ibid.	
377	121205_002—“I	have	French	nationality,	absolutely.	I	feel	a	bit	Franco-Algerian,	both	of	them.	I	prefer	to	take	
the	two	cultures.	The	culture	that	my	parents	gave	me	and	the	French	culture	that	I	acquired	here	but	also	that	my	
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Although this person was not born with this “double culture” in the strictest understanding of it, 
he believed it to be a significant aspect of his identity. For this informant, and many others, this 
“double culture” identity was a beneficial thing, a thing of beauty, and one that they were proud 
to hold. 
 Those informants who professed a “double culture” for themselves tended to argue that it 
was a positive thing. One informant stated that they saw the “double culture” as positive because 
it allowed the person who proclaimed it access to multiple cultures.378  
Similarly, speaking specifically as it relates to food, one informant suggested that the 
beauty of the “double culture” was that one could tap into either side when needed and had 
access to two of the richest and most varied food cultures in the world. Instead of being 
American and “eating hamburgers” all the time, she saw her “double culture” as giving her 
access to richness and variation, in diet but also in life.379 
While those who professed a “double culture” saw it as beneficial, those who refused this 
identity saw it as problematic. Again, it is important to note that these informants, who spoke of 
“double culture” and its downfalls did not hold the identity themselves. Instead they projected 
the problems with holding a “double cultural” identity on second and third generation 
Maghrébine Muslims in France. Although they projected it onto these “others,” my interviews 
with second generation Maghrébines in Paris did not reveal that a “double cultural” identity was 
something with which these second generation Maghrébines struggled. Moreover, they were not 
even speaking about such an issue. It was, in fact, first generation Maghrébines who held both 
sides of the “double cultural” identity. Regardless, because my sample size of second generation 
Maghrébines was so small, I cannot state that the characteristics and struggles that my 
informants spoke of for those holding a “double culture” did not exist. My data merely reveals 
that generalisations should not be made about all second generation Maghrébines by the 
mainstream French culture, nor the first generation Maghrébines in the larger community. 
 
 
																																																						
parents	gave	me.	My	parents	already,	they	had	this	French	culture.	My	father	was	in	the	French	Marines,	he	was	a	
“canonnier”,	so	he	educated	us	with	this	double	culture	before	I	came	to	France.	So	the	two	mix.”	
378	121205_001.	
379	121203_006.	
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3.3.1 Characteristics of Double Culture 
So what were the characteristics and struggles of the so-called “double cultural” identity? First, 
according to my informants, the issue was seen as one of inner turmoil. Identity negotiation can 
be a tough task in the best circumstances. When one is faced with two seemingly competing and 
strong identities, this can lead to much confusion within oneself. In fact, one informant expressed 
the issue as one of disruption. By not knowing which part of your identity is your true identity, 
you are left with a disruptive thought process that makes everything else in your life difficult or 
disengaged. In fact, this informant suggested that “en finale, de faire partie de deux choses c’est 
faire partie de rien.”380 This “double culture” was seen as a “sad” thing, sad to not know who you 
are, and it was a reason why many of my informants were glad to “not have this problem.”381  
This desire to avoid the problem of not knowing who you are often led these informants 
to profess an even stronger Maghrébine identity. Another informant, the only one who claimed a 
“double culture” and saw it as problematic, expressed that this “double culture” was something 
that needed to be resolved. There was a notion of unrest, or uneasiness with holding to both 
sides. 
Évidemment, j’ai un problème d’identité à résoudre; enfin que j’arrive à le résoudre…J’ai 
accepté de couper la poire en deux. J’ai accepté d’avoir une identité française en France 
et une identité tunisienne en Tunisie. Et je n’exporte pas l’une à l’autre.382 
 
Ultimately, this informant argues that it is impossible to hold both sides of the “double cultural” 
identity at the same time. While one can hold one side at a particular moment and the other at 
another moment, they are seen as foundationally incompatible, impossible to project equally in 
the same moment. This is reflected in Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth when he states that the 
person “who is Arab and French…if he wants to be sincere with himself, chooses the negation of 
one of these two determinations.”383 Another informant suggested that even if one may wish to 
hold both sides of this “double culture” identity that person would be viewed by those who hold 
strictly to one or the other as not holding either. Like the informant mentioned above who 
																																																						
380	121123_001—“In	the	end,	to	be	a	part	of	two	things	is	to	be	a	part	of	nothing.”	
381	121128_001.	
382	121209_001—“Evidently	I	have	an	identity	problem	to	resolve;	I	finally	managed	to	solve	it…I	accepted	to	cut	
the	pear	in	two.	I	accepted	to	have	the	French	identity	in	France	and	a	Tunisian	identity	in	Tunisia.	And	I	do	not	
export	one	to	the	other.”	
383	Fanon,	Wretched,	155-156.	
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suggested that to be a part of two things is to be a part of neither, this informant explained to me 
that those who hold a “double culture” are viewed as immigrants in both contexts. 
Tous les étrangers en France sont nulle part chez eux. Quand on est en France, on est des 
étrangers; quand on retourne chez nous, on est des étrangers. On n’est nulle part chez 
nous, on est au milieu. Vous voyez? Lorsqu’on arrive par exemple au Maroc, “les 
immigré(e)s sont là, ah les immigré(e)s,’’ et quand on arrive en France, “Ah, les 
immigré(e)s sont là”....On est tout le temps traités comme immigré(e)s, donc on n’a pas 
une place où c’est chez nous.384 
 
This conflict of being labeled an “immigrant” in both contexts, of being stripped of both sides of 
the “double culture” identity, is seen as problematic for the informants who spoke of it. 
This notion of not being able to find oneself in either side of the “double culture” leads to 
the idea that one cannot possibly know who we are when we have two competing identities. 
Because of our innate drive to identify ourselves, this process would lead second and third 
generation Maghrébines to identify instead with another identity, the only one that clearly made 
sense, according to my informants, and that was often Islam. The idea presented here was that 
one had such a strong need to identify, but was told from all angles, both interior and exterior, 
that one could not identify with either or both national identities. The result? Strong 
identification with another identity, usually a religious one.  
This was one argument presented to me for why radicalization may be a reality for some 
Muslim youth in the banlieues in Paris. According to this argument, the youth are “told” by the 
majority French population that they are not French, and yet at the same time are “told” by the 
majority Maghrébine population that they are not Maghrébine. The one identity that they are told 
they can hold, that they feel an un-negotiated connection to, is their religious identity. In 
speaking about the second and third generation Maghrébines in the banlieues of Paris, one 
informant explained to me the following: 
Après il y a les extrémistes…tu sais comment ils arrivent à les avoir [à leur convaincre de 
les joindre]? En fait, ils viennent, ils s’occupent d’eux, ils leurs donnent du travail, ils 
leurs promettent des choses. Et bien eux, ils ont trouvé tout simplement: je viens en 
France et la France m’a rejeté, elle n’a rien fait pour moi. Pourquoi je n’irais pas vers 
eux?385 
																																																						
384	121130_001—“All	foreigners	in	France	are	nowhere	at	home.	When	we	are	in	France,	we	are	foreigners,	when	
we	return	home	we	are	foreigners.	We	are	nowhere	at	home,	we	are	in	the	middle.	You	see?	When	we	arrive	in	
for	example	Morocco,	“the	immigrants	are	here,	ah	the	immigrants”,	and	when	we	arrive	in	France,	“ah,	the	
immigrants	are	here”…We	are	always	treated	like	immigrants,	so	we	do	not	have	a	place	that	is	our	home.”	
385	121201_002—“After	there	are	the	extremists…do	you	know	how	they	manage	to	have	them	[to	convince	the	
youth	to	join	them]?	In	fact,	they	come,	they	take	care	of	them,	they	give	them	work,	they	promise	them	things.	
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They claim Muslim identity to be part of something.386 The need to identify, to understand 
oneself in relation to others is essential, especially in one’s youth, and this conflict of not 
knowing one side of a “double culture” but trying to hold to both may lead to a potentially 
stronger religious identity. In fact, one informant explained that extreme religious factions, like 
the Muslim brotherhood, will take advantage of this need for identity in many of these newer 
generation youth, and will draw them in, solely because they can offer a clear identity, a clear 
community, and a clear understanding of one’s role amidst the majority population that 
surrounds them.387  
It is because of the potential fragility of a “double culture” that many of my informants 
hold one or the other identity, French or Maghrébine. While some argued for the potential of 
conflicted identities leading to more extreme expressions of religiosity, most of my informants 
would not claim this type of religious identity but would profess something that I am calling 
“cultural Muslim” identity. It is to that topic that I turn next. 
 
3.4 “J’ai une culture musulmane”388: Cultural Muslims in Paris 
 
One of the main parameters of my study was that my informants would hold some notion of 
Muslim identity. They had to claim Maghrébine identity in some way, but they also had to claim 
Muslim identity to some degree. As I presented in Chapter 1, how one claimed this religious 
identity varied drastically across my data set, but all stated at some point in their interview that 
they were “Muslim” in some way. While other scholars, or even individuals within the 
community, may argue that there are specific characteristics or actions that one must have to be 
labeled as Muslim, my only restriction was that the informants saw themselves as Muslim to 
some degree. As I explained in Chapter 1, Ahmed in his work What is Islam takes issue with this 
“Whatever-Muslims-Say-It-Is” definition of Islam.389 While I agree with Ahmed, that suggesting 
that “whatever-Muslims-say-it-is” leads to problems in terms of defining Islam, I was not 
																																																						
And	well,	in	the	end	they	find	themselves	simply,	“I	come	to	France	and	France	rejects	me,	she	does	nothing	for	
me,	why	wouldn’t	I	go	toward	them?”	
386	121123_001—“A	bit	to	say	‘I	am	part	of	something.’”	
387	121202_004.	
388	121128_001—“I	have	a	Muslim	culture.”	
389	Ahmed,	What	is	Islam,	266-270.	
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seeking a definition of Islam from my informants. Instead I was allowing them to define 
themselves as Muslim, in whatever way was meaningful to them. In agreement with Ahmed, I 
argue that “whatever and however differently Islam may mean to Muslims, to all Muslims Islam 
is meaningful.”390 That being Muslim, whatever that may denote, was a meaningful identity to 
my informants was my only requirement for inclusion in my study.	This requirement led to an 
intriguing self-understanding held by some of my informants: that of “cultural Muslim identity.” 
In fact, 12 of my 33 informants (over one third) classified their Muslim identity as a “cultural” 
one. 
 
3.4.1 Cultural Islam: Definition 
Before exploring what these 12 informants said about their Muslim identity, I present what it is 
that I mean by “cultural Muslims,” and how someone fits into this category. First, it is vital to 
address the problematic nature of categorization, and the separation of “cultural Muslim” identity 
from “religious Muslim” identity. Again, I turn to Ahmed’s What is Islam to address the 
criticism of this approach. Ahmed suggests that breaking apart religion and culture into separate 
categories, as Hodgson does in his The Venture of Islam,391 is problematic because it assumes 
that there is a thing that is “true” Islam, the religion, while other, usually understood cultural 
manifestations are somehow less authentically ‘Islam.’392 He also suggests that by organizing 
phenomena in binary ways such as this we miss out on the “human and historical phenomenon of 
Islam.”393 I argue that by choosing to try to separate out this category, and showing the incredible 
variation within all categories that we may as scholars try to impose on our informants, it is my 
intention in fact to draw attention to the “human and historical phenomenon of Islam.”394 
Furthermore, by focussing on these “cultural manifestations” or “cultural identities” I show how 
these informants’ enactment of Islam is no less authentic than those who label themselves as 
																																																						
390	Ibid.,	249.	
391	Hodgson	uses	three	separate	terms	where	Ahmed	uses	one.	Broadly	speaking,	for	Hodgson,	Islam	=	religion,	
Islamdom	=	society	and	Islamicate	=	culture,	such	that	Islamicate	“would	refer	not	directly	to	the	religion,	Islam,	
itself	but	to	the	social	and	cultural	complex	historically	associated	with	Islam	and	the	Muslims.”	Marshall	G.S.	
Hodgson,	The	Venture	of	Islam:	Conscience	and	History	in	a	World	Civilization,	Volume	One,	The	Classical	Age	of	
Islam	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1974),	59.		
392	Ahmed,	What	is	Islam,	162-164,	171.	
393	Ibid.,	116.	
394	I	address	this	diversity	of	interaction	within	and	between	the	categories	of	“culture”	and	“religion”	further	in	
chapters	5	and	8.	
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“religious” Muslims. I do acknowledge that in any attempt to categorize, to place people within a 
particular understanding of a given phenomenon, that I am guilty of trying to determine the 
bounds of the concentrate of Islam present in my informants’ experience.395 
My understanding of who is a “cultural Muslim” or what it means to be “culturally 
Muslim” comes largely from my informants who labeled themselves as such. For example, one 
informant, in response to my question about identity, responded: 
Je suis une femme, je suis Algérienne et je suis de culture musulmane. Je ne me considère 
pas comme croyante religieuse, mais inévitablement j’ai une culture musulmane, vu que 
j’ai grandi dans un milieu complètement religieux.396 
 
This informant went on to explain that while she identified much more closely with her Muslim 
identity as a religious one in Algeria, once she came to France and had distance from her family 
and the religious milieu, she saw it more as a cultural identity. This Muslim culture for her was 
often dependent on one’s traditions. In the words of another informant: “Oui, je suis musulman, 
oui. Je le sens, mais c’est plus par mimétisme, par tradition, par habitude.”397 From these 
examples it became clear to me that there was a specific identity at work that I needed to explore.  
At first glance I thought that this identity might have something to do with the often-
made distinction between “practicing” and “non-practicing” Muslims; no matter how 
complicated this distinction may be considering the various definitions of practice and non-
practice. I questioned whether the label of “cultural Muslim” was something someone used to 
replace the label of “non-practicing Muslim.” By examining the responses of my informants, 
particularly in relationship to their practice, it became clear that these were in fact two separate 
aspects of their identities. One could be a “practicing” cultural Muslim or a “non-practicing” 
																																																						
395	Ahmed	suggests	that	“any	such	conceptualization	of	Islam	that	is	based	on	identifying	an	Islam-concentrate	
whose	presence	in	greater	or	lesser	dilution	may	then	be	measured	in	some	sort	of	litmus	test	inevitably	leaves	us	
with	the	problem	of	determining	when	it	is	that	a	given	phenomenon	is	characterized	by	a	sufficient	quantum	of	
the	concentrate	‘Islam’	to	be	‘Islamic’	and	when	it	is	not.	In	the	absence	of	universally	accepted	criterion	by	which	
to	distinguish	the	Islamic	from	the	Islamicate,	we—Muslims	and	Unbelievers	alike—will,	like	Hodgson,	inevitably	
fall	back	onto	our	own	respective	preconceptions	and	predilections	to	determine	what	that	concentrate	is”	
(Ahmed,	What	is	Islam,	175).	
396	121128_001—“I	am	a	woman,	I	am	Algerian	and	I	am	of	a	Muslim	culture.	I	do	not	consider	myself	a	religious	
believer	but	inevitably,	I	have	a	Muslim	culture,	seeing	as	I	grew	up	in	a	completely	religious	milieu.”	Another	
informant	said	“je	suis	musulmane.	Je	ne	suis	pas	croyante	en	l’Islam	mais	je	suis	d’une	culture	musulmane	(I	am	
Muslim.	I	am	not	a	believer	in	Islam	but	I	come	from	a	Muslim	culture)”	(121209_001).	
397	121206_001—“Yes,	I	am	Muslim,	yes.	I	feel	like	it,	but	it	is	more	by	mimicking,	by	tradition,	by	habit.”	
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cultural Muslim; so practicing versus non-practicing could be a subset of this overarching 
identity of “cultural Islam.” Non-practice was not the hinge on which this identity rested. 
In fact, for most of my “cultural Muslims” it was practice that was the evidence of their 
Muslim identity, in place of creed or belief or belonging. Those informants who had some 
“religious” practice in which they would continue to engage did so because of cultural reasons, 
not religious ones, where religious refers to a sense of personal piety.398 For example, they did so 
because they wanted to maintain tradition or connection to homeland, because it was habit, 
etcetera. The evidence of their “cultural Islamic” identity was often a specific action that they 
took. For example, the informant above, who expressed being Muslim by tradition, explained to 
me that he was not practicing and yet he did practice Ramadan. It was basically based on this 
practice alone that his Muslim identity rested. He explained:  
Je fais le ramadan par exemple. En même temps, je ne fais pas la prière, je bois de 
l’alcool, je mange du porc, etcetera. Mais je me sens quand même musulman. Même si je 
ne pratique pas du tout, je me sens quand même musulman. C’est dans une notion un peu 
culturelle et aussi d’un point de vue de religion et aussi d’un point de vue culturel, mais 
culturellement musulman.399 
 
Ramadan was seemingly the only distinguishing thing about this informant’s practice or 
behaviour that made him “Muslim.” 
What distinguished the “cultural Muslims” from “religious Muslims” seemed to be the 
intention behind the action. If the intention behind the action or identity was because of tradition 
or culture, and not because of some deep-seated conviction, belief or religious understanding, 
then it was often a good example of cultural commitment rather than religious commitment for 
my informants. These informants still feel Muslim, but they simply have a different intention 
behind this identity than someone who feels Muslim because of personal piety reasons.  One 
informant described this as follows: 
En fait, je suis musulmane, mais pas dans le fond de la religion…C’est-à-dire que, 
comment expliquer ça? C’est, je me sens musulmane dans les sens où, dans ma culture, 
dans mon entourage, dans ma façon aussi de pratiquer, [en]fin, de pratiquer les fêtes par 
																																																						
398	This	is	in	line	with	Hodgson’s	understanding	as	presented	by	Ahmed	in	What	is	Islam:	“the	core	of	Islam	the	
religion	is	personal	piety”	(161).	
399	121206_001—“I	do	Ramadan	for	example.	At	the	same	time,	I	do	not	do	the	prayers,	I	drink	alcohol,	I	eat	pork,	
etc.	But	I	feel	Muslim	all	the	same.	Even	if	I	do	not	practice	at	all,	I	feel	Muslim	all	the	same.	It	is	in	a	slightly	
cultural	notion	and	also	from	the	point	of	view	of	religion	and	also	from	the	cultural	point	of	view,	but	culturally	
Muslim.”	
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exemple, je peux fêter une fête musulmane. Donc, je peux [me] sentir [musulmane], mais 
après, je peux passer de l’autre côté sans aucun problème.400 
 
This woman celebrates Muslim festivals and holidays because of a cultural identification with 
these things, not a traditionally understood religious one. As she explains, it is because it is 
cultural and not religious that she can easily move to the other side (understood as the non-
Muslim way of life/identity) with ease. 
These kinds of engagements with Islam reveal how complicated it can be to define what 
is religion and what is culture. For these 12 informants who considered themselves “cultural 
Muslims” they still very much functioned within common understandings of “religion.”401 In 
fact, I am not trying here to suggest that these informants were not “pure” Muslims, or 
“authentic” Muslims, or not fully engaged with Islam as such, and only Islamicate.402 I am 
simply trying to present the self-understanding that was presented to me in the field by these 12 
people.403 
Ultimately, because religious conviction was not behind these informants’ identity, this 
way of imagining oneself in the world allowed for a greater flexibility in practice and processes 
of identity for them. There was a greater degree of picking and choosing which aspects of one’s 
identity to live out for these cultural Muslims than for more, traditionally understood, religious 
																																																						
400	120917_001—“In	fact,	I	am	Muslim	but	not	deep	in	the	religion…That	means,	how	do	I	explain	that?	It’s,	I	feel	
Muslim	in	the	sense	where,	in	my	culture,	in	my	entourage,	in	my	way	of	practicing.	Like,	practicing	the	holidays	
for	example.	I	can	celebrate	a	Muslim	holiday.	So,	I	can	feel	[Muslim],	but	after	I	can	pass	to	the	other	side	without	
issue.”	
401	Space	is	not	sufficient	to	explore	the	many	definitions	of	religion	and	culture	that	exist	in	the	study	of	religion,	
and	specifically	in	the	study	of	Islam.	For	an	excellent	overview,	see	chapters	3	and	4	in	Ahmed’s	What	is	Islam.	
402	Again,	see	Hodgson’s	The	Venture	of	Islam.	
403	Steven	Vertovec	in	his	work	Transnationalism	suggests	that	there	are	seven	different	trajectories	of	identity	for	
Muslims	in	Europe:	“(1)	the	secular	option—discarding	Muslim	identity	altogether;	(2)	the	cooperative	option—
playing	on	Muslim	identity	in	the	process	of	pursuing	common	goals	with	other	groups;	(3)	the	cultural	option—
maintaining	certain	social	and	cultural	practices	without	much	religious	sentiment;	(4)	the	religions	option—
emphasizing	wholly	scriptural	modes	of	religious	affiliation	at	the	expense	of	cultural	aspects	(an	option	described	
by	some	as	‘fundamentalist’);	(5)	the	ethnic-religious	option—perpetuating	a	specific	national	or	regional	form	of	
Islam	(e.g.	Moroccan);	(6)	the	behavioural	option—expressing	Islamic	tenets	through	moral	or	ritual	behaviour	
only;	and	(7)	the	ideological	option—identifying	with	or	opposing	the	‘official’	Islam	of	a	particular	home	country”	
(154-55).	My	category	of	“cultural	Muslim”	here	is	a	combination	of	Vertovec’s	“cultural,”	“ethnic-religious”	and	
“behavioural”	options.	Levitt	similarly	provides	5	ways	of	being	religions	in	her	work	God	Needs	No	Passport:	(1)	
the	strict	faithful,	(2)	the	questioning	faithful,	(3)	the	Golden	Rule	faithful,	(4)	the	Symbolic	faithful,	and	(5)	the	self-
help	faithful.	My	category	of	cultural	Muslim	is	most	similar	to	her	“Symbolic	faithful”	as	they	are	“people	who	
used	religious	symbols	to	express	feelings	of	religiosity	and	identification	[emphasis	mine],	without	participating	
regularly	in	religious	culture	or	celebrations”	(104).	
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Muslims.404 Partaking in Ramadan was the most consistent, “cultural” practice engaged in by 
“cultural Muslims,” but even that would be absent for some. Basically, the cultural Muslim 
would rely on whatever practice, belief, or behaviour that represented their culture the most to 
them; that meaningfully represented their own understanding of Islam. For most of these so-
called cultural Muslims it was a food practice or set of food practices that was the clearest 
representation of their Muslim identity. 
 
3.5 The Role of Food in Identity Negotiations for Maghrébine Muslims in Paris405 
 
Food plays a significant role in identity formation. It aides in solidarity and separation and thus 
clearly defines the in group from the out group. In fact, “anthropological work has produced a 
broad consensus that food is about commensality—eating to make friends—and competition—
eating to make enemies.”406 Eugene Anderson in his work Everyone Eats, notes that the word 
companion comes from the Latin word for “bread sharer”; those with whom we eat are those 
with whom we are close.407 Furthermore, Mary Douglas presents a hierarchy of food experience 
and intimacy,408 showing that it is foundationally through food practice that boundaries are 
constructed within and between groups.409 If this is the case, in an immigrant context this may 
lead certain groups to invite or exclude others to eat with them in a statement about who is “in” 
and who is “out” of the realm of intimacy. Douglas suggests that the various ways that we 
interact with one another around food reveals a great deal about our social relationships. It is in 
the distinction between meals and drinks where this becomes evident. She states that 
drinks are for strangers, acquaintances, workmen, and family. Meals are for family, close 
friends, honoured guests. The grand operator of the system is the line between intimacy 
																																																						
404	I	return	to	this	idea	of	cultural	versus	religious	practice	and	flexibility	versus	obligation	in	Chapter	5.	
405	Parts	of	this	section	have	been	published	in	my	chapter,	“Tell	me	What	you	Eat	and	I’ll	Tell	you	What	you	Are.	
The	Literal	Consumption	of	Identity	for	North	African	Muslims	in	Paris,	France,”	in	Everyday	Life	Practices	of	
Muslims	in	Europe:	Consumptions	and	Aesthetics,	ed.	Erkan	Toguslu	(Leuven:	Leuven	University	Press,	2015),	41-
56.	
406	Sutton,	Remembrance	of	Repasts,	5.	Claude	Fischler	in	his	work	“Commensality,	Society	and	Culture,”	Social	
Science	Information,	vol.	50,	no.	3-4	(December	2011):	528-548,	supports	this	by	stating	that	“while	commensality	
bonds	participants,	it	also	excludes	outsiders”	(529).	
407	Eugene	N.	Anderson,	Everyone	Eats:	Understanding	Food	and	Culture	(New	York:	New	York	University	Press,	
2005),	125.	
408	Mary	Douglas,	“Deciphering	a	Meal,”	Daedalus	Vol.	10,	No.1	(1972):	66.	
409	Graham	Harvey,	in	agreement	with	Douglas,	also	emphasizes	that	what	one	eats,	or	does	not	eat,	places	one	in	
a	group	that	behaves	in	similar	ways.	Harvey,	“Respectfully	Eating,”	39-40.	
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and distance. Those we know at meals we also know at drinks. The meal expresses close 
friendship. Those we only know at drinks we know less intimately.410 
 
Similarly, Miller, Rozin and Fiske suggest that food sharing indicates a relationship that is 
personal rather than professional.411 Markedly, 19 of my Paris 33 interviews (58 percent) were 
conducted over drinks (coffee, tea, wine, etc.), nine had no consumption involved at all (27 
percent), two were over drinks and sweets (six percent), two over a meal at a restaurant (6 
percent), and only one over a meal at the informant’s home (3 percent). This general lack of 
invitation to partake in a meal with my informants often felt like a message, along the lines of 
Douglas’ distinction above, that I was not included in the intimate group. As time went on, and I 
gained some level of bread-sharer status, I began to receive dinner invitations, but these were 
still mostly limited to meals located outside of the informant’s home. By the end of my 
fieldwork, I had eaten in the homes of only five of my informants - a dramatic difference from 
my experience in Montréal which I address in the Montréal case study chapters. 
 
3.5.1 Food and Muslim Identity 
Beyond stating that I was not a member of the in-group through the kinds of consumption 
experiences I was invited to be a part of, my informants also clearly stated what made them a 
part of that group through what or how they ate. Beyond the simple statement about one’s 
predilection for pork or not, the informants in my study would speak about alcohol, halal meat 
and the fast of Ramadan when addressing what makes them Muslim. In response to the interview 
question about Muslim identity, about what practices and/or beliefs are indicative of Muslim 
religion or culture,412 every single one of my 33 informants made some mention of food or a 
food practice as indicative and foundational to their Muslim identity. While not everyone spoke 
about daily prayer, alms giving, or even a basic belief in God and Muhammad, every single 
informant either spoke about fasting, halal, pork or alcohol and often all four. For example, one 
																																																						
410	Douglas,	“Deciphering,”	66.	
411	Lisa	Miller,	Paul	Rozin,	and	Alan	Page	Fiske,	“Food	Sharing	and	Feeding	Another	Person	Suggest	Intimacy:	Two	
Studies	of	American	College	Students,”	European	Journal	of	Social	Psychology,	vol.	28,	no.	3	(1998):	423-236.	
412	The	question	that	I	asked	was	“Je	suppose	que	vous	êtes	musulman/e.	Est-ce	correct?	[Yes;	if	No,	the	interview	
possibly	ends,	but	sometimes	a	“No”	can	really	mean	“I’m	not	a	good	Muslim,”	so	a	few	other	questions	can	be	
asked	to	tease	out	a	proper	response].	Pourriez-vous	me	parler	du	type	d'Islam	que	vous	pratiquez?	Qu’est-ce	que	
ça	veut	dire	d’être	musulman(e)?”	(I	suppose	that	you	are	Muslim.	Is	that	correct?	Could	you	speak	to	me	about	
the	kind	of	Islam	that	you	practice?	What	does	it	mean	to	be	Muslim?).	
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young woman said to me “je suis musulmane, je suis née musulmane, je fais le ramadan, oui, 
mais pas la prière.”413 Similarly, another informant answered the question of what it means to be 
Muslim, or how she shows that she is Muslim, with the following response: “je ne suis pas 
pratiquante. Je ne fais pas la prière. Je fais le carême mais c’est plus par tradition. Je fais ma 
religion. Je ne mange pas du porc. Je bois de l’alcool.”414 When I asked another informant if she 
felt Muslim, in spite of not practicing, she responded as follows: 
Oui, oui, parce que je fais, par exemple, le ramadan. Ça je le fais parce que, pour moi, 
c’est important. Je ne conçois pas de ne pas le faire. Par contre, faire les prières tous les 
jours, non, parce que je ne [les] connais pas et je ne cherche pas trop. Mais ce que je peux 
faire, je le fais: le ramadan et je ne mange pas de porc.415 
 
A food practice, often Ramadan, is the base on which their Muslim identities rested. 
Consumption practices seem to act as an important means of self-identification for many 
immigrants. 
 Ethnic/religious identity hinges on a food practice. The problem arises that, if the non-
Muslim French population see a representation of religious identity in the food that Muslims in 
France eat, this could cause a potentially difficult setback for Muslims who are also trying to 
claim French identities. The notion of being French first and not having visible identities other 
than French identity are foundational for the French understanding of who can and cannot be 
French.416 If Muslims are eating halal meat, which is inevitably seen as a religious food practice, 
this may be seen as an affront to secular understandings of how to live one’s life in France. Food 
as a religious or ethnic identity marker can hinder the integration process into French identity.417 
It may hinder it because if Muslim immigrants in France refuse to consume food that is seen as 
central to French identity, i.e. wine and pork, it may be questioned how they can possibly 
integrate fully into that identity. One informant expressed the centrality of food to French 
																																																						
413	121105_001—“I	am	Muslim,	I	was	born	Muslim,	I	do	Ramadan,	yes,	but	not	the	prayers.”	
414	121123_001—“I	am	not	practicing.	I	do	not	pray.	I	do	the	fast	but	it’s	more	by	tradition.	I	practice	my	religion.	I	
do	not	eat	pork.	I	drink	alcohol.”	
415	121129_001—“Yes,	yes,	because	I	do,	for	example,	Ramadan.	That	I	do	because,	for	me,	it’s	important.	I	cannot	
conceive	to	not	do	it.	On	the	other	hand,	do	the	prayers	every	day?	No,	because	I	do	not	know	them	and	I	don’t	
look	too	far	to.	But	what	I	can	do,	I	do.	So,	Ramadan,	and	I	don’t	eat	pork.”	
416	For	discussions	about	French	notions	of	identity	and	laïcité,	especially	in	relation	to	Muslims	in	France,	see	
Bowen,	Why	the	French	don’t	like	Headscarves;	Bowen	“Does	French	Islam	Have	Borders?”;	Fetzer	and	Soper,	
Muslims	and	the	State.	
417	It	can	also	aid	integration.	One	only	needs	to	think	of	the	many	Maghrébine	dishes	which	French	people	
incorporate	into	their	own	culinary	preferences.	By	consuming	couscous,	tajine,	Moroccan	mint	tea,	etcetera,	the	
French	may	be	prompted	to	view	these	“foreigners”	as	French.	
	 124	
identity when she expressed to me that “la France c’est vin, fromage et baguette. Je mange que la 
baguette. Donc voilà. Je ne suis pas vraiment Française, Française.”418 As I argued in Chapter 2 
of this work, Marion Demossier in her work Wine Drinking Culture in France suggests that wine 
is so intertwined with French identity that to not drink wine firmly places one as an outsider.419 
Another of my informants expressed this very feeling to me: 
En France, l’alcool c’est une mode de vie. Il fait partie de la culture. Quand on va chez 
quelqu’un on emmène une bouteille de vin que l’on va choisir. On n’emmène pas de pot 
de fleurs, on emmène du vin; on n’emmène pas de gâteau, pas de chocolat sauf si la 
femme est enceinte. On emmène une bouteille de vin que l’on va ouvrir, que l’on va 
partager…quand on ne boit pas d’alcool, on n’a pas accès à certain plaisirs purement 
français.420 
 
How can Muslims, then, at least those who do not drink wine, the product of the French ground 
and culture, claim this identity?  
 
3.5.2 Akhtar’s Four Categories of Identity Negotiation 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, in order to explore the various responses to 
identity negotiation that were present for my informants I use the fourfold typology presented by 
Salman Akhtar in his 2011 work Immigration and Acculturation as a framing tool.421 The four 
immigrant identities that he presents are the (1) ethnocentric identity, (2) hyperassimilated 
identity, (3) alienated identity, and (4) bicultural identity.422 Like any typology there are no 
																																																						
418	120905_001—“France	is	wine,	cheese	and	baguette.	I	eat	only	the	baguette.	So	there	you	go.	I	am	not	really	
French,	French.”	
419	Demossier,	Wine	Drinking	Culture	in	France,	27-29.	
420	121206_001—“In	France,	alcohol	is	a	way	of	life.	It	is	part	of	the	culture.	When	we	go	to	someone’s	house	we	
bring	a	bottle	of	wine	that	we	will	choose.	We	do	not	bring	a	pot	of	flowers,	we	bring	wine;	we	do	not	bring	a	cake,	
no	chocolate,	unless	the	woman	is	pregnant.	We	bring	a	bottle	of	wine	that	we	will	open,	and	that	we	will	
share…When	we	do	not	drink	alcohol,	we	do	not	have	access	to	certain	purely	French	pleasures.”	
421	Akhtar,	Immigration	and	Acculturation.		
422	We	find	similar	categories	for	the	experience	of	migrants	in	Peggy	Levitt,	God	Needs	No	Passport,	Immigrants	
and	the	Changing	American	Religious	Landscape	(New	York:	The	New	Press,	2007).	While	Levitt	posits	six	national	
responses	that	religious	migrants	can	take	(American,	Homeland,	Ethnic	National,	Dual	National,	Cosmopolitan,	
Religious	Global	Citizens)	in	the	host	context	only	a	couple	overlap	with	Akhtar’s	categories	here.	For	example,	
Levitt’s	“American,”	what	I	will	in	the	conclusion	call	“hostland”	identity,	overlaps	with	Akhtar’s	hyperassimilated	
identity.	Her	“Homeland”	identity	equates	to	Akhtar’s	“ethnocentric”	and	her	“Dual	National”	equates	to	Akhtar’s	
“Bi-cultural”	identity	negotiation.	Levitt	does	not	present	a	category	that	fits	with	Akhtar’s	alienated	identity.	
Derek	S.	Hicks,	“An	Unusual	Feast:	Gumbo	and	the	Complex	Brew	of	Black	Religion,”	in	Religion,	Food	&	Eating	in	
North	America,	eds.	Benjamin	E.	Zeller,	Marie	W.	Dallam,	Reid	L.	Neilson	and	Nora	L.	Rubel	(New	York:	Columbia	
University	Press,	2014),	134-153,	also	presents	the	ways	that	foodways	communicate	messages	about	cultural	
identity	in	three	ways:	the	migrant	can	1)	focus	on	the	host	context	identity	and	reject	the	home;	(2)	aggressively	
maintain	traditional	foodways;	(3)	blend	the	two	(Hicks,	“Unusual	Feast,”	145).	These	reflect	three	of	the	four	
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perfect examples of any of these identity types and most of my informants would have 
characteristics of all four of these categories. Most of the informants did generally fall in line 
with at least one of the four categories, most often Akhtar’s second and fourth categories. I now 
present each of his categories in turn and show how food plays a foundational role in identity 
negotiations for my informants. 
  
3.5.2.1 Akhtar’s Ethnocentric Identity 
Akhtar’s first category is that of “ethnocentric identity.” This term encapsulates people who 
emphasize their ethnic/religious identity in their immigrant location, often more so than they did 
“au bled” (in the homeland). When one finds oneself in an unfamiliar context it is not unusual to 
hold to the familiar more strongly. Religious and ethnic practices may be emphasized in the 
beginning as a way to maintain feelings of connection to the homeland, and if continued can lead 
to communalistic trends. What may start as a simple search for the familiar can lead to separate 
communities formed by people who speak only with other Maghrébines, only in Arabic, who 
shop only at halal butcher shops and who eat only traditional North African food.  
 In relation to food, then, ethnocentric identities are represented by heightened 
ethnic/religious food practices. Here the immigrant would cook mostly food from the home 
location, in religiously prescribed ways. As Akhtar states, in restaurants “things that were 
familiar and beloved are nowhere to be found while tabooed items dance proudly on the menu’s 
floor. Waking up from such culinary nightmare, the immigrant rushes to an ethnic restaurant that 
serves food familiar to him.”423  
 While many of my informants spoke about this sort of identity consolidation process 
happening for others, specifically those Muslims who live in communities in the banlieues, my 
data set itself did not provide many examples of this sort of extreme ethnic maintenance 
response; nevertheless, many of the informants would eat at ethnically-run restaurants when they 
were feeling homesick and were looking for transnational connection. For example, one 
informant stated that eating at an ethnically-run restaurant allowed him to maintain “repères”424 
																																																						
identity	consolidation	processes	presented	by	Akhtar	here.	(1)	is	the	hyperassimilated	identity,	(2)	is	the	
ethnocentric	identity,	(3)	is	the	bicultural	identity.	Again,	there	is	no	equivalent	to	Akhtar’s	“alienated”	identity	in	
Hicks’	work.	
423	Akhtar,	Immigration,	96.	
424	121205_002—“Moorings.”	
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with which he could understand himself. Using this word in particular reveals how food grounds 
an ethnocentric identity.  
Many of my informants expressed an increase in religious and ethnic food practices in the 
host location—that is, ethnocentric food practice became more prominent in France than in the 
Maghreb in some cases. This was evident in relation to the practice of eating halal food. A few 
informants expressed that it was in France that they learned what halal food was, and as a result 
it was in France that this practice became even more important than in the Maghreb. Although 
this practice was unknown to the informants back home in the Maghreb, it still became affiliated 
with Maghrébine/Muslim practice and one’s engagement in that practice, becoming an example 
of an “ethnocentric” practice and identity.  
While many of the informants in my study had subtle moments of emphasis on 
ethnocentric identity, it was more in my interactions with people at the mosque where this sort of 
identity consolidation process was evident. In speaking with some of the community members 
there, as well as with some of the leadership, emphasis was placed on eating only halal and only 
North African dishes. The notion of eating pork or drinking wine was seen as an example of 
French people’s general character of excess and immorality, and maintaining religious food 
practices was thus essential in showing how they were different from the indulgent French. It 
was crucial in creating boundaries that marked Maghrébine identity as separate. 
 
3.5.2.2 Akhtar’s Hyperassimilated Identity 
Akhtar’s second category of “hyperassimilated identity” was clearly represented in my 
interviews. While the notion of assimilation or integration carries a great deal of negative 
connotation for many of the people in the communities which I study, the idea of adapting one’s 
identity and practice in the host location, to become more French, is common. Scholars of 
Muslim communities in France such as John R. Bowen and Jocelyne Cesari suggest that in many 
instances assimilation is judged by the degree to which immigrants lose their culturally-specific 
behaviours and blend into the French model.425 Whether being categorized as “practicing versus 
believing” or “good versus bad” Muslim, Maghrébine immigrants are often judged by the host 
society and by themselves based on which practices they leave behind.  
																																																						
425	Bowen,	Why	the	French	don’t	like	Headscarves;	Cesari	and	McLoughlin,	European	Muslims.	
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In the French context where food and drink are central to national identity, these elements 
are one avenue that immigrants can use to show their assimilated, integrated identity. Hence, 
“hyperassimilated” immigrants would reject their home food and would take up eating the host 
nation’s food. In comparison to ethnocentric identity types who may eat 85 percent Maghrébine 
food and maintain religious food practices, these “hyperassimilated” immigrants would eat 85 
percent French food and often leave religious food practices behind. For example, in an 
interview with one young woman she expressed the following opinion to me: “En Tunisie, je ne 
recherche pas à manger de porc, de foie gras, je mange ce qu’il y a; je m’adapte. Mais en France, 
c’est vrai, j’ai un comportement, des habitudes françaises, on va dire.”426 In this she suggested 
that adaptation to the cultural setting on all levels was important; one assimilates to either side 
when one finds oneself in a context with a particular culinary approach. She went on to explain 
that she prepares mostly French fare when in France. Another woman whom I interviewed drank 
alcohol (champagne specifically), ate pork, did not necessarily eat halal meat and generally 
cooked European dishes at home. In this she was able to show that she was just like everyone 
else, even though she stated that “la société française me renvoie l’idée que je ne suis pas 
Française.”427 While the “hyperassimilated” immigrant may emphasize French modes of eating, 
some cultural/religious food practices are still kept, usually depending on the situation and 
community one finds oneself in. 
 
3.5.2.3 Akhtar’s Alienated Identity 
The third category of identity consolidation in Akhtar’s typology is that of the “alienated 
identity.” This type of immigrant neither identifies with the home or host identity.428 They feel 
lost in between. One may find the “alienated” identity in the experience of very recent 
immigrants: those immigrants who have just arrived in the host land and are trying to negotiate 
on what end of the spectrum of assimilation and ethnocentrism they are going to fall on. 
Furthermore, this “alienated” identity negotiation may be found in those individuals who do not 
want to be identified with their home culture because of experiences of prejudice against those 
cultures, and yet cannot, or do not want to, identify with the host culture.  
																																																						
426	121209_001—“In	Tunisia,	I	do	not	look	to	eat	pork,	foie	gras,	I	eat	what	there	is;	I	adapt.	But	in	France,	it’s	true	I	
have	a	behaviour,	shall	we	call	it,	French	habits.”	
427	121203_006—“The	French	society	sends	me	the	idea	that	I	am	not	French.”	
428	Akhtar,	Immigration,	192.	
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One young woman whom I interviewed was a good example of this identity negotiation. 
On the one hand, she could not imagine eating pork, or leaving many of her religious and 
cultural food practices aside; she could not identify as fully French. On the other hand, she was 
also hesitant about putting extreme emphasis on the Maghrébine Muslim food practice and this 
expression of identity because she saw many of her compatriots as “too extreme”429 and 
consequently feeding into the prejudicial approach to this community in France. She felt like she 
could not identify with her home or host culture and as a result was left in what Akhtar would 
call an “alienated” space, not sure what or how to identify herself. 
While this young woman personally expressed a desire to not identify with either 
Akhtar’s “ethnocentric” or “hyperassimilated” identities, this “alienated identity” was often one 
placed on other members of the Maghrébine Muslim community in Paris by my informants. 
Informants would express that while it is not an identity that they held, they did see many so-
called alienated people in the community. This identity was often placed on second and third 
generation Maghrébine Muslims, who could not really claim French identity because of being 
othered by non-Muslim French, and yet at the same time could not really claim Maghrébine 
identity because of being othered by Maghrébines in the Maghreb.  
A few of the informants in the study noted that because these (other) people were stuck 
between two identities, they would struggle with which practices to engage in. Tension would 
arise in debates regarding the consumption of halal products and drinking alcohol most 
prominently. The “double culture” identifiers would try to find a place in both the French and the 
Maghrébine cultures that surrounded them, often making them feel unable to claim either.  
While some people remained in this “alienated identity” state for long periods of time, 
many people in this circumstance latched more strongly onto the Muslim identity; the only 
identity which these second and third generation Maghrébines felt that they could undoubtedly 
claim. This would then lead to large groups who would find themselves in the “ethnocentric 
identity” category, but specifically as it relates to their Muslim identity. Food practices such as 
keeping halal, not eating pork, not drinking alcohol and fasting for Ramadan, become important 
for these previously “alienated” identifiers, even more so than those who hold the “ethnocentric 
identity” from the beginning. 
 
																																																						
429	120905_001.	
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3.5.2.4 Akhtar’s Bicultural Identity 
Immigrants who embrace both sides of a possible hyphenated identity represent Akhbar’s fourth 
category: “bicultural identity.” They embrace beliefs and practices of both home and host 
country. While the alienated immigrant is one who is conflicted by their bi- or double cultural 
identity, the bicultural immigrant according to Akhtar is one who is comfortable on both sides of 
their identity.430 For these informants, they were both fully French and fully 
Muslim/Maghrébine, again acknowledging that for them these terms were often interchangeable.  
Even for those of my informants who saw themselves as only Maghrébine, the food 
practices in which these immigrants engage represent an admixture of loyalties to two cultures. I 
interviewed Maghrébine Muslims who called themselves Muslims, who practiced the Ramadan 
fast, but who would also eat pork and drink alcohol. I interviewed Maghrébine Muslims who 
would state that they are not really Muslim but at the same time would not eat pork and not drink 
alcohol amidst friends and colleagues who would. A multifaceted case was presented by a man 
who stated: “je consomme uniquement et exclusivement de la viande halal,”431 and yet, in the 
same breath, emphasized his desire to eat French fare. In fact, he opened a restaurant that makes 
high end, traditional French food. He explained that he opened the restaurant because of 
les frustrations que j’ai eues autant que musulman qui mange halal: ne pas pouvoir manger 
français, la cuisine française, alors que j’ai grandi en France, je m’ai baigné en France, j’ai 
une culture française. Le fait de ne pas pouvoir manger français c’était la frustration, ce 
que j’appelais gastronomique. La discrimination gastronomique…maintenant on n’est plus 
discriminé. On peut manger français, on peut manger du foie, on peut manger du magret 
de canard, tout le temps respectant sa religion.432 
 
While this “bi-cultural” Muslim maintained his practice of eating halal, but halal French food, 
for most of the immigrants with whom I spoke who fit in this category, the idea of keeping halal 
seemed to be the most flexible of food practices; it was the most easily left behind. Many would 
buy halal meat for their homes, but not restrain themselves to only eating halal meat when they 
																																																						
430	For	this	chapter,	I	use	Akhtar’s	“bicultural”	label	although	I	prefer	to	call	this	identity	negotiation	process	
“transnational”	and	discuss	my	use	of	this	term	in	Chapter	7.	
431	121031_001—“I	eat	uniquely	and	exclusively	halal	meat.”	
432	121031_001—“The	frustrations	that	I	had	as	a	Muslim	who	eats	halal	who	was	not	able	to	eat	French,	French	
cuisine,	even	though	I	grew	up	in	France,	I	bathed	in	France,	I	have	a	French	culture,	but	the	fact	to	not	be	able	to	
eat	 French,	 that	was	 the	 frustration.	 I	 call	 that	 gastronomical	 discrimination.	But	now	we	are	not	discriminated	
[against].	We	can	eat	French.	We	can	eat	liver	pâté.	We	can	eat	duck	cutlet,	all	the	while	respecting	one’s	religion.”	
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were at school or work or out for dinner with friends. For example, one woman I interviewed 
expressed the following:  
On ne mange pas le porc. Voilà. Nous ne mangeons pas le porc. Voilà, c’est tout. Si non, 
mais… uh … en général on mange de la viande halal. Mais des fois, par exemple, surtout 
au travail, des fois ça m’arrive d’aller manger au Macdo [McDonald’s]. Macdo…la 
viande… ce n’est pas halal. Voilà.433 
 
Others would reject halal completely, suggesting that it did not matter to them in their new 
immigrant location at all. For example, one woman said to me, “alors, je m’en fous de la viande 
halal…peut être que j’ai plus de respect pour ma dernière paire de chaussettes misent en panier 
de linge sale; non, je m’en fous, mais royalement.”434 
These adjustments in ethnic/religious food practice are evident for people who label 
themselves, in one form or another, cultural Muslims.  One of these Muslims expressed to me 
that he did not believe in God necessarily but still saw himself as a culturally Muslim Algerian 
French man. When explaining some of his practices to me he stated that, to not shock certain 
family members or friends he would practice the fast for the month of Ramadan. He expressed 
that,  
traditionnellement, je ne mange pas du porc, par exemple. Uh, l’alcool, je bois de l’alcool. 
Pas de porc, pas de, les vrais interdits c’est ça, c’est le porc, c’est les viandes qui n’ont pas 
été, comment dire? Si j’ai le choix entre la viande halal et pas de viande halal, je prendrais 
la viande halal. Malheureusement, on n’a pas toujours le choix.435 
 
The complexity of practice and understanding of identity is made clear in the aforementioned 
example. Furthermore, the woman who cared less about halal than she did about her dirty socks 
told me that she generally bought halal food and would prepare traditional Maghrébine dishes at 
home, but would also eat pork even if she did not like it. She expressed some of her double 
culture in the following way: 
Je n’aime pas le porc. J’aime pas la charcuterie. Mais je mange du porc…. Ça me 
dérange pas. Pour moi c’est comme, uh, les épinards. Je mange pas les épinards parce que 
j’aime pas les épinards, mais si je suis bloqué sur une île déserte avec une boîte 
d’épinards, je vais manger des épinards. C’est pareil pour le porc. Quand je suis invitée 
																																																						
433	121006_002—“We	don’t	eat	pork.	There	you	go,	that’s	it.	But	um,	in	general	we	eat	halal	meat.	But	there	are	
times,	for	example	mostly	at	work,	there	have	been	times	where	I	went	to	eat	at	McDonald’s.	McDonald’s	…	the	
meat	is	not	halal.	There	you	go.”	
434	121203_006—“I	don’t	care	at	all	about	halal	meat,	it’s	possible	that	I	have	more	respect	for	my	last	pair	of	socks	
that	I	put	in	the	dirty	laundry	basket.	No,	really,	I	don’t	care	at	all.”	
435	 121202_004—“Traditionally	 I	 do	 not	 eat	 pork,	 for	 example.	 Alcohol,	 I	 drink	 alcohol	 (...)	 if	 I	 have	 the	 choice	
between	halal	meat	and	non-halal	meat	I	take	the	halal	meat,	but	unfortunately	we	don’t	always	have	the	choice.”	
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chez les gens qui ne savent pas que je suis musulmane, et qui pensent qui vont m’offrir à 
manger, qui m’offrent un plat avec du porc, je vais pas leurs dire « non, non, je mange 
pas [ça]. » Non, je le mange, mais j’aime pas trop ça, mais je le mange.436 
 
To not differentiate herself from those around her, to not cause offense, even if she genuinely did 
not like the meat, she would eat it all the same.  
These last two examples may be seen as concrete examples of what Mohammed El-
Bachouti calls “bounded creativity.”437 El-Bachouti explains that the immigrant is “truly free to 
choose their actions, but they select one action versus another to mitigate conflict in the host 
country.”438 Another informant demonstrated this notion of bounded creativity when he 
explained to me that he eats halal at home but not at work as he does not want to cause a 
problem. He explained: “Je mange ce qu’il y à manger, je l’accepte, et voilà.”439 Maghrébine 
Muslim immigrants in France may choose particular food actions that help to mitigate the 
conflict of identity that they themselves are experiencing, or to mitigate the conflict that those 
within the larger French culture may suggest is inevitable if the Maghrébine immigrant does not 
eat “French food.” The so-called bi-cultural Maghrébine Muslim immigrant may be especially 
suited to engage in these selections, having some creativity in action but with some boundaries of 
identity in place.  
What became clear from many of the interviews with individuals, who felt like they had a 
double culture, was that they would emphasize certain practices with certain people and other 
practices with other people. When with practicing Muslim friends or family, and often when 
home in the Maghreb, they would keep halal, not eat pork, not consume alcohol, fast during 
Ramadan, etcetera. But when they were with non-Muslim French friends they might leave their 
more traditional practices aside to drink “un verre avec des amis”440 or to taste “une bonne 
																																																						
436	121203_006—“I	don’t	like	pork.	I	don’t	like	cured	meats,	but	I	eat	pork,	if	I	have	access	to	eat	it,	I	eat	pork.	It	
doesn’t	bother	me.	For	me	it	is	like	spinach.	I	don’t	eat	spinach	because	I	don’t	like	spinach	but	if	I	was	on	a	desert	
island	with	a	box	of	spinach	I	am	going	to	eat	spinach.	It’s	the	same	for	pork.	When	I	am	invited	to	people’s	houses	
who	do	not	know	that	I	am	Muslim	and	they	are	going	to	offer	me	something	to	eat,	who	offer	me	a	dish	with	
pork,	I	am	not	going	to	say	to	them	‘no,	no	I	don’t	eat	that.’	No,	I	eat	it,	but	I	don’t	like	it	very	much,	but	I	eat	it.”	
437	Mohammed	El-Bachouti,	“Individualization	of	Muslim	Religious	Practices:	Contextual	Creativity	of	Second-
Generation	Moroccans	in	Spain,”	in	Everyday	Life	Practices	of	Muslims	in	Europe:	Consumption	and	Aesthetics,	ed.	
Erkan	Toguslu	(Leuven:	Leuven	University	Press,	2015),	98,	108.	
438	El-Bachouti,	“Individualization,”	108.	
439	121130_001—“I	eat	what	there	is	to	eat,	I	accept	it	and,	there	you	go!”	
440	Drink	a	glass	[understood	of	some	form	of	alcohol]	with	friends.	
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choucroute”441 (typically mixed with sausages). It becomes clear that food practice and 
consumption can act as another lens with which to examine immigrant identity negotiation and 
maintenance.442 
 
3.6 Conclusion  
 
It is impossible to speak of a single Maghrébine Muslim identity that emerged in Paris. Every 
individual expressed their identity in a unique way, emphasizing certain aspects over others, and 
reflective of each informant’s distinctive history and context. In this chapter I explored the 
various identity categories that emerged for my informants in Paris. First, I presented an 
overview of the various identity claims that my informants made in Paris. In this I showed how 
the kinds of identity claims that my informants made either instinctively or after some 
exploration were incredibly varied.  
I then addressed some of the identities present for the informants of my study. In this, I 
looked at the idea of a “born Muslim” identity. Here my informants explained how someone 
could hold an identity based purely on the circumstances of his/her birth. One was “born 
Muslim” because one was born in one of the countries of the Maghreb and into Muslim cultures 
and contexts from which one could not escape. I suggested that if religious identity could be 
argued to be a “born” identity, much like race, or ethnicity, it might be seen as more difficult to 
change than is generally argued for religious identity. This led into a discussion of who is 
actually able to claim any given identity. In this my informants suggested that even if one wanted 
to claim a particular identity, usually French, because of various factors, including one’s 
																																																						
441	Taste	a	good	sauerkraut—which,	in	France,	can	come	“garnished”	with	sausages.	
442	While	Akhtar’s	categories	were	helpful	for	thinking	through	the	various	ways	that	my	Parisian	informants	
negotiated	their	identities	in	Paris,	there	are	a	few	critiques	that	I	have	of	his	typology.	First,	his	work	is	principally	
focused	on	youth,	whereas	I	argue	that	these	kinds	of	identity	negotiations	are	happening	for	all	ages	of	
immigrants.	This	is	not	just	a	matter	of	regular	identity	processes	that	any	youth	might	undergo,	but	about	the	set	
of	challenges	to	and	experiences	of	identity	for	the	immigrant	individual,	no	matter	their	age.	Second,	Akhtar’s	
four	categories	do	not	quite	cover	the	range	of	experience	that	immigrants	have	in	relation	to	identity	negotiation.	
Here	I	believe	that	Peggy	Levitt’s	six	categories	are	closer	to	covering	the	wide	array	of	perspectives	and	
approaches	taken	by	immigrants	in	their	identity	negotiation	and	presentation	(Levitt,	God	Needs	no	Passport,	70-
83).	I	find	this	to	be	especially	the	case	in	relationship	to	her	“Cosmopolitan”	category.	I	had	two	informants	who	
expressed	this	kind	of	identity	and	others	whose	food	practices	would	have	been	reflective	of	it	as	well,	that	I	
could	not	present	here	with	Akhtar’s	typology.	
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appearance or name, that identity may not be open to that individual. Not just anyone could “be 
French.”  
An exploration of what it meant to “be French” according to my informants followed. For 
many of my informants, the primary way of understanding what it meant to “be French” was to 
distinguish between French citizenship and French nationality. One who had French citizenship 
could not immediately claim French identity according to my informants. Instead French ethnic 
nationality, which was seen as encompassing more than just legal citizenship, was the base of 
“French” identity.  
Next, I explored the idea of “double culture”; that people see themselves as holding both 
French and Maghrébine (Algerian, Moroccan or Tunisian) identity. Informants who held this 
“double cultural” identity seemed to use it as a means of understanding their transnational 
identity experiences, or to justify the actions of other transnational identifiers that may act in 
strange ways. Those who held the identity for themselves tended to see it as a positive thing, 
offering a great deal of culture to one’s life, and flavour since one would have access to both 
food cultures. Those who refused this double culture and placed it on others, usually second and 
third generation Maghrébine youth, saw it as a problematic identity to hold, arguing that it would 
lead to confusion of identity and thus could possibly lead to more extreme religious 
identification.  
The next subsection concentrated on the category of “cultural Muslims” that arose in my 
data in Paris. This identity label was not just a new way of addressing the often-imposed 
categories of “practicing” and “non-practicing” Muslims, as this identity often relied on practice 
of one form or another to illustrate that it was present. Instead, the defining characteristic of a 
“cultural Muslim” identity seemed to be one of intention. If the intention behind the action or 
identity was because of tradition or culture, and not because of some deep-seated conviction, 
belief or religious understanding, then it was often a good example of cultural commitment 
rather than religious commitment. These informants still feel Muslim, but they simply have a 
different intention behind this identity than someone who feels Muslim because of clearly 
“religious” reasons. In this section I showed how religious food practice was often the clearest 
evidence of this identity for my informants.  
This led me into a discussion of the role of food in identity in general for my informants 
in Paris. I showed how food practice was an essential representation of my informants’ various 
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identities. First, I explored the role of food in Muslim identity in general for my informants and 
found that food was often the crux on which their religious identities lay. It was the most 
important and most often practiced religious tradition that my informants engaged in. 
I have stressed the importance of one kind of everyday practice, namely food, in one’s 
daily experience and consequent identity over and over in this work. This chapter shows just how 
essential food is to the identity negotiations and integration processes of a group of Maghrébine 
Muslim immigrants in Paris. Food serves as a foundational representation of my informants’ 
identities, both communal and individual, in the City of Lights. What and how one eats firmly 
place an individual within a particular identity group and helps that person come to some clear 
understanding of his/herself in light of conflicting identity groups.  
Through an exploration of Salman Akhtar’s fourfold typology of immigrant identity 
negotiation, I showed how members of my informant group placed themselves within this 
typology based on what they did or did not consume. In this I discussed the role that food plays 
for (1) ethnocentric, (2) hyperassimilated, (3) alienated, and (4) bicultural immigrants. While I 
had informants who fell into each of Akhtar’s categories, most fit best in the hyperassimilated or 
bicultural categories, showing that my informants made serious efforts to leave their ethnocentric 
identities and consequently practices behind. I gave examples of Maghrébine Muslims who do 
not feel French and yet prepare traditional three course French meals with wine for friends and 
colleagues. There are also examples of French Maghrébines who do not feel particularly Muslim 
and yet will not eat pork or drink alcohol, or of Maghrébine French Muslims who do not eat pork 
at home, but will grab a Jambon Beurre (the traditional French sandwich of ham on a baguette) 
with colleagues when they are at a conference. The list of diverse responses to identity 
presentation can go on and on. While every person reacts slightly differently to the immigrant 
experience and how food practice is consequently worked out for him or her, it is clear from my 
data that for many immigrants, or at least for a small group of Maghrébine Muslim immigrants in 
Paris, food plays an essential role, in negotiating and presenting old and new identities.  
What is evident from the vast array of responses that I received to identity claims is that 
my research challenges simplistic notions of Muslim identity formation in France. The 
immigrants’ food practices reveal that categories of “good and bad Muslim,” “practicing or 
believing/non-practicing,” simply do not cover the diverse identities present in this immigrant 
location. Instead it becomes clear that scholars must add nuance and diversity to the typologies 
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present to reflect the reality on the ground, in the everyday life experiences of Muslims in Paris. 
This everyday experience sheds light on the complex and multivalent approaches to living within 
a transnational context, a reality which underlies my informants’ daily lives and is the focus of 
the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4: “Le meilleur brassage culturel”443: Food, Transnationalism and Integration in 
Paris 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Identity negotiations are central to the immigrant experience. In Chapter 3 I suggested that how 
one views oneself and is viewed by others is a constant consideration for members of the 
Maghrébine Muslim community in France. The working out of identity most often takes place 
within a context of interaction between different groups, between “us” and “them.” Without an 
“other” to compare oneself to, questions of identity tend to remain unstated or not reflected upon. 
In relation to food, it is often when a practice, belief or approach is placed beside a conflicting 
practice, belief or approach that it becomes a statement of identity. Pork consumption, or the lack 
thereof, takes a more significant role in identity, when one is surrounded by a clear “other”: those 
who do/do not eat pork. The separation of communities into “us” and “them” is essential in 
addressing who is a part of the “us,” in this case French national identifiers, and who is part of 
the “them,” in this case, Maghrébine transnational identifiers.  
In this chapter I address the kind of binary thinking that lays the groundwork for the 
integration efforts as well as the negotiation of transnational identity for the Maghrébine 
Muslims of my study. I begin with a presentation of this “us” and “them” dichotomy as a means 
of showing why transnational connection is seen as important for my informants. I then explore 
the seven understandings of “integration” that my informants presented to me, and the role that 
food can play in expressing one’s integration, or lack thereof. In this section I argue that food can 
serve as the symbol par excellence of both similarity, and difference, between “us” and “them,” 
and can consequently be used by the immigrant to aid in or detract from their “integration” into 
the French culture, a potentially essential process for those individuals wishing to hold to a 
transnational identity. The final section of the chapter addresses the topic of transnationalism, 
exploring how one’s interaction with the mundane subject of food and eating aids in my 
informants’ mediation of their transnational identity, where transnational refers to comfort in two 
nation-state homes. Unlike diaspora identity, where the diasporic individual’s centre of gravity is 
																																																						
443	“The	best	cultural	mix”—this	comes	from	a	quotation	from	one	of	my	informants	who	spoke	about	the	fact	that	
mixing	traditions,	and	cultures,	whether	represented	by	food	or	people,	was	a	beautiful	thing.	
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firmly located in the homeland, the transnational identity is claimed by those who see themselves 
at home in both the host and the home context, and make efforts towards maintaining connection 
to and claiming identity in both.444 What and how they eat, and the kinds of food practices in 
which they engage, leads them to place themselves in varying places along the spectrum of 
diasporic/transnational identification. Furthermore, I show how food can act as a bridge between 
the two sides of transnational identity, whether within or between individuals, and therefore can 
be used as a powerful tool for my informants. 
 
4.2 The Effect of “Us” and “Them” Distinctions on Transnationalism 
 
It did not take long in the field to feel the palpable idea that there is an “us” and there is a “them” 
in France, and that my informants fit firmly within the “them” category. Even for those 
informants who were born and raised in France, those informants who barely identified with 
their culture of origin, those informants who claimed French national identity, they still felt as 
though there were significant differences between them and the rest of the French population. In 
fact, this mentality of clear distinctions between “us” and “them” was propagated on both sides. 
The non-Muslim, multi-generation, European French saw Maghrébine Muslims as “them” and 
the Maghrébine Muslims saw the non-Muslim, multi-generation European French as “them.” 
One informant suggested that this distinction between “us” and “them” was based on the fact that 
“on ne voit pas les choses pareille.”445 Dichotomies were set up between “the West” and “the 
Maghreb.”446 The “othering” process of Muslims by majority, non-Muslim French communities 
is widely known and generally discussed in other sections of this work, so the focus of this 
section is on the dichotomies created and maintained by the Maghrébine Muslim community of 
my study. Ultimately, if my informants view themselves as inherently separate from the 
European French “them” this will have a significant impact on their feelings toward and seeming 
ability to claim the French side of their transnational identity. 
																																																						
444	I	will	define	my	use	of	“transnationalism”	further	in	section	4.4	below	as	well	as	in	Chapter	7	when	I	address	my	
Montréal	data.	
445	120822_001—“We	do	not	see	things	in	the	same	way.”	
446	“The	West”	as	understood	by	my	informants	to	be	either	secular	or	minimally	Christian.	“The	Maghreb”	as	
understood	by	my	informants	to	be	Muslim.	Thus,	conflation	of	the	religious	understanding,	approach	and	practice	
with	cultural	ones	were	frequent.		
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These dichotomies between cultures, between “us” and “them,” can be seen in two 
different realms: general culture and food practices. In interest of space I cannot address all the 
general cultural differences that my informants spoke about. I focus primarily on those practices 
that relate directly or indirectly to food.447 
In that light, an important distinction that was made between the Western and 
Maghrébine cultures was the approach to hospitality in both. Informants would mention the 
importance of hospitality to Maghrébine culture, noting that there seemed to be a great deal of 
this hospitality missing with people who were a part of the West. Informants would stress how 
this was a difference between “their” culture and “our” culture. One informant for example 
expressed the following. She said, 
il y a des choses en France qui s’opposent à ma culture ... d’hospitalité…on n’est pas 
obligé de téléphoner aux gens avant d’aller chez eux, on n’est pas obligé de prendre 
rendez-vous trois semaines avant pour un dîner;  on peut arriver, et y a de la place, on 
n’est pas obligé d’aller à l’hôtel alors qu’il y a une chambre d’amis. Tu vois ce genre de 
choses?448 
 
She gave examples of how the Maghrébine culture or hospitality worked, as a seeming contrast 
to what one might find in the majority French friendship and family circles. While the French 
have a reputation for being cold and distant, even with their inner circle contacts, the Maghrébine 
culture is presented as being one of warmth and closeness, of hospitality.  
While hospitality is generally a characteristic of Maghrébine culture, as became clear in 
my Québec data, this hospitality seemed to be altered in the French context—Frenchified, if you 
will. This seemingly important approach of hospitality was not present unless you were already 
inside the “us.” I return to this argument in the conclusion when I compare the French and 
Québécois contexts, but it is merely important to note here the role that hospitality plays in the 
minds of Maghrébine Muslims in France as a distinguishing mark between “us” (the more 
hospitable ones) and “them” (the colder, more distant ones). 
 
																																																						
447	My	informants	highlighted	differences	between	themselves	and	the	French	community	surrounding	them	in	
how	the	French	treat	animals,	how	they	view	life	and	the	afterlife,	in	that	the	French	shut	religion	out	while	they	
orient	their	lives	by	it,	and	that	the	French	were	viewed	as	hypocritical	and	fake.	
448	121209_001—“There	are	things	in	France	which	are	opposed	to	my	culture…of	hospitality…we	are	not	obliged	
to	call	people	before	going	to	their	house.	We	are	not	obligated	to	set	an	appointment	three	weeks	in	advance	for	
a	lunch;	we	can	arrive	and	there	is	space.	We	are	not	obligated	to	go	to	a	hotel	when	there	is	a	guest	room.	You	
see,	that	sort	of	thing.”	
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4.2.1 Food as Distinguishing Mark Between “Us” and “Them” 
While there were basic characteristics, attitudes and practices that my informants argued were 
indicative of the difference between the “West” and the Maghreb the most frequent examples my 
informants gave were related to food practices. The dichotomies in food practice were found in 
three realms: what one ate, how one ate and where one ate. Because food is foundational to 
identity, as argued above, its use as a symbol of distinction between “us” and “them” is 
noteworthy here. If what, how and where one eats are all foundational to who one is, and if these 
ways of being are seen as dichotomous with others, certain food practices may solidify these 
binary mentalities, making a fluid transnationalism difficult to hold.  
For example, in regards to what one eats, one informant told me a story about a move by 
a far right political association that emphasized this “us” and “them” distinction through a 
particular food practice. Because of the significance of this story to the current argument I will 
quote it at length. My informant told me that,  
dans le sens inverse, il y a eu une association qui faisait la soupe populaire pour les 
pauvres pour exclure les non chrétiens…. Ils ont mis des lardons dans la nourriture qu’ils 
servaient aux gens. Donc les juifs et les musulmans ne mangeaient pas. C’est une 
pratique barbare à mon sens quand on parle de 2012. Et ça c’était une association du 
Front National qui servait soi-disant de la nourriture aux pauvres. Sauf que lorsqu’il y a 
du porc, on sait très bien que le porc qu’il soit juif ou bouddhiste ou musulman, il ne 
mangera pas. C’était une anecdote mais ils pensaient exclure les autres religions.449 
 
This “anecdote,” as my informant labels it, was prevalent in popular media between 2004 and 
2006. The extreme right, French political group, Bloc Identitaire and some of its affiliate groups 
organized soup kitchens to provide soup for homeless individuals in France (sans domicile fixe: 
SDF) but they made these “soupes identitaires” (identity soups) with pork. Many understood 
these actions as a purposeful act of racism towards and exclusion of Jewish and Muslim 
individuals in the community, even leading officials in Strasbourg to ban such soup and Paris 
police to close down the soup kitchens that served them.450 This example shows that not only are 
																																																						
449	121205_001—“In	the	opposite	sense,	there	was	an	association	that	ran	soup	kitchens	for	the	poor	to	exclude	
the	non-Christians.	…They	put	bacon	in	the	food	that	they	served	to	people.	So	Jews	and	Muslims	would	not	eat	it.	
It’s	a	barbaric	practice	in	my	opinion	when	we	are	speaking	of	2012.	And	that	was	an	association	of	the	National	
Front	that	supposedly	served	food	to	the	poor.	Except,	because	there	was	pork,	we	know	full	well	that	pork,	
whether	Jew	or	Buddhist	of	Muslim,	he	will	not	eat	it.	It	was	an	anecdote	but	they	thought	to	exclude	the	other	
religions.”	
450	“French	Crackdown	on	Racist	Soup,”	BBC	News,	accessed	29	June	2016,	
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4644766.stm;	“Pork	Soup	and	Muslims:	Recipe	for	Racism?,”	NBC	News,	
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these distinctions felt between and among cultural groups, but they can be used by some groups 
and individuals to further the notion of dichotomous cultures for political purposes.  
Beyond the common differences in what my informants eat versus the “them” to which 
they were comparing themselves, i.e. not eating pork, more simply, my informants gave 
examples such as the fact that they buy and consume food with fewer pesticides, which is more 
“natural” than the food that the majority French culture eats.451 One informant stressed the 
difference in relation to meat and meat products. 
Par exemple, la viande, les Français achètent directement dans les supermarchés tout fait. 
Ça [il] n’y a pas chez nous. Même si on travaille, on a toujours la tradition de manger 
frais, de pas manger de la nourriture dans les boîtes, les conserves. Vous ne trouvez pas 
ça chez les Maghrébins, ou rarement.452 
 
Food practices are generalized across cultures. In this statement, the informant is suggesting that 
all majority non-Maghrébine French people buy their meat from supermarkets or butchers who 
do not give them fresh meat, and that all Maghrébines buy their meat from butchers who provide 
them with fresh meat. Whether that is the case, the discourse is present and has an affect on 
notions of difference and/or similarity—as well as what is better, or not. 
 The distinctions are also present in how one eats and prepares food. First, how much food 
a person consumes is an important example of the differing values present in the two groups. The 
amount of food consumed by each culture is seen as a dichotomy between abundance versus 
necessity.  
For example, while in France I attended and acted as the witness for a wedding for one of 
my informants. While both her family and the groom’s family were both Maghrébine, the bride 
and groom decided to have a more traditional French meal at their reception. The entire meal, 
which lasted four hours, consisted of halal foie gras, followed by a course of fish, then meat, then 
a cheese course, dessert and fruit, finished with platters and platters of Maghrébine pastries. The 
abundance of food at the meal seemed to conflict with the notion that in Islam people are not 
																																																						
accessed	29	June	2016,	http://www.nbcnews.com/id/11010604/ns/world_news-europe/t/pork-soup-muslims-
recipe-racism/;	“Polemique	autour	d’une	soupe	au	porc	à	Nice,”	TFI	News,	accessed	29	June	2016,	
http://lci.tf1.fr/france/2005-12/polemique-autour-soupe-porc-nice-4861011.html.	
451	121008_001;	121202_003.	
452	121102_001—“For	example,	meat,	the	French	buy	directly	in	the	supermarkets	all	ready.	That,	we	do	not	have	
where	we	are	from.	Even	if	we	work,	we	have	the	tradition	of	eating	fresh,	of	not	eating	canned	food,	conserved	
food.	You	will	not	find	that	at	Maghrébine	homes,	or	rarely.”	
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supposed to eat too much, they are not to overindulge, according to my informants.453 The sister 
of the bride commented on this at the end of the meal when I was talking to her. She mentioned 
that there was too much food and that it was wasteful and unnecessary. While I was very full by 
the end of the night, and feeling like the meal was probably one course too long, I do not know 
that any French person would have agreed. In fact, most of the people I spoke to about the meal 
expressed that it was normal for French weddings to have that much food. 
Furthermore, while the French mode of cooking is often viewed as complex and time 
intensive, many of my informants suggested that Maghrébine cooking is even more so. In fact, 
they suggested that because workdays are so long in France, there is simply no time to make 
traditional Maghrébine dishes.454 These require too much work and too many hours, which the 
non-Maghrébine French culture simply does not understand or support. Family meals in the 
Maghreb are long events, staying at the table for hours, enjoying the meal together. The 
European mode of eating is viewed as fast. Not only that, but the kind of plate used is also seen 
as distinct in the two cultures. While in the Maghrébine context a communal plate is used, in 
France separate plates are the norm. Not only are separate plates the norm, but eating from one 
dish is seen as less cultured or refined—not really “French.” 
 Where the meals happen is also an important distinction between Maghrébine and non-
Maghrébine French, according to my informants. Many informants stated that it was essential 
that Maghrébine food be consumed with others. In fact, for many it was not possible to eat a 
Maghrébine dish alone. One woman explained to me that “la différence c’est que notre bœuf à 
nous ne se mange pas seule. C’est triste de faire un couscous et de manger toute seule… les plats 
pour une personne, ça n’existe pas.”455 This informant explained to me that not only were there 
no recipes for one-person couscous, but you were to always make enough for extra people that 
may happen to show up. Furthermore, the centrality of eating as a family was built into the daily 
structure of the culture in the Maghreb and was lacking in the French context. One informant 
explained to me that, while it was almost impossible to eat with one’s family at lunch in France, 
it was an everyday occurrence in Morocco. She explained that, “à midi, on rentre pour manger, 
																																																						
453	I	address	the	arguments	for	not	over	eating	in	Chapter	7.	
454	121123_001;	121206_001;	121207_001.	
455	121123_001	-	“The	difference	is	that	our	food	is	not	eaten	alone.	It’s	sad	to	make	a	couscous	and	to	eat	it	
alone…dishes	for	one	person,	that	does	not	exist.”	
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on est en famille. Là-bas on a deux heures de pause déjeuner entre midi et deux.”456 She went on 
to say that “Ce sont des rituels qui sont dans le sang. On essaie de les garder.”457 These 
differences in practice and approach are not only important but are bred in the bone. As a result, 
the distinction between “us” and “them” may be hard to remove. 
 
4.2.2 The other “them”: Othering as a Defensive Strategy 
Many of my informants would use other groups to show how their own community, namely the 
Maghrébine Muslim community, was not as problematic as some of the others out there. Natasha 
Bakht suggests that minority individuals often feel the need to create “stranger strangers” in 
order “to construct a flattering image of ourselves, rather than doing the work of asking harder 
questions about who we are as a society.”458 The most prominent group that was brought up as 
an example of a “stranger stranger” by my informants was the Jewish community in France. My 
informants expressed that, while they had different practices from the dominant French “us,” 
they were not as bad as “them,” i.e. the Jewish community. This became clear in relation to food 
practice. My informants, when speaking about the food practices that might be used as examples 
of how they did not fit in with the “us,” would bring up Jews as an example of people who limit 
what they eat, in order to show how they are not that different: they are not the only ones who 
limit what they eat and they are not the only strange “them” in the midst of the dominant French 
“us.” For example, one informant explained to me: 
On [nous] oblige en France à entrer tous dans la même boîte…les musulmans, mais ce 
qui est en contradiction, c’est que les juifs mangent le même, comme nous, quoi? Oui, 
donc en France on a la tendance [de] vouloir unifier tout. A faire que soit, on est tous 
pareille. Sauf que c’est impossible.459 
 
This informant was explaining that, while it was part of the French approach to put everyone in 
one box and to put one’s back up about any practice that showed distinction, it was actually an 
																																																						
456	121216_001—“At	lunch	time,	we	go	home	to	eat,	we	are	with	family.	There	we	have	a	two-hour	lunch	break	
between	noon	and	two.”	
457	121216_001—“These	are	the	rituals	that	are	in	the	blood,	we	try	to	keep	them.”	
458	This	quotation	is	from	Lori	G.	Beaman,	“Introduction,	Exploring	Reasonable	Accommodation,”	in	Reasonable	
Accommodation:	Managing	Religious	Diversity,	ed.	Lori	Beaman	(Vancouver:	UBC	Press,	2012),	8,	in	reference	to	
Bakht’s	chapter	in	the	edited	volume.	Bakht	herself	states	“our	need	for	these	‘stranger	strangers’	who	refuse	to	
comply	with	our	rules	help	us	to	better	comprehend	who	we	are”	(Bakht,	“Veiled	Objections,	99).	
459	121203_006—“In	France,	they	put	us	all	in	the	same	box…Muslims,	but	it	is	in	contradiction,	because	the	Jews	
eat	the	same,	like	us.	What?	Yes,	in	France	we	have	the	tendency	to	want	to	unify	everything/everyone,	to	make	it	
as	though	we	are	all	the	same.	Except	it	is	impossible.”	
	 143	
impossible feat. She was using the Jewish community as an example of another community that 
“eats the same” as Muslims, that restricts certain food consumption, thus distinguishing itself 
from the larger mainstream, “unified” French community. Another informant when defending 
the Muslim restriction on pork, highlighted how it is not a distinct practice that should place the 
Muslim community on the outside because “dans la religion juive, je crois que c’est aussi interdit 
de manger du porc.”460 This statement was an effort to say, “you see, we aren’t the only ones. 
We can still be a part of the ‘us.’” 
While some of my informants used the Jewish community as an example of another 
group with restrictive food practices as a means of highlighting the fact that Muslims were 
themselves not so different from the mainstream culture, others pushed this further and suggest 
that the Jews were more difficult, had more restrictive food laws and could be seen as more 
“different” than Muslims to the dominant French culture. It was a trope that was used to show 
that there were worse “thems,” “stranger strangers,” out there. For example, one informant talked 
about the fact that they could go to Jewish butcher shops to buy their meat, that it was halal for 
them to do so, but the reverse was not true.461 When I asked others about the links between 
religion and food in Islam, some responded that there were not really any links, unlike in 
Judaism. One informant quickly cut me off to say “Non, non. Ce n’est pas comme le judaïsme où 
tu ne mélanges pas la viande et le lait. Non, on a aucune restriction”462 This informant went on to 
explain that there were of course a couple of restrictions on Muslims, such as not eating pork and 
eating halal, but her main focus was to show that there were “others” who were more 
complicated. Instead of just stating that Islam had a flexible, non-restrictive relationship to food, 
she first presented the idea that there was worse out there. Others would also describe how Jews 
have specific religious food obligations, but they, as Muslims, did not really have the same sort 
of thing. For example, 
c’est vrai que dans les religions comme le judaïsme, ils ont certaines nourritures qui sont 
liées directement à la religion. Nous non. Peut-être la seule chose que l’on a c’est le jour 
de l’Aïd on doit égorger un mouton. On n’est pas obligé d’égorger un mouton, on peut 
																																																						
460	121207_001—“In	the	Jewish	religion,	I	believe	that	it	is	also	forbidden	to	eat	pork.”	
461	121130_001;	Another	informant	also	brought	up	the	fact	that	Muslims	could	go	to	Jewish	butchers	because	“les	
juifs	vont	plus	loin	que	les	musulmans”	(121202_004).	
462	121201_001—“No,	no,	it	is	not	like	in	Judaism	where	you	cannot	mix	meat	and	milk.	No,	we	have	no	
restrictions.”	
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égorger une chèvre, quelque chose comme ça. On n’a pas de rapport direct entre la 
religion et la nourriture.463 
 
This informant emphasized that while other religions have restrictions, Islam does not, and it is 
consequently more flexible in the cultural outworking of the tradition. Relatedly, another 
informant drew the distinction between Islam and Judaism as follows: 
des juifs, pour le coup, eux ils ont des restrictions alimentaires. Par exemple, ils 
n’utilisent pas les mêmes casseroles pour faire cuire tel ou tel aliment. Ils ne trempent pas 
et ne mettent pas la cuisse dans la casserole dans laquelle on a déjà fait cuire du lait. Dans 
l’Islam la seule restriction c’est de ne pas manger du porc. Même si dans la même 
casserole on peut faire rien. Oui on ne mange pas de porc, mais si je préparais dans une 
casserole, j’ai l’habitude de faire cuire du porc, et bien la casserole est lavée, et bien, je 
peux cuisiner autre chose. Du point de vue de la boisson, le seul truc interdit c’est 
l’alcool. Faut pas le boire, faut pas cuisiner avec, faut pas le vendre, faut pas le porter etc. 
Ce sont les deux seules restrictions. Après, dans l’Islam, on mange tout, on boit tout.464 
 
In this quotation, we can see the justification for the relatively simple restrictions that are in 
place in Islam, according to my informants. Unlike the Jews who “cannot even cook in certain 
dishes,” Muslim food restrictions, the argument goes, are easily adaptable to the French context. 
One can imagine a sub-context to this conversation that indicates that this informant would be 
able to go to a non-Muslim French person’s home and use their dishes to cook their meals, while 
a Jew could not. 
While my informants used the Jewish food restrictions to show how the Muslim 
community was not the only one to engage in different practices, or to show how the Muslim 
way of practice was not as difficult or problematic as some may think, the consensus from my 
informants was that the Jewish community, despite having stricter food restrictions, was a much 
less threatening “them” in the eyes of the dominant French community than the Muslim 
community. Many of my informants would bring up the fact that even though kosher is just as 
																																																						
463	121201_002—“It’s	true	that	in	religions	like	Judaism	they	have	certain	foods	that	are	directly	linked	to	the	
religion.	Us,	no.	Maybe	the	only	thing	we	have	is	the	day	of	the	Eid	we	have	to	slaughter	a	sheep.	We	are	not	
obligated	to	slaughter	a	sheep,	we	can	slaughter	a	goat,	or	something	like	that.	We	do	not	have	a	direct	link	
between	religion	and	food.”	
464	121206_001—“The	Jews,	for	example,	they	have	food	restrictions.	For	example,	they	do	not	use	the	same	
dishes	to	cook	this	or	that	ingredient.	They	do	not	place	the	leg	in	the	dish	in	which	we	already	cooked	milk.	In	
Islam	the	only	restriction	is	to	not	eat	pork.	Even	if	it	was	made	in	the	same	dish,	we	can	do	nothing.	Yes,	we	do	
not	eat	pork,	but	if	I	make	it	in	a	dish,	where	I	have	the	habit	of	making	pork,	and	of	course	the	dish	is	washed,	and	
well,	I	can	cook	something	else.	In	the	point	of	view	of	drinks,	the	only	restricted	thing	is	alcohol.	You	cannot	drink	
it,	cannot	cook	with	it,	cannot	sell	it,	cannot	carry	it,	etc.	Those	are	the	only	two	restrictions,	after	in	Islam	we	eat	
everything	and	we	drink	everything.”	
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strict, if not more so, than halal, it does not seem to pose a problem to the dominant culture in 
France. This was reflective of Scott’s suggestion that “the Jews from the Maghreb pose many of 
the same challenges to French universalism that Arabs/Muslims do, and yet the animus of those 
who worry about the fracturing of the nation is directed at Muslims, not at Jews.”465 One 
informant suggested that this was another realm within which one could see discrimination 
against the Muslim community in France. He stated that “il y a de la viande kascher et très peu 
de viande halal, et ils en font tout un plat par rapport à la viande halal; là, ça rentre dans le cadre 
de la discrimination.”466 Some would argue that this was based on the fact that the situation on 
the ground does not seem to matter, but simply the perception of and obsession with all things 
Muslim in France. Others argued that the more positive, or at least less problematic, view of the 
Jewish community derived from the fact that the Jewish community seems to have more power 
in effecting change in France than the Muslim community. One informant stated that it was 
religion that was the problem, specifically the Muslim religion. She said that the only reason why 
the Jewish religion was not an issue was because “en France la société juive est très influente; 
donc, le débat ‘kascher ou pas’ ne se pose pas.”467 Even though Jews are also engaging in 
practices that may separate them from the larger French collective, the perception from my 
informants was that it did not matter because this other, more normalized, group was not the 
focus of Western media attention.	
Because the notion of “us” and “them” is so thoroughly felt by my informants, it often 
leads to a much stronger desire to maintain and profess transnational connections than it may in 
other more nationally inclusive locations, such as Canada.468 Trying to erase borders between the 
homeland and host land may become important for people who struggle with being a part of the 
“them.” Before I address directly the important role of transnationalism for my informants, it is 
essential to explore how the topic of integration is experienced by and affects these groups. The 
focus on the “integration of them” influences transnational practice and identity as well.	
																																																						
465	Scott,	Politics	of	the	Veil,	78.	
466	121126_001—“There	is	kosher	meat	and	very	little	halal	meat	and	they	make	a	big	deal	about	halal	meat,	so	
that	enters	into	the	category	of	discrimination.”	
467	120905_001—“In	France	the	Jewish	society	is	very	influential,	so	the	debate	about	kosher	or	no	kosher	is	not	
had.”	
468	This	will	become	clear	in	chapters	7	and	8,	which	look	at	Maghrébine	Muslim	experience	in	Montréal,	Canada.	
While	there	is	still	a	strong	presence	of	transnational	practice	and	identity	in	Montréal,	there	is	not	the	same	
emphasis	on	how	essentially	different	this	identity	is	for	the	Maghrébine	Muslims	who	profess	it.	
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4.3 “On intègre quelque chose mais pas quelqu’un”469: The Role of Integration in 
Transnationalism 
 
The discourse on integration has a significant impact on immigrants in a variety of contexts. This 
discourse is prevalent in the French immigrant context, where integration is a daily topic of 
conversation and media focus. In a context such as France where a national, unified identity is 
the professed ideal, the integration of newcomers into that identity is a focus of politics, and of 
daily interaction. People who do not visibly or ideologically fit into the majority, secular French 
population are faced with questions about their integration on a frequent basis. Whether they 
claim or have French national identity often does not matter. They are viewed as a “them” and as 
people who need to be integrated, whatever that may mean. In this section I explore how my 
informants respond to the topic of integration. I present some of the various responses to the 
question that I posed directly about integration, as well as responses that came up throughout our 
interviews. I address definitional issues as expressed by my informants and present the various 
ways that Maghrébine Muslims think about integration in France. Finally, I survey the role of 
food in integration. While I touched on this briefly in the section on food and identity, I show 
how some “others” are using food as a means to integrate into French culture and or act against 
integration. 
 After working through questions about food practice and daily life in my interviews, I 
would end each one by saying I had two questions left, the first of which was a big one and the 
second of which was a fun and easy question to end the interview on an enjoyable note. I would 
then ask my informants the second last question of the interview, which was: “lorsque vous 
entendez le mot ‘intégration’ de quoi pensez-vous? Est-ce que vous vous voyez ‘intégré’ dans la 
société française? Vous souciez-vous de celà?”470 This question elicited many different answers 
and generated clear emotional responses in some of my informants.  
Most responded to the question as if it were an inevitable question, one they had 
addressed many times before. There were people who answered with what seemed like a cookie 
																																																						
469	121106_001—“We	integrate	something,	but	not	someone.”	
470	“When	you	hear	the	word	‘integration’	what	do	you	think	of?	Do	you	see	yourself	as	‘integrated’	in	the	French	
culture?	Do	you	care?”	
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cutter answer that they had rehearsed and presented as their official stance on integration. Others 
struggled to express their response, either out of anger that such a question was being asked, or 
out of pure disinterest in the topic. Having already spent an hour with me, talking about generally 
pleasant topics, though, all my informants, even the “integrationally frustrated” ones, gave me 
extensive answers on this topic. While in Québec this was one of the questions that was quickly 
asked and answered, in France, the depth of knowledge, experience and interaction with this 
topic was much bigger and thus resulted in much more complex and nuanced responses.  
Informants tended to fall within a handful of definitional understandings of what 
integration was. They argued that integration was 1) not assimilation, and yet 2) about being just 
like everyone else (assimilation). Others argued that it was 3) about being a good citizen, 4) or 
about being good in general. Finally, there were those who stressed that integration inevitably 
implicated 5) respect, 6) racism and 7) language issues. Before I address each of these seven 
responses, a few preliminary comments must be made about the process of defining the word 
“integration” for my informants, as well as whether they viewed the term positively or 
negatively. 
When I asked the integration question, many people would respond immediately, not 
with their actual response but with a variation of a set of other questions. They would ask, “What 
does it actually mean?” “According to whose standards?” “To whom does it apply? To those 
who want, versus those who don't want, French identity? First generation versus second and third 
generation? Just immigrants or French born people as well? Only Muslims?” For many of the 
informants who expressed such questions, the term “integration” was one that incited passionate, 
negative responses within them. These informants would emphasize that they did not like the 
term,471 or that it was reductionist.472 One informant went as far as to say that “Moi ça me révolte 
quand j’entends ça.”473 While this informant had a visceral response to the word, there were 
others who suggested that it was simply a useless term. For example, when I asked one informant 
what he thought when he heard terms such as integration and assimilation, he said “je pense à la 
débilité profonde d’être humaine. Voilà…l’assimilation, l’intégration, je suis très honnêtement ni 
																																																						
471	121129_001.	
472	121126_002.	
473	121102_001—“Me,	that	is	revolting	to	me	when	I	hear	that.”	
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pour, ni contre. Je trouve c’est juste un terme qui n’a pas lieu d’être.”474 For this informant, 
integration is a topic that does not deserve the attention that it has been given. While people may 
adjust to particular settings, his thought was that it was not something to be overly dissected, and 
especially not something to be set up as a distinction placed on others.  
Similarly, another of my informants, who just so happens to be the former informant’s 
sister, gave an example for why integration does not work on a human level. She said, “le terme 
intégré pour moi c’est tout à fait débile pour les personnes. Fin, on intègre je ne sais pas, des 
chiffres dans un intervalle, on intègre quelque chose mais pas quelqu’un.”475 Like many of my 
informants, she argued that the term was simply not applicable to the situations to which people 
try to apply it. It is a hijacked word, a word that is a political term and nothing else.476 It is 
“uniquement un terme politique autour duquel on va rassembler des gens. Parce que, qu’est-ce 
que ça veut dire intégrer?”477 These informants in general tried to argue that integration is given 
too much weight in current discussions on immigrant experience in Europe, and because the 
term, according to their arguments, holds no weight in discussions of human interaction. It 
should be dropped altogether. 
Other informants allowed for the use of the term but struggled to determine to whom 
integration applies and who gets to determine to whom it applies. One informant stated “C’est 
quoi être intégré? Tout dépend. D’après certains Français, je suis intégré. Pour d’autres, je ne le 
suis pas; et d’autres ne se posent même pas la question.”478 If certain people see her as 
integrated, and others do not, who is determining what it is to be integrated? Who determines to 
whom the term applies?  
Some of my informants did have suggestions concerning to whom the term applies. For 
example, one person expressed to me that it was a question of socio-economic status. He 
suggested that integration was only an issue for the poor and it was also not for all “étrangers” 
																																																						
474	121108_001—“I	think	of	the	profound	debility	of	humanity.	There	you	go…assimilation,	integration,	I	am	
honestly	not	for	or	against,	I	find	it	is	just	a	term	that	has	no	place.”	
475	121106_001—“The	term	integrate,	for	me,	it	is	totally	stupid	for	people.	We	integrate,	I	don’t	know,	numbers	in	
an	interval,	or	integrate	something,	but	not	someone.”	
476	While	integration	is	a	political	term	in	Canada,	it	also	functions	as	a	social	term	in	that	context	as	well,	e.g.,	
“Have	we	successfully	welcomed	the	immigrant	or	refugee?”	
477	121203_006—“Uniquely	a	political	term	around	which	we	can	assemble	people.	Because	what	does	it	mean	to	
integrate?”	
478	121206_001—“What	is	it	to	be	integrated?	It	all	depends.	According	to	certain	French	people,	I	am	integrated.	
For	others	I	am	not;	and	others	do	not	even	ask	the	question.”	
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(foreigners) but for French Muslims.479 Similarly, another informant suggested that integration 
should not be applied to immigrants, but to French nationals. 
Je suis une pure étrangère qui vit en France. Je n’ai pas de souci par rapport à 
l’intégration car je suis étrangère. Ça ne me pose pas de problème. Je n’ai pas de souci du 
tout. C’est un peu abstrait pour moi, s’intégrer…Je travaille dans le Social. Si on pouvait 
déjà intégrer tous les Français d’ici, ça serait bien. Je parle le français de souche. Si on 
arrivait à les intégrer, eux, ça serait bien.480 
 
For this informant, integration is not a term that should be applied to foreigners, who knew their 
place within French society, but to those within French society itself. One informant suggested 
that it was a term not meant for immigrants in general, but in fact only for Arabs living, and born 
in France. She expressed that “moi, quand j’entends intégration je me sens pas concernée. J’ai 
l’impression que c’est les Arabes nés en France qui ont besoin de s’intégrer, mais pas les 
immigré(e)s.”481 She went on to explain that immigrants do not need to integrate since they know 
their position in the host society clearly. They know how and why they came, and as a result they 
do not need to integrate.  
On the other hand, many informants suggested that it was not a fair term to apply to third 
and fourth generation Muslims living in France. One informant suggested that it was a term that 
applied to French-born people, but somehow drew the line between generations. He expressed 
that it was a bit unjust to speak of integration of young people who have been French for three or 
four generations because “ces gens-là ne connaissent pas leur pays d’origine.”482 The question of 
to whom the term could be applied was cloudy, and besides, even if one could figure out to 
whom to apply it and how, the result may not even matter given underlying biases. One 
informant asked:  
Et ceux qui ont essayé, sont-ils considérés comme des Français? Un Mouloud Ben 
Achour ou un Shlomo Bengourion, est-il considéré tellement Français même s’il s’est 
																																																						
479	121201_002.	
480	121128_001—“I	am	a	pure	foreigner	that	lives	in	France.	I	don’t	have	any	issue	in	regards	to	integration	
because	I	am	a	foreigner.	It	doesn’t	pose	any	problem	for	me.	I	don’t	have	any	issues	at	all.	It	is	a	bit	abstract	for	
me	to	integrate…I	work	in	social	service,	if	we	could	first	integrate	all	the	French	here,	that	would	be	good.	I’m	
talking	about	the	‘Français	de	souche.’	If	we	could	arrive	at	integrating	them,	that	would	be	good.”	
481	121123_001—“Me,	when	I	hear	integration	I	don’t	feel	that	it	concerns	me.	I	have	the	impression	that	it’s	Arabs	
born	in	France	who	need	to	be	integrate	but	not	immigrants.”	
482	121202_004—“These	people	do	not	know	their	country	of	origin.”	
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intégré totalement? Non, on le sait très bien. Il est question de physique, couleur et de 
nom.483 
 
Those who are seen as outside of the majority French cultural group would not be seen as 
integrated anyway, this informant argues, so the debate around integration is not worthwhile.  
 
4.3.1 Definitions/Understandings of Integration 
Despite the arguments that integration is a term that is difficult to understand and apply, my 
informants did try to grasp what it was and what it meant for them and those around them. The 
first understanding of integration that I am going to explore is that integration is not assimilation. 
It is not to be equated with assimilation, according to many of my informants. These informants 
would argue that integration is not about being exactly like the “French” (understood as the 
mainstream, non-Maghrébine, non-Muslim French majority), even though many “French” think 
that this is the way to understand integration. What was important for these informants was the 
idea that one can be integrated, but still maintain elements of their cultural, religious or ethnic 
identity that may not be viewed as “French.” 
Ce que je n’accepte pas dans le terme intégration, c’est le sous-entendu 
d’assimilation…L’assimilation, le reniement de la culture d’origine, je suis contre. Car ça 
veut dire qu’il faut que je fasse une croix sur une partie de mon identité. Ça peut induire 
de graves dérèglements psychologiques. Encore une fois, l’intégration peut se faire sans 
nier la religion et la culture d’origine. En France, il est possible de vivre avec sa culture et 
ce que l’on apporte.484 
 
This informant was seemingly fine with integration as long as it did not cross the line into 
assimilation, resulting in an expectation that she would renounce parts of her identity. Another 
informant explained that adaptation was inevitable in the integration process but not assimilation. 
For this informant, one of course adapts to the host culture, or else they would have stayed in 
their home country, but this does not mean that one loses or gives up their convictions.485 A third 
																																																						
483	121205_001—“And	those	who	try,	are	they	considered	as	French?	A	Mouloud	Ben	Achour	or	a	Shlomo	
Bengourion,	is	he	considered	really	French	even	if	he	is	totally	integrated?	No,	we	know	that	very	well.	It	is	a	
question	of	physique,	colour	and	name.”	
484	121126_001—“What	I	do	not	accept	in	the	term	integration	is	the	undercurrent	of	assimilation…Assimilation,	
the	denial	of	the	culture	of	origin,	I	am	against	it.	That	means	that	I	must	cross	out	a	part	of	my	identity.	That	can	
introduce	serious	psychological	disorder.	Once	more,	integration	can	be	done	without	the	negation	of	religion	and	
cultural	origins.	In	France,	it	is	possible	to	live	with	that	culture	and	the	one	we	bring.”	
485	121202_003.	
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informant explained that assimilation and integration are two separate things and need to be 
viewed in that way to not marginalize certain communities for no reason. 
Ce n’est pas que les gens ne veulent pas s’intégrer à la société française mais ils ne 
veulent pas quitter leur identité. Il y a deux choses différentes. Nous voulons être en 
France tels que nous sommes. Ce n’est pas un refus d’intégration. De l’autre côté, c’est 
une façon de marginaliser, en disant “si vous n’abandonnez pas votre identité, vous n’êtes 
pas intégré.” C’est là le problème.486 
 
By equating assimilation and integration, many immigrants may be labeled “not integrated,” 
which would be an unfair representation of those communities according to this informant.  
When integration is viewed as separate from assimilation, many are happy to claim 
integration into French society. When it is equated with assimilation it is seen as one of the most 
problematic aspects of the immigrant experience. For example, the informant who spoke of 
psychological disorder from the emphasis on assimilation above expressed to me that if for some 
reason assimilation became a forced reality, a necessity in one’s integration into France, that 
would be the day he would leave France.487 Even though this informant did not believe that 
assimilation was an essential part of integration in France, there were others who argued that 
assimilation is exactly the way that integration should be understood. The two terms were 
interchangeable. 
While many would stress the importance of viewing integration as something totally 
different from assimilation, and see it as not yet an essential part of official integration, others 
suggested that it was often exactly that. The equation of assimilation and integration was already 
well established, and expected of those who needed to integrate.488 Because of this, many of my 
informants claimed that they were not integrated and did not need to. They would never 
assimilate with majority “French” society/culture and accordingly would always remain 
unintegrated.  
For these informants, integration meant being “the same” as everyone else. One young, 
French-born informant explained that integration meant “être pareille avec les autres…de ne pas 
																																																						
486	121212_001—“It’s	not	that	people	do	not	want	to	integrate	into	the	French	society	but	they	do	not	want	to	
give	up	their	identity.	They	are	two	completely	different	things.	We	want	to	be	in	France	as	we	are.	It	is	not	a	
refusal	of	integration.	On	the	other	hand,	it	is	a	way	of	marginalizing	by	saying	‘if	you	do	not	abandon	your	
identity,	you	are	not	integrated.’	That	is	the	problem.”	
487	121126_001.	
488	Scott	suggests	that	in	France	integration	often	equals	assimilation	(Scott,	Politics	of	the	Veil,	79).	
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être différent, de vivre pareille.”489 She explained to me that she saw herself as integrated, as 
living the same as others, even though the majority French society would still reject her. In this 
we can see the apparent emphasis on assimilation, on being the same and being the same in a 
particular way. It was not enough for this informant “to live the same” as those around her, 
because she was still viewed as not “living the same,” according to other people’s definitions of 
what “living the same” means. Assimilation is equated with integration. After a long explanation 
about how people who try to live separately and differently than the mainstream French society 
have problems with integration, one informant stated: “l’intégration, ça n’existait pas pour moi. 
Je vis ici comme tout le monde, tout simplement.”490 Here he shows how if one lives, like him, 
as a doctor, not in the banlieues, engaged in friendship with other French citizens in a French 
manner, then one has no problem with integration; if one is willing to assimilate, then one does 
not need to worry about integration, as it will inevitably follow. 
The third way that my informants understood integration was related to civil engagement. 
For these informants, one was integrated if one was a good citizen, and this was often expressed 
through respecting laws, working, and paying taxes. The same informant who expressed that he 
would leave France if assimilation were expected for integration gave the following definition of 
integration: 
Intégration, pour moi, ça veut dire respecter les lois du pays dans lequel je vis; sachant 
que ce n’est pas mon pays d’origine. Je me considère comme une personne intégrée. Je 
fête Noël à ma façon, je fête Pâques à ma façon, et je respecte les lois françaises.491 
 
He saw himself as integrated because he “respects the laws of the country” and acts as an 
engaged citizen, which apparently, for this informant, includes celebrating the religious festivals 
of the majority religious population. Another informant explained that it was specifically the 
paying of taxes that made someone a good citizen and an integrated citizen in France. She saw 
herself as integrated because of this fact. For her,  
à partir du moment où je paye mes impôts, je considère que je suis intégrée. Si 
maintenant mon argent est différent de celui d’un Français, et que le fait que je suis 
Arabe peut-être me permettra de payer moins d’impôts parce que je n’suis pas une 
citoyenne normale, je n’suis pas une citoyenne, il n’y a pas de souci…À partir du 
																																																						
489	120822_001—“To	be	the	same	as	others…to	not	be	different,	to	live	the	same.”	
490	121201_002—“Integration	does	not	exist	for	me.	I	live	here	simply	like	everyone	else.”	
491	121126_001—“Integration,	for	me	that	means	to	respect	the	laws	of	the	country	in	which	I	live;	knowing	that	it	
is	not	my	country	of	origin.	I	consider	myself	as	an	integrated	person.	I	celebrate	Christmas	in	my	way,	I	celebrate	
Easter	in	my	way	and	I	respect	the	laws	of	France.”	
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moment où je participe économiquement à l’évolution d’une société, je considère que je 
suis intégrée. Après maintenant, si c’est pas ça, être intégrée, je ne sais pas ce que 
c’est.492 
 
The paying of taxes is an equal experience shared by all good citizens and acts as the base of 
evidence for one’s integration, according to this informant. Of course, there are those who do not 
pay taxes, Arab or French, and according to this informant these people are not good citizens and 
as a result are not integrated in France.493 
 While these informants argued that integration was about being a good citizen, others 
viewed it as being good in general. One informant stated that, for her, “mon intégration c’est 
d’être bien, d’avoir mon petit chéri, de faire ma vie.”494 She believed that integration was simply 
about being a good person and living what she viewed as a “normal life.” Another informant 
explained that it was not just about being good, but about being better than she was before. She 
explained that the term integration was “reductionist” (as mentioned above) and should not be 
used. Instead, for her the most important thing was what “integration” pointed to, namely, 
whether or not one lived well in society and was better than before.495 
 The next two ways that informants viewed integration, or the evidence of integration can 
be dealt with together. These informants viewed integration as implying either respect or, if 
respect was lacking, then the concept implied racism. On the one hand, for those who saw 
respect as central, they argued that one could not integrate oneself or others without respecting 
difference. One informant stated that, in fact,  
le mot intégration c’est respecter la tradition de l’autre, se respecter mutuellement. 
S’intégrer, ça veut pas dire prendre la culture des Français, s’identifier aux Français; ça, 
ce n’est pas s’intégrer, pour moi ce n’est pas une intégration. Pour moi, s’intégrer c’est 
respecter son prochain.496 
																																																						
492	121203_006—“From	the	moment	where	I	pay	my	taxes,	I	consider	that	I	am	integrated.	If	now	my	money	is	
different	than	that	of	a	French	person	and	the	fact	that	I	am	Arab	maybe	permits	me	to	pay	less	taxes	because	I	am	
not	a	normal	citizen,	I	am	not	a	citizen,	there	is	no	problem….	From	the	moment	where	I	participate	economically	
to	the	evolution	of	a	society,	I	consider	myself	integrated.	After,	if	that	is	not	integrated,	I	do	not	know	what	is.”	
493	When	considering	this	form	of	argumentation,	it	is	important	to	ask	how	does	this	work	in	other	contexts	where	
some	communities	have	different	taxes,	i.e.	First	Nations	in	Canada	are	they	NOT	integrated,	according	to	this	
person's	definition?	If	one	had	different	taxes	or	tax	expectations	because	of	another	identity	that	they	hold,	does	
this	automatically	indicate	that	that	person	is	not	integrated?	
494	121128_001—“My	integration	is	to	be	good,	to	have	my	boyfriend,	to	live	my	life.”	
495	121126_002.	
496	121205_002—“The	word	integration	is	to	respect	the	tradition	of	the	other,	mutual	respect.	To	integrate	does	
not	mean	to	take	the	culture	of	the	French,	identify	as	French,	that	is	not	to	integrate,	for	me	that	is	not	
integration.	For	me,	to	integrate	is	to	respect	the	person	close	to	you.”	
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For this informant, one was integrated not if one expected assimilation but if one respected 
difference.  
 On the opposite end of the spectrum, some informants indicated that the term integration 
was inevitably linked to racism. One person suggested that integration, to whom it applies and of 
whom it is expected, is based solely on skin colour and outward appearances.497 Another 
informant expressed the idea that the term integration is used by racist people to present the idea 
that there are people who have undesirable cultures and identities. For this informant, 
“l’intégration c’est la grosse arnaque des racistes” and it is only “des racistes qui parlent 
d’intégration.”498  
 The final issue that my informants brought up when answering my question about 
integration was language. For these informants, language was the ultimate evidence of 
integration, as well as the foundation for it. Shared language was seen as absolutely essential to 
the integration process: “if you cannot communicate, you cannot integrate.” One informant 
explained that “quand on prend tous les Algériens qui sont venus d’Algérie, ils parlent le bon 
français, et bizarrement les Algériens qui sont nés ici, la France n’a pas su leur apprendre le 
français. C’est bizarre, non?”499 If language is essential to integration and those Maghrébines 
who are born in France have a difficult time learning and speaking French, this may be some 
clear evidence of the fact mentioned previously, that French-born Maghrébines are seen as the 
target of integration. 
 Integration turned out to be not as straightforward of a term as I had imagined it might be 
when I started my fieldwork. My informants interacted with this term in drastically different 
ways, some seeing it as totally insignificant, while others being moved to tears because of the 
feelings it brought up for them. While some stressed the importance that integration did not mean 
assimilation, there were others who saw it exactly as that. Surprisingly, for many of my 
informants who saw integration as assimilation, rather than feeling as though they needed to 
assimilate to integrate, they simply chose to claim an unintegrated identity. For those who saw 
integration as evidenced by civic engagement, integration was not a problematic process or term 
																																																						
497	121203_006.	
498	121205_001—“Integration	is	the	biggest	racist	scam….	racists	who	speak	about	integration.”	
499	121205_001—“When	we	take	all	of	the	Algerians	who	came	from	Algeria,	they	speak	the	right	French	and	
strangely,	the	Algerians	who	are	born	here,	France	was	not	able	to	teach	them	French.	It’s	strange,	no?”	
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at all. One simply paid their taxes, respected laws, worked, etcetera, or one did not. While being 
a good citizen was evidence of integration for some, being “good” in general was what 
integration was about for others. For these informants one had to be better than one was before if 
one was to be integrated. Other informants saw integration as relating directly to respect or 
racism: one was integrated if one respected those around him, or on the other hand, one did not 
respect the “other” and thus required integration, usually understood as “assimilation” of that 
“other.” Finally, I had informants suggest that integration was primarily based on one’s ability to 
converse in the language of the land. 
 
4.3.2 The Role of Food in Integration  
Whether the issue of integration revolves around its relationship to assimilation, citizenship, 
morality, respect, racism or language, it is undoubtedly a central topic for the people who belong 
to the communities that I study. It is a notion imposed from the outside and felt from the inside. 
It is a term and topic that elicits strong emotional responses and is generally a topic that members 
of minority communities do not want to talk about. That being said, there are ways of gaining 
insight into one’s integration practices, or lack thereof through other practices, namely food. 
What people eat and how they eat it can reveal a great deal about how they interact with and 
understand the world around them. For example, Michel and Ellen Desjardins propose that food 
practice can provide insight into someone’s perceptions of the divine, or their own ethnicity, of 
community building, and of charity, of the challenges of religious diversity and the impact of 
immigration on relations between individuals of differing worldviews.500 People’s worldviews 
become evident when examining food. It is for this reason that most of my informants brought 
up food and food practice when discussing various topics related to integration, whether their 
own or the perceived integration of others. My informants expressed the centrality of this topic to 
integration, not only in their responses to my direct question about integration, but also 
throughout their interview.501 One informant used food as a metaphor for the process of 
																																																						
500	Desjardins	and	Desjardins,	“The	Role	of	Food	in	Canadian	Forms	of	Christianity,”	70-82.	
501	As	I	mentioned	in	the	section	on	integration	above,	the	question	that	I	asked	about	integration	was	as	follows:	
“lorsque	vous	entendez	le	mot	‘intégration’	de	quoi	pensez-vous?	Est-ce	que	vous	vous	voyez	‘intégré	dans	la	
société	française’?	Vous	souciez-vous	de	cela?”	(When	you	hear	the	word	‘integration’	what	do	you	think	of?	Do	
you	see	yourself	as	‘integrated’	in	the	French	culture?	Do	you	care?).	While	I	did	not	directly	ask	about	food	in	this	
question,	the	question	did	come	at	the	end	of	an	interview	where	I	asked	a	great	deal	about	food	and	food	
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integration itself. After describing how people integrate different ingredients from different food 
traditions to make a new dish that pleases everyone he expressed how this practice is  
le meilleur brassage culturel. On mélange la touche à la française avec les choses 
marocaines et on fait quelque chose, un plat qui plaît à tout le monde. Et ça, c’est ce qui 
devrait être en fait avec les gens qui vivent dans le même pays. On devrait pouvoir tous 
les faire aimer les uns les autres avec ce brassage culturel. On arrive à [le] faire avec la 
cuisine, on n’arrive pas encore à le faire avec les êtres humains.502 
 
In this section I address specific food practices that reveal a commitment to integrate, or a 
commitment not to integrate, as well as the ability of food and eating to be an access point to 
understanding and/or encounter with “the other” (an essential element in integration). 
 As discussed above, some of my informants would argue that one did not have to leave 
cultural convictions aside to integrate; integration does not equal assimilation. For these 
informants, food was another example of cultural, religious or ethnic practice that could be 
maintained in one’s integration process.503 One informant explained that just because there are 
inevitable adjustments that one makes when one lives in a context that is different from one’s 
homeland, “ça ne nous empêche pas de laisser nos convictions de côté … que ce soit religieux ou 
culinaire ou autre, il n’y a pas de problèmes.”504 Food is seen as a conviction, and an important 
one to maintain. While many of my informants would argue that integration is not about eating 
distinct foods, what one eats still plays a significant role in influencing one’s own perception of 
one’s integration, as well as the perception of others. For example, one of my informants, who 
opened a halal fine dining French restaurant, noted that integration should not be about eating 
																																																						
practices.	It	is	therefore	possible	that	food	was	a	central	part	of	my	informants’	responses	to	this	question	because	
they	were	primed	to	think/talk	about	food.	
502	121108_001—“The	best	cultural	mix.	We	mix	a	touch	of	French	with	Moroccan	things	and	we	make	something,	
a	dish	that	pleases	everyone.	And	that	is	something	that	should	be	in	fact	with	people	who	live	in	the	same	
country.	We	should	be	able	to	make	everyone	like	each	other	with	this	cultural	mix.	We	manage	to	do	it	with	
cuisine,	we	have	not	yet	managed	to	do	it	with	humans.”	
503	One	is	reminded	of	the	“table	and	chairs”	controversy	that	arose	within	the	Sikh	community	in	the	1990s,	
where	the	question	arose	if	a	tradition,	such	as	eating	on	the	floor,	should	be	adapted	in	the	Canadian	context;	
should	adaptation	be	a	part	of	integration?	Desjardins	and	Desjardins	explore	this	controversy	further	and	what	it	
says	about	the	“integration”	of	minority	religious	communities	in	multicultural	and	secular	Canada	(Michel	
Desjardins	and	Ellen	Desjardins,	“Food	that	Builds	Community:	The	Sikh	Langar	in	Canada,”	in	Cuizine:	The	Journal	
of	Canadian	Food	Cultures	/	Revue	des	cultures	culinaires	au	Canada	1/2	(2009):	16-18,	
http://www.erudit.org/revue/cuizine/2009/v1/n2/037851ar.html).	
504	121202_003—“That	does	not	force	us	to	leave	our	convictions	aside.	Whether	religious	or	culinary,	there	is	no	
problem.”	
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pork or drinking alcohol, yet went on to talk about the fact that his restaurant could be viewed as 
an effort to show integration. He stated that,  
maintenant, après ce qui est paradoxal, c’est que moi je fais mon restaurant parce que j’ai 
évolué en France. Donc, c’est une manière de dire “oui, regarde, nous sommes intégrés, 
puisque nous mangeons français maintenant, mais c’est halal.” Ça reste toujours halal.505 
 
As much as this informant and others may want to argue that particular foods do not illustrate 
integration, just as much as they may want to argue that integration is not equated with 
assimilation, there is still a clear understanding that integration is just that. There is an 
understanding from outside and within these communities that what one eats is in fact a sign of 
the degree to which one is integrated. Furthermore, if integration is seen as assimilation to 
French culture, specific food practices would be more indicative of integration than others. 
 For people in the Maghrébine Muslim community it may be hard to feel fully able to 
integrate into a society where the majority culture revolves around food practices that are 
forbidden in one’s own culture/religion. This may keep people on the margins, feeling unable to 
integrate, or being told they cannot do so. One young woman explained to me that if you are a 
practicing Muslim integration practices are inevitably affected because what you eat and drink, 
or do not eat and drink, will limit where you can go, and will limit your social group. When 
describing a situation where she felt she could not go out for drinks with colleagues at school she 
said, “donc oui ça sélectionne quand on est pratiquant. Ça réduit un peu. Tu sélectionnes ton 
entourage, avec qui tu restes, avec qui tu ne restes pas. C’est naturel, c’est comme ça.”506 While 
pork and non-halal meat may be easy enough to avoid (one can eat fish), consuming alcohol can 
be a much more difficult situation to negotiate.  
Another example came from an informant who explained to me that if you refuse alcohol 
it is seen as an insult to French culture. He expressed that  
j’ai aussi beaucoup d’amis français. Et au niveau individuel, tu sens à chaque fois qu’il 
veut t’intégrer. Pour lui l’intégration c’est de boire du vin, de l’accompagner à boire du 
vin et à manger des lardons. Tu le sens. Il ne te le dit pas clairement mais il te le fait 
sentir. J’ai été plusieurs fois dans des dîners mondains; que ce soit dans des châteaux, 
																																																						
505	121031_001—“Now,	what	is	paradoxical	is	that	I	made	my	restaurant	because	I	evolved	[grew	up,	matured]	in	
France	and	so	it	is	a	way	of	saying	that	‘yes,	look,	we	are	integrated	because	we	eat	French	now,	but	it	is	halal.’	It	
remains	halal	always.”	
506	121102_001—“So,	yes,	that	selects	when	we	are	practicing.	It	reduces	a	bit.	You	select	your	entourage	with	
whom	you	stay	and	with	whom	you	do	not.	It’s	natural,	it’s	like	that.”	
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quand tu refuses un verre de vin, ils le prennent mal. C’est comme si tu les avais 
insultés.507 
 
He also explained to me that this sort of insistence on food evidence for integration or 
identification is only relevant for the Muslim in the situation. He suggested that while it is 
normal and frequent for non-Muslim French to ask Muslims why they do not eat pork, or drink 
alcohol, it is not normal or frequent for the Muslim to ask the non-Muslim why he does. The 
place of alcohol in French culture and identity that I described in Chapter 2 is felt strongly by my 
informants and often makes it difficult to feel fully integrated if one does not share that practice.  
 One informant presented an example of the prevalence of alcohol in the French context 
and the reasoning behind why one’s drinking habits can be indicative of integration or the lack 
thereof: 
Y a des cabinets ou l’on va boire dans le bureau pour fêter quelque chose à midi. On va 
ouvrir une bouteille de vin, de champagne. Quand on va déjeuner avec son patron, on va 
boire de l’alcool. En France, entre midi et deux quand on sort pour manger on boit de 
l’alcool. C’est quand on ne boit pas, du coup on n’est pas dans le même modo que tous 
les gens qui sont en train de boire et faire la fête etc. On a beau dire, on peut faire la fête 
sans alcool, avec le coca c’est un peu plus difficile. C’est un peu plus difficile car tout le 
monde se met dans un état recherché. On va tous communier autour d’une bouteille, ou 
plusieurs. Quand tu ne bois pas d’alcool tu es en retrait car à un moment quand les gens 
ont pris quatre ou cinq verres… et bien tu n’es plus au même niveau. Ils sont en train de 
voler, toi tu marches encore alors que les autres sont beaucoup plus libres, plus ouverts, et 
tu deviens observateur. C’est ce qui peut faire changer… ce ne sont pas des pressions, 
mais ça peut être un frein pour intégrer un groupe.508 
 
While it is not an explicit expectation that one would engage in these activities with those around 
them, there is an implicit expectation of these sorts of practices. In a country such as France, 
																																																						
507	121129_002—“I	have	many	French	friends	and	at	the	individual	level,	you	feel	each	time	that	he	wants	to	
integrate	you.	For	him,	integration	is	to	drink	wine,	to	accompany	him	to	drink	wine	and	to	eat	bacon.	You	feel	it.	
He	does	not	say	it	to	you	clearly,	but	he	makes	you	feel	it.	I	have	been	many	times	to	high	society	dinners;	
sometimes	in	castles;	when	you	refuse	a	glass	of	wine,	they	take	it	poorly.	It	is	as	if	you	have	insulted	them.”	
508	121206_001—“There	are	offices	where	we	will	drink	in	the	office	to	celebrate	something	at	lunch.	We	will	open	
a	bottle	of	wine,	of	champagne.	When	we	go	to	lunch	with	our	boss,	we	will	drink	alcohol.	In	France,	between	
noon	and	two	when	we	go	out	to	eat	we	drink	alcohol.	It’s	when	we	do	not	drink,	we	are	not	in	the	same	world	as	
the	people	who	are	drinking	and	celebrating,	etc.	We	can	say	that	we	can	celebrate	without	alcohol;	with	coco	cola	
it’s	a	bit	more	difficult.	It	is	a	bit	more	difficult	because	everyone	is	in	a	desired	state.	We	are	all	going	to	commune	
around	a	bottle,	or	many	bottles.	When	you	do	not	drink	alcohol,	you	are	behind	because	at	the	moment	when	
people	have	had	four	or	five	glasses	and,	well,	you	are	no	longer	at	the	same	level.	They	are	flying,	you	are	walking	
along	while	the	others	are	much	more	liberated,	more	open	and	you	become	the	observer.	It’s	what	can	change	
things…	it	is	not	pressure	but	it	can	be	a	hindrance	to	join	a	group.”	
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where food and drink are foundational to national identity (as I discussed in Chapter 2), how and 
what one eats and drinks can be a powerful symbol of integration. 
4.3.2.1 Food as access to the “other” 
This brings me to the other aspect of food and food practice that is relevant to integration, 
namely, the ability of food to be an access point rather than a hindrance to understanding the 
“other.” Without the presence of some “other,” integration would not exist. It is only when there 
are “others” to integrate or “others” to integrate toward that integration matters. Unlike those 
who argue that what one eats or does not eat leads to separation of groups, there are those who 
argue that food brings people together in ways that can lead to mutual understanding and respect. 
Desjardins and Desjardins describe how food can be a means of building community and 
understanding of an “other” that used to seem foreign.509 For my informants as well, rather than 
acting as a means of displaying one’s lack of integration and resulting separation from the 
mainstream French society, food can be seen “plus comme un élément de rassemblement, de 
ralliement. Ce n’est pas un élément de séparation ni de coupure entre les gens.”510 The table acts 
as an access point to interaction amongst groups. In a context such as France where the dining 
table is a central part of daily experience and family structure,511 it is not surprising to think that 
it is around the table where one learns about those present.  
 The table as access point is not only significant to French culture. This same 
understanding is central to Maghrébine Muslim culture. One informant stated that the moment of 
the meal was central to the Muslim culture: “c’est là où on se rencontre, c’est là où on parle, 
c’est là où on rit, c’est le moment de partage et c’est le moment le plus important, je pense, pour 
les musulmans.”512 Another informant explained that eating a meal together was something 
traditional in the Maghreb, something brought from “back home,” which allows one to share 
one’s origins and desires and to have a discussion with the other person.513 The centrality of the 
																																																						
509	Desjardins	and	Desjardins,	“Role	of	Food,”	72.	
510	121207_001—“More	like	an	element	of	gathering,	of	rallying	[together].	It	is	not	an	element	of	separation	or	of	
rupture	between	people.”	
511	See	Anne	Chemin’s	article,	“France	Remains	Faithful	to	Food	as	Meals	Continue	to	be	a	Collective	Affair,”	The	
Guardian,	4	April	2014.	Accessed	2	May	2014	from	http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2014/apr/07/france-
food-ritual-meal-tradition.		
512	121203_006—“It’s	there	that	we	meet,	it	is	there	that	we	talk,	it	is	there	where	we	laugh,	it	is	the	moment	of	
sharing	and	it	is	the	most	important	moment	I	think	for	Muslims.”	
513	121106_001.	
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eating experience, then, is a joint cultural conviction for the immigrant Muslim community and 
the majority, non-Muslim community in France. If some shared cultural practices are essential to 
integration, then highlighting this similarity may be useful for those communities trying to prove 
their integration, or the reason why integration is irrelevant to them. These shared cultural 
practices go beyond the eating experience itself and encapsulate the kinds of foods consumed as 
well. When French non-Muslim, non-Maghrébines eat Muslim/Maghrébine food they inevitably 
make the “other” seem less foreign, more a part of “us.” Reflective of Fischler’s comment that 
“if eating a food makes one become more like that food, then those sharing the same food 
become more like each other,”514 the French non-Maghrébine who not only enjoys couscous but 
claims couscous as part of his/her own “French” food practices envelops the “other” into “our” 
self-understanding. Just as disgust in the face of “their” food can feed disgust regarding “their” 
foreign-ness, so too can acceptance of “their” food feed acceptance of “their” likeness. 
 Ultimately, the process of defining and then interacting with integration is essential to the 
immigrant experience in France. Whether integration equals assimilation or not, or whether one 
engages in distinct practices, food or otherwise, to illustrate one’s integration into a particular 
culture, there is an overarching importance placed on this subject for Maghrébine Muslim 
communities in France. How deeply one is integrated or how shallow has an affect on how one 
engages with one’s culture of origin. If, as some informants suggested, no matter how hard one 
tries to integrate that person will never be seen as integrated by the majority French culture, what 
does that do to that person’s sense of self and sense of belonging? If one cannot possibly “fit in” 
in France, will connection to one’s homeland take on a more significant role? It seems as though 
how one defines and engages with integration can affect how that person defines and engages 
with transnationalism.515 
 
 
 
																																																						
514	Fischler,	“Commensality,”	533.	
515	Vertovec	suggests	that	integration	and	transnationalism	can	impact	one	another,	but	they	do	not	necessarily	
have	to.	For	example,	he	states	that	“the	‘more	transnational’	a	person	is	does	not	automatically	mean	he	or	she	is	
‘less	integrated’,	and	the	‘less	integrated’	one	is	does	not	necessarily	prompt	or	strengthen	‘more	transnational’	
patterns	of	association”	(Vertovec,	Transnationalism,	78).	
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4.4 Fence Straddling and Unstable Ground: Transnational Efforts by Maghrébine Muslims 
in Paris 
 
With notions of “us” versus “them” rampant in the experience of Maghrébine Muslim 
immigrants in France, and with forced understandings of integration, one may argue that there 
cannot possibly be an “Islam de France.”516 As argued by my informants, there are no “types” of 
Islam,517 and consequently no such thing as “Islam de France.” In response to former President 
Nicolas Sarkozy’s comments about wanting an “Islam de France” and not an “Islam en France” 
one of my informants said: “l’Islam—qui sois en France ou en Égypte ou aux États Unis—c’est 
l’Islam. Il y a un seul livre saint, ça s’appelle le Coran. Il n’y a pas un livre saint en France, un 
livre saint au Canada.”518 For this informant, and many others, the whole discussion of an “Islam 
de France” was not worthwhile, not only because there could not be a separate Islam for one 
country, because that would indicate that Islam is fragmented, but also because Islam, from their 
experience was not accepted as part of the mainstream French culture (as is made evident by the 
discussion that precedes this section). If immigrants from the Maghreb are constantly being sent 
the message that they cannot possibly be a part of the collective “we” in France, inevitably this 
has an affect on the community’s emphasis on and desire to maintain transnational identity; to be 
firmly rooted in France, but reliant on the Maghreb for cultural, social, emotional and even 
economic sustenance. 
 As I mentioned above, and will discuss further in Chapter 7, I use the term transnational 
to refer to the process of feeling “at home” in two or more places, and specifically, in two or 
more nation-states. Dirk Hoerder in his chapter ““Transnational – transregional – translocal: 
transcultural” dissects these various, related and yet distinct terms. In his exploration of 
“transnational” one of his principal criticisms of the use of the term is that it posits national 
cultures that are identifiable and unique, which he argues cannot hold true since “most states 
																																																						
516	See	the	section	on	“Islam	de	France”	in	Chapter	2	of	this	work.	Also,	Bowen,	“Does	French	Islam	Have	Borders?”	
43-55;	Bowen,	Can	Islam	be	French?;	Cesari	and	McLoughlin,	European	Muslims;	Cesari,	“Islam,	Immigration	and	
France”;	Zarka,	Taussig	and	Fleury,	L’islam	en	France.	
517	120905_001;	121106_001.	
518	121031_001—“Islam	whether	it	is	in	France	or	in	Egypt	or	in	the	United	States	is	Islam.	There	is	only	one	holy	
book	that	is	called	the	Quran.	There	is	not	a	holy	book	in	France,	a	holy	book	in	Canada.”	
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are—at least to some degree—composed of many cultural groups.”519 Furthermore, and using 
other scholars’ research as support, he proposes that “migrants arrive in complex societies rather 
than in mono-cultural nations,” and “no society or state offered only one single model of 
adjustment to newly arriving migrants.”520 While this may generally be the case, given what I 
have described about French nationalism and its approach to immigration and integration, I argue 
that, in fact, France does attempt to present a mono-cultural nation to which all (im)migrants 
must adjust. Because of this, my use of the term “transnational” falls in line with the definition 
that Hoerder provides in his work, namely that transnationalism refers “to processes by which 
‘immigrants’ or ‘transmigrants’ build ‘social fields’ or multi-layered relations linking their 
countries of origin with those of settlement, they establish networks in two or more nation-states 
and ‘maintain activities, identities and statuses in several’ locations.”521 More simply, the 
definition of transnationalism that I engage throughout this work is that of Steven Vertovec 
which he describes as “sustained cross-border relationships, patterns of exchange, affiliations 
and social formations spanning nation-states.”522 As I see it, food is an essential instrument in the 
transnational immigrant’s tool belt to sustain relationships, affiliations, social formations, and 
exchange between the host and home land. In agreement with Miriam Abu Salem, I argue that 
“food, as well as language, preserves culture and especially during periods of migration it 
becomes essential in providing and sustaining self-representation in the public space as well as 
																																																						
519	Dirk	Hoerder,	“Transnational	–	Transregional	–	Translocal:	Transcultural,”	in	Handbook	of	Research	Methods	in	
Migration,	ed.	Carlos	Vargas-Silva	(Cheltenham,	UK:	Edward	Elgar	Publishing,	2012),	70.	
520	Hoerder,	“Transnational-transregional,”	82.	
521	Ibid.,	72.	While	I	choose	to	use	the	term	transnational	here,	I	do	appreciate	Hoerder’s	understanding	and	
definitions	of	transregional/translocal,	and	transcultural.	Hoerder	argues	that	we	must	be	more	specific	in	regards	
to	the	trans-relationships	that	migrants	may	have,	such	that	“rather	than	a	state	as	a	whole,	particular	regional	
frames	like	labor	markets,	schools,	and	neighborhoods	are	the	spaces	of	migrant	insertion	and	of	interactions	and	
these	contribute	to	individual	and	societal	transculturation”	(Hoerder,	“Transnational-transregional,”	84).	In	the	
context	of	this	study	then,	we	may	see	my	informants	as	transregional,	that	is,	establishing	networks,	maintaining	
activities	and	identities	in	both	Paris	and	whatever	regional	city	they	maintain	connection	to	in	the	Maghreb.	
Hoerder’s	understanding	of	“transcultural,”	which	he	sees	as	encompassing	all	the	other	trans-terms	he	discusses	
here,	is	also	useful.	He	sees	it	as	a	four-step	system	approach	which	“connect	migration	decisions	and	patterns	(1)	
in	the	society	of	departure	on	all	levels	from	local	to	global;	via	(2)	the	actual	move	across	distance	given	an	era’s	
means	of	transportation	and	communication;	to	(3)	the	society	or	societies	of	destination	again	in	micro-,	meso-,	
and	macro-regional	perspectives;	and	(4)	linkages	between	the	communities	in	which	migrants	spent	or	spend	part	
of	their	lives”	(Hoerder,	“Transnational-transregional,”	87).	This	system	covers	the	multiplicity	of	experience	that	
may	be	present	for	any	given	trans-migrant,	and	allows	for	the	inclusion	of	migrants	coming	from	former	colonial	
contexts	to	their	former	colonizing	nation-states;	something	that	Hoerder	thinks	is	not	possible	with	the	term	
“transnational.”	
522	Vertovec,	Transnationalism,	2.		
	 163	
maintaining firm roots in the motherland.”523 It helps to situate the migrant on both sides of the 
transnational fence. 
 In this section I present the evidence for transnational religion and identity amongst the 
Maghrébine Muslims of my study in Paris. As argued by Anderson, immigrants inevitably 
straddle cultures, between homeland and host-land.524 For many immigrants, their feet are firmly 
on both sides of the fence that they are straddling, trying to find their place in the host-land while 
still feeling firmly placed within the homeland. The dynamic of which foot is more firmly 
planted than the other vacillates and often changes over the generations. For example, Ebaugh 
and Chafetz suggest that “transnational networks are likely to weaken substantially as the 
immigrant generation passes from community and congregational leadership and ultimately from 
life.”525 In this they suggest that one’s foot would become more firmly planted on the host-land 
side of the fence as generations pass and one may simply keep one’s toe on the homeland side—
for example, speaking the home language at holiday events with extended family, and eating the 
home food once in a blue moon for nostalgic purposes. If this argument is true, the question 
becomes whether there will come a point where transnational connections no longer matter and 
what will come after transnationalism for those who formerly held transnational identities. Does 
the trans- simply get dropped for a pure, one-sided nationalism? Regardless, it is clear from this, 
and from the former discussion on transnationalism, that the transnational immigrant is in a 
constant dance with the fence, invisible or not, leaning over to one side on certain occasions and 
falling toward the opposite side on others.  
For the Maghrébine Muslims whom I interviewed, this straddling dance was complex and 
difficult. For members of groups experiencing prejudice in France, the host-land side of the fence 
is often protected with sharp barbed wire, sometimes visible and other times not. What is made 
clear from my data is that one may feel as though she has her foot firmly in France, but she 
inevitably feels how hostile the ground beneath her is. When the ground beneath your left foot is 
not firm, you will certainly put more weight on the right foot to balance and protect yourself.  
																																																						
523	Miriam	Abu	Salem,	“Religious	Dietary	Rules	and	the	Protection	of	Religious	Freedom:	Some	Evidence	from	
Practice	in	Italy,”	Scripta	Instituti	Donneriani	Aboensis,	vol.	26	(2015):	181-182,	
http://ojs.abo.fi/index.php/scripta/issue/view/74/showToc.	
524	Anderson,	Breaking	Bread,	131,	177.	
525	Helen	Rose	Fuchs	Ebaugh	and	Janet	Saltzman	Chafetz,	eds.,	Religion	Across	Borders:	Transnational	Immigrant	
Networks	(Walnut	Creek,	CA:	AltaMira	Press,	2002),	189.	
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This rebalancing can be seen as what is happening for many of the Maghrébine Muslims 
of my study. The ground under their French foot is not quite sturdy, often leading to experiences 
of pain. The ground under the Maghrébine foot, on the other hand, is stable, familiar and 
ultimately comforting. As humans who seek safety and belonging it is not surprising, then, that 
Maghrébine immigrants’ emphasis on re-creating the homeland in the host-land to some degree 
would be strongly present in this community. The goal of transnational identity and practice is to 
make this straddling dance a less clumsy and more elegant representation of self; the goal is to 
remove the fence completely so that one can move comfortably between the two sides of the 
field. 
 
4.4.1 To be a Proud “Blédard(e)”: The Idealized Homeland 
The Maghreb is idealized for many of my informants. Nostalgia for the homeland is strong, 
whether the person is recently immigrated or a French-born second generation Maghrébine. In 
fact, for many of my informants the homeland, what they would refer to as “au bled,” is central 
in their thoughts and interactions with the world around them. I’ve already touched on the term 
“blédard.” “Au bled” can simply be a way to refer to a foreign country which was someone’s 
homeland, but in the French context often refers to rural, isolated portions of the Maghreb. 
People who came from “au bled” were often seen as less educated, integrated, etc. Although the 
term “blédard(e),” one who comes from “au bled,” on the whole is seen as a negative appellation 
by the mainstream majority non-Maghrébine French community, it was held up as a point of 
pride by many of my informants. One woman explained it to me as follows: 
Beaucoup de Français pensent que, parce que tu viens du bled tu as une tendance [uses an 
accent] à parler comme ça, être un peu ce qu’on dit “blédarde.” Je suis une blédarde qui 
maîtrise. C’est différent. Mais ça ne me dérange pas d’être une blédarde, si une blédarde 
veux dire que je viens du bled. Oui, je viens du bled.526 
 
Instead of being offended by being called someone who comes from North Africa (perceived to 
be culturally backwards), this term is appropriated by those very communities it was meant to 
insult and is used as a point of pride, in ways reflective of Frantz Fanon’s emphasis on 
																																																						
526	121123_001—“Lots	of	French	people	think	that	because	you	come	from	the	bled	you	have	a	tendency	[uses	an	
accent]	to	speak	like	this,	to	be	a	bit,	what	we	call	“bledarde.”	I	am	a	bledarde	that	learns.	It’s	different.	But	it	does	
not	bother	me	to	be	a	bledarde,	if	a	bledarde	means	that	I	come	from	the	bled.	Yes,	I	come	from	the	bled.”	
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reclaiming the things which the colonizer distorts.527 Like the veil, which at the time of 
decolonization acted as “the means by which the abjection of colonial subjects could be 
transformed into a proud and independent national and personal identity,”528 so too the very 
identity of “blédard(e)” could be a subversive symbol taken up by members of former colonies. 
Another informant considered being called a “blédard(e)” the ultimate compliment.   
Quand on dit “tu viens du bled” c’est le plus beau compliment que l’on me fait, car je 
n’aimerai pas perdre cette identité pour rien au monde. Je suis Algérienne, je le resterais 
toute ma vie. C’est ce qui m’a fait, c’est ce qui m’a construit, c’est ce qui me donne mes 
idées, mon point de vue, ma façon d’être. Après, j’adore vivre en France.529 
 
This informant’s explanation shows the two sides of the transnational fence. She is proud to be 
firmly planted in her Maghrébine identity and yet loves having her other foot planted on French 
ground. Both these informants use a negative term in the majority French context to express a 
proud transnational identity.  
Most of my informants envision a return “au bled” for their retirement. Even those 
informants who were born in France have an idealized vision of the homeland that encourages a 
desire to maintain connection with the homeland while in the host-land. In fact, transnational 
identity and practice allows the immigrant to take the good from both sides of their transnational 
identity. For example, as one woman explained,  
j’ai la chance, moi, contrairement à ceux qui sont nées en France et qui sont uniquement 
Français, j’ai la chance de pouvoir me protéger par ma première identité et ma culture 
maternelle de naissance, qui est la culture algérienne.530 
 
Unlike those uni-national people, who can rely only on one-sided identity, transnational 
identifiers have a complex, rich context from which to draw. When necessary they can 
emphasize their “Frenchness” and when necessary they can emphasize their “Maghrébineness.”  
This emphasis on one side or the other can come from a variety of sources. I have already 
addressed the importance of projecting identities when trying to claim identities, but here I 
																																																						
527	Fanon,	Wretched.	
528	Scott,	Politics,	64,	in	reference	to	Fanon’s	writings	about	the	veil.	
529	121128_001—“When	they	say,	you	come	from	the	bled	it	is	the	most	beautiful	compliment	that	they	can	give	
me	because	I	never	want	to	lose	this	identity	for	nothing	in	the	world.	I	am	Algerian;	I	will	be	so	for	the	rest	of	my	
life.	It	is	what	made	me,	it	is	what	constructed	me,	what	gave	me	my	ideas,	my	point	of	view,	my	way	of	being.	
After	that,	I	love	living	in	France.”	
530	121203_006—“I	am	lucky,	contrary	to	those	who	are	born	in	France	and	who	are	uniquely	French,	I	am	lucky	to	
be	able	to	protect	myself	with	my	first	identity	and	my	maternal	culture	of	birth,	which	is	the	Algerian	culture.”	
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address the need to emphasize transnational identity because of inward forces. Immigrants have a 
need to build, project and protect transnational activities in order to feel connected to their past 
and understand their present. For my informants, maintaining connection to the homeland is an 
essential part of their everyday experience in France, more essential for some than for others. 
Because of the political and social context in France, members of immigrant communities are 
constantly sent the message that they are not “fully French.” Hence, transnational identity is seen 
as inevitable for these communities, whether they choose it or not, at least as imposed from the 
outside. On the other hand, again because of the context in France, which is often hostile toward 
immigrant communities (the majority of which are Maghrébine Muslims) transnationalism 
provides these communities with some level of acceptance, comfort and self-understanding. 
While the French side of their identity may be contested, the Maghrébine side often is not.531  
To maintain connection to the homeland, to break down the real or imagined borders 
between host- and homeland, and to feed one’s transnational identity, accessibility to the 
homeland is key. This accessibility comes in the form of trips back home, or frequent phone calls 
and interaction over the Internet.532 Thomas Tweed emphasizes the importance of artifacts, 
tropes, rituals, etcetera, in the processes of crossing and dwelling.533 Ebaugh and Chafetz’ work, 
Religion Across Borders, posits that modern technology has made transnational connections 
easier to maintain.534 The question then becomes, has modern technology made the need for 
rituals, artifacts and tropes less necessary in the process of boundary making and boundary 
																																																						
531	Perhaps	for	second	and	third	generation	Maghrébines,	the	Maghrébine	identity	would	be	somewhat	contested	
and	not	all	that	comforting.	As	was	argued	by	some	of	my	informants	about	those	French-born	double-culture	
Maghrébines	in	France.	That	being	said,	this	contested	identity	is	only	felt	when	the	second	or	third	generation	
Maghrébine	goes	to	the	Maghreb.	In	France,	this	identity	is	less	contested,	and	often	imposed.	
532	Vertovec	addresses	the	role	of	technological	advancements	(particularly	communication	technology)	in	the	
process	of	transnationalism	in	his	work,	Transnationalism,	15,	54.	The	increase	in	communication	technology	has	
inevitably	had	an	affect	on	the	immigrant’s	ability	to	maintain	transnational	connection.	Most	of	the	Maghrébines	
with	whom	I	interacted	in	France,	both	in	participant	observation	and	in	structured	interviews,	had	cell	phone	
plans	which	allowed	them	to	call	friends	and	family	back	in	the	Maghreb,	sometimes	on	a	daily	basis.	While	
conducting	one	of	my	interviews	my	informant	received	a	phone	call.	When	I	asked	her	if	she	was	sure	that	she	did	
not	need	to	take	the	call,	she	responded,	laughing,	and	said,	it	was	just	family	so	there	was	no	need	for	her	to	take	
the	call.	If	my	aunt	or	a	family	member	had	called	from	across	the	country,	or	from	the	United	States,	it	would	
have	been	something	out	of	the	ordinary,	but	this	was	not	the	case	for	this	informant,	or	many	others.	Constant	
communication	with	family	back	in	the	Maghreb	was	part	of	their	daily	reality.	In	fact,	I	met	people	at	the	mosque	
who	had	cell	phones	for	the	sole	purpose	of	communicating	with	people	back	in	the	Maghreb,	not	for	
communicating	with	people	around	them	in	France.	They	would	hold	these	phones	close	to	them,	especially	during	
Ramadan	and	holidays,	to	be	ready	to	talk	to	family	and	friends	at	any	moment.	
533	Tweed,	Crossing	and	Dwelling.	I	come	back	to	Tweed’s	theory	in	Chapter	9.	
534	Ebaugh	and	Chafetz,	Religion.	
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crossing? If one can simply go on the Internet and see Algeria, is it necessary to recreate Algeria 
in France? If one can maintain connection to the past and the religiously significant locations of 
one’s religious identity is it necessary to emphasize metaphors, and artifacts? That being said, 
technology itself appears to be just another mechanism for dwelling and crossing.  
What became clear from my research is that even with increased computer and 
communications technology, which brings the homeland closer, trips back to the homeland still 
play a significant role (boundary crossing is aided here by a different kind of technological 
advancement: air travel). Not only are trips by those living in France to the Maghreb common, 
but trips by family members who still live in the Maghreb to visit those living in France are also 
common. Vertovec suggests that there are varying degrees of mobility found among the 
transnational migrant community in any given place. For example, there are those “(a) who 
travel regularly between specific sites, (b) who mainly stay in one place of immigration but 
engage people and resources in place of origin, and (c) who have never moved but whose 
locality is significantly affected by the activities of others abroad.”535 Many of my first 
generation informants would fall into the first category as they would go once a year to the 
Maghreb, while others, including second generation Maghrébines who fall into the second 
category, would go every few years. For example, one informant expressed the importance of 
going back to Tunisia for the Eid because “ma famille est en Tunisie, quand je peux y aller j’y 
vais, mais sinon j’y vais [au moins] chaque année.”536 This informant tried to go back home for 
the major religious celebrations and also simply to visit her family. Another informant explained 
to me the importance of his transnational identity. He noted that, while he grew up in Algeria, he 
has lived for most of his adult life in France and he nourishes both these sides of himself. He 
explained the way that he maintains connection with Algeria as follows: 
Ma vie d’adulte, je l’ai vécu en France, avec bien sûr des allers-retours parce que je partais 
souvent en Algérie. J’ai gardé le lien avec l’Algérie. Entre parenthèse, je suis également 
Français.537 
 
Frequent trips home allow this Algerian to “keep the tie with Algeria” that is essential to his 
knowledge of himself as equally French and Algerian. When speaking with another informant 
																																																						
535	Vertovec,	Transnationalism,	19.	
536	121209_001—“My	family	is	in	Tunisia.	When	I	can	go	there	I	go,	but	if	not	I	go	[at	least]	every	year.”	
537	121126_001—“My	adult	life,	I	lived	in	France,	with	return	trips	of	course	because	I	go	often	to	Algeria.	I	keep	
the	tie	with	Algeria.	In	parentheses,	I	am	equally	French.”	
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about the celebration of Eid Al-Adha, she expressed that it was ideal to celebrate “back home” 
with the family, where the rituals could be celebrated to their fullest extent.538 She informed me 
that, as long as people have the means, she believed that they would go back to the Maghreb for 
the celebration of the Eid. Even for those without high paying jobs, i.e., without a great deal of 
disposable income, trips back home are important. Many of the women with whom I worked in 
the kitchen at the mosque went back to the Maghreb for long visits after the month of Ramadan 
was complete.539 In particular, the woman who ran the operations of the mosque kitchen 
conveyed to me how important it was to her to return home once a year to re-connect with family 
and reinvigorate herself and her identity as a Moroccan living in France.540 Many of the people I 
spoke with at the mosque would talk about saving money all year in order to go “home” once a 
year. These trips home are made possible by the fact that the distance between France and the 
Maghreb is manageable. The flights are frequent, short, and depending on the time of year, not 
horribly expensive. Even when the flights are expensive, these trips are given importance and 
money is spent regardless. 
 
4.4.2 “Elles arrivent avec les légumes”541: Food and Transnationalism 
Beyond just connecting with family, and one’s past, these trips back home are used strategically 
as well, mostly to bring food back from the homeland to host-land. To help create a small piece 
of the homeland in France, to help ease the transition, to “dwell” as Thomas Tweed would say, 
informants feel a need to bring back food and other objects from “au bled,” or have family 
members bring them for them. The three most frequent items brought back from the Maghreb to 
France are: couscous, spices and oils, and vegetables. Even though it is forbidden to bring some 
																																																						
538	The	Eid	Al-Adha,	also	known	as	the	festival/feast	of	sacrifice,	is	a	significant	Muslim	festival	celebrated	annually	
by	Muslims	all	over	the	world.	It	comes	at	the	end	of	the	annual	pilgrimage	to	Mecca	and	commemorates	
Abraham’s	willingness	to	sacrifice	his	son	Ishmael	to	God.	Muslims	celebrate	by	engaging	in	prayer,	visiting	with	
family	and	friends	and	by	eating	together	(often	from	the	sacrificed	lamb).	While	it	is	not	necessary	to	sacrifice	a	
lamb,	many	see	this	as	the	central	aspect	of	the	festival.	In	the	countries	of	the	Maghreb	individuals	can	sacrifice	
their	own	lamb,	but	in	places	such	as	France	and	Canada	the	slaughter	of	any	animal	can	only	be	undertaken	by	
certain,	trained	individuals	in	particular	places.	This	is	why	the	informant	above	expressed	that	celebrating	“back	
home”	allowed	for	the	rituals	to	be	celebrated	to	the	fullest	extent.	
539	Ramadan,	the	ninth	month	of	the	Muslim	calendar,	is	considered	the	most	holy	month	of	the	year	as	it	was	
during	Ramadan	that	Muhammad	is	thought	to	have	received	the	first	verses	of	the	revelation	of	the	Quran.	It	is	a	
month	of	fasting,	prayer,	reflection	and	religious	study.	During	this	month,	Muslims	(although	there	are	many	
exceptions)	fast	from	all	food,	drinks,	and	certain	other	activities	during	daylight	hours.	
540	Personal	communication,	21	August	2012.	
541	121203_006—“They	arrive	with	vegetables.”	
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food across the border, many of my informants and their family and friends would engage in 
such behaviour in an effort to feel like the borders between homeland and host-land were not so 
high. While many of my informants expressed the importance of living by rules, whether of 
society or Islam, they were willing to break rules to feed their transnational identities. One 
informant told me about her mother bringing food for her from the Maghreb: 
Ma mère, quand elle vient me voir d’Algérie, elle m’achète des tomates. Elle m’achète 
des poivrons, des courgettes, des navets. Elle ramène d’huile d’olive. Et parfois, ma mère 
ramène de la viande. Donc, ma mère fait passer clandestinement dans les valises, et ma 
mère n’est pas la seul, eh? Elles sont toutes comme ça. Elles arrivent avec des légumes.542 
 
This story was one of many that I was told about people bringing allowed and forbidden things 
back in their suitcases with them. Some would even travel to the Maghreb with an empty 
suitcase to specifically fill it up with food products that they could not get in France, or ones that 
simply did not have the same taste (goût) as they do “au bled.” Like these women who would 
arrive with vegetables, David E. Sutton in his work, Remembrance of Repasts: An Anthropology 
of Food and Memory, also found that his informants would bring back food from the homeland, 
mostly feta, in their suitcases. He suggests that they do this as a means of evoking wholeness; 
“the food event evokes a whole world of family, agricultural associations, place names and other 
“local knowledge.””543 By bringing back ingredients from “au bled” my informants, like other 
immigrants all over the world, engage in this evocation. 
 The fact that many people bring food products back from the Maghreb to Paris is 
indicative of the central role that food plays in transnational connection. When analyzing my 
transnationalism code, of the eight most frequently occurring words, half of them were food 
words. Words such as taste, vegetables, meat and couscous were prevalent in almost every single 
interview. Technology, no matter how impressive, did not seem to take away the need to 
continue to buy and consume Maghrébine food products. According to Kalcik’s chapter in 
Brown and Mussell’s 1984 work, Ethnic and Regional Foodways in the United States, foodways 
are notably resistant to change because they are part of the earliest formed layers of culture, and 
																																																						
542	121203_006—“My	mother	when	she	comes	to	see	me	from	Algeria,	buys	me	tomatoes.	She	buys	me	peppers,	
zucchini,	turnips.	She	brings	me	olive	oil.	And	sometimes,	my	mother	brings	meat.	So,	my	mother	smuggles	them	
in	her	suitcase	and	my	mother	isn’t	the	only	one,	eh?	They	are	all	like	that.	They	arrive	with	vegetables.”	
543	Sutton,	Remembrance	of	Repasts,	81-83.	Paulette	Kershenovich	Schuster	also	describes	the	situation	of	
informants	going	“back	home”	with	empty	suitcases	and	returning	to	the	host	land	with	them	full	of	“home	
ingredients”	in	her	“Habaneros	and	shwarma:	Jewish	Mexicans	in	Israel	as	a	transnational	community,”	Scripta	
Instituti	Donneriani	Aboensis,	Vol	26	(2015),	291,	http://ojs.abo.fi/index.php/scripta/issue/view/74/showToc.	
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those layers are the last to erode.544 When everything else is changing for the immigrant, these 
layers of identity that are resistant to change become important. We find an example of the 
centrality of food in transnational identity in Sussman’s chapter in Gafaiti et al.’s work 
Transnational Spaces and Identities in the Francophone World. There she argues that “cooking 
Algerian Jewish cuisine offered the Algerian Jews an active way of preserving the past for future 
generations.”545 In fact one of her informants stated: 
Wherever we are, in France, Montréal, or elsewhere, as long as we prepare our cuisine, 
we still exist as a specific people with a long history behind us. Our cuisine represents 
our culture that we try to pass on to the children.546 
 
Food is representative of culture and is a means of connection to that culture. One of my 
informants similarly expressed: “quand je goûte à une cuisine, je retrouve le pays d’origine.”547 
Food and transnationalism are inevitably linked because food is inevitably linked to nationalism, 
to memory and to identity. 
 For my informants eating and food preparation were important aspects of their efforts to 
maintain connection with the homeland while in the host-land. In fact, for many, it was the most 
important and most easily accessible doorway to their home identity. Because when you “taste a 
cuisine, you find the country of origin,” eating that cuisine can allow the homesick immigrant a 
moment of comfort. Food acts as way to remember, to access memories, and to cross invisible 
boundaries. Sutton similarly posits that sensory objects and experiences are  important “in 
reconnecting and remembering experiences and places one has left behind for short- or long-term 
migration…objects can shift levels of identity when experienced in new contexts, becoming a 
symbol not just of home or local place, but of countries or perhaps regions.”548 Food is one of 
these objects that becomes essential for reconnecting the migrant to home, for crossing 
boundaries of time and place, and consequently for re-creating home in the host land. 
To maintain transnational connections through food one must have access to 
transnational ingredients. It is easier to create a “petit Maghreb” when one can purchase 
																																																						
544	Susan	Kalcik,	“Ethnic	Foodways	in	America:	Symbol	and	the	Performance	of	Identity,”	in	Ethnic	and	regional	
foodways	in	the	United	States:	the	performance	of	group	identity,	eds.	Brown,	Linda	Keller	Brown	and	Kay	Mussell	
(Knoxville:	University	of	Tennessee	Press,	1984),	39.	
545	Sussman,	“Jews	from	Algeria,”	227.	
546	Ibid.,	228.	
547	121216_001—“When	I	taste	a	cuisine,	I	find	the	country	of	origin.”	
548	Sutton,	Remembrance	of	Repasts,	74.	
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ingredients that one may find in the Maghreb. One informant explained to me the importance of 
cooking food from the homeland as a means to present a transnational identity. He explained that 
such a practice was differently motivated whether he was cooking for himself or for others. He 
expressed that “si je fais un plat de couscous, ce n’est pas tout le temps. C’est si j’invite des amis 
c’est pour leur donner quelque chose. Si je le fais pour moi, c’est pour retrouver quelque 
chose.”549 For this informant food is a means of finding something missing. One does not need to 
find something that is out in plain sight, but one “finds something” that is hidden, that is 
understood to be present and yet often not clearly located.  
À la recherche du temps perdu, to use the words of Proust (“In search of lost time”), in 
the process of trying to find something that is missing from one’s transnational identity, memory 
plays a significant role in gaining access to the missing thing. As already argued, food is 
inherently tied to memory. Meredith McGuire argues that “memory resides in the whole 
body…[;] that means that memory can be closely connected with our senses and bodily states, 
including experiences of which we are not even conscious.”550 Our sense of taste, then, and the 
bodily experience of eating are powerful means of accessing those memories resident in the 
body. If food is tied to memory and memory is an access point for something that one cannot 
access physically, then food can be seen as playing a significant role in accessing and presenting 
connection to distant homelands and identities. Like the students in Desjardins and Desjardins’ 
work, food practices can become essential for people who are living away from “home,” because 
it “connects them with the smells and tastes of home.”551 One informant said that food practices 
acted as “repères” (benchmarks or landmarks) for his memories.552 Food is the trigger, the 
ground for the memory. One woman explained to me that when she went to a Moroccan 
restaurant, even though she was Algerian, she found the flavours of her childhood reminded her 
of that.553 Another informant said the tie of memory and food when he described to me how he 
thought of his mother and grandmother. When describing what it was like to grow up in a 
traditional family and imagining his mother and grandmother, he said “j’en ai encore le goût en 
																																																						
549	121206_001—“If	I	make	a	plate	of	couscous,	it’s	not	all	the	time.	It’s	if	I	invite	friends,	it’s	to	give	them	
something.	If	I	do	it	for	myself,	it’s	to	find	something.”	
550	McGuire,	Lived	Religion,	99.	
551	Desjardins	and	Desjardins,	“Food	that	Builds,”	21.	
552	121205_002.	
553	121207_001.	
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pensant à elle.”554 For this informant, who was a man in his sixties, his taste memories were what 
came to mind when thinking of growing up in Algeria.  
Not only was food memory a result of accessing memories of the homeland, it was also a 
deliberate action taken to evoke those memories. As Sutton says, we “eat in order to remember.”555 
It was not simply that people thought of the homeland and as a result thought of the food that 
related to those moments, but food was used to evoke memories, and to evoke mental access to 
those memories and the related spaces. For example, one informant stated: “si j’ai envie de me 
rappeler du pays, forcément je vais faire de la chorba.”556 For this informant, a kind of soup was a 
tool to access a memory about his country. Another informant expressed a similar tactic. He told 
me that he ate, and many other Maghrébines, even those born in France, eat as though they are 
back “au bled,” in order to gain access to the homeland, to the flavours and to the connection.557 
For other informants it is simply a matter of nostalgia for one’s childhood, which is inevitably tied 
to food.558  
One may seek out food from the homeland, not necessarily for the transnational 
connection, but simply for the nostalgia for one’s childhood, which one just happened to spend 
in that particular locale. Regardless, when one eats the home food, one feels at home. As one 
informant expressed, when describing a dinner that she had at a Moroccan restaurant, “je me suis 
senti au Maroc; la décoration, le manger, le goût.”559 Sutton explains this as a means of 
connecting with the imagined community of the homeland. Eating a particular thing, in a 
particular way, creates “the embodied knowledge that others are eating the same food.”560 Food 
transports us to the homeland and the homeland to us.561 
To recreate the homeland in the host-land and to cook the home food one must have 
access to the necessary ingredients. I addressed this issue by asking my informants if it was 
difficult to find the necessary ingredients to maintain religious and cultural food practices from 
																																																						
554	121212_001—“I	still	have	the	taste	when	I	think	of	her.”	
555	Sutton,	Remembrance	of	Repasts,	2.	
556	121129_002—“If	I	want	to	be	reminded	of	the	country,	clearly	I	am	going	to	make	a	chorba	[a	type	of	stew	or	
soup].”	
557	120726_001.	
558	121209_001.	
559	121216_001—“I	felt	like	I	was	in	Morocco;	the	decoration,	the	eating,	the	taste.”	
560	Sutton,	Remembrance	of	Repasts,	84.	
561	See,	Sutton,	Remembrance	of	Repasts,	when	he	discusses	the	reconstruction	of	wholeness	in	the	migrant	
experience	(75).		
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the Maghreb in France. Every single informant suggested that it was relatively easy to find the 
necessary elements, whether they needed them for their own personal food practices or not. This 
is a newer development for the community, though.  
One informant explained to me that while it is easy to find halal meat, and everything 
else one may need to recreate cultural and religious food practice in France, that was not always 
the case. In fact, 
la première génération, quand ils sont arrivés en France, ils n’avaient pas des boucheries 
halal. Donc, ils ont acheté leur viande dans les boucheries non-halal. Sinon, ils sont 
condamnés par leur parents de manger de la viande.562 
 
For those first generations, before a solid market had started for North African and halal 
products, immigrants would have difficulty recreating home in France. Hence the emphasis on 
trips back home to bring products back to France. That is no longer the case, though.  
My informants spoke about how easy it was to find everything they needed to cook 
Maghrébine dishes in France and how this led to feeling like they were “chez nous, au bled.”563 
In fact, one informant suggested that,  
aujourd’hui, on peut tout faire. Je n’ai aucune difficulté à préparer les plats que ma mère 
faisait, et d’autres que je trouve sur internet ou dans les bouquins de recette; il n’y a 
vraiment aucune difficulté. Aussi bien, en termes de viande qu’en termes d’épices, très 
important dans la préparation aux Maghreb. Les épices sont très importants. Tout est 
disponible. Je n’ai aucune difficulté à trouver la matière première pour faire les plats 
traditionnels…Quasiment tout est accessible. 99% de ce que l’on peut faire en Algérie, 
on peut le faire ici.564 
 
This ease of accessibility of ingredients can be attributed to the former colonial relationship 
between France and the Maghreb, the close distance between the two locations, and the 
increasing demand for these products in France. Not only does this allow for ease of access for 
people to bring ingredients back with them when they visit the homeland, as discussed above, 
but also to allow the ease of commerce between the two locations.565  
																																																						
562	121031_001—“The	first	generation,	when	they	arrived	in	France	they	did	not	have	halal	butchers.	So	they	
bought	their	meat	from	non-halal	butchers.	If	not,	they	were	forbidden	by	their	parents	to	eat	meat.”	
563	121006_002—“At	home,	au	bled.”	
564	121126_001—“Today	we	can	make	everything.	I	have	no	problem	preparing	the	dishes	that	my	mother	made	
and	others	that	I	find	on	the	internet	or	in	recipe	books;	there	is	really	no	difficulty.	Both	in	terms	of	meat	and	in	
terms	of	spices;	very	important	in	cooking	in	the	Maghreb.	Spices	are	very	important.	Everything	is	available.	I	have	
no	difficulty	finding	the	primary	materials	to	make	traditional	dishes…Practically	everything	is	accessible.	99%	of	
the	things	we	can	make	in	Algeria,	we	can	make	here.”	
565	121204_002.	
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While most of my informants would suggest that you could find almost everything (99 
percent) in France and make 99 percent of the dishes, and maintain 99 percent of one’s 
transnational identity, others suggested that the situation in France was even better than that in 
the Maghreb. It may be even easier in France than in the Maghreb to maintain the Maghrébine 
part of one’s transnational identity because, according to these informants, you can get even 
more ingredients in France than you could get back home. One informant explained it as follows: 
Il y a des produits ici en France que l’on ne retrouve plus dans les pays du Maghreb. 
Comme spécialités, les épices dans les pays du Maghreb on trouve de moins en moins de 
bonnes épices. Alors qu’en France de bonnes épices on en trouve partout. On peut faire la 
cuisine que l’on fait au Maghreb.566 
 
Because France is a country that views food as essential, the market for speciality goods and 
spices is large, and consequently one can find practically everything one needs. Not only that, 
but if one is in the Maghreb, one often only has access to the spices and ingredients of the region 
in which one is located. One cannot necessarily get spices from another region in the Maghreb. 
In France, on the other hand, one has access to all spices of all regions in one place. One 
informant painted the picture as follows: 
On trouve tout, même on trouve mieux. Parce qu’en Algérie, on n’a pas les ingrédients du 
Maroc, de la Tunisie, mais à Paris on a tout ce que l’on veut. Et quand je vais faire mes 
courses au marché de Saint-Ouen ou au marché de Nanterre, je trouve même la menthe 
qui vient du Maroc, les courgettes qui viennent du Maroc, pas les courgettes françaises. 
Et les radis ou le navet venant du Maroc, qui n’existent pas en Algérie.567 
 
For this informant, Maghrébine identity was potentially maintained even more easily in France 
than in the Maghreb because of the access to pan-Maghrébine ingredients. 
The question arises: if one can find practically all of the necessary ingredients in France, 
or perhaps even more, why do people continue to bring food back from the Maghreb with them? 
Also, if the ingredients are exactly the same, and one can get the spices and products one needs 
to make traditional Maghrébine dishes, does that mean that the food is exactly the same in 
																																																						
566	121206_001—“There	are	products	here	in	France	that	we	cannot	find	anymore	in	the	countries	in	the	Maghreb.	
Like	specialties,	spices	in	the	countries	of	the	Maghreb	we	find	less	and	less	the	good	spices.	Whereas	in	France	we	
find	good	spices	all	over	the	place.	We	can	make	the	cuisine	that	we	made	in	the	Maghreb.”	
567	121212_001—“We	find	everything,	even	we	find	better/more.	Because	in	Algeria,	we	do	not	have	the	
ingredients	from	Morocco,	or	Tunisia,	but	in	Paris	we	have	everything	we	want.	And	when	I	do	my	grocery	
shopping	at	the	Saint	Ouen	market,	Nanterre	market,	I	find	even	the	mint	that	comes	from	Morocco,	the	zucchini	
that	come	from	Morocco.	Not	the	French	zucchini.	The	radishes	or	the	turnip	coming	from	Morocco,	that	do	not	
exist	in	Algeria.	
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France as it is in the Maghreb? Does one have an easier time feeling at home with one’s food 
practice in France than in the Maghreb? While one may imagine that this is the case, considering 
the fact that some of my informants suggested that you could get everything necessary to 
recreate traditional Maghrébine food in France, most of my informants suggested otherwise. 
While the dishes were all the same, while one could get harissa and zucchini and halal meat, my 
informants expressed that there was still a significant difference in taste (goût).  
 
4.4.2.1 Difference in “Goût”: The Social Construction of Taste 
The idea of there being a difference in taste between Maghrébine dishes prepared in France and 
those prepared in the Maghreb was a significant theme that arose in my interviews. In fact, all 
but one of my 33 interviewees mentioned something about this difference in “goût.” From the 
first interview to the last, informants described how one could prepare all of one’s favourite 
traditional dishes, and practice all of one’s religious food practices in France, but that something 
was different, something was missing. That something was a particular taste: the taste of home. I 
remember sitting in the park by the mosque conducting my first interview with a first-generation 
Algerian man, who casually brought up this difference in taste and brushed it off as “quelque 
chose [de] normal.”568 Because it was my first interview, and because I was not looking for this 
response, I did not engage the topic further, but it did not matter, because later in the interview 
he brought it up again. He noted that even if someone takes the exact same ingredient in France 
and in the Maghreb, it will not be the same because the taste would be different. This was not 
just something he read, or heard, but something he directly experienced. When describing this 
difference in “taste” to me with various examples, he said: “je parle avec l’expérience, parce que 
j’ai goûté ici, et j’ai goûté là-bas, donc je sais comment ça se passe. Là-bas c’est différent par 
rapport à ici. Même l’huile d’olive, par exemple, c’est pas pareil.”569 When I left that interview 
that day, I noted that it was curious that he had brought up this difference in taste, but did not 
think much of it. I did not imagine that practically every single one of my informants would 
highlight this difference. It became clear that there was something going on with the idea of 
“taste” that I needed to address. This phenomenon is not unusual. Desjardins and Desjardins 
																																																						
568	120726_001—“Something	normal.”	
569	120726_001—“I	speak	with	experience,	because	I	tasted	here	and	I	tasted	there,	so	I	know	how	it	goes.	It	is	
different	there	in	comparison	to	here,	even	olive	oil,	for	example,	it’s	not	the	same.”	
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similarly speak about this difference in taste of the same ingredient in two different locations.570 
Instead of the home food tasting better than the same food in the host land, Desjardins and 
Desjardins speak of this phenomenon in relation to transformed langar food tasting “better” than 
home food even when the same ingredients are used.571 
Although two of my informants suggested that there was no difference between the taste 
of the dishes or ingredients in France versus in the Maghreb, the other 30 suggest that there were 
clear differences. For one reason or another, these informants saw the ingredients that come from 
the Maghreb as more full of flavour, as having a better taste, and as generally leading to more 
delicious dishes. When exploring the different responses that people gave me, three explanations 
for why there was a difference in taste became apparent. The arguments were made that it was 
because of 1) the organic nature of Maghreb products, 2) the different ambiance, or 3) pure 
psychology. 
The most prevalent reasoning for the difference in taste that my informants gave relates 
to the nature of the ingredient itself. For these informants, Maghrébine products provided 
superior taste because they were inevitably organic. These informants would explain that even if 
one could find all of the necessary ingredients in France, the taste would still be different 
because the vegetables and the meat in the Maghreb are raised without additives, in the sunshine, 
and in artisanal572 rather than industrial ways.573 One informant explained to me the difference 
between the vegetables in France and those in the Maghreb as follows: 
Les légumes français ne sont pas terribles. Nos légumes sont plein de terre, ils sont pas 
très bons à regarder mais en fait ils sont très, très goûteux. Ici, ils sont tous beaux, tous 
grands, tous mâchants, mais le goût … n’y pas trop. En fait, je crois que notre agriculture 
en Algérie c’est l’agriculture bio ici. Ce qu’ils appellent le bio ici. Pour nous c’est de la 
normale en Algérie.574 
 
For this informant, and for others, organic vegetables are thought to be the norm in the Maghreb 
and accordingly provided better taste. Many informants highlighted the abundance of sunlight that 
																																																						
570	Desjardins	and	Desjardins,	“Food	that	Builds.”	
571	Ibid.,	8.	
572	120905_001.	
573	121008_001.	
574	121201_001—“French	vegetables	are	not	great.	Our	vegetables	are	full	of	earth,	they	are	not	very	nice	to	look	
at	but	in	fact	they	are	very,	very	tasty.	Here	they	are	all	beautiful,	all	large,	all	whatever,	but	there	is	not	much	
taste.	In	fact,	I	believe	that	our	agriculture	in	Algeria	is	organic	agriculture	here.	What	they	call	organic	for	us	it	is	
the	norm	in	Algeria.”	
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the vegetables would get in the Maghreb as the reason for this difference.575 Another theme that 
arose throughout people’s responses about the difference in taste was the physical comparison 
between vegetables in France and those in the Maghreb. I had informants express how there are 
“de très bons légumes” (very good vegetables) in France and yet are far from being “bons” (tasty), 
while in the Maghreb the vegetables are “tout pourris…pas beaux physiquement”576 but have an 
amazing, true flavour. Another informant described it as follows: 
Quand je croque dans une tomate chez moi, c’est une redécouverte de la tomate. Ici, j’ai 
l’impression que les légumes sont fades. C’est une réalité, ils sont beaux, chez moi ils ne 
sont pas beaux. Ils sont toujours petits, tout écrabouillés, la carotte elle est tordue. Mais 
quand on cuisine … on sent les légumes, on sent le goût.577 
 
In this response we see the comparison between French and Maghrébine ingredients yet again. It 
is notable that these informants claim that the French vegetables are beautiful on the outside but 
bland on the inside while the opposite is true of Maghrébine vegetables. If food represents 
identity and can act as a metaphor for people, this may be a way of saying that “sure they may 
look nice, but they are bland and lacking on the inside. Whereas we may not be pretty but we are 
of the earth, natural, and full of flavour.” Not only that, but setting up the difference in taste as 
one based on “our” ingredients versus “their” ingredients is just one more example of ways that 
the paradigm of “us” versus “them” can be worked out on the ground. This informant also 
suggested that when she eats the “home” ingredients she rediscovers the vegetable itself. There is 
purity to the experience, a truth to the experience of eating these organic, from the earth 
vegetables, that one cannot possibly get in the host-land. 
 While many of my informants suggested that it was impossible to get the same sort of 
taste from ingredients in France, there were a couple of people who suggested that it was 
possible. When I asked one informant about the difference in taste she responded differently than 
most. She said: 
Alors je vous fais la réponse des Algériens, qui est, “non c’est pas le même goût parce 
que les légumes ils sont pas pareilles, parce que la viande il est pas pareille, parce 
que….” C’est vrai que là-bas certains aliments comme les fruits et les légumes ont un peu 
																																																						
575	120905_001;	121124_001;	121209_001.	
576	121123_001—“All	rotten…not	beautiful	physically.”	
577	121128_001—“When	I	bite	into	a	tomato	back	home,	it	is	a	rediscovery	of	the	tomato.	Here	I	have	the	
impression	that	the	vegetables	are	bland.	It’s	a	reality,	they	are	beautiful,	back	home	they	are	not	beautiful.	They	
are	always	small,	all	squished,	the	carrot	is	twisted.	But	when	we	cook	with	them,	we	sense	the	vegetables,	we	
sense	the	taste.”	
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plus de goût. Ils sont moins insectisés qu’en France. C’est vrai. Mais quand on a une 
bonne primeur, les légumes ils sont très bons.578 
 
The difference in this case is not so much between French and Maghrébine vegetables, but 
between organic and industrial vegetables. Another informant suggested that it was possible to 
find good quality vegetables in France but the problem was that they were incredibly expensive. 
He explained, “les légumes, il faut vraiment acheter le plus cher pour avoir du goût. Or là-bas, le 
moins cher est déjà bon.”579 In sum, the general belief is that everyone has access to the taste-full 
vegetables of the Maghreb, whereas in France only those with lots of money do. 
 Whether one could buy organic vegetables in Paris and closely recreate the taste of the 
traditional home food, or use the vegetables that one brought home from the home land, some 
informants argued that this was not enough to erase the difference in taste. One informant 
explained to me that the difference in taste that was so evident was not so much about the 
ingredients, but about the ambiance of the eating experience.  
Le dîner, ça va être la même chose, le couscous on le fait à Paris ou Alger, ça va être 
exactement le même. Y aura aucune différence. Mais c’est vrai que l’ambiance donne un 
goût différent au plat que l’on va manger. Il ne sera pas dégusté de la même façon.580 
 
Other informants explained to me that eating back home in the Maghreb offered a better, truer, 
experience because the ambiance was totally different and this changed everything, even the 
tastes of the moment. Trying to recreate this ambiance was an important effort put forward by 
people in the community that I was studying, but many argued that it would be almost 
impossible to fully recreate because of the French approach to eating and to work. Just as much 
as a French person may look at a North American and argue that the North American culture is 
not conducive to slow eating, long lunches, and three hour meals, many of my Maghrébine 
informants argued that the French culture was not conducive to really slow eating, extra-long 
lunches, and eight-hour food preparation, not to mention the importance of eating as a family and 
																																																						
578	121203_006—“O.k.	I	am	going	to	give	you	the	response	of	Algerians	which	is	“No,	it’s	not	the	same	taste	
because	the	vegetables	are	not	the	same,	because	the	meat	is	not	the	same,	because…”	It’s	true	that	back	there	
certain	ingredients	like	fruit	and	vegetables	have	a	bit	more	taste.	They	are	less	covered	in	insecticide	than	in	
France.	It’s	true.	But	when	you	have	a	good	grower,	the	vegetables	are	very	good.”	
579	121205_001—“You	absolutely	have	to	buy	the	most	expensive	vegetables	to	have	the	taste.	Whereas	back	
there	[in	the	Maghreb]	the	cheapest	ones	are	already	good.”	
580	121206_001—“The	dinner	will	be	the	same	thing,	the	couscous	whether	we	make	it	in	Paris	or	Alger;	it	will	be	
exactly	the	same.	There	will	not	be	a	single	difference.	But,	it’s	true	that	the	ambiance	gives	a	different	taste	to	the	
dish	we	are	going	to	eat.	It	will	not	be	tasted	in	the	same	way.”	
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larger community. These are the factors that affect the ambiance of the eating experience, and as 
a result, at least according to this one informant, affect the taste of the dish one is eating. Here we 
see an example of what Paulette Kershenovich Schuster suggests, that is, that the difference in 
taste arises from the fact that taste is culturally and socially influenced.581 
Another informant, who also suggested that the difference in taste comes from a 
difference in ambiance, explained that this difference was one that happens not in reality but only 
“dans la tête.”582 She explained that one could have the exact same ingredients, the exact same 
person who prepares the meal, but because of the difference in ambiance, one will think that 
there is a different taste. The argument that the difference in taste was merely a psychologically-
based difference is the final argument that I address here. For these informants, the difference in 
taste was evident, but they did not try to argue that it was a physical difference, or one that 
necessarily actually manifested in a legitimate difference in taste; rather, they said, it was one 
that was simply created in the minds of the person eating the food. In one of my interviews this 
idea was presented as follows. 
Autre: Psychologiquement, ce n’est pas la même chose. 
 Rachel: Qu’est-ce que ça veut dire? 
Autre: C’est-à-dire, c’est dans ta tête que ça se passe. En réalité c’est la même chose mais 
c’est meilleur si tu le fais chez toi en Algérie. C’est comme ton plat: le pancake. Quand tu 
le fais avec ta maman, le goût est meilleur au Canada. Pour moi, c’est pareil. C’est la 
même chose.583 
 
This informant claimed that there was no real difference the ingredients are the same, but it still 
tastes different. Another informant, in reflecting on what could possibly give this different taste, 
suggested that “c’est peut-être psychologique.”584 She explained that she had searched for so 
long for what the difference could possibly be, and eventually realized that she had no good 
reason for it to be different and wondered if it may just be something that she created in her 
mind. 
																																																						
581	Kershenovich	Schuster,	“Habaneros	and	Shwarma,”	297.	
582	121207_001—“In	the	head.”	
583	121205_002—“Other:	Psychologically,	it	is	not	the	same	thing.	
Rachel:	What	does	that	mean?	
Other:	It	means,	it’s	in	the	head	that	it	happens.	In	reality	it	is	the	same	thing	but	it	is	better	if	you	make	it	in	your	
home	in	Algeria.	It’s	like	your	dish	of	pancakes.	When	you	make	it	with	your	mother,	the	taste	is	better	in	Canada.	
For	me	it	is	the	same.	It	is	the	same	thing.”	
584	121128_001—“It’s	maybe	psychological.”	
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As much as my informants clearly noticed these differences, the taste was not noticeably 
different for a non-Maghrébine like myself. One afternoon I was visiting with some of my 
informants, one of whom had just arrived back to France from a trip to Algeria. He asked if I 
wanted dates. I said, “no thank you” and was even able to justify my refusal by saying “I have 
lots of dates at home.” My friend responded “Oh you do, do you? Where do you come from? 
Who are you?” insinuating that only Maghrébines/Arabs have dates at home. I responded “I’m a 
Maghrébine now.” This got a laugh. He then assured me that I still had to take some dates 
because these dates came from Algeria and therefore tasted better than the dates that I had at 
home. When I got home that evening I snacked on a couple of them, and they tasted exactly like 
all the other dates I had eaten since arriving in France. I reflected and determined that either I 
had been eating dates fresh from Algeria the whole time (which I knew was not true), or my 
palate did not pick up on the differences, perhaps because my palate was not refined enough, or 
perhaps because these obvious differences in taste were not so obvious for an outsider. 
Similarly, while these differences in taste were obvious for my informants, some 
informants suggested that this difference in taste went away the longer you are away from the 
homeland. That is to say, while the difference in taste was painfully evident in the first years 
someone spent in France, with time that difference faded. For example, one informant expressed 
the effect of time on this issue with the following story. 
Par exemple, quand je suis arrivé, j’ai trouvé que le goût de la viande, des légumes, ne 
sont pas les mêmes. Moi je trouve que les légumes en Algérie et la viande sont beaucoup 
plus bons, on va dire. Parce que, on va dire qu’en Algérie il n’y a pas de… ils utilisent 
pas beaucoup… c’est bio pratiquement. Donc, forcément le goût c’est, uh, mais avec le 
temps ça veut dire que, quand on s’habitue, quand on commence à vivre vraiment 
longtemps ici, moi je fais plus la différence.585 
 
Another informant expressed this decline in noticeable difference as a process of becoming 
anaesthetised. He stated: 
Je suis anesthésié de la bouche. Mais quand je suis arrivé c’était clair. Et tous mes amis 
en France diraient la même chose. Les aliments en France ont moins de goût qu’en 
Algérie.586 
																																																						
585	120917_001—“For	example	when	I	arrived,	I	found	that	the	taste	of	the	meat,	of	vegetables	was	not	the	same.	
I	found	that	the	vegetables	from	Algeria	and	the	meat	was,	shall	we	say,	much	better.	Because,	shall	we	say	that	in	
Algeria	there	is	not,	they	do	not	use	much,	it	is	practically	organic.	So,	naturally	the	taste	is	uh,	but	with	time,	that	
means,	when	one	gets	used	to	it	and	lives	a	long,	long	time	here,	now,	I	myself	do	not	notice	the	difference.”	
586	121129_002—“I	am	anesthetized	in	my	mouth.	But	when	I	arrived	it	was	clear.	And	all	my	friends	in	France	said	
the	same	thing.	The	ingredients	in	France	have	less	taste	than	in	Algeria.”	
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For both these informants, the difference in taste was evident to them in the beginning but with 
time disappeared.  
Whatever the argument is for why the taste was different, often meaning “better” in the 
Maghreb than in France, it became clear from my interviews that it was important to try to get to 
as close as possible to the full “taste” of the homeland. One informant seemed to suggest that one 
could not feel fully at home in France because of this difference in taste. She expressed that the 
difference leads to a great sense of disappointment, so much so that she would rather not even try 
to recreate the home food because it just could not be the same. She stated, “parfois c’est 
déprimant. Ah oui, c’est dur, c’est dur. Je préfère de ne pas manger que de manger quelque chose 
qui a une imitation de quelque chose que j’ai aimé.”587 For this informant it was better to eat 
something totally different than to try and recreate a loved dish that looked the same, and was 
prepared the same, but did not taste the same. For her, and for many others like her, her cultural 
food practice would change because of her connection to her homeland and the continuing 
influence of memory and experience of “how things should be” based on “how things were” in 
her homeland. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
	
In this chapter I explored how my informants negotiate their transnational identities through food 
practice. First, I addressed the process of “othering” that happens between the Maghrébine 
Muslim immigrants of my study and the non-Muslim, multi-generation European French that 
surround them. I presented how my informants see a clear distinction between “us” and “them” 
based on dichotomies between the two cultures, specifically as represented in food practices. My 
informants suggested that one could see the difference between “us” and “them” based on 
approaches to hospitality, and more specifically in what, how and where one eats.  
While my informants spent a significant amount of time explaining how they saw 
themselves as distinct from the non-Muslim French community, they also tried to remove these 
boundaries between “us” and “them” by pointing out other “thems” for the majority French 
culture to focus on. In this I showed how my informants would speak about Judaism as the real 
																																																						
587	121123_001—“Sometimes	it’s	depressing.	Ah	yes,	it’s	hard,	it’s	hard.	I	prefer	to	not	eat	than	to	eat	something	
that	is	an	imitation	of	something	that	I	love.”	
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“them” and how food was often the example given for why Jewish people in France were a more 
problematic group than Muslims. At minimum, I had informants show how Muslim and Jewish 
food practices were similar, arguing that since Jewish food practices were generally accepted in 
France so too should Muslim ones; if Jewish people in France were not being labelled as a 
“them” because of their food practices then neither should Muslims. 
When considering relations between two separate groups the question of integration 
becomes important. In this section I addressed the various ways that my informants defined this 
controversial term. Through this I discovered seven different definitions and consequent 
understandings of integration. For my informants, integration was 1) not assimilation, and yet 2) 
about being just like everyone else (assimilation); it was 3) about being a good citizen, 4) or 
about being good in general; integration inevitably implicated 5) respect, 6) racism and 7) 
language issues.  
Because integration can be a difficult topic to address for many members of immigrant 
communities in a country such as France, I attempted to gain access to the ways people were 
engaging with integration on the ground through their food practice. People might not want to 
talk about integration, but they were willing to talk about ingestion. The ways that my informants 
interacted with their religious and cultural food practices in fact revealed a great deal about how 
they felt about their integration processes, or lack thereof. In this section I showed how specific 
food practices reveal a commitment to integration, or a commitment to not integrate, as well as 
the ability of food and eating to be an access point to understanding and/or encounter with “the 
other” (an essential element in integration). For some, maintaining religiously and culturally 
accurate foodways was in line with their definition of integration; hence they saw themselves as 
being able to maintain those foodways while still claiming an integrated identity. Others felt a 
need to change their foodways in an effort to show how they had integrated into the French 
culture, e.g. by drinking with colleagues. On the other hand, my informants presented the idea 
that food could also be an access point to understanding the “other.”  
After this exploration of integration, I then addressed the efforts that my informants made 
to maintain their transnational identities in Paris. I showed how my informants interacted with 
both sides of their transnational identities, often idealizing the homeland, and yet transforming 
the home practice in the host land. Whatever the case may be, my informants felt a need to 
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maintain connections to the homeland to some extent, and this often happened through their 
interaction with the home food.  
If food is tied to memory and memory is an access point for something that one cannot 
necessarily access physically, then food can be seen as playing a significant role in accessing and 
presenting connections to distant homelands and identities. My informants maintained 
transnational connection by cooking “home food” frequently and in culturally and religiously 
accurate ways. In order for this to be a reality, my informants needed to have access to the home 
ingredients, often bringing them back with them from trips “au bled.”  
While my informants were able to get their hands on all of the necessary ingredients and 
were able to make all of their home-food in Paris, there was still something missing according to 
most of my informants, and that was the taste of the homeland. 32 of my 33 informants 
mentioned the fact that there was a difference in taste in the home and host ingredients. I 
explored the various reasons that my informants gave for this difference in taste and suggested 
that this process of reasoning may be a psychological means of addressing one’s transnational 
experience. For many of my informants, food is one of the most beautiful aspects of their 
homeland identity and thus it is an essential means of maintaining this identity in their immigrant 
location. 
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Chapter 5: “Même si je ne pratique pas du tout, je me sens quand même musulman”588: 
Food Practice as a Lens into Religion and Culture 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This discussion of changing practice brings us to the final chapter in the Paris case study and of 
the exploration of the Maghrébine immigrant experience in Paris. Having explored the 
negotiations of identity and transnationalism for my informants, I can now address the actual 
practices of the individuals that I interviewed. I begin with an exploration of the relationship 
between religion and culture. Using food practice as a lens, I discuss the various ways that 
members of these communities understand their practice and consequently their engagement 
with religion and culture. Within this discussion, I present some of the religious food obligations 
that my informants spoke about and the hierarchy of practice that seems to be evident. This 
hierarchy allowed me to create a fourfold typology of religious and cultural food practices that I 
explore in this chapter. Throughout I present the three main arguments that my informants gave 
for their practice, namely, that 1) it was based in the Quran, 2) there was some scientific or 
health reason for the practice, and/or 3) it was a way of life. I then finish this chapter by giving 
an overview of the general trends in these individuals’ cultural and religious food practice. In this 
I explore the times, and examples of, when my informants increased their cultural and religious 
food practices, decreased them, or generally maintained the same level of practice as they did in 
the homeland. 
  
5.2 “Un peu les deux: culturelle et religieuse”589: Culture Versus Religion in Paris 
 
The distinction between, or relationship of, culture and religion has been a pervasive theme 
throughout this research. When discussing a topic such as food practice, this question is 
prevalent. Although Ahmed suggests that breaking anything down into binary categories such as 
																																																						
588	121206_001—“Even	if	I	don’t	practice	at	all,	I	still	feel	Muslim.”	This	quotation	comes	from	a	respondent	who	
practices	the	Ramadan	fast,	but	does	not	practice	the	daily	prayers,	drinks	alcohol,	eats	pork,	etc.,	and	went	on	to	
say	that	the	practice	of	Ramadan	was	both	cultural	and	religious	for	him.	
589	121129_001—“A	bit	of	both:	cultural	and	religious.”	
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this is problematic,590 I argue that the definition of a practice as cultural or religious has 
multivalent effects. I found, through examining the food practices of my informants, that how 
one categorizes a practice can affect how the practitioner feels about her practice, as well as how 
the outside viewer feels about it. It can affect how flexible, essential or valid both parties 
consider the practice. Simply labelling the same practice as cultural by some and religious by 
others reveals the complexity of the issue. How does one determine what is cultural and what is 
religious? Who is the authority? What is authentic practice? All these questions are difficult to 
answer in any authoritative way, and this is the reason that Ahmed suggests that breaking things 
into categories of “religion” and “culture” is so problematic. He argues that 
the human and historical phenomenon of Islam is a field of meaning where truth is 
constituted, arranged, and lived in terms not of categories constituted by mutual 
exclusion, but rather by categories of mutual intersorption and inter-locution that run 
athwart and conceptually frustrate the religious/secular binary or religion/culture 
division.591 
  
By engaging the question of “culture” versus “religion,” by examining how my informants 
understood these terms and their practices that were representative of them, by revealing the 
diversity of interaction with these categories, I too will conceptually frustrate this binary. 
Instead of defining culture and religion and imposing that definition on my informants, I 
allowed them to define what was cultural or religious for them.592 My informants clearly 
engaged these binaries and implemented them in different ways in relationship to their food 
practices. For example, one informant stressed to me the importance of drawing the line between 
culture (what he called tradition) and religion. He expressed to me that  
il y a quelque chose vraiment fondamental qu’il faut absolument que les gens 
comprennent, c’est qu’il y a une religion et une tradition, et ça, c’est pas le même chose, 
																																																						
590	Ahmed,	What	is	Islam,	116.	
591	Ahmed,	What	is	Islam,	116.	
592	These	definitions	often	came	out	in	response	to	a	couple	of	the	questions	that	I	asked	my	informants	during	our	
interviews.	First,	after	asking	the	question:	“Je	suppose	que	vous	êtes	musulman/e.	Est-ce	correct?”	I	would	ask	my	
informants	to	clarify	what	it	meant	to	them	to	be	Muslim,	did	they	have	specific	practices	that	were	in	line	with	
that	understanding	of	what	it	meant	to	be	Muslim,	etc.	Within	this	they	would	often	separate	out	religious	and	
cultural	elements	of	their	understanding	of	what	is	Islam.	Furthermore,	when	I	asked	my	informants	about	the	
various	food	practices	that	came	to	mind	when	they	thought	about	their	religious	lives	and	food	in	those	contexts	
they	would	list	a	great	deal	of	food	practices.	Afterwards	I	would	often	enquire	of	each	individual	practice,	
whether	or	not	they	saw	that	practice	as	religious	or	cultural.	
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parce que les traditions divergent selon le pays d’où tu viens, mais la religion, elle est 
sacrée et elle est unique à tout le monde.593  
 
While my informants had differing understandings of what these two realms were, many did 
make a distinction between culture and religion. While there is some blurring of the lines 
between religious and cultural practices, most of my informants did argue for a foundational set 
of Muslim practices, namely the five pillars of Islam.594  
What was included in the five pillars sometimes varied, and there were some informants 
who did not know exactly what the five pillars were. They would state that the five pillars were 
the foundational Muslim practice, but then would either not list all the pillars or would confuse 
other Muslim practices with the pillars. For example, one informant, a young, second generation 
Algerian woman, listed the five pillars of Islam to me as follows. “D’une part, c’est faire la 
prière, ne pas manger de porc, faire l’aumône, fêter le mois du ramadan, et si un jour Dieu me 
l’accorde, inshallah, comme on dit chez nous, aller à la Mecque au pèlerinage.”595 She expressed 
that her practice was simply the five pillars of Islam, as if this was the most basic and well-
understood way of practicing and yet she forgot the shahada (declaring belief in the oneness of 
God and the unique status of Muhammad as God’s Prophet), and replaced it with the interdiction 
against eating pork. Like the groups which Kate Holbrook examines in her work, the Nation of 
Islam and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,596 my informants highlight what some 
may see as secondary religious values and practices over the more commonly understood central 
tenets and practices of the faith. 
While there are many realms in which to explore the difference and/or relationship of 
culture and religion, I focus on the realm of food and food practice. As is made evident by the 
previous example, food plays an essential role in religious and cultural practices for the members 
of the community that I studied—so much so that one person forgot the most basic of the five 
																																																						
593	121108_001—“There	is	something	incredibly	fundamental	that	people	must	understand,	that	is	that	there	is	a	
religion	and	a	tradition	and	they	are	not	the	same	thing,	because	traditions	diverge	depending	on	the	country	from	
which	you	come,	depending	on	the	culture,	and	the	religion	is	sacred	and	unique	for	everyone.”	
594	Reciting	the	shahada	(profession	that	Allah	is	the	one	true	God	and	that	Mohammed	is	his	Prophet),	five	times	
daily	prayer,	fasting	during	Ramadan,	almsgiving	and	the	hajj	(pilgrimage	to	Mecca).		
595	121005_001—“First,	it’s	the	prayer,	[then]	to	not	eat	pork,	to	give	alms,	to	celebrate	the	month	of	Ramadan	
and	if	one	day	God	accords	me,	God	willing	as	we	say,	to	go	to	Mecca	for	the	pilgrimage.”	
596	Kate	Holbrook,	“Good	to	Eat:	Culinary	Priorities	in	the	Nation	of	Islam	and	the	Church	of	Jesus-Christ	of	Latter-
Day	Saints,”	in	Religion,	Food	&	Eating	in	North	America,	eds.	Benjamin	E.	Zeller,	Marie	W.	Dallam,	Reid	L.	Neilson	
and	Nora	L.	Rubel	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2014),	195-213.	
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pillars of Islam and replaced it with a food practice. Food in fact is one of the most central areas 
of Islamic practice for my informants. The most frequently occurring words in my “practice” 
code were all food related terms. While this has much to do with the fact that the questions I 
asked in my interviews were principally food related, I also inquired about all “religious” 
practices and listened and coded for anything that might be considered a religious practice. The 
most frequent words in my practice code were consequently “viande, halal, alcool, manger, 
porc,”597 and other words commonly associated with Muslim religious practice, i.e. prayer, were 
far down the list of frequently occurring words.598 Food practice was sometimes the sole 
expression of one’s religious practice, and often one of the most essential expressions of one’s 
religious practice and identity. I had informants who did not see themselves as practicing 
Muslims and yet engaged in “Muslim” food practices. One informant explained to me that she 
was not “trop pratiquante” and yet went on to explain that she felt Muslim because “je fais, par 
exemple, le ramadan…et je ne mange pas de porc.”599 She listed off various food practices as the 
reason why she claimed Muslim identity (Ramadan, not eating pork, not drinking alcohol and 
eating halal meat) and yet also labelled herself as non-practicing.600 When I asked her if these 
practices were cultural or religious she responded, “un peu les deux: culturelle et religieuse.”601 
She seemed to not see herself as “pratiquante” because her central practices could also be argued 
as purely cultural practices.602 The complex relationship between culture and religion is clearly 
evidenced in relationship to food. By examining my informants’ approach to food practice, I was 
able to see the varied relationship between these two subjects and to further complicate the often 
black and white labels that are placed on the practices of immigrant groups.  
																																																						
597	“Meat,	halal,	alcohol,	to	eat,	pork.”	
598	Of	course,	this	still	could	be	a	result	of	the	framing	of	the	interview.	I	presented	myself	as	a	researcher	who	was	
interested	in	my	informants’	food	practices.	Therefore,	even	if	I	asked	about	other	practices,	or	what	it	meant	to	
be	a	practicing	Muslim,	most	of	my	informants	would	have	been	aware	of	the	focus	of	my	research	project	and	
could	have	very	easily	focused	on	the	food	examples	in	their	lives	as	a	means	of	responding	to	what	they	may	have	
assumed	I	was	interested	in	hearing.	
599	121129_001—“Very	practicing”…“I	do,	for	example,	Ramadan…and	I	do	not	eat	pork.”	
600	Two	other	informants	who	stated	similar	arguments	were	121126_002	and	121207_001.		
601	121129_001—“A	bit	of	both,	cultural	and	religious.”	
602	It	seems	as	though	there	is	an	understanding	of	practice	based	on	the	Western	Catholic	understanding	of	who	is	
a	practicing	Christian	and	who	is	not.	If	one	attends	church	on	Sundays	and	engages	in	the	sacraments,	then	one	is	
practicing.	Many	of	my	Muslim	informants	when	they	labeled	themselves	as	non-practicing	seemed	to	have	this	
vision	in	their	heads	of	what	practice	referred	to.	It	became	clear	that	they	were	in	fact	practicing,	but	perhaps	not	
in	a	way	that	was	recognized	by	mainstream	society,	and	this	influenced	their	own	perception	of	where	they	lay	on	
the	practicing	versus	non-practicing	spectrum.	
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5.2.1 Fourfold Typology of Food Practice 
In analyzing my data, a hierarchy of food practice seemed to emerge.603 In this, there were 
practices that were seen as absolutely essential and obligatory and those that were seen as more 
flexible. I argue that the spectrum was as follows: the more officially religious something was 
viewed as, or the more something was labelled as religious, the more obligatory it was 
understood to be. On the other end of the spectrum, the more cultural a practice was viewed as, 
or labelled as, the more flexible and open to change and/or abandonment it was. This finding 
accords with those of Samira Mehta, who suggests that labelling a food practice as 
traditional/cultural/ethnic rather than religious can lead to that practice being seen as more 
flexible or not as strict.604 This could also play out the other way, i.e. the desire to make 
something less obligatory may lead an individual to define that practice as cultural rather than 
religious. Furthermore, practices were labelled as religious versus cultural depending on whether 
they were grounded in religious texts or tradition. So, the hierarchy of religious practice worked 
out in this way. 
 
 
Taking this into consideration I created a fourfold typology of food practice to understand 
the ways that my informants understood and interacted with these practices. First, there is the 
Quranically-documented and “prescribed” food practices. These practices include the abstention 
																																																						
603	For	an	excellent	overview	of	the	various	Quranic	food	taboos,	see	Mohammed	H.	Benkheira,	“Alimentation,	
altérité	et	socialité:	Remarques	sur	les	tabous	alimentaires	coraniques,”	European	Journal	of	Sociology,	vol.	38,	no.	
2	(1997):	237-287.	
604	Samira	Mehta,	“‘I	Chose	Judaism	but	Christmas	Cookies	Chose	Me’:	Food,	Identity,	and	Familial	Religious	
Practice	in	Christian/Jewish	Blended	Families,”	in	Religion,	Food	&	Eating	in	North	America,	eds.	Benjamin	E.	Zeller,	
Marie	W.	Dallam,	Reid	L.	Neilson	and	Nora	L.	Rubel	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2014),	156.	
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from consuming pork and alcohol, practicing the fast of Ramadan and the obligation to eat 
properly sacrificed animals (halal). The second category is the Quranically-documented but not 
prescribed category. The lamb of the Eid Al-Adha was generally placed in this category. The 
third category is Sunnah-inspired food practices. The best example from this category is the 
practice of breaking the fast during the month of Ramadan by consuming dates and milk. The 
fourth and final category is that of the cultural food practices not mentioned in any major 
religious text. This category is where many of the cultural food practices reside, although some 
of these practices have been given religious significance as well, such as the eating of couscous.  
Regardless of their engagement in any of the four categories of practice outlined above, 
each of my respondents gave some form of justification for their practice. There were three main 
forms of argumentation that my respondents gave for their practice: 1) it was based in the Quran, 
2) there was some scientific or health reason for the practice, and/or 3) it was a way of life. For 
those who argued that they practiced certain things because they were written in the Quran, there 
were two sub arguments made. The first was that anything that is written in the Quran has to be 
obeyed simply by the fact that it was in the Quran. If God said, as is made evidenced by the 
Quran, that one was not to eat pork, then one was not to eat pork, plain and simple. The 
respondents who used this argument without any other real back up argument tended to label 
themselves as practicing Muslims and were fairly conservative in their ideology and approach to 
their religious lives. Others used the Quran as the justification for their action but took the 
argument slightly further by suggesting not only that one must do what is written in the Quran 
point blank, but also because there was a divine wisdom in the Quran.  
Science and health reasons were the next ones given for various food practices. Many of 
my respondents would start from a reason of faith for their practice, but then support that 
argument with what they considered a scientific argument. In fact, respondents spoke to me 
about the logic of Islam on a frequent basis. If other traditions or cultures did not seem “logical” 
they were somewhat discounted, and many of my respondents took pride in the fact that they felt 
as though Islam and its requirements were completely logical and in line with scientific 
reasoning. It was almost as if they felt that they had to ground their reasoning for fasting during 
Ramadan, not drinking alcohol, not eating pork, eating halal meat, etcetera, in something beyond 
mere faith. While I cannot imagine many Catholics (from the dominant culture) would feel the 
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pressure to explain why they ate fish on Fridays with scientific arguments, many of my 
respondents seemed to feel such a pressure.  
The everyday nature of food was the third argument that my informants used to explain 
why they engaged in any of the practices below. My informants would suggest that these 
practices were an inevitable outworking of belief, a part of one’s routine and things that were 
“anchored” within one’s life and experience. “C’est ancré dans le comportement. Parfois on ne 
fait pas attention, mais ça fait partie des comportements les plus banales de notre quotidien.”605 
Another respondent also spoke to the daily, mundane and therefore ever-present practice of 
Islam. When someone is engaged in something every day, they noted, as a part of his or her 
everyday existence, it becomes difficult to avoid or break with that.  
Très simplement, c’est une religion qui est très forte, qui a beaucoup de dogmes, 
beaucoup de fonctionnements, qui intègre énormément le quotidien. C’est-à-dire que 
même si tu n’es pas croyante en Dieu, même si à 10, 15, 20 ou 30 ans, tu décides que 
Dieu n’existe pas et que c’est une réflexion personnelle, le fait est que c’est une religion 
qui est tellement ancré au quotidien.606 
 
Whether or not one believes in God, or practices the religion according to Christian or Western 
understandings of what religious practice looks like, it does not matter, because Islam is 
“anchored in the quotidian.” When examining something such as food practice, this argument 
from daily, consistent practice is especially strong. Practices become habits, which become 
mundane parts of one’s daily life that do not require special effort or reflection, but are simply 
done because that is what one has always done. 
Ultimately, some people used a combination of two of the above arguments, or even all 
three, but often they would focus on one as their main argument for why they did any of the 
practices I outline below. I include some of this argumentation as I present each category of 
practice. 
I start with the Quranically-documented, “prescribed” food practices. One informant 
while explaining to me that there were no religious food obligations, stopped himself and added 
																																																						
605	121207_001—“It’s	anchored	in	behaviour.	Sometimes	we	do	not	pay	attention	but	it	is	part	of	the	most	banal	
behaviours	of	our	daily	life.”	
606	121209_001—“Very	simply,	it	is	a	religion	that	is	very	strong,	that	has	many	dogmas,	many	functions;	that	is	
incredibly	integrated	in	daily	life.	That	means	that	even	if	you	are	not	a	believer	in	God,	even	if	at	10,	15,	20,	or	30	
years	old	you	decide	that	God	does	not	exist	and	it	is	a	personal	reflection,	the	fact	remains	that	it	is	a	religion	that	
is	incredibly	anchored	in	daily	life.”	
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that in fact there are some obligations and those are “tout qui est écrit.”607 He stated that if 
something was written in the Quran, it was automatically a religious practice and the question 
was not so much about what was obligatory, but how seriously someone took their religious 
practice. If someone saw him/herself as a “practicing Muslim,” then these Quranically-
documented and prescribed practices would be obligatory. Alternatively, for those who saw 
themselves as “non-practicing Muslims,” whatever that may mean, these practices were viewed 
as religious and obligatory, but they chose to not place the importance on being religiously 
accurate, and may leave the obligatory practices aside. Another informant explained what she 
meant by obligatory practice as follows:  
Dans la religion, il y a des choses obligatoires, et d’autres [elle réfléchit] qui font partie 
du comportement du Prophète; …Dieu a dit, il faut faire la prière, et donc il faut faire la 
prière, c’est une obligation. Si on ne le fait pas c’est qu’il y a d’autres sanctions. Ça c’est 
le sens d’obligation.608 
 
For this informant, if God said something, as documented in the Quran, it was not only religious, 
but also obligatory, whereas things said by human voices, such as the voice of Mohammed, as 
documented in the Sunnah/Hadith, were also religious, but not obligatory.  
 When looking at the four explicit Quranically-based and prescribed food practices that I 
listed above, my informants’ practices reveal a hierarchy of these practices as well. For example, 
30 of my 33 informants fasted during the month of Ramadan, with only three informants not 
fasting at all. While a few of those 30 informants had altered their practice of Ramadan slightly 
since living in France, they all still practiced it to some level or another. The next most practiced 
was the interdiction against pork. Twenty-four of my informants did not eat pork while nine did. 
In relation to alcohol, 17 did not consume alcohol and 16 did. Finally, the most varied practice 
was that of keeping halal. In this category nine people kept halal strictly, 15 ate halal when they 
could but also ate non-halal when halal was not available, eight people were not particular about 
halal at all and one informant only ate fish out of preference, so halal was not a concern for him.  
 
 
																																																						
607	121202_004—“All	that	is	written.”	
608	121102_001—“In	the	religion	there	are	obligatory	things	and	others	(she	reflects)	that	are	part	of	the	
comportment	of	the	Prophet;	…	God	said	that	you	must	pray,	you	must	pray,	it’s	an	obligation.	If	we	do	not	do	it	
there	are	other	sanctions.	That	is	the	sense	of	obligation.”	
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5.2.1.1 Ramadan Fast 
The first of the four Quranically-documented and “prescribed” practices that I address was the 
most fundamental and overarching practice for my informants: the fast during Ramadan. 
Because of its explicit mention in the Quran (2:185)609 and its place within the five pillars of 
Islam, this was the least disputed religious food practice of them all. In fact, it seemed to be the 
most basic Muslim practice in general. What I mean by this is that even those who did not see 
themselves as practicing or religious Muslims still fasted during Ramadan and often based their 
identities as Muslim on this one practice. One informant explained it as follows: 
Beaucoup de membres de ma famille n’étaient pas pratiquants, euh...sauf pour le carême, 
pour le mois de ramadan, où tout le monde le fait. Tout le monde fait carême, en fait, 
c’est surtout parce que, hmmm, on a peur du… même si on le fait pas, on le cache [des 
autres]. On le cache vraiment bien, parce que ça reste un des piliers de la religion qui est 
le plus important.610 
 
Even if people were not practicing, it was expected that they would do this one practice. The 
incomplete phrase, “on a peur de…,” in context implies that a person who does not fast opens 
themselves to negative social repercussions. Most of my informants, especially those who 
considered themselves “practicing Muslims,” argued for the centrality of this practice within 
their religious devotion because of the clear-cut prescription to fast as is made evidenced by its 
place in the five pillars of Islam. While the other food practices that make up this category are 
also prescribed in the Quran, interpretation can allow for flexibility of practice.  
 The place of the fast in the five pillars makes it more difficult to argue for a cultural 
interpretation. Yet for my informants who saw themselves as “non-practicing,” Ramadan was 
still at base religious, but they would argue that their engagement with the practice was cultural. 
																																																						
609	“The	month	of	Ramadan	is	the	month	when	the	Quran	was	sent	down	as	guidance	for	mankind	with	clear	
proofs	of	guidance	and	the	criterion	by	which	to	distinguish	right	from	wrong.	Therefore,	whoever	of	you	is	
present	in	that	month,	let	him	fast;	but	he	who	is	ill	or	on	a	journey	shall	fast	a	similar	number	of	days	later	on.	
God	desires	ease	for	you,	not	hardship.	He	desires	you	to	fast	the	whole	month,	so	that	you	may	glorify	Him	for	His	
having	guided	you	and	so	that	you	may	be	grateful	to	Him”	(Maulana	Wahiduddin	Khan,	trans.,	The	Quran,	ed.	
Farida	Khanam	[New	Delhi:	Goodword	Books,	2009],	2:185)	The	parameters	of	the	fast	are	further	explicated	in	
2:187	specifically:	“eat	and	drink	until	the	white	thread	of	dawn	becomes	distinct	from	the	black.	Then	resume	the	
fast	until	nightfall.”		
610	121126_002—“Many	of	my	family	members	weren't	practicing,	except	for	the	fast,	for	the	month	of	Ramadan	
where	everyone	did	it	(the	fast).	Everyone	did	the	fast.	It's	basically	because,	hmm,	we're	afraid	of,	even	if	we	
don't	do	it,	we	hide	it.	We	hide	it	well	because	it	remains	one	of	the	pillars	of	the	religion,	which	is	the	most	
important.”	
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Although most would see it as religious, these informants generally expressed cultural arguments 
for their continued practice of Ramadan, not religious ones. For example,  
moi je ne suis pas pratiquant, je fais uniquement le ramadan, c’est par culture. Parce que 
je suis né en Algérie, je suis venu à 25 ans, on a toujours fait ramadan, c’est comme Noël 
pour toi, c’est un repas familial, c’est joyeux, c’est une fête en quelque sorte. C’est vrai 
que c’est difficile de le faire quand on est à l’étranger, mais je vais garder ça en moi. Je 
ne veux pas me déraciner de ce que mes parents m’ont transmis.611 
 
For this informant, and others like him, even if Ramadan was arguably a religious practice, it 
was more complicated than that. The fast linked him to his family roots. Another informant 
revealed the complicated relationship between religion and culture that is represented by this 
practice as follows:  
Je fais le ramadan, par exemple. En même temps, je ne fais pas la prière, je bois de 
l’alcool, je mange du porc, etc. Mais je me sens quand même musulman. Même si je ne 
pratique pas du tout, je me sens quand même musulman. C’est dans une notion un peu 
culturelle et aussi d’un point de vue de religion et aussi d’un point de vue culturel, mais 
culturellement musulman.612 
 
The border between culture and religion appears quite blurred and the terms are somewhat 
interchangeable for many people. While this informant practiced Ramadan as his basic 
religious/cultural practice, the other Quranically-documented and prescribed practices did not 
play a part in his cultural practices and were left aside. What is remarkable in this extract is the 
fundamental connection made by this person between the Ramadan fast and being a Muslim: to 
fast during Ramada is to be a Muslim.	
5.2.1.2 Pork 
Going into my fieldwork I anticipated that the interdiction against pork would be the most 
fundamental food practice that my informants engaged in due to its repeated presence in the 
Quran.613 Instead of just one or two of my informants telling me that they ate pork, nine 
																																																						
611	121205_002—“Me,	I	am	not	practicing,	I	only	do	Ramadan,	it’s	by	culture.	Because	I	was	born	in	Algeria,	I	came	
at	25	years	old,	we	always	did	Ramadan.	It’s	like	Christmas	for	you;	it’s	a	family	dinner.	It’s	joyous,	it’s	a	party	in	
some	way.	It’s	true	that	it	is	difficult	to	do	when	we	are	in	a	foreign	place	but	I	am	going	to	keep	that	in	me.	I	do	
not	want	to	uproot	myself	from	what	my	parents	gave	me.”	
612	121206_001—“I	do	Ramadan	for	example.	At	the	same	time,	I	do	not	do	the	prayer,	I	drink	alcohol,	I	eat	pork,	
etc.	But	I	feel	Muslim	all	the	same.	Even	if	I	do	not	practice	at	all,	I	feel	Muslim	all	the	same.	The	idea	is	a	bit	cultural	
and	also	religious,	and	also	a	cultural	point	of	view	but	culturally	Muslim.”	
613	“He	has	forbidden	you	only	carrion,	blood,	and	the	flesh	of	swine;	also,	any	flesh	that	is	consecrated	other	than	
in	the	name	of	God.	But	for	one	who	is	driven	by	necessity,	it	is	no	sin.	For	God	is	forgiving	and	merciful”	(The	
Quran,	2:173);	“You	are	forbidden	carrion,	blood	and	pork”	(The	Quran,	5:3);	“Say	[O	Prophet],	‘In	all	that	has	been	
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individuals admitted to eating pork. For some, it was just that: a guilty admission. For others, 
they proclaimed their indulgences in pork-eating with absolutely no hesitation, and sometimes 
with pride. In fact, there seemed to be three categories or reasons given for pork consumption by 
those who ate pork. The first category encompassed those who ate pork from the time they were 
children. For these informants, unlike most of my informant group, pork consumption was a part 
of their customs growing up.614 They do not see the practice as problematic. The second group 
included those who ate pork, but did not actually enjoy it that much or had problems digesting 
it.615 These people seemed to eat it to fit in, or because they felt like they had no other choice. As 
I mentioned in Chapter 2, pork plays an important role in French identity. Not only are some of 
the most iconic French dishes essentially pork dishes—cassoulet, choucroute garni, tartiflette, 
etcetera—but there have been many recent controversies that highlight the importance of pork as 
an identity marker in France.616 As is made evident by my informants who eat pork, these 
experiences can put pressure on those who eat outside the bounds of “French eating” to change 
their practice. The final group encompassed those who ate pork because they wanted to, and 
could come up with an argument why it was acceptable for them to do so.617 For example, one 
informant suggested that because the reasons given in the Quran at the time of the Prophet were 
no longer valid in today’s day and age, people can eat whatever they would like today.618 
 While these informants all had different reasons for their pork consumption, most would 
drastically restrict what kind of pork they would consume. They may eat charcuterie but will not 
eat a piece of plain pork meat, i.e. a pork chop or roast. While charcuterie can be understood as 
not pork, or can take on an appearance that is not so obviously pork, pork chops or pork roast 
cannot. Mohammed Benkheira states that for those few people who do transgress this 
																																																						
revealed	to	me,	I	do	not	find	a	ban	on	anything	to	eat,	except	for	carrion,	flowing	blood	and	pork,	all	these	being	
unclean	or	profane,	on	which	the	name	of	someone	other	than	God	has	been	invoked.’	But	if	anyone	is	forced	by	
necessity,	being	neither	disobedient	nor	exceeding	the	limit,	then	surely	your	Lord	is	most	forgiving	and	merciful”	
(The	Quran,	6:145);	“He	has	forbidden	you	only	carrion,	blood	and	the	flesh	of	swine”	(The	Quran,	16:115).	
614	121126_002;	121209_001.	
615	121201_001;	121202_004;	121203_006.	
616	For	example,	the	identity	soup	controversy	in	2006	that	I	mentioned	in	Chapter	4.	Similarly,	in	2015	a	new	
controversy	arose	over	the	place	of	pork	in	French	life	with	the	ban	on	pork-free	options	for	students	in	public	
schools	in	France.	See	Angelique	Chrisafis,	“Pork	or	Nothing:	How	School	Dinners	are	Dividing	France,”	The	
Guardian,	13	October	2015,	https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/13/pork-school-dinners-france-
secularism-children-religious-intolerance.	
617	121124_001;	121128_001;	121205_001;	121206_001.	
618	121205_001.	
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prohibition, you will see that they do not eat pork stew, or choucroute, or even ham or “soft 
sausage”; instead, they will eat charcuterie, i.e. cured meats, paté, etcetera, because “dans cette 
charcuterie, on ne retrouve ni les couleurs caractéristiques du porc—le blanc et le rose—, ni 
l’odeur.”619 One informant reflected this idea when she explained that  
les musulmans non-pratiquants, mais vraiment non-pratiquants, mangent en général du 
charcuterie mais pas du porc cuit, ça pourquoi, je ne sais pas. J’ai l’impression que le 
porc cuit représente vraiment le porc, et la religion musulmane reste ancrée dans leur tête 
quand même, et on a du mal [à le manger].620 
 
As this informant explained, for many of my informants the interdiction against pork is a 
foundational representation of Islam, both religiously and culturally.  
 For the 24 informants who maintained this practice of not eating pork, the reasons 
differed as well. The three main types of arguments that were given were 1) based on the 
Quran/religion, 2) scientific/medical in nature, and 3) cultural. Some informants expressed all 
three types of arguments. For example, one informant explained that she did not eat pork because 
at base “dans la religion c’est strictement interdit.”621 She expressed this twice, and in between 
these two affirmations of religious reasoning for not consuming pork, she also presented the 
arguments from science and culture. Scientifically, she argued for the “fact” that pork is dirty 
because pigs eat dirty things, and she also argued that there was a study done which showed that 
it was “dangereux pour la santé de manger du porc.”622 Finally, she also suggested that her 
abstention from pork was also a cultural practice, stating that “principalement, je ne mange pas 
de porc car dans ma famille on n’en mange pas; au Maroc, tu ne peux pas trouver du porc qui se 
vend (elle rit), faut aller le chasser.623 Et je pense que c’est des habitudes culturelles.”624 This one 
informant used all three arguments—religious, scientific and cultural—to argue for her practice.  
																																																						
619	“In	this	charcuterie,	we	do	not	find	either	the	characteristic	colours	of	pork	–	the	white	and	the	pink	–	nor	the	
odor”	(Benkheira,	“Alimentation,”	276).	
620	121124_001—“Non-practicing,	and	I	mean,	really	non-practicing	Muslims	in	general	eat	charcuterie	but	not	
cooked	pork.	Why	is	that?	I	don't	know.	I	have	the	impression	that	cooked	pork	really	represents	pork	and	the	
Muslim	religion	is	anchored	in	their	heads	all	the	same,	and	we	have	difficulty	[eating	pork].”	
621	121207_001—“It	is	strictly	forbidden	in	the	religion.”	
622	121207_001—“Dangerous	for	one’s	health	to	eat	pork.”	
623	Benkheira	(“Alimentation,”	266)	states	that	while	pork	consumption	is	generally	avoided	in	the	Maghreb,	there	
is	a	minority	of	people	who	do	consume	it,	often	those	in	rural	areas,	and	most	often	in	the	form	of	wild	boar	
(sanglier).	
624	121207_001—“Principally,	I	do	not	eat	pork	because	in	my	family	we	did	not	eat	it;	in	Morocco,	you	cannot	find	
pork	that	is	sold	(she	laughs),	you	have	to	go	hunt	it.	And	I	think	it	is	about	cultural	habits.”		
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Others use the Quran as the justification for their action but take the argument slightly 
further by suggesting not only that one must do what is written in the Quran point blank, but also 
because there is divine wisdom in the Quran. One young woman explained this to me. Starting 
with the interdiction against pork she said: 
Le porc déjà c’est dans le Coran. Tout qui est dans le Coran c’est des obligations. Donc 
déjà, voilà, après chaque chose qui est stipulée dans le Coran c’est … il y a une sagesse 
derrière. Pour chaque interdiction mentionnée dans le Coran, il y a une explication, une 
sagesse divine. C’est pas juste dit pour nous ennuyer, entre guillemets.625 
 
For this respondent it was not just enough to justify her practice on the grounds that the pork 
prohibition was in the Quran and therefore must be done; her justification also related to the 
wisdom that is present in the Quran. After all, if “le Coran dit que ce n’est pas bon, ça doit être 
pour de bonnes raisons.”626 
 For many of these 24 informants, it was clear that they felt like they had to provide 
reasoning beyond religiously-based arguments for their practices. Perhaps because I was a 
Western researcher, and an outsider to the tradition, they felt a need to justify their practice, 
which for many was a strictly religious one, by other means.627 Here is one example: 
Oui dans notre religion, c’est strictement interdit de manger du porc. Mais je ne le mange 
pas pour deux choses. La première, dans notre religion le Bon Dieu nous dit qu’il y a une 
partie du porc qui est fortement déconseillée, qui peut provoquer des maladies, mais 
seulement dans les pays très chaud. Par exemple, l’Arabie Saoudite, c’est là où le Coran 
est descendu. Et par la suite, j’ai un gros problème culturel avec le porc. Mes parents n’en 
ont jamais mangé. C’est plus héréditaire. Mais le fait de le voir, j’ai la nausée, donc ça je 
ne pourrais jamais faire. J’ai un problème culturel avec le porc.628 
 
For this informant, there were both religious and cultural reasons for her practice of abstention 
from pork. While for some, the religious and cultural are blurred, she saw these two as distinct 
reasons, but equally powerful in influencing her practice. What is important to note is that even 
																																																						
625	120905_001—“Pork,	firstly	it’s	in	the	Quran.	Everything	that	is	in	the	Quran,	those	are	obligations.	So	already,	
there	you	go.	After	each	thing	that	is	stipulated	in	the	Quran	is,	um,	there	is	a	wisdom	behind	it.	For	each	
interdiction	mentioned	in	the	Quran,	there	is	an	explanation,	a	divine	wisdom.	It’s	not	just	said	to	annoy	us,	in	
quotations.”	
626	121216_001—“The	Quran	says	that	it	is	not	good,	it	has	to	be	for	good	reasons.”	
627	I	return	to	this	when	I	explore	the	three	forms	of	arguments	presented	for	practice	below.	
628	121202_003—“Yes,	in	our	religion,	it	is	strictly	forbidden	to	eat	pork.	But	I	do	not	eat	it	for	two	reasons.	The	
first,	in	our	religion,	God	told	us	that	there	is	a	part	of	the	pork	that	is	strongly	discouraged,	that	can	provoke	
illnesses	but	only	in	very	hot	countries.	For	example,	Saudi	Arabia,	that	is	where	the	Quran	is	from.	And	also,	I	have	
a	large	cultural	problem	with	pork.	My	parents	never	ate	it.	It’s	more	hereditary.	But	the	mere	fact	of	seeing	it,	I	
get	nauseated,	so	I	could	never	do	that.	I	have	a	cultural	problem	with	pork.”	
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in her religious argument, she argued from a basis of scientific reasoning. It was not just that 
God said in the Quran that Muslims are not allowed to eat pork, but there is a further reason 
related to health that is behind the interdiction. She provides scientific reasoning for God’s 
injunction.  
In regards to pork, many other respondents spoke about various scientific studies that 
reveal that pork is bad on the human system, that it is proven to cause illnesses, that it is dirty, 
etcetera. One young law student cited scientific studies and explained how science supports the 
divine wisdom found in the Quran:  
Le porc aussi, il y a des études. Concernant le porc, des études scientifiques ont révélés 
que dans le porc il y a une partie qui est pas bon et on sait pas où; donc, on commence à 
douter de tout, tout. Les scientifiques disent que le porc est pas très sain. Moi je les crois.  
Il y a une substance pas recommandée pour les humains, car sa teneur en acide urique est 
forte. En plus, chaque principe stipulé dans le Coran a été analysé, étayé, afin de 
connaître la véracité. De ces derniers jusqu’au présent aucun scientifique n’a pu 
contredire le Coran. Et je ne me doute absolument pas ce qui est dans le Coran.629 
 
This young student held strongly to the belief that science and the divine wisdom in the Quran 
went hand in hand. She therefore had a clear reason to not consume pork in her mind.  
 Many of my informants when arguing a cultural reason for not eating pork would suggest 
that they do not have “l’habitude” (the habit) of eating pork. They would present the reasoning 
that one does not have the habit of doing something/consuming something and as a result they 
will not do/consume said thing. Even when the reasoning behind the original interdiction does 
not appear to be present in their current life experience, they will still not do/consume said thing. 
This cultural influence on one’s practice can be powerful and enduring. One young woman 
explained to me that pork “disgusted” her.630 No matter how many people told her that pork was 
delicious and that she should try it, using various reasons and explanations why it was not 
problematic, she still could not bring herself to try it. Because she had been “educated” to not eat 
pork, because culturally she was told that it was dirty and forbidden, she simply could not let go 
																																																						
629	120905_001—“Pork	as	well	there	are	studies.	Concerning	pork,	there	are	scientific	studies	that	revealed	that	
there	is	a	part	of	the	pork	that	is	not	good	and	we	do	not	know	where,	therefore	we	begin	to	doubt	everything,	
everything.	Scientists	say	that	pork	is	not	very	healthy,	me	I	believe	that.	There	is	a	substance	that	is	not	
recommended	for	humans	because	its	uric	acid	content	is	high.	Moreover,	every	principle	that	is	stated	in	the	
Quran	was	analyzed,	to	substantiate,	to	know	the	truth	of	these	claims,	of	these	so	far,	no	scientist	can	contradict	
the	Quran.	And	I	absolutely	do	not	doubt	what	is	in	the	Quran.”	
630	121105_001.	
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of that practice. She let go of other religious/cultural food practices, such as eating halal,631 but 
the practice of not eating pork was firmly engrained. We can see with this example how disgust 
is a deeply rooted response. 
5.2.1.3 Alcohol 
The third Quranically-documented and prescribed practice is the interdiction against consuming 
alcohol.632 This practice was maintained by 17 of my informants and broken by 16; essentially a 
50-50 split.  
 If I were to write a paper strictly on this religious/cultural practice in the Muslim 
tradition, based exclusively on my sample, I would title it “Alcohol: An obligation in variation.” 
These two terms, obligation and variation, are essential here. I had some informants who would 
emphasize the obligatory nature of this practice and would argue strongly that it could not be 
altered. One young woman explained it to me as follows: “Dans le Coran, certaines choses 
nécessitent d’être mises dans un contexte, doivent être interpréter, sauf que pour l’alcool. C’est 
écrit noir sur blanc que l’alcool est interdit. Il n’a pas besoin de contexte.”633 She most likely 
made this argument in light of the many arguments presented by other Muslims, real or 
imagined, that were clearly present in my data set. It seemed as though she assumed that I had 
heard some of these arguments before and she felt like she needed to correct the wrong 
understanding. In relation to alcohol, the argument was also made that, scientifically speaking, 
addiction is unhealthy and one can do regrettable things when under the influence of alcohol.634 
Many of my informants would speak about the fact that it was a religious obligation to not 
consume alcohol, and yet at the same time would explain why it was acceptable to do so. As the 
																																																						
631	Perhaps	this	is	because	the	discussion	of	halal	in	the	Maghreb	was	not	as	prevalent	as	that	of	the	interdiction	
against	pork.	All	meat	was	halal	in	Tunisia	so	this	informant	was	not	faced	with	the	same	sort	of	strong	emphasis	
on	consuming	halal	meat	as	she	was	on	not	consuming	pork.	
632	For	the	Quranic	verses	that	address	“khamr”	(intoxicants)/wine/drunkenness:	“They	ask	you	[Prophet]	about	
intoxicants	and	gambling.	Say,	‘There	is	great	sin	in	both,	although	they	have	some	benefit	for	people:	but	the	
harm	is	greater	than	their	benefit’”	(The	Quran,	2:219);	“Believers,	do	not	approach	your	prayers	when	you	are	
drunk,	until	you	understand	what	you	say”	(The	Quran,	4:43);	“Believers,	intoxicants	and	gambling	and	[occult	
dedication	of]	stones	and	divining	arrows	are	abominations	devised	by	Satan.	Avoid	them,	so	that	you	may	
prosper.	Satan	seeks	to	sow	enmity	and	hatred	among	you	by	means	of	wine	and	gambling,	and	to	keep	you	from	
the	remembrance	of	God	and	from	your	prayers.	Will	you	not	then	abstain?”	(The	Quran,	5:90-91).		
633	120905_001—“In	the	Quran,	certain	things	necessitate	to	be	placed	in	context,	they	must	be	interpreted	except	
in	regards	to	alcohol;	it	is	written	black	on	white	that	alcohol	is	forbidden.	It	does	not	need	context.”	
634	120726_001—“On	peut	pas	boire	l’alcool,	parce	que	c’est	mauvais,	c’est	pas	bon	pour	la	santé,	et	voilà,	il	y	a	
beaucoup,	beaucoup	de	choses	qui	sont	interdit	parce	que	c’est	pas	bien	pour	l’être	humaine.	C’est	ça	le	but,	
pourquoi	Dieu	il	a	interdit	tout	ça.”	
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young woman above alluded to, they would argue a specific context for the creation of the 
obligation in the Quran, and would argue why it was not the same sort of obligation as other 
practices listed. For example, many of the 16 informants who drank alcohol gave the explanation 
that the proscription against alcohol came to be in stages and they also argued that it was 
problematic only for people who did not know their limits. When justifying her consumption of 
alcohol, one informant defended her view in this manner:  
Parce qu’à la base dans la religion musulmane le Bon Dieu n’a pas interdit l’alcool tout 
de suite. Il nous disait, dans un de ses versets: n’approchez pas de la prière en étant saoul. 
Et bien sûr, il y a toujours des gens qui déconnent et qui le faisaient encore. Ils se 
bourraient la gueule et s’approchaient de la prière. C’est à partir de ce moment-là que le 
Bon Dieu l’a interdit catégoriquement. Mais il ne l’a jamais interdit de facto. C’est venu 
progressivement. À la base, c’était: n’approchez pas la prière en étant saoul. C’est pour ça 
que je ne m’interdis pas l’alcool… mais pas d’abus!635 
 
Another informant explained that she used to abstain from alcohol, but then one day she asked 
herself why it was forbidden and began to explore the reasoning behind it. When she realized 
that it had been forbidden because people were coming to prayer drunk, or forgetting to come to 
prayer at all, she realized that it was not in itself forbidden, but the excessive use of it was 
forbidden. With this realization, and because she “knew her limit,” she began drinking.636 
Another informant expressed something similar, suggesting that he contradicted the religion in 
relation to alcohol. He expressed that alcohol consumption was not allowed, that there was one 
rule for all, and yet because he “knew his limit” it was ok for him to consume it.637  
 While most of my informants would either argue why it was acceptable to drink alcohol 
or why it was not, one informant argued that it was acceptable for some and not acceptable for 
others. For this informant, the interdiction against alcohol changed based on whether one was a 
“practicing” or “non-practicing” Muslim. She, a non-practicing Muslim herself, argued that,  
je trouve qu’il y a des musulmans, je parle pas des Maghrébins, je parle de musulmans, 
qui vont se dire très pratiquants qui vont boire de l’alcool. Je trouve ça pas normale. Ce 
n’est pas normal. Je trouve que c’est un peu facile. C’est souvent les hommes, mais par 
																																																						
635	121202_003—“Because	at	the	base	of	the	Muslim	religion,	God	did	not	forbid	alcohol	right	away.	He	told	us,	in	
one	of	his	verses:	do	not	come	to	the	prayer	in	a	drunken	state.	And	obviously,	there	are	always	people	who	said	
silly	things	and	who	continued	to	do	it,	they	got	drunk	and	they	approached	the	prayer.	It	was	from	that	moment	
that	God	categorically	forbade	it.	But	he	never	forbade	it	de	facto.	It	came	progressively.	At	its	base	it	was	to	not	
come	to	prayer	in	a	drunken	state.	It	is	for	that	reason	that	I	do	not	forbid	myself	of	alcohol,	but	I	do	not	abuse	it.”	
Here	the	informant	is	referring	to	the	Quranic	verse	4:43.	
636	121201_001.	
637	121205_002.	
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contre tu vois ils sont dur—donc non, ça c’est pas normale. Après, quand tu n’es pas très 
pratiquant et bois l’alcool, et surtout que tu demandes rien aux autres, tu pratiques ta 
religion pour toi à la limite ce qu’il veut. Voilà.638 
 
For this informant, it is not normal for a practicing Muslim to drink, it is hypocritical. But a non-
practicing Muslim can do as they please. 
 If logical reasoning could be provided for the consumption of a product, there seemed to 
be more flexibility in that practice. This was further evidenced to me when some of my 
informants were trying to convince me to convert to Islam. I had given them many arguments 
over the months, mostly in relation to my commitment to my own religious tradition, but one day 
decided to use the food argument as a reason for my lack of conversion. I explained to them that 
I could never become a Muslim because I like bacon and wine too much. Thinking that this 
would be a sufficient excuse, I was surprised at one of my informant’s answers. Instead of saying 
“yes, you have to give up pork and alcohol, because that is what the Quran says,” he went on to 
give me logical reasons why I only need to give up one of those things to become a Muslim. He 
explained that pork was not necessary for me to continue eating. There were other meats that I 
could eat that were much better for one’s health, and that I simply would not miss it. On the 
other hand, alcohol was not so easily replaced by another substance and so he could understand 
why I would not give that up right away, but hoped that with time I would give that up as well.639 
 While this informant suggested that there was some flexibility in the application of the 
two interdictions based on logic, another argued that both were strictly forbidden for logical 
reasons as well. After becoming friends with an imam in the community, he offered 
scientific/health reasons for me to stop eating pork and drinking alcohol. When I was feeling 
sick, he would ask if I was still eating pork and drinking alcohol. When I would respond in the 
affirmative, he would look at me with great concern and say “Rachel, if you would just stop 
eating pork and drinking alcohol, your health would be perfect.” Instead of telling me that it was 
forbidden to do so in the religion, he argued that it was in fact for health reasons that everyone 
should give up these two substances. He could clearly see that a religious argument would not be 
																																																						
638	121124_001—“I	find	that	there	are	Muslims,	I	am	not	talking	about	Maghrébines,	I	am	talking	about	Muslims,	
who	will	say	that	they	are	very	practicing	who	will	drink	alcohol.	That	I	do	not	find	normal.	It	is	not	normal.	I	find	
that	it	is	a	bit	easy.	It	is	usually	men.	On	the	other	hand	you	see	that	they	are	hard,	so	no,	that	is	not	normal.	After,	
when	you	are	not	really	practicing	and	drink	alcohol	and	especially	when	you	do	not	demand	anything	from	others,	
you	practice	your	religion	for	yourself	to	the	limit	that	you	want.	And	that’s	it.”	
639	Personal	communication,	November	2012.	
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effective for me, and therefore supported his own clearly religiously based argumentation with 
scientific ones.  
 This leads me to an important addendum to this first category of practices. While this first 
category was generally the clearest as to what was religious and what was cultural, and relatedly, 
what was obligatory and what was flexible, there were some practices that complicated this 
typology, quite clearly. For example, even though both the interdiction against pork and alcohol 
were generally placed in this “religion” category, the difference in application of these two 
interdictions by many of my informants reveals the powerful effect of culture on religion and the 
confusing nature of the question of what is religion and what is culture. For many of my 
informants there seemed to be different levels of interdiction in relation to pork and alcohol. 
Alcohol was forbidden, but at a seemingly different level than pork.640 While the interdiction 
against alcohol could be argued away, the consumption of pork was much more difficult to argue 
and often because the cultural arguments against consumption of pork were much stronger than 
the cultural arguments against drinking alcohol. In the Maghreb, alcohol was present and was 
consumed more frequently than many would assume. Informants would explain how alcohol was 
forbidden, both religiously and culturally, and yet it was for sale and people would drink it in the 
Maghreb.641 I had informants tell me of going to bars in Algeria and drinking with friends, 
although they would rarely drink at home.642 When I asked one informant if he thought people 
drink more once they have come to France, he explained that, in fact, most of the Muslims that 
he knew who drank alcohol were in Morocco, not in France.643 These various examples show 
how alcohol, even though it is generally understood as forbidden for Muslims, is still available 
for consumption in the Maghreb. This was in large part due to the colonial presence of France in 
the Maghreb in the 20th century, which led to an impressive and productive wine industry in 
Algeria and Morocco. So even if alcohol is forbidden in the Quran, it is not only present, but 
continues to be a significant economic industry in the countries of the Maghreb, not only in the 
first part of the 20th century, but also today.644 
																																																						
640	121202_004.	
641	121203_006.	
642	121126_001.	
643	121108_001.	
644	Giulia	Meloni	and	Johan	Swinnen,	“The	Rise	and	Fall	of	the	World’s	Largest	Wine	Exporter—and	its	Institutional	
Legacy,”	Journal	of	Wine	Economics,	vol.	9,	no.	1	(2014):	3-33.	In	fact,	according	to	Meloni	and	Swinnen,	Algeria	
was,	until	50	years	ago,	the	world’s	largest	wine	exporter	and	was	“the	fourth	largest	producer	of	wine	in	the	
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 Pork is a different situation. Only two of my informants had tried pork before coming to 
France, and the two who had consumed it had done so only because their parents had brought it 
to the Maghreb either from France or because they owned a restaurant for tourists. In general 
pork is not available in the Maghreb, and thus the interdiction against it is consequently much 
more culturally charged. I had many more informants suggesting that they refrained from eating 
pork for cultural reasons than those who would argue for not drinking alcohol because of their 
culture. If they did not consume alcohol, it appeared to be because of clearly religious reasons 
and even if they did consume alcohol it was often because of a lack of religiosity, not a lack of 
culture. 
 Although alcohol consumption was more prevalent in the Maghreb than in France for 
some of my informants, for others who drank alcohol it was directly related to their immigrant 
experience in France. What I mean by this is that, while many of them did not drink in the 
Maghreb, they began drinking in France. I had informants explain to me that they tried alcohol 
for the first time in France “parce qu’il n’y a pas de jugement,”645 which was not the situation in 
the Maghreb. When asked if she thought there were more Muslims who drank in the Maghreb or 
in France, one informant expressed that there were more in France saying that “parce qu’il y a 
plus d’occasions, disons, de sortir, plus de liberté. Euh, la plupart du temps quand ils immigrent, 
ils sont sans leurs parents, donc ils se sentent un peu plus libres. Oui, donc je pense un peu plus 
[en France].”646 For these informants, the French context allowed for more flexibility in practice 
because alcohol is an accepted substance. Not only is it accepted, though, it is an important 
social practice. One informant explained that the consumption of alcohol was an important part 
of his life in France because it was a “mode de vie”647 in France. The importance of wine to the 
French national identity, which I addressed earlier in this chapter and in Chapter 2, influences the 
practice of those immigrating to France from traditionally non-alcohol consuming cultures. 
																																																						
world”	(3).	In	Morocco,	in	spite	of	a	restriction	on	selling	alcohol	to	Muslims,	wine	production	abounds	as	well,	
where	“annual	output	stands	at	about	400,000	hectolitres,	or	more	than	40m	bottles	of	wine,	industry	sources	say,	
making	the	former	French	protectorate	the	second	biggest	producer	in	the	Arab	world.	By	comparison,	
neighbouring	Algeria,	whose	vineyards	were	cultivated	for	a	much	longer	period	during	French	colonial	rule,	
produces	500,000	hectolitres	on	average”	(“Wine:	Morocco,”	Africa	Research	Bulletin:	Economic,	Financial	and	
Technical	Series,	vol.	50,	no.	6	[August	2013]:	20032A-20032C).	
645	121123_001—“Because	there	is	no	judgement.”	
646	121126_002—“Because	there	are	more	occasions,	shall	we	say,	to	go	out,	more	liberty.	Most	of	the	time	when	
they	immigrate,	they	are	without	their	parents,	so	they	feel	a	bit	freer,	yes,	I	think	a	bit	more	[in	France].”	
647	121206_001.	
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While they may have maintained their non-alcohol consumption practices if they had stayed in 
the Maghreb, the immigrant context allows for new cultural practices to challenge the old ones. 
5.2.1.4 Halal Meat 
The final practice in the Quranically-documented and prescribed category is the practice of 
consuming halal meat. While “halal” refers to all things that are “permissible,” it is used most 
often by my informants as a term that applies principally to “properly” slaughtered meat.648 In 
this section, when my informants speak about keeping, or not keeping, halal they are referring to 
consuming halal meat specifically. This practice was the most contested and most talked about 
practice in France, by both the Maghrébine Muslim community as well as the non-Muslim 
majority French population. My informants felt the need to address the topic of halal because it 
was a highly-politicized topic.  
 Unlike the prohibition against pork and alcohol, which had very few political polemics 
against them at the time, the industry of halal was a major focus of political and social debate. 
Beyond the issues around pork consumption in France, which I have already highlighted, the 
polemics around halal were strong. Scholars such as Michaela DeSoucey, Wynne Wright and 
Alexis Annes suggest that particular foods and foodways can be enrolled in political projects, 
																																																						
648	While	there	are	many	ways	of	understanding	this,	the	verses	in	the	Quran	on	which	this	practice	is	based	have	
to	do	with	not	eating	animals	that	are	already	dead	(carrion)	and	the	interdiction	on	blood.	The	idea	of	ridding	an	
animal	of	all	its	blood	to	act	in	line	with	this	prohibition	is	what	most	of	my	informants	refer	to	as	“halal	meat.”	
The	Quranic	verses	that	are	most	commonly	cited	then	are	the	same	ones	that	prohibit	pork:	“He	has	forbidden	
you	only	carrion,	blood,	and	the	flesh	of	swine;	also	any	flesh	that	is	consecrated	other	than	in	the	name	of	God.	
But	for	one	who	is	driven	by	necessity,	it	is	no	sin.	For	God	is	forgiving	and	merciful”	(The	Quran,	2:173);	“Say	[O	
Prophet],	‘In	all	that	has	been	revealed	to	me,	I	do	not	find	a	ban	on	anything	to	eat,	except	for	carrion,	flowing	
blood	and	pork,	all	these	being	unclean	or	profane,	on	which	the	name	of	someone	other	than	God	has	been	
invoked.’	But	if	anyone	is	forced	by	necessity,	being	neither	disobedient	nor	exceeding	the	limit,	then	surely	your	
Lord	is	most	forgiving	and	merciful”	(The	Quran,	6:145);	“He	has	forbidden	you	only	carrion,	blood	and	the	flesh	of	
swine;	also	any	[flesh]	consecrated	in	the	name	of	any	but	God.	But	if	anyone	is	forced	by	dire	necessity,	not	
desiring	it	or	exceeding	his	immediate	need,	God	is	forgiving	and	merciful	towards	him”	(The	Quran,	16:115).	The	
most	extensive	verse	in	the	Quran	that	addresses	the	various	points	behind	halal	slaughter	is:	“You	are	forbidden	
carrion,	blood	and	pork;	and	any	flesh	over	which	the	name	of	any	other	than	God	is	invoked;	and	any	creature	
which	has	been	strangled,	or	killed	by	a	blow	or	in	a	fall,	or	has	been	gored	to	death	or	half-eaten	by	a	wild	animal,	
saving	that	which	you	make	lawful	[by	slaughtering	properly	while	it	was	still	alive]	and	what	has	been	slaughtered	
at	an	altar.	You	are	forbidden	to	make	the	division	of	[meat]	by	means	of	divining	arrows;	that	is	sinful	
conduct…But	if	anyone	is	forced	by	hunger	to	eat	something	which	is	forbidden,	not	intending	to	commit	a	sin,	he	
will	find	God	forgiving	and	merciful.	If	they	ask	you	what	has	been	made	lawful	for	them,	say,	‘All	good	things	have	
been	made	lawful	for	you;’	and	what	you	have	taught	your	birds	and	beasts	of	prey	to	catch,	training	them	as	God	
has	taught	you.	So	eat	what	they	catch	for	you,	but	first	pronounce	God’s	name	over	it.	Fear	God,	for	God	is	swift	
in	taking	account”	(The	Quran,	5:3-4).	
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especially in a place like France where food is such an essential element to national identity.649 
Furthermore, Marie Dallam proposes that “because food is both a commodity and a necessity for 
living, it can potentially be used as a tool by either side in a disagreement, regardless of whether 
the tension is in any way related to food itself.”650  
 One of the most famous controversies around this sort of political use of food occurred 
around the introduction of a halal burger on the menu of one of France’s largest fast-food chains, 
Quick, in 2009-2010.651 As described by Wright and Annes, the fact that media and politicians 
used this situation as a tool to perpetuate “the myth of the ‘Islamization of France’” is evidence 
that “gastronationalism can be used as a political weapon laden with nativist and defensive 
tendencies that intentionally erect boundaries to distinguish ‘in’ from ‘out’ groups.”652 I had 
informants explain to me that the debate around halal was just one other scandal that the 
government could use to show that a particular group was problematic, or to avoid “les vrais 
problèmes de la France.”653 This informant went on to explain the problem with the politicization 
of the topic of halal.  
Le problème c’est que la France se précarise. Les politiques, au lieu de nous parler de ces 
vrais problèmes nous parle du halal. Les gens sont dans la merde. Voilà, le vrai problème 
dans la France ce n’est pas l’Islam. Franchement, il y a des personnes, ils ont envie de 
manger halal, ils mangeraient bien halal. Le problème c’est pas ça. Le problème c’est 
vraiment le fait qu’on est dans une situation de précarisation et que les politiques, au lieu 
de s’intéresser ou nous dire ce qui est, vraiment, nous dire les vrais problèmes de la 
France, ils trouvent d’autres stratégies.654 
 
Halal, by this account, becomes a focus of political polemics that puts pressure on the members 
of the communities that practice it in a real and tangible way. Many of my informants felt the 
need to respond to the topic of halal simply because of the place it has been given in political 
discourse. Not only do they feel the need to talk about it, but also some feel the pressure to give 
																																																						
649	DeSoucey,	“Gastronationalism,”	432-455;	Wynne	Wright	and	Alexis	Annes,	“Halal	on	the	Menu:	Contested	Food	
Politics	and	French	Identity	in	Fast-food,”	Journal	of	Rural	Studies,	vol.	32	(2013):	388-399.	
650	Dallam,	“Introduction,”	xxv.	
651	For	many,	Quick	violated	“the	secular	principles	underlying	republican	universalism	through	their	introduction	
of	religious	distinctions	into	the	public	sphere”	(Wright	and	Annes,	“Halal	on	the	Menu,”	397).	
652	Wright	and	Annes,	“Halal	on	the	Menu,”	397.		
653	120905_001—“The	real	problems	of	France.”	
654	120905_001—“The	problem	in	France	is	jobs.	Instead	of	talking	to	us	about	the	real	problems,	politicians	talk	to	
us	about	halal.	People	are	in	trouble.	There,	the	real	problem	in	France,	it’s	not	Islam.	Really	there	are	people,	they	
want	to	eat	halal,	well	they	eat	halal.	The	problem	is	not	that.	The	problem	is	really	the	fact	that	we	are	in	a	
situation	of	job	insecurity,	and	the	politicians,	instead	of	being	interested	in,	or	telling	us	what	is	real,	the	real	
problems	in	France,	they	find	other	strategies.”	
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up the practice in totality because of the polemics around it. Many informants spoke about the 
fact that in the Maghreb there are no polemics around Islam and therefore no polemics around 
the practice of keeping halal, whereas in France there are so many different communities present 
and so many polemics around the things related to Islam that one feels pressured to change one’s 
practice.  
 Beyond politicians using halal as a means of showing how some communities are 
problematic, my informants spoke about other highly influential public figures who will use the 
topic of halal as a means of presenting an argument about the Muslim community in general. 
One informant spoke of the famous actress Brigitte Bardot and her presentation of Islam. Bardot, 
along with other public figures, highlighted the way of slaughtering the animals in halal practice 
as an example of what is wrong with the Muslim community in general; she was engaging in 
defensive gastronationalism.655 For this informant, this sort of action was a means for racist 
people to gain the attention of many and try and deal with other crises that are present in France 
by blaming a scapegoat. When speaking to me about Bardot he suggested that “avec la crise 
économique en ce moment les gens sont de plus en plus racistes. Ils rejettent de plus en plus tout 
qui est étrange.”656 Halal becomes another realm within which the politics of “Islam versus the 
West” gets worked out.657 
 This polemic inevitably affected how my informants engaged this practice as one of the 
Quranically-documented and prescribed practices. According to a few of my informants, eating 
halal was a basic obligation,658 the first thing that comes to mind when one thinks of Islam and 
food,659 and the only thing that is really a “Muslim food practice.”660 All that considered, for my 
informants the practice of eating halal meat was the most diverse of the four practices in this 
category. It was seen as flexible by some, essential by others, but generally there was no real 
consensus on how or why one should follow this practice. As much as it was seen as prescribed 
																																																						
655	Wright	and	Annes,	“Halal	on	the	Menu.”	
656	121202_004—“With	the	economic	crisis	at	the	moment	people	are	more	and	more	racist.	They	reject	more	and	
more	everything	that	is	foreign.”	
657	For	another	example	of	this	see	Adam	Withnall,	“Denmark	bans	kosher	and	halal	slaughter	as	minister	says	
‘animal	rights	come	before	religion,’”	Independent,	February	18,	2014.	
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/denmark-bans-halal-and-kosher-slaughter-as-minister-says-
animal-rights-come-before-religion-9135580.html.	
658	121205_001.	
659	121126_001.	
660	121205_001.	
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because of Quranic documentation of the practice, there was greater interpretation of exactly 
how one was to engage this process. Like the Jewish informants in Aldea Mulhern’s study who 
do not keep kosher and yet still consider themselves Jewish, many of my informants did not keep 
halal and yet still claimed Muslim identity.661 Here we can see an example of how the very 
categories that we construct as scholars can become complicated and messy when exploring the 
things of the everyday.662 
	 Unlike the injunction to fast during Ramadan, or to refrain from consuming pork or 
alcohol, the rules around halal meat are varied within the Quran itself and can consequently lead 
to more varied interpretations and varied practice. As mentioned above, there were four different 
approaches generally taken by my informants in relation to halal meat: they ate strictly halal, 
they ate halal when they could and non-halal when they could not, they did not care at all about 
halal, or they were pescatarians.663 
 Even if “la viande halal c’est dans le Coran,”664 there are multiple rules and exceptions 
around this practice located therein, and many of my informants would use this fact as reason for 
their lack of practice in this regard. For example, many of my informants referred to the rule in 
relation to halal meat that states that one can eat any meat if one cannot find properly-sacrificed 
meat.665 Many of my informants would use this idea and say that because France is not a Muslim 
country, one is not obliged to keep halal there. They would argue that one might break from halal 
practice when one “doesn’t have the choice.” This was sometimes literal666 and sometimes 
imagined.667 Often the breaking of the practice of eating halal meat had to do with being in 
school/work and having “no choice” but to eat non-halal.668 One young woman explained this 
type of choice as follows:  
Dieu ne [le] prohibe pas totalement. Il nous dit d’essayer de manger halal, mais si vous 
n’avez pas le choix, il faut bien se nourrir. Donc je mangerais du non halal. C’est pas un 
																																																						
661	Aldea	Mulhern,	“What	Does	it	Mean	to	‘Eat	Jewishly’:	Authorizing	Discourse	in	the	Jewish	Food	Movement	in	
Toronto,	Canada,”	Religion	and	Food.	Scripta	Instituti	Donneriani	Aboensis,	vol.	26	(2015),	326-348,	
http://ojs.abo.fi/index.php/scripta/issue/view/74/showToc.	
662	Michel	Desjardins,	“Religious	Studies	that	Really	Schmecks:	Introducing	Food	to	the	Academic	Study	of	
Religion,”	in	Failure	and	Nerve	in	the	Study	of	Religion,	eds.	William	Arnal,	Willi	Braun	and	Russell	McCutcheon,	
(London:	Equinox,	2012),	154.	
663	Someone	who	does	not	eat	meat	but	does	eat	fish.	
664	121129_002—“halal	meat	is	in	the	Quran.”	
665	Specifically,	the	verses	that	I	presented	in	footnote	616	above:	2:173,	5:3-4,	6:145,	16:115.	
666	120905_001.	
667	121006_002.	
668	121130_001;	121216_001.	
	 207	
interdit strict, c’est quelque chose qui peut dépendre du contexte. C’est comme dans tout: 
dans la vie on a le libre arbitre. Et donc, si je suis dans un petit village pendant une 
longue période, à mon avis je mangerai peut-être pas halal au bout d’un moment. Je ne le 
ferai pas toute suite. J’attendrai. J’essayerai de me retenir, etc., mais si je vois que c’est 
pas possible de pas trouver de la viande halal, à moment donner il faudrait que je mange 
quelque chose. Et la viande c’est quand même important. Ça fait partie des choses qui 
sont importantes pour le corps humain: manger de la viande.669 
 
For this informant, and many like her, the context dictates practice.  
Beyond just the context and one’s ability to find halal meat, another concern was that if 
one could find halal meat one could not always be guaranteed that it was in fact “authentic” halal 
meat; questions over certification were prevalent.670 When speaking with my informants about 
the topic of halal, inevitably one issue that came up was the question of certification. One of the 
biggest concerns in relation to the question of the certification of halal was not necessarily 
whether or not a certification existed but whether or not that certification could be trusted. I had 
informants stress that there were controls for halal that were universal and trustworthy,671 and 
other informants who would suggest that one could never be guaranteed of the validity of 
certification.672 There was clearly a desire for a better certifying agency that could offer less 
room for error and more accountability for the farmers and the butchers who were engaged in the 
business of halal.673  
Most informants argued that because of the lack of real, trusted, universal certification, 
the issue of whether one could find halal, or would keep halal, was ultimately a matter of 
individual trust.674 If the individual trusted that his/her butcher was providing them with real 
																																																						
669	120905_001—“God	did	not	prohibit	totally.	He	told	us	to	try	to	eat	halal	but	if	you	do	not	have	the	choice,	well,		
one	must	nourish	oneself	well.	So	I	would	eat	non-halal.	It	is	not	a	strict	interdiction;	it	is	something	that	can	
depend	on	context.	It’s	like	in	anything;	in	life	we	have	free	will.	And	so,	if	I	am	in	a	small	village	for	a	long	time	in	
my	opinion	I	will	maybe	eat	non-halal	after	some	time.	I	would	not	do	it	right	away.	I	would	wait.	I	would	try	to	
hold	off,	etc.	But	if	I	see	that	it	is	not	possible	to	find	halal	meat,	bah,	at	a	point	it	is	necessary	that	I	eat	something.	
And	meat	is	still	important.	It	is	part	of	the	things	that	are	important	for	the	human	body,	to	eat	meat.”	
670	Florence	Bergeaud-Blackler	explains	the	process	of	meat	becoming	halal	in	the	French	market	and	the	issue	of	
“fake	halal”	in	her	“Social	Definitions	of	halal	Quality:	The	Case	of	Maghrebi	Muslims	in	France,”	in	Qualities	of	
Food,	eds.	Mark	Harvey,	Andrew	McMeekin,	and	Alan	Warde	(Manchester	and	New	York:	Manchester	University	
Press,	2004),	95,	98.	She	also	explains	how	because	of	the	“plurality	of	social	definitions	of	halal	products”	one	can	
see	“why	there	are	several	halal	certifications	and	why	all	attempts	to	reduce	them	to	one	have	thus	far	failed”	
(103).		
671	121006_002.	
672	120905_001;	121102_001.	
673	121031_001.	
674	Bowen,	Can	Islam	be	French,	170.	
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halal meat, they would most likely continue the practice. If they doubted, or felt like the label in 
general was dishonest, then they could use that as a reason to stop the practice. One informant, 
for example, explained to me that she kept halal in Algeria but not in France because she trusted 
the label in Algeria, but does not trust it in France.675 Others would stop keeping halal because 
they felt as though it was strictly a business issue in France. One young man explained to me that 
while he did his prayers, and fasted during Ramadan, he did not keep halal because “pour moi 
[l’halal] c’est que de business.”676 For this informant, and others like him, the fact that halal had 
become such a strong business in France led to hesitation about the purity of the practice, and as 
a result they felt like finding “real halal” meat was not a possibility in France.677  
 While many of my informants would argue that the context of France was not conducive 
to keeping halal, that it was difficult to find halal meat or to find guaranteed halal meat, others 
would argue that France was a context within which keeping halal was easy. One informant 
explained further how context may change one’s practice, and also how the French context, or at 
least the Parisian context, is now one that allows for continued/increased practice of keeping halal. 
When explaining about his practice of Islam in France, he focused on halal and said: 
il y a des années en arrière où on n’avait pas le choix [et] on était tenté. Une fois, j’ai 
mangé de la viande qui n’était pas halal. Mais aujourd’hui, là c’est multiple, on trouve un 
peu partout, aujourd’hui il y a Quick [a French fast food restaurant chain which now 
carries halal meat products], il y a des grandes chaines qui font du halal. Donc pour moi 
c’est simple: je ne me pose pas réellement des questions de liens entre la religion et la 
nourriture; c’est, parce que ça coule de source pour moi. Il n’y a aucune complication. Il 
n’y a aucun frein, aucun obstacle…Non, aujourd’hui on trouve tous les produits halals et 
c’est pour ça qu’il y en a qui disent: la dernière génération respecte plus les principes que 
les anciennes. Oui, parce que la première génération, quand ils sont arrivés en France, il 
n’avait pas des boucheries halals. Donc, ils ont acheté leur viande dans les boucheries non 
halals, sinon ils sont condamnés par leur parents de manger de la viande, et alors voilà, 
certaines s’autorisent cette situation. Mais aujourd’hui je pense que, pour moi, il n’y a 
plus d’obstacles.678 
																																																						
675	121202_003.	
676	121108_001—“For	me	[halal]	is	just	business.”	
677	See	Bergeaud-Blackler,	“Social	Definitions	of	Halal	Quality,”	especially	her	overview	of	the	development	of	the	
halal	market	in	France	(96-99).	
678	121031_001—“there	were	years	in	the	past	where	we	did	not	have	the	choice,	where	we	were	tempted.	One	
time	I	ate	meat	that	was	not	halal.	But	today,	it’s	multiplied,	we	find	[it]	a	bit	everywhere,	today	there	is	Quick,	
there	are	major	chains	that	do	halal.	So	for	me	it	is	simple:	I	do	not	pose	questions	really	of	the	link	between	
religion	and	food;	it’s	because	it	flows	from	the	source	for	me.	There	is	no	complication.	There	are	no	brakes,	no	
obstacles…No,	today	we	find	all	of	the	halal	products	and	that	is	why	there	are	those	who	say,	the	last	generation	
respects	more	the	principles	than	the	older	[generation].	Yes,	because	the	first	generation	when	they	arrived	in	
France	did	not	have	halal	butcher	shops.	So,	they	bought	their	meat	in	non-halal	butcher	shops,	or	if	not,	they	
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Not only was the French context conducive to maintaining halal practice for Maghrébine Muslim 
immigrants, it was the context in which some members of this community learned about halal in 
the first place.  
 I had informants tell me that they learned about halal in France, not “au bled.” There were 
different explanations for this as well. One informant explained his discovery of the concept of 
halal as follows: 
Moi, j’ai découvert ça quand je suis arrivé en France. Puisqu’en Algérie, ça n’existe pas 
la viande halal, le halal non plus. Les gens, quand ils viennent en France, j’ai remarqué 
que de plus en plus, c’est assez récent, ils cherchent à manger de la viande halal. Ça veut 
dire que la bête a été tué sous certains rites. [Il réfléchit.] Pour moi c’est complètement, 
c’est une innovation, je ne vois pas l’intérêt des gens qui sont très strictes là-dessus. À 
mon avis, n’y a pas de description exacte sur la viande halal. On ne mange pas de porc: 
point barre. Le reste de la viande … c’est vraiment une innovation très, très récente, la 
viande halal. Je ne [le] connaissais pas. Je ne mangeais pas de viande halal. J’en mange, 
mais je ne vais pas chercher à acheter de la viande halal quand je fais mes courses.679 
 
This informant believed halal to be a completely constructed Western concept, and consequently 
did not consider it necessary to engage in as a religious practice.  
 On the other hand, I had informants who explained that they learned about halal in France 
because in the Maghreb everything is halal and does not require reflection or consideration of 
what that term means. 
J’ai découvert la viande halal quand j’avais 20 ans, quand je suis arrivé en France. On 
m’a dit, ‘Tu ne manges pas halal?’ ‘Mais c’est quoi halal?’ Alors que j’ai vécu 19 ans en 
Tunisie. Je n’avais pas compris. Donc j’ai compris qu’il y avait deux façons de tuer un 
animal: l’électrocution ou l’égorger. Mais je n’avais jamais fait gaffe. Mais quand tu vis 
dans un pays musulman, tu ne te sens pas oppressé par quelque chose, tu ne te sens 
pas…moi j’ai jamais senti que le porc me manquait. Je n’ai jamais senti qu’il fallait que 
je fasse attention à la viande que je mangeais, si elle était halal ou pas.680 
																																																						
were	forced	by	their	parents	to	eat	meat	and	therefore	some	allow	themselves	this	situation,	but	today	I	think	
that,	for	me	there	are	no	more	obstacles.”	
679	121206_001—“Me,	I	discovered	[halal]	when	I	arrived	in	France.	Because	in	Algeria,	that	doesn’t	exist,	halal	
meat,	halal	either.	People	when	they	come	to	France,	I	noticed	that	more	and	more,	it’s	quite	recent,	they	look	to	
eat	halal	meat.	The	means	that	it	is	an	animal	has	been	killed	under	certain	rites.	(he	thinks)	For	me	it	is	totally	an	
innovation,	I	don’t	see	the	interest	of	the	people	who	are	really	strict	about	it.	In	my	opinion	there	is	not	an	exact	
description	of	halal	meat.	We	do	not	eat	pork,	period.	The	rest	of	the	meat…	it	is	really	a	very,	very	recent	
innovation,	halal	meat.	I	do	not	know	it.	I	do	not	eat	halal	meat.	I	eat	it	but	I	do	not	go	and	search	to	buy	halal	
meat	when	I	do	my	shopping.”	
680	121209_001—“I	discovered	halal	meat	when	I	was	20	years	old,	when	I	arrived	in	France.	They	told	me,	‘Do	you	
do	not	eat	halal?’	‘But	what	is	halal?’	While	I	had	lived	19	years	in	Tunisia,	I	did	not	understand	the	question.	I	
understood	that	there	were	two	ways	to	kill	an	animal.	Electrocution	and	to	slaughter	it.	But	I	never	paid	attention	
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For this informant, the practice of halal was taken for granted in the Maghreb because it was a 
part of everyday, non-contested life practice. It is only when  
il y a  besoin d’avoir une identité, d’appartenir à une communauté, de s’identifier à 
certaines choses. Et du coup on s’accroche à des choses connues, à des éléments 
communs qui font qu’on appartient à un groupe.681 
 
Halal becomes a “known thing,” a “common element” that helps a community to identity itself 
when in a context where their identity is challenged or in question. This is why, for some, halal 
became a more important practice in France than in the Maghreb. 
5.2.1.5 Eid Al-Adha Lamb 
The second category of religious/cultural food practice for the members of the community I was 
studying was the Quranically-documented but not prescribed practices. The clearest example of 
this was the sacrifice and consumption of the lamb for the Eid Al-Adha. This practice occurs 
during the celebration of the Eid Al-Adha, at the end of the time of the hajj, as a symbolic 
reflection on the willingness of Abraham to sacrifice his son Ishmael in obedience to God.682 The 
remarkable thing about this practice was that even though it was not considered a prescribed 
practice it was almost universally considered a religious practice.683 My informants would 
explain to me that it was in the Quran and while it was not obligatory to engage in the slaughter 
and consumption of a lamb for the Eid, it was essentially a “Muslim” practice, or a Muslim food. 
For example, one informant suggested that there was a Muslim way of eating but not “Muslim 
food,” except for the lamb for the Eid. 
On n’a pas de nourriture qui est proprement religieuse. On a une façon de manger qui est 
religieuse, c’est-à-dire on a une conduite à tenir par rapport à ce que l’on mange. Mais on 
n’a pas de nourriture directement reliée à la religion. On n’a pas. C’est vrai que dans les 
																																																						
to	it.	But	when	you	live	in	a	Muslim	country,	you	do	not	feel	oppressed	by	something,	you	do	not	feel…	me,	I	never	
felt	that	I	was	missing	pork.	I	never	felt	that	I	had	to	pay	attention	to	the	meat	that	I	ate,	if	it	was	halal	or	not.”	
681	121209_001—“There	is	a	need	to	have	an	identity,	to	belong	to	a	community,	to	identify	with	certain	things.	
And	then	we	cling	to	known	things,	to	common	elements	that	make	us	belong	to	a	group.”	
682	The	verses	of	the	Quran	that	describe	the	story	of	Abraham’s	willingness	to	sacrifice	his	son	Ishmael	are	found	
in	37:99-109	and	the	common	verse	that	people	refer	to	in	support	of	the	sacrifice	of	an	animal	at	the	end	of	the	
pilgrimage	is	as	follows:	“Call	mankind	to	the	Pilgrimage.	They	will	come	to	you,	on	foot,	and	on	every	kind	of	lean	
camel,	by	every	distant	track	so	that	they	may	witness	its	benefit	for	them	and,	on	the	appointed	days	may	utter	
the	name	of	God	over	the	cattle	He	has	provided	for	them.	Then	eat	their	flesh,	and	feed	the	distressed	and	the	
needy—then	let	the	pilgrims	purify	themselves	and	fulfill	their	vows	and	perform	the	circumambulation	of	the	
Ancient	House”	(The	Quran,	22:27-29).	Finally,	the	Quranic	verse	which	addresses	the	Hajj,	to	which	the	sacrifice	is	
related,	is	found	in	2:196.	
683	Bowen,	Can	Islam	be	French,	172.	
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religions comme le judaïsme, ils ont certaines nourritures qui sont liées directement à la 
religion. Nous, non. Peut-être la seule chose que l’on a c’est que le jour de l’Eid on doit 
égorger un mouton.684 
 
This was the only “Muslim food.” In fact, another informant expressed that the lamb for the Eid 
was one of the absolute, definite religious food practices and this “certainty” was based on the 
fact that it was a cross-cultural practice. It did not matter if you were a Muslim in China, 
Pakistan or the Maghreb, the sacrifice of a lamb for the Eid was practiced everywhere.685 It did 
not matter if the informant knew the correct story behind the sacrifice or not, where in the 
religion it was based, or why exactly they engaged in this practice, but they knew that it was a 
religious thing. 
 A couple of informants argued that, even though the lamb for the Eid was essentially 
religious, it had taken on a cultural implication as well. One informant explained that at base it 
was religious practice because it referred to the sacrifice of Abraham, but then he went on to 
explain that  
aujourd’hui ça a pris une autre tournure, c’est plus culturel...on est obligé d’avoir chaque 
année le mouton, même pour les familles qui normalement ne devraient pas le faire, parce 
qu’ils n’ont pas les moyens d’acheter un mouton, donc ça devient un truc très culturel.686 
 
Another informant expressed a similar understanding of the lamb and the Eid. After having a 
hard time remembering the actual story of the Eid and which Eid was which, she presented her 
understanding of whether it was a religious or cultural practice. She expressed that at its base it 
was religious but today it was much more of a cultural practice. For this informant, it was a way 
to maintain transnational connection, and to remember being back home.687 Another informant 
suggested that God had given certain injunctions in the Quran because he had a divine wisdom 
that humanity would need in the future. For example, she explained that God created the two 
																																																						
684	121201_002—“We	do	not	have	food	that	is	properly	religious.	We	have	a	way	of	eating	that	is	religious,	that	is	
to	say,	we	have	a	way	to	behave	with	respect	to	what	we	eat.	But	we	do	not	have	food	directly	connected	to	the	
religion.	We	don’t	have	it.	It’s	true	that	in	the	religions	like	Judaism,	they	have	certain	foods	that	are	directly	linked	
to	the	religion.	Us,	no.	Maybe	the	only	thing	that	we	have	is,	the	day	of	the	Eid,	we	have	to	slaughter	a	sheep.”	
685	121216_001.	In	fact,	sheep	are	not	universally	slaughtered	by	Muslims	for	Eid;	other	animals	are	also	chosen	
(goats,	cows,	buffalo,	camels),	and	those	without	means,	or	access	to	butchers	and	animals,	are	not	obligated	to	
purchase	animals.	
686	121130_002—“Today	it	has	taken	on	another	twist,	it	is	more	cultural.	We	are	obliged	each	year	to	have	the	
sheep,	even	for	the	families	that	normally	would	not	have	to	do	it,	because	they	do	not	have	the	means	to	buy	a	
sheep,	so	it	becomes	something	very	cultural.”	
687	121201_001.	
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Eids and placed them in the Quran so that people would be obligated, in this day and age where 
it was not the norm, to spend time with their families.688 
5.2.1.6 Dates 
The third category of food practice that my informants spoke about were the Sunnah-inspired 
food practices. In this section I address the most commonly cited example of this type of 
practice, the breaking of the Ramadan fasts with dates (and milk). While both dates and milk are 
mentioned in the Quran, there is not injunction to consume them found there. Instead, the 
practice of breaking the fast with dates comes from specific hadith which address the “way of the 
Prophet” or Sunnah.689 Although many of my informants also suggested that milk was an 
important element of the iftar, I could not find a specific hadith that addresses the breaking of the 
fast with milk. This category, and specifically this example, is an excellent example and 
illustration of the complicated relationship between religion and culture and the difficulty of 
labelling any practice one or the other.  
 Because this practice was not in the Quran it was not considered an “obligation” by any 
of my informants. While some considered it a religious practice, the lack of Quranic validation 
immediately made it not obligatory, but instead, just “preferred.” One informant explained to me 
that, “en première position, c’est le Coran, en deuxième le Prophète, car c’est le messager de 
Dieu.”690 She then went on to explain that, in regards to the dates and the milk, people would 
engage in this practice because the Prophet did. She explained that “si on ne le fait pas ce n’est 
pas grave. Si tu manges autre chose ça n’a aucune valeur. Pour les gens qui ont un certain amour 
envers le Prophète, et bien, il suit ses traces. C’est la simple raison.”691 In this we can see that the 
practice of consuming dates and milk to break the Ramadan fast is not obligatory, but there is 
still some religious value in it. While eating something else to break the fast is fine, there is no 
benefit to it. By saying this, the informant suggests that, given that it was something that 
																																																						
688	121202_003.	
689	One	of	the	common	hadith	in	this	regard	is:	“The	Messenger	of	God	used	to	break	his	fast	with	some	fresh	
dates,	before	he	prayed;	if	there	were	none,	then	with	dried	dates	(tamarat).	If	there	were	none	of	these	he	would	
take	a	drink	of	water”	(Ibn	Hanbal,	Musnad,	III.164)	as	found	in	Ibn	Qayyim	Al-Jawziyya,	Medicine	of	the	Prophet,	
trans.	See	Penelope	Johnstone	(Cambridge:	The	Islamic	Texts	Society,	1998),	224.	
690	121102_001—“In	first	position	is	the	Quran,	in	second	is	the	Prophet,	because	he	is	the	messenger	of	God.”	
691	121102_001—“If	we	do	not	do	it,	it’s	not	a	problem.	If	you	eat	something	else	there	is	no	value	in	it.	For	people	
who	have	a	certain	love	toward	the	Prophet,	well,	they	follow	his	tracks.	That’s	the	simple	reason.”	
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Muhammad is reputed to have done, there is some sort of religious value in engaging in the 
practice, something that separates this food practice from any “regular, mundane” practice. 
 About 28 percent of my informants labeled the practice of consuming dates and milk a 
religious one. One informant argued that it was “un peu la religion” because of the desire to 
follow the Prophet in his actions.692 Another simply stated that it was religious because the 
Prophet did it.693 One informant explained that the dates and milk are a bit more than just a 
cultural tradition, and that people give “une raison religieuse” for the practice.694 One of the most 
common reasons that I was given for why it was religious and not just cultural was its 
universality. For these informants, cultural practices varied depending on the context, whereas 
religious practices would be generally practiced by all Muslims no matter what the context. One 
young woman, after explaining to me that because the Prophet did it, they also do it, told me that 
the practice was religious because “tous les musulmans font ça.”695 This notion of the 
universality of the practice was important for other informants as well. They argued that, even if 
people might not eat dates, it is still a universal practice.696 Dates and milk are “recommandés 
dans l’Islam,” and “toutes tables musulmanes vont avoir du lait et des dattes” during 
Ramadan.697 One young man explained the reason why it was a universal practice by stating that 
“c’est une chose universelle et religieuse en tant que spirituel parce que c’est une des seules 
pratiques, avec évidemment la prière, qu’on peut assimiler à une des pratiques du Prophète.”698 
Like the Quran, which is universally regarded, these informants argued that the life of the 
Prophet is universally regarded as well and so any of his practices can be seen as religious 
practices that are worthwhile engaging in. 
 While this group argued that it was strictly a religious practice, there were others who 
argued that the dates and milk were “entre croyance et tradition.”699 Even more informants 
argued that it was strictly traditional or cultural. In comparison to the clearly “religious” food 
practices of not eating pork, not drinking alcohol and eating halal, the consumption of dates and 
																																																						
692	121006_002—“A	little	religious.”	
693	121207_001.	
694	121212_001—“Give	a	religious	reason.”	
695	121105_001—“All	Muslims	do	that.”	
696	121130_001.	
697	121128_001—“Recommended	in	Islam…all	Muslim	tables	will	have	milk	and	dates.”	
698	121108_001—“It	is	a	universal	thing	and	religious	in	a	spiritual	way	because	it	is	one	of	the	only	practices,	along	
with	the	prayers,	that	we	can	assimilate	to	one	of	the	practices	of	the	Prophet.”	
699	121123_001—“Between	belief	and	tradition.”	
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milk during Ramadan was simply something one tried to follow out of a desire to imitate the 
Prophet, according to one of my informants.700 For her this was an important practice, based in 
the Sunnah, but it did not evoke “Muslim” for her. What is unusual is that for many of those 
informants who argued for a strictly cultural interpretation of this practice, they all mentioned the 
Sunnah specifically. It was almost as a way of saying, “it is not the Quran, it is the Sunnah, and 
so it is not at that level.” It was because the practice was not imposed by the religion that it could 
only be argued as cultural and not religious.701 Even if the practice was recommended, it did not 
seem to hold the same sort of weight for these informants as other practices. 
 Universality came up for these informants as well, but they used this argument in exactly 
the opposite way from the group I mentioned above. For these informants, it was exactly the fact 
that not everyone engages in this practice, that it was not a universal practice, that meant that it 
was a cultural and not religious practice. One informant told me that she was not aware of the 
practice in the Maghreb and only learned of it after she had moved to France. 
Les dattes et le petit lait, ou du lait. Chaque rupture du jeûne. Mais ça, je crois qu’on ne le 
voit pas chez tout le monde. Je ne crois pas. Moi, de mes souvenirs je n’ai jamais vu chez 
moi la rupture avec des dattes et du lait. Moi, j’ai découvert ça ici.702 
 
This informant was suggesting that not only was it not universal across cultures across the world, 
but it also was not even universal across the Maghreb. Most people would argue that it was a 
fairly universal practice across the Maghreb, but would bring up experiences of fasting in 
different locations across the world as evidence of the lack of over-arching universality in this 
practice. For example, one informant told me of her experience in Syria during Ramadan and 
how this differed from the fast in the Maghreb: 
Au Moyen-Orient ils n’ont pas ça… certains pays du Moyen-Orient, la Syrie par 
exemple, ils n’ont pas ça. L’endroit où j’étais, ils ne comprenaient pas pourquoi on prend 
du lait et des dattes. Alors on essaie de comprendre pourquoi, après q’on s’est dit que les 
dattes étaient vraiment le symbole du désert, donc de la culture musulmane, parce qu’elle 
est née dans la péninsule arabique. Et le lait on se dit que peut-être c’est le lait de la 
chamelle, mais on ne sait pas trop. On ne sait pas trop. Je ne sais pas quelle est l’origine 
vraiment, mais je sais que c’est pas partout.703 
																																																						
700	120905_001.	
701	121202_004.	
702	120917_001—“Dates	and	whey	or	milk.	Every	breaking	of	the	fast.	But	that	I	think	that	you	do	not	see	that	at	
everyone’s	home.	I	don’t	think	so.	Me,	in	my	memories,	I	never	saw	in	my	home	the	breaking	of	the	fast	with	dates	
and	milk.	I	learned	that	here.”	
703	121203_006—“In	the	Middle	East	they	don’t	have	that,	…	in	certain	countries	in	the	Middle	East,	Syria	for	
example,	they	don’t	have	that.	The	place	where	I	was,	they	did	not	understand	why	we	take	milk	and	dates.	So	we	
	 215	
 
According to this informant, the consumption of dates and milk was not universal, and in view of 
that was not a religious practice. Unlike the abstention from pork, which can be found across 
cultures and traditions, the consumption of dates and milk was more culturally specific. 
Whether the consumption of dates was seen as religious or cultural for my informants, 
many gave scientific, logical reasons for engaging in this practice as well. When talking about 
the practice of eating dates to break the fast during the month of Ramadan, many of my 
respondents would talk about the kind of sugars and vitamins704 that are present in dates and how 
they are a super food for boosting one’s sugars after fasting because they are rich in “healthy 
sugars” and give nutrients where are absorbed quickly by the body. 
Les dattes, c’est au-delà ça, parce que certaines vont rester buter sur le fait que c’était en 
assimilation au Prophète—et pas uniquement ça parce qu’il faut savoir que c’était aussi 
un homme assez intelligent pour savoir que huit dattes pouvaient avoir un apport 
énergétique très important. Il est évident que quand on jeûne pendant toute la journée on 
a une certaine faiblesse, et les dattes permettent de rapporter l’énergie.705 
 
While it was mostly out of imitation of the Prophet that people engaged in the practice, it was 
also argued to be a significant health benefit to follow the Prophet’s lead in this case. 
 
5.2.1.7 Couscous 
As is made clear by the various ways that people responded to the questions about what is a 
religious and what is a cultural practice, it seems that what is culture and what is religion is a 
highly individual thing; even those practices that may be understood to be strictly religious by 
some are presented as strictly cultural by others, and those practices that are understood as 
strictly cultural are presented as strictly religious by others. The final group of practices that I 
outline are the cultural food practices. These are practices that are not located in any specific 
religious text or tradition, but sometimes take on a religious value in the everyday practice of 
																																																						
try	to	understand	why,	and	after	we	said	that	dates	are	the	symbol	of	the	desert	and	therefore	of	the	Muslim	
culture	because	it	was	born	in	the	Arabian	Peninsula.	And	the	milk,	we	told	ourselves	that	maybe	it	was	camel’s	
milk	but	we	don’t	know	really.	We	don’t	know	too	much.	We	don’t	know,	I	don’t	know	what	is	the	origin	of	it	
really,	but	I	know	that	it	isn’t	[practiced]	everywhere.”	
704	121128_001;	121129_001;	121212_001.	
705	121108_001—“Dates	are	a	good	case	in	point,	because	certain	people	will	remain	fixed	on	the	fact	that	it	was	
to	follow	the	example	of	the	Prophet,	and	not	simply	that	because	one	must	also	know	that	he	was	an	intelligent	
man	to	know	that	eight	dates	were	able	to	have	an	important	energizing	effect.	It	is	evident	that	when	we	fast	
during	the	whole	day	we	have	a	certain	weakness	and	dates	are	used	to	bring	energy.”	
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individuals. The specific cultural food practice I present as an example of this category is the 
eating of couscous.  
While couscous is generally argued as a strictly cultural practice, it has taken on religious 
significance for some. For example, one informant presented a pithy statement about what a 
“Muslim needs.” He said “L’eau, la semoule [couscous] et la respiration. On a besoin que de ça 
en l’Islam.”706 Couscous is given a significant role in the religion by this informant, and yet later 
in the interview he goes on to explain that couscous is traditional, cultural, and not on the same 
level as dates and milk which are in the Sunnah, or even further from the interdiction against 
pork which is in the Quran.  
Another informant, a fairly conservative young woman, also gave couscous some 
religious significance. When telling me about religious food practices she explained that  
pour les mariages c’est une tradition…c’est par rapport à la religion parce qu’en temps du 
Prophète (salalahu alayhi wa salam), ils faisaient pour les mariages… du couscous…. Je 
ne sais pas comment trop expliquer. C’est parce que, quand ils se mariaient, ils faisaient 
du couscous. Ils avaient un repas de couscous.707 
 
Although there was not necessarily a story of the Prophet eating couscous in the Sunnah, this 
informant had learned that Muhammad made couscous for his own weddings and so, for her, it 
was a religious tradition to make couscous for all weddings.708  
Her sister had a bit of a different understanding of why couscous was important in her 
cultural and religious practice. While she also mentioned the story that the Prophet Muhammad 
ate couscous, for her it was not the actual couscous that mattered but the kind of meal that was 
represented by the couscous. 
Le couscous est utilisé dans les cérémonies religieuses justement parce que c’est un plat 
de partage. Aujourd’hui dans la société occidentale, avec l’individualisme qui prime, les 
gens ont tendance à manger le couscous dans des plats et des couverts séparés. Mais les 
pays d’Afrique ont gardé cette idée de partage autour d’un même plat. Au Mali on appelle 
ça un mafé, en Tunisie couscous, mais l’idée de partage reste la même. Les musulmans 
[Maghrébiens] font ça, ils font un grand plat de semoule et puis, voilà, c’est quelque 
																																																						
706	121008_001—“Water,	couscous	and	breath.	We	only	need	that	in	Islam.”	
707	120822_001—“For	weddings	it	is	a	tradition…it’s	related	to	the	religion	because	at	the	time	of	the	Prophet	
(Peace	be	upon	him),	they	made	it	for	weddings,	they	made	couscous…I	don’t	know	how	to	explain	it	really.	It’s	
because	when	they	got	married,	they	made	couscous.	They	had	a	meal	of	couscous.”	
708	I	attended	the	wedding	celebration	of	this	informant’s	sister.	While	her	family	made	a	couscous	for	the	day	
before	the	wedding,	her	sister	did	not	serve	couscous	for	her	wedding	meal.	Instead	she	served	a	high	end,	five	
course	French	meal.	Her	family	seemed	confused	and	unimpressed	by	this	meal	choice,	perhaps	because	it	was	
against	religious	tradition	as	they	understood	it.	
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chose qu’on peut manger avec les mains. On donne aux petits, etc., et c’est quelque chose 
qui est beaucoup plus lier au partage que lier à l’aliment lui-même.709 
 
For this informant, couscous is the representation of the religious tradition of sharing, and 
although she argues that it is a traditional thing, what it represents is religious. Many other 
informants also spoke of the necessity to eat couscous for certain religious holidays—whether it 
is for “la nuit du destin” (the night of destiny) where “il faut que je mange un couscous,”710 or 
“c’est vraiment le plat traditionnel de fêtes,”711 “le plat central c’est le couscous”712 and thus it 
plays an important role in many of my informants’ religious festival lives. 
 For most of my informants, couscous is clearly a cultural food. It is not found in the 
Quran, or the Sunnah, and while it may take on significance in one’s religious life because it is 
used in religious ceremonies, it is not at its base religious. One woman was emphatic that 
couscous was traditional and not religious. She exclaimed: 
non, ce n’est pas religieux, non, non, ça n’a rien à voir avec la religion! C’est une 
tradition chez nous. Voilà. On va dire tradition. Ça n’a rien à voir avec la religion. Il n’y a 
pas [de place] dans le Coran [où] c’est marqué “le jour de l’Eid il faut … préparer le 
couscous,” non, c’est une tradition, voilà, chez nous.713 
 
When I asked another woman, what came to mind when she thought of couscous, she responded: 
“je pense en Algérie que ça fait partie de mon patrimoine. Mais pas parce que je suis musulmane, 
pas du tout.”714 It was her cultural identity that was linked to couscous, not her religious identity. 
Another informant spoke of the differences between Muslim cultures to argue that the 
consumption of couscous was strictly traditional.  
Il y a le Maghreb, mais la religion musulmane, elle est beaucoup [plus répandue] dans les 
pays asiatiques. C’est là qu’il y a plus de musulmans, et eux, ils ont peut-être une autre 
alimentation. Ils n’ont pas de couscous…L’Afghanistan, le Pakistan, l’Inde, ils ont une 
																																																						
709	120905_001—“Couscous	is	used	in	religious	ceremonies	just	because	it	is	a	dish	that	is	shared.	Today	in	
Western	society,	with	individualism	that	prevails,	people	have	a	tendency	to	eat	couscous	from	separate	dishes	
with	separate	utensils.	But	in	African	countries	we	keep	this	idea	of	sharing	around	the	same	plate.	In	Mali	it	is	
called	a	“mafé,”	in	Tunisia	“couscous”	but	the	idea	of	sharing	remains	the	same.	Muslims	do	that,	they	make	a	big	
plate	of	semoule	and,	presto,	it	is	something	that	we	can	eat	with	our	hands.	We	give	it	to	the	little	ones,	etc.,	and	
it	is	something	that	is	more	linked	with	sharing	than	with	the	ingredient	itself.”	
710	121106_001—“I	must	eat	a	couscous.”	
711	121124_001—“It	is	really	the	traditional	dish	for	holidays.”	
712	121212_001—“The	central	dish	is	a	couscous.”	
713	121006_002—“No,	it’s	not	religious,	no,	no,	it	has	nothing	to	do	with	religion,	it	is	a	tradition	for	us.	Period.	We	
would	say	tradition.	It	has	nothing	to	do	with	religion.	It	is	not	indicated	in	the	Quran	that	“the	day	of	the	Eid	you	
must	put,	you	must	prepare	couscous,”	No,	it	is	a	tradition	for	us.”	
714	120917_001—“I	think	of	Algeria,	that	that	is	part	of	my	heritage.	But	not	because	I	am	a	Muslim.	Not	at	all.”	
	 218	
alimentation qui est un peu différente. Et ils utilisent beaucoup d’épices. On le voit bien, 
l’alimentation indienne, c’est plus à base de riz. Nous, c’est plus la semoule, mais sinon, 
oui elle est différente suivant le pays où on vit. Mais c’est vrai qu’au Maghreb, c’est 
beaucoup le couscous.715 
 
Couscous is clearly a cultural tradition for this informant because it is not typically found in 
other parts of the world where Muslims live. This quotation also shows awareness of how, just 
like rice is a base of food culture for South Asian cultures, couscous is a base of food culture for 
those who come from the Maghreb. With Muslims spread across the world, in especially large 
numbers in South and South East Asia, the Maghrebian focus is perforce limited. 
 Regardless of whether couscous is viewed as a cultural or a religious practice, it is 
ultimately argued to be a representative dish of a particular community, namely the Maghrébine 
community. Couscous may be taking on a symbolic role for French national identity as well. For 
example, when I asked one informant whether it was difficult to find the necessary ingredients to 
make a couscous dish her response was, “pour le couscous, non. Parce que c’est un plat national 
français maintenant.”716 Other informants were quick to point out that one of the favourite (in 
fact the third favourite, and one of the most consumed) dishes of the French was couscous.717 
Because of the large population of Maghrébines in France, couscous has taken on a major role in 
French eating habits.718 One informant also explained that the love of couscous by the French 
was  
aussi lié au passé entre la France et le Maghreb, avec les colonies… [et] ça m’étonne pas 
que le plat préféré des Français c’est le couscous—mais que ç’était pendant 20 ans, 15 
ans, le plat préféré des Français, des Français pure souche, uh, qui n’ont rien à voir avec 
le couscous.719 
 
																																																						
715	121129_001—“There	is	the	Maghreb,	but	the	Muslim	religion	is	in	many	Asian	countries.	That’s	where	there	
are	the	most	Muslims,	and	they,	they	maybe	have	a	different	food.	They	don’t	have	couscous…Afghanistan,	
Pakistan,	India,	they	have	a	diet	that	is	a	bit	different.	And	they	use	a	lot	of	spices.	We	see	that	easily,	[e.g.]	Indian	
food,	it’s	more	a	base	of	rice.	For	us	it’s	more	semolina,	but	otherwise,	yes	it’s	different	depending	on	the	country	
where	we	live.	But	it’s	true	that	in	the	Maghreb,	it	is	a	lot	of	couscous.”	
716	121126_002—“For	couscous,	no	[it	is	not	difficult].	Because	it	is	a	French	national	dish	now.”	
717	120917_001;	121006_002;	121031_001;	121124_001;	121126_001;	121128_001;	121201_002;	121202_004;	
121203_006;	121205_001;	121206_001.	
718	In	fact,	a	polling	agency	in	France	found	that	in	2011	couscous	was	the	third	favourite	food	of	the	French;	falling	
behind	Moules-frites	(mussels	and	French	fries)	in	second	place	and	magret	de	canard	(duck	breast)	in	first.	“Les	
plats	préférés	des	Français	(2011),”	21	October	2011,	http://www.tns-sofres.com/publications/les-plats-preferes-
des-francais-2011.	
719	121203_006—“Also	linked	to	the	past	between	France	and	the	Maghreb,	with	the	colonies….	That	doesn’t	
surprise	me	that	the	favourite	dish	of	the	French	is,	but	it	has	been	20	years,	15	years,	the	favourite	dish	of	the	
French,	the	purebred	French,	uh,	who	have	nothing	to	do	with	it,	was	couscous?”	
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Not only do the French love couscous, but they make it themselves and even sometimes serve it 
back to Maghrébines. “Par exemple, le couscous, mes amis français m’invitent chez eux pour 
manger un couscous, mais ce n’est pas du tout le couscous que je connais. Le couscous français 
est différent du couscous du Maghreb.”720 So even if the French may appropriate and make 
couscous, there is still a (non-Maghrébine) French flare to it. Other informants also spoke about 
the “couscous français”: something that at its base was Maghrébine, but was changed by the 
French to suit French tastes and approaches to food, usually consisting of a mix of meats.721 
 If the French also hold couscous in high regard, there is the possibility that couscous 
might play a role in relations between the Maghrébine Muslim immigrant community and the 
majority non-Muslim French population in France. When talking about the possible tension 
between non-Muslim and Maghrébine Muslim communities in France one of my informants 
clearly spoke about the role that some foods could play in easing those tensions. 
C’est qu’il y ait de la place pour tout le monde sans stigmatiser l’un ou l’autre. Justement 
l’unification ou le rassemblement peut se faire via la nourriture, et d’ailleurs on a un bon 
début avec le couscous, plat préféré des Français. On pourrait continuer avec d’autres 
plats qui viennent d’autres contrées qui soient aussi répandu, tous aussi appréciés et par 
tout le monde.722 
 
For this informant, couscous is the representation of cultural sharing, and the representation of 
the appreciation of the “other.” It is considered a way to unify and to congregate people and is a 
model that could be followed with other dishes and between other cultures. Food practices can 
act as a bridge and means of understanding between varied groups.  
 Food is a strong tool for mutual understanding as it is a part of most people’s everyday 
life and experience. These practices are a way of life. What happens when the context of one’s 
daily life changes, though? Does the immigrant experience change one’s level of practice no 
matter what the reasoning? 
 
																																																						
720	121207_001—“For	example,	couscous,	my	French	friends	invite	me	to	their	place	to	eat	a	couscous,	but	it	isn’t	
the	couscous	that	I	know.	The	French	couscous	is	different	from	Maghrébine	couscous.”	
721	121201_001,	121201_002;	121205_001;	121206_001.	
722	121126_001—“It’s	that	there	is	room	for	everyone	without	stigmatizing	one	another.	Rightly,	the	unification	or	
the	congregating	can	happen	through	food	and	anyway	we	have	a	good	start	with	couscous,	the	favourite	dish	of	
the	French.	We	can	continue	with	other	dishes	that	come	from	other	countries	which	are	also	prevalent,	equally	
appreciated	by	everyone.”	
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5.3 Consistency and Change in Religious and Cultural Food Practices in Paris 
 
In this final section I tackle the changes, or lack thereof, in practice for the Maghrébine Muslim 
immigrants of my study. I have divided this section into three categories of, or trends in, 
experience for my informants. Two of the categories record whether this is a change by 
decreasing a practice in the immigrant location or by increasing the practice. The third category 
envelops those who maintain their practice in the immigrant location, not significantly increasing 
or decreasing certain practices. Because second generation immigrants have no home context to 
which to compare, those six informants will be left out of this discussion. 
 
5.3.1 Increase in Practice  
Based on the knowledge that I had of the scholarly presentation of immigrant religion before I 
went into the field, I anticipated that most of my informants would fall into this category of 
practice.723 I assumed that most of the people that I would interview would tell me that they had 
increased their practice out of a means of trying to maintain transnational identity, or to 
legitimize an identity when they were in a context that challenged their basic notions of identity.  
I was surprised in fact to see that only two of my informants (out of the 27 first-
generation informants) had any real increase in their practice in France. These two informants 
increased their religious practices based on a renewed sense of religious conviction. It was not 
necessarily because they had a type of identity that was in conflict that they needed to legitimize, 
but simply that they used to be “non-practicing Muslims” and became “practicing Muslims” for 
one reason or another. One man explained to me that when he lived in Algeria, and for the first 
many years that he lived in France, he did not necessarily eat halal food and would drink alcohol 
quite often with his friends. It was only “depuis que je suis pratiquant”724 that he stopped 
drinking alcohol. The change had nothing explicitly to do with the immigrant experience (he had 
been drinking in France for years after his immigration) but instead was a natural outworking of 
a new commitment to a religious life. An older gentleman expressed something similar. It was an 
encounter with a Sufi leader that led him to restart “ritual practice” again, not (explicitly) his 
																																																						
723	As	I	discussed	in	Chapter	3	in	section	3.2,	for	immigrants	who	find	themselves	in	a	minority	position,	or	claiming	
a	minority	identity	in	their	host	context,	symbols	of	that	identity	can	become	important,	such	that	an	increase	in	
practices	related	to	that	identity	is	common.		
724	121126_001—“Since	I	was	a	practicing	[Muslim].”	
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immigrant experience.725 This informant did go on to explain that the access that he had to more 
varied practices in France did play a role in his renewed interest in and increase in practice of 
Islam, but as he tells it, it was more about an individual, personal decision than a result of the 
context around him. 
 
5.3.2 Consistency in Practice 
Some of my informants maintained the same level and sort of practice that they did in the 
homeland. Whether it was maintaining extensive practice, or no practice at all, for these 
informants the practices went under no significant change from the Maghreb to France. For 
example, one man explained to me that “certains Algériens qui viennent à l’étranger, ils rentrent 
dans la religion vraiment à fond. Ce n’est pas arrivé comme ça [pour moi]. Quand je suis venu, 
j’étais déjà comme ça. Ça n’a pas changé grand-chose à ma vie.”726 Many of these informants 
would talk about the fact that in a superficial spiritual society such as France the maintenance of 
traditions and practices gives some depth and stability to one’s existence.  
My informants maintained cultural food practices to the largest extent. Considering the 
fact that “cultural” practices were seen as flexible, and religious practices as obligatory, if one 
could label their practice as cultural they almost gave themselves a “get out of jail free” card 
when it came to leaving some practices aside. On the other hand, it also allowed those who 
labelled their practice as cultural to get around the hesitation about religious practices in France 
and allowed them to maintain these practices with greater ease; there was not as much pressure 
to alter these cultural practices. Even for a self-proclaimed “non-practicing” Muslim, one 
informant explained to me the importance of maintaining some traditions and practices. For 
example, even though she was not insistent on eating halal meat, she still felt like she had to buy 
halal meat for traditional Maghrébine dishes.727 Another informant expressed a similar 
commitment to maintaining some practice, not necessarily because of conviction but simply 
because one is used to doing something in a particular way.728 
																																																						
725	121212_001.	
726	121201_002—“Certain	Algerians	that	come	from	abroad,	they	enter	into	the	religion	very	deeply.	It	did	not	
happen	like	that	[for	me].	When	I	came,	I	was	already	that	way.	That	did	not	change	very	much	in	my	life.”	
727	121124_001.	
728	121128_001—“Je	ne	sais	pas,	c’est	psychique.	Je	ne	sais	pas	pourquoi	mais	c’est	comme	ça	(elle	sourit).	Pour	
moi,	c’est	meilleur.	C’est	la	viande	qu’il	faut.	(Elle	rigole.)	C’est	pour	ça	que	je	dis,	j’ai	des	séquelles	mais	je	ne	sais	
pas	pourquoi	je	continue	à	les	faire.	Et	ce	n’est	pas	par	conviction,	c’est	l’habitude.	Je	n’arrive	pas	à	passer	outre.”	
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5.3.3 Decrease in Practice 
The third and final trend refers to those who decreased their practice in France from what they 
engaged in in the Maghreb. This was by far the most common trend for my informants. Some 
would only decrease some practices and maintain others, while others would stop practicing 
altogether. When I began my research in France I was told about the verb “se méfier.”729 I noted 
this earlier. I was told by non-Muslim French and Maghrébine Muslim French that this verb 
often dictated how the Muslim community interacted with the non-Muslim community in France 
and vice versa, i.e. that it reflected distrust. Because of this utter “méfiance” there was often fear 
to practice traditions that may increase the tension or distance between the two communities. 
Consequently, the French context made some of my informants feel as though they had to 
decrease their religious practice that othered them in France. Whether they felt forced because of 
the non-Maghrébine non-Muslim French around them,730 or because the context provided other 
practices that were in conflict with their traditional home practices (i.e. eating non-halal foie gras 
because halal foie gras was non-existent),731 many of my informants felt like they had to change 
some of their practices in order to fully live an “integrated” life in France.  
I had people tell me that life in France was not as conducive to traditional food practices 
from the Maghreb because life in France was much more fast paced and did not provide the 
necessary time to prepare dishes and engage in traditional food practices.732 I had other 
informants tell me that it was simply because they would want to go out with friends, and that 
was often in conflict with their religious practices, going to bars, etcetera.733 One man told me 
that he tried to maintain his practice in the French context, particularly eating halal meat and not 
drinking alcohol, but it became too difficult for him to resist and he left both practices behind.734 
Another informant explained that her decrease in practice came because of a distance between 
herself and her past, and this distance opened an opportunity for self-reflection not offered to her 
in the Maghreb:  
																																																						
729	To	be	wary	of,	or,	to	distrust.	
730	121216_001.	
731	121105_001.	
732	121201_001.	
733	121202_002.	
734	121129_002.	
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Je ne suis pas pratiquante. Quand j’étais en Algérie, je m’intéressais beaucoup à la 
religion, j’étais assez croyante. Mais le fait d’être sortie de l’environnement, du cocon 
familial, ça m’a permis de prendre un peu de recul, et je me suis complètement détachée 
de la religion. Je ne pratique plus. J’ai un rapport très distancié avec ma religion, qui est 
l’Islam.735 
 
The immigrant context allowed for a distancing from one’s religious practice that was not 
possible, she felt, in the religiously-soaked Maghrébine context. 
One of the biggest reasons given for decreasing one’s practice was that it was too 
difficult to maintain the practice to the same level in France as it was in the Maghreb, whether in 
ambiance or essential elements, and so they simply would not bother. If they could not do it 
right, they did not want to do it at all. One woman explained to me that, in regards to halal, she 
stopped consuming halal in France because she could not be sure that the meat was properly 
butchered. Instead of trying to meet this practice in other ways, she simply decided that if she 
could not do it right she would not do it at all.736 The practice was often still significant for these 
informants; they simply decided that it had to be done in a particular way or else it was not worth 
it, but they would restart the practice when they would visit the Maghreb. While Ramadan may 
be too difficult to practice in France, it was something that everyone did, and did “properly” in 
the Maghreb, and so could be re-instated in one’s practice when in the Maghreb.737 The context 
clearly changes the practice. 
It is important to note that even if my informants changed, decreased, or stopped their 
religious food practices completely in Paris, this did not stop them from continuing to identify as 
Muslim in some way. As I stated above, all my informants claimed Muslim identity to some 
degree. While they may have altered their practice in their immigrant context, and often altered 
the way they understood their Muslim identity as a result, this did not remove their identification 
as “Muslim” completely. Specific practices were sometimes the hinge on which the identity 
rested and sometimes they were not. In fact, food revealed how the terms and categories that we 
attempt to place on people are incredibly tenuous. We can see that, in agreement with Michel 
Desjardins, “in talking with people about the role that food plays in their religious lives it does 
																																																						
735	121128_001—“I	am	not	practicing.	When	I	was	in	Algeria,	I	was	very	interested	in	religion,	I	was	quite	believing.	
But	the	fact	of	leaving	the	environment,	the	family	cocoon,	that	permitted	me	to	take	a	bit	of	a	recoil	and	I	
completely	detached	myself	from	the	religion.	I	do	not	practice	anymore.	I	have	a	very	distant	relationship	with	my	
religion,	which	is	Islam.”	
736	121202_003.	
737	121124_001.	
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not take long to appreciate that, even on a personal level, the categories developed by scholars 
are fragile constructs.”738 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter addresses the specific food practices in which my informants engage, and their 
changing relationships to them in Paris. First, I examined what food practice can reveal about my 
informants’ definitions and understanding of culture and religion. In this part I explored how my 
informants label a given food practice cultural or religious depending on whether they see that 
practice as flexible or obligatory. I argue that where a practice lies on the spectrum of 
obligatory/flexible tends to be grounded in the source of that practice. If it is found in the Quran 
it is seen as obligatory, and consequently religious. If it is found only in traditional practices and 
stories then it is often seen as flexible, and consequently cultural. If the practice is found in the 
Sunnah, it lies somewhere in the middle of this flexible/obligatory, religious/cultural spectrum. 
My informants also play with these relationships. By labelling a practice as cultural, which is 
normally understood to be religious, my informants could justify the flexibility with which they 
approached this practice. This was evident with those informants who ate pork, arguing that not 
eating pork was only cultural and thus this practice did not need to be maintained.  
 Overall a fourfold typology of food practice emerged for my informants in Paris. The 
four categories were: (1) Quranically-documented and “prescribed,” i.e. not eating pork, not 
drinking alcohol, fasting during Ramadan and eating properly sacrificed meat (halal); (2) 
Quranically-documented but not prescribed, i.e. the lamb for the Eid Al-Adha; (3) Sunnah-
inspired, i.e. breaking the Ramadan fast with dates and milk; and (4) cultural food practices, i.e. 
eating couscous. While these practices were generally understood to fall into these categories, 
with category 1 food practices being the most religious/obligatory and category 4 food practices 
being the most cultural/flexible, I had informants who labelled the food practices in each of these 
categories in the opposite manner. My informants engaged with each of these practices 
differently and had different understandings of the role that they played in their religious/cultural 
lives.  
																																																						
738	Desjardins,	“Religious	Studies	that	Really	Schmecks,”	154.		
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Of all the practices, the Ramadan fast was the most clear-cut religious food practice 
according to my informants. Because of its place not only in the Quran but also within the five 
pillars of Islam, this practice was the least disputed of all the religious food practices listed by 
my informants. Even those who understood themselves to be cultural Muslims did not argue 
away the religious significance of this practice. They may have seen their engagement with it as 
cultural, but they saw it as religious at its base. On the other hand, the interaction with pork and 
alcohol reveal a complex relationship between culture and religion as it is worked out in food 
practice by my informants. While both were firmly placed within category 1 food practices, my 
informants in France revealed that on the ground there were drastically different approaches to 
these two practices.  
Throughout I discussed some of the main forms of argumentation that my informants 
gave for their engagement in these food practices. The first argument was that if something was 
written in the Quran then it must be done. This argument was broken into two sub arguments, 
namely that anything that is written in the Quran must be obeyed simply because it is in the 
Quran, and secondly, because there is divine wisdom in everything presented therein. The second 
argument that my informants gave me for their religious food practice was that beyond there 
being religiously or culturally significant reasons to engage in such a practice, there were also 
scientific or health reasons for it. My informants saw their food practices as logically sound, as 
serving some purpose for their health, and as worthwhile engaging in. Finally, my informants 
argued that they engaged in a given practice based on habit. It was something that they did in the 
homeland and since childhood, and as a result it was something that they continued now. 
Finally, I closed this chapter with an exploration of the ways in which my informants 
remained consistent in their food practices and the ways in which they changed them in Paris, in 
comparison to their practice in their home lands. In contrast to my expectations before entering 
the field, only two of my informants revealed an increase in food practice in Paris. This increase 
in practice had nothing explicitly to do with the immigrant experience and everything to do with 
a new found religious conviction, often long after their move to Paris. For a larger proportion of 
my informants, consistency was key. Cultural food practices tended to be easier to maintain and 
were the most consistent practices kept. Overall, the most common trend for my informants in 
Paris was to decrease their food practices once they were in Paris. Because of the Maghrébine 
mistrust of the broader French society, many of my informants felt a need to leave some of the 
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more apparent food practices aside out of fear of creating greater distances between themselves 
and the non-Muslim, non-Maghrébine French with whom they interacted on a daily basis. 
Furthermore, informants made the argument that life in France was not conducive to the 
traditional and religious food practices that were the norm in Maghreb, based on the time it takes 
to prepare a traditional dish or on the kinds of social food practices they felt were expected of 
them in Paris. Whatever the case, my informants were changing their food practice in tangible 
ways from what they lived in the Maghreb. Largely, I presented an overview of the ways that my 
informants practice their religion in secular France, and addressed how they justify these 
seemingly problematic practices in light of French laïcité. 
 Overall, the evidence presented in the last three chapters shows a vast and varied 
experience of “Islam de France.” While some of my informants identified strongly with both 
sides of that identity, others stressed one side over the other. While some felt firmly within the 
French national “us,” others felt as though they would never be able to claim this side of their 
transnational identity. While some felt comfortable living out the daily practices of their “French 
Muslim” identity, others felt the need to leave the “Muslim” side behind and consequently 
decrease, or re-label, their religious practice in the host-land, often labelling it as cultural in place 
of religious.  
The variety of practice and self-understanding that is present in this community, as I 
experienced it, becomes telling when comparing it to the fairly homogeneous understanding and 
approach to practice of the community in Montréal, to which I will now turn. 
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PART 2: Maghrébine Muslim Experiences in Multicultural Montréal 
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Chapter 6: Québec’s “Distinct in Canada” National Identity: Four Influential Factors in 
the Montréal Context of Reception 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
My first week of fieldwork in Montréal was drastically different from that in Paris. While I spent 
my first week in France reeling from the overwhelming amount of data already at my fingertips, 
my first week in Québec was quiet. No one was talking about Muslims. There were no signs in 
the Metro to observe, no conversations about integration to be had, no politics around pork in the 
school cafeterias, no blatant or subtle prejudice to be witnessed. At least not toward the Muslim 
community at the time I was there. Since this is a chapter about context, it is important to note 
that since the time of my fieldwork in Québec there has been a heightened awareness of the 
Muslim community there and an increased, visible, palpable prejudice towards it. My fieldwork 
is situated in a pre-Charter of Québec Values (2013).739  
Since the time of my fieldwork, this proposed Charter for Québec Values, which many 
viewed as a response by the PQ government to the “problem of the veil,” and Islam in Québec in 
general, was only one example of increased awareness of and prejudice toward Islam in the 
province. There has also been an increase in verbal and physical altercations between non-
Muslim Québécois(es)740 and Muslims in Québec following various terrorist attacks in Canada 
and around the world. It seems clear to me, when looking at the history of Québec, and the 
history of Islam in Québec, that prejudice towards Muslims tends to ebb and flow in the 
province. There are moments in history where Muslims in Québec feel very uncomfortable, and 
discriminated against. On the other hand, there are moments in time where Muslims feel quite 
comfortable living their lives in Québec; they feel as though they can be both 
Québécois(e)/Canadian and Muslim and that experiences of prejudice are simply not the norm. 
Unfortunately, at the current moment in time (2016) the situation in Québec, as in much of the 
																																																						
739	As	I	described	in	Chapter	1,	specifically	in	footnote	149,	the	Charter	of	Québec	Values,	also	known	as	Bill	60,	
was	the	then	PQ	government’s	attempt	to	address	the	issue	of	“reasonable	accommodation”	in	Québec	by	
emphasizing	state	neutrality,	most	specifically	through	the	limiting	of	wearing	“conspicuous”	religious	symbols	in	
public	service	postions.	
740	The	term	Québecois(es)	has	gone	through	an	evolution	over	the	years.	It	was	first	used	to	refer	to	people	who	
live	in	Québec	City,	then	to	all	francophones	in	Québec,	and	more	recently	it	has	expanded	to	include	all	citizens	of	
Québec.		
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rest of the Western world, is one of heightened prejudice toward Islam. At the time of my 
research, there was an ebb in the prejudice felt by many Muslims living in the province. This fact 
inevitably affects the data I collected and reveals a different view of the relationship between 
Islam and Québec than what many might assume reading this research at this current historical 
moment in time. 
As I explained in Chapter 2, there are certain historical and contextual aspects of the host 
society, independent of the ongoing ebb and flow, that inevitably influence an immigrant’s daily 
life, and the food practices in which they engage. There are events, philosophies, policies, and 
beliefs about self and other that are present in Québec that affect how the Maghrébine Muslim 
immigrants in Québec, and in this case, in Montréal, not only interact with the non-Muslim 
Québécois(es) around them, but also how they view, and present themselves. The experiences of 
the Maghrébine Muslim in Montréal are quite different from that of the Maghrébine Muslim in 
Paris. While there are always complicated reasons for differences between groups and 
individuals, many of the unique aspects of an individual’s experience can be traced back to the 
context within which that individual lives. Simply speaking, Maghrébine Muslims in Montréal 
are different from Maghrébine Muslims anywhere else in the world because of some very 
specific elements to Québec history and society that inevitably change anyone living in la Belle 
Province. 
To understand the ways that food plays a role in the working out of religious identity and 
the integration processes of the individuals of my study I must set the Québec scene. After all, in 
the province where “Je me souviens” (I remember) is the provincial slogan one must take history 
seriously. Remarkably the same four historical and contextual factors that I explored in the last 
chapter are significant here: colonialism, immigration, church/state relations and nationalism. 
That being said, while there are some similarities between the French and Québec context, the 
differences in each of these four realms are significant.  
In relation to colonialism, France’s history as colonizer affects the interaction between 
Muslim and non-Muslim French, while in Québec its history as colonized, first by the French 
then by the English, impacts this relationship. The type, duration and quantity of Maghrébine 
Muslim immigration to France and Québec also differs, which will impact how people respond 
to the food practices and related identities of Muslim immigrants in Québec—not to mention the 
effect that the identity of Canada as a “nation of immigrants” has on the way that new 
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immigrants understand and present themselves. While both France and Québec have a 
historically complicated relationship with religion, specifically the Catholic Church, the resulting 
secular policies present in each context are distinct. Québec’s break with Catholicism occurred 
only in the 1960s, and its intercultural form of laïcité differs from the often strict laïcité at work 
in France. Finally, both contexts have different historical developments of nationalism, and 
relatedly, national identity. While in both contexts secularism plays an essential role in the 
national identity, in Québec, which finds itself in the midst of a larger, predominantly English-
speaking country, language is also foundational to what it means to “be Québecois.”741 
Also, while food and drink are often representative of French national identity, the 
multicultural and intercultural742 nationalism present in Québec, and specifically in Montréal, 
encapsulates the food traditions of all people from all backgrounds. Keeping these differences in 
mind, I present Québec’s unique history as it relates to colonialism, immigration, secularism and 
nationalism. 
First, I explore the unique experience of colonialism in Québec and how this might 
impact the Muslim community found therein. While Québec may not have its own colonial 
relationship with the Maghreb, as France does, its own identity as a colonizer and colonized 
nation imparts essential characteristics to the context in which my informants live.  
Second, I outline the immigration history of Muslims to Canada, and specifically Québec, 
with a focus on Maghrébine Muslim immigration. In this section I address the reasons that 
Maghrébine Muslims have immigrated to Québec, alongside the immigration policies in the 
province that have clear consequences for this community and its foodways. Within this section I 
demonstrate what is distinct about the Québec approach to immigration compared to the rest of 
Canada.  
																																																						
741	This	is	especially	true	in	Montréal,	where	the	province’s	majority	of	English	speakers	reside.	This	tension	
between	English	and	French	speaking	Québécois(es)	in	Montréal	was	the	more	obvious	tension	at	work	when	I	was	
in	the	field.	I	heard	more	about	“those	darn	English”	(of	which	I	am	one)	than	“those	darn	Muslims”	during	my	
time	in	Montréal.	I	will	discuss	this	tension	further	below.	
742	Throughout	this	work,	I,	at	times,	use	these	two	terms,	multiculturalism	and	interculturalism,	as	seemingly	
interchangeable.	While	the	Québec	government	and	the	Québécois	population	at	large	tend	to	firmly	reject	
Canadian	“multiculturalism,”	many	scholars	have	argued	that	making	a	distinction	between	these	two	concepts	is	
not	always	straightforward.	I	will	unpack	some	of	the	arguments	around	how	these	terms	differ	or	are	similar	in	
this	chapter,	but	for	an	excellent,	brief	overview	of	some	of	the	main	questions	around	the	relationship	of	the	two	
concepts,	see	Gerard	Bouchard’s	“What	is	Interculturalism?”	McGill	Law	Journal/Revue	de	Droit	de	McGill,	vol.	56,	
no.	2	(2011):	435-468—especially	his	discussion	on	pages	462-466.	
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Third, I provide an overview of the history of church and state relations in Québec and 
how this history informs the noteworthy approach to secularism that is present in Québec. In this 
section I explore the most significant events and policies that continue to have an impact on the 
Maghrébine Muslim experience, including but not limited to, church/state relations before 1960, 
the Quiet Revolution, the Bouchard-Taylor Commission, rigid versus open secularism and 
interculturalism versus multiculturalism.  
Finally, I close the chapter with an examination of Québec nationalism. In this 
endeavour, I consider questions such as: What does it mean to be Québécois(e)? What are the 
orienting principles of that identity? Who can claim it? And especially, can Maghrébine Muslims 
in Québec call themselves “Québécois Muslims” or Muslim Québecers? In fact, is there such 
thing as an “Islam du Québec?” All these considerations help us to understand how my 
informants live out their North African, Muslim and Québécois/Canadian lives in Montréal, and 
the ways that they interact with the daily practices that shape those identities, namely food. 
 
6.2 The Effect of Colonization on Québec self-understanding743 
 
As I mentioned in Chapter 2, the colonization of North America was a part of the first wave of 
French colonization abroad. This wave and its effects on the Québec colony are the focus of this 
section. I show how this history has an impact on the self-understanding of the province and will 
therefore inevitably affect the ways that my informants negotiate their identities in this context of 
reception; specifically, how they will engage and utilize food as a tool in these processes. 
Québec had its beginnings as a colony of France, called New France, in the mid-sixteenth 
century (1534). The “real beginning of French colonization in the St Lawrence Valley was in 
1608, when Samuel de Champlain established a fort at Cap Diamant, the site of Québec City 
today.”744 French colonization of New France then expanded quickly throughout the seventeenth 
																																																						
743	For	overviews	of	the	history	of	France’s	colonial	endeavor	in	New	France,	and	the	founding	of	Québec	see:	
Claude	Couture,	“Québec,”	last	modified	May	6,	2015,	The	Canadian	Encyclopedia,	accessed	February	3,	2016,	
http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/Québec/;	John	Alexander	Dickinson	and	Brian	Young,	A	Short	
History	of	Québec	4th	edition	(Montréal	and	Kingston:	McGill-Queen’s	University	Press,	2008);	Marc	Lescarbot,	
History	of	New	France	(New	York:	Greenwood	Press,	1968);	Susan	Mann,	The	Dream	of	Nation:	A	Social	and	
Intellectual	History	of	Québec	(Montréal	and	Kingston:	McGill-Queen’s	University	Press,	2002).		
744	Couture,	“Québec.”	I	use	Couture’s	summary	of	the	founding	of	New	France,	and	its	colonial	beginnings	for	the	
“facts”	of	the	historical	founding	of	Québec	as	a	colony	of	France.	The	Encyclopedic	treatment	of	this	subject	
	 232	
century, but remained relatively constrained in comparison to the British colonization of the 
period. By the eighteenth century, while the colonial rivalry between Britain and France was well 
established, France focused mostly on the European continent while Britain expanded further 
into other international realms.745  
Not only did Britain focus its colonial efforts off of the European continent at that time, 
but the kind of colonization and the settlers who were arriving were starkly different from that of 
France’s settlement. While the British allowed for and even encouraged the settlement of 
minority religious groups in British North America, the French were much more selective, only 
allowing for French-born Catholics to settle in New France, significantly restricting their 
numbers in the North American colony.746 This sets the stage from the beginning of the Canadian 
colonial experience for difference between the part of the future nation that spoke French and 
had a French background and that which spoke English and had a British background. 
Furthermore, it establishes an ideal of “who belongs” as a part of the Canadian/Québécois 
people. While British North America was being populated by immigrants from various minority 
groups, New France was strictly populated by French, Catholic settlers. 
Mann suggests that not only did France populate New France with Catholic settlers, but 
these settlers were a particular type of Catholic. She explains that coming out of the religious 
turmoil of sixteenth century France, these settlers were “the most extraordinary group of hard-
nosed religious zealots: mystics who knew how to run a business; wealthy nobles and bourgeois 
with an intense longing to change the world for God,” and they saw New France as the place to 
realize all of these dreams.747 These “mystics” brought money, power and determination with 
them, which allowed them to “establish a network of clerically administered social institutions 
that would not only outlive New France but be an enduring feature of Québec society until well 
into the twentieth century.”748 Because of this type of settlement in New France, the Catholic 
Church was established as a powerful force, not only because the majority settler population was 
Catholic but because these Catholics strove to establish a role for the church outside of the 
																																																						
allows	for	a	certain	clarity	and	simplicity	for	this	introductory	paragraph.	Where	some	of	these	“facts”	need	to	be	
complicated,	I	use	Mann’s	Dream	of	Nation.	
745	Couture,	“Québec.”	
746	Mann,	Dream	of	Nation,	2;	Couture,	“Québec.”	
747	Mann,	Dream	of	Nation,	4.	
748	Ibid.,	4.	
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building’s walls. They believed the church to have a role to play in the larger social structures of 
their new society. 
After the British conquest of New France between 1756 and 1760, Britain finally won 
control of the French colony in 1763 with the signing of the Treaty of Paris. While one might 
expect that this change in power might lead to an Anglicization of the region of Québec, more 
complicated politics were at work; not that the British colonial powers did not try to make 
Québec a proper English colony for thirty years after the Conquest.749 Because church and 
landowners stayed in the region after the Treaty of Paris, the British found themselves in an 
awkward position when they ran into troubles with the American Colonies. To appease the 
Francophone settlers, and attempt to keep them from joining the American Colonies, the Québec 
Act of 1774 was passed. It was the “attempt by Britain to keep Québec British without making it 
English.”750 According to Peter Beyer, this was the “first official act of Reasonable 
Accommodation of religious diversity in Canada.”751 Not only did French civil law gain legal 
recognition at this point, but the landowners and Catholic Church were given strong power in the 
province, which dissuaded the Québécois(es) from joining the Americans in spite of their many 
invitations.752 This also laid the foundation for the power of the Catholic Church to grow, which 
becomes important for us to know when addressing the relations between church and state. 
 
6.2.1 Québec as Distinct in Canada 
This recognition of Québec, and those who lived in this area of the colony, as distinctive, as 
having its own civil law, etcetera, led to the notion that there were two different 
“nations/societies” in the Canadian colony:753 the English and the French. The problem in the 
mid-nineteenth century was not one of the “people” against a government but a conflict between 
																																																						
749	Ibid.,	33.	
750	Mann,	Dream	of	Nation,	36.	
751	Peter	Beyer,	“Religion	and	Immigration	in	a	Changing	Canada:	The	Reasonable	Accommodation	of	‘Reasonable	
Accommodation’?”	in	Reasonable	Accommodation:	Managing	Religious	Diversity,	ed.	Lori	G.	Beaman	(Vancouver:	
UBC	Press,	2012),	13-31.	
752	Couture,	“Québec;”	Mann,	Dream	of	Nation,	37.	
753	Beyer	suggests	that	while	Europe	is	broken	up	into	culturally	specific	countries,	Canada	(and	the	U.S.A)	do	not	
have	as	much	variation,	unless	of	course	one	is	talking	about	Québec	in	Canada;	there	one	can	see	two	culturally	
specific	contexts	within	the	national	setting.	Peter	Beyer,	“Growing	up	in	Canada,	the	United	States,	and	Western	
Europe,”	in	Growing	up	Canadian:	Muslims,	Hindus,	Buddhists,	eds.	Peter	Beyer	and	Rubina	Ramji	(Montréal	&	
Kingston:	McGill-Queen’s	University	Press,	2013),	291.		
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two opposing “peoples”: the French and the English.754 With confederation in 1867, economic 
control remained mostly in the hands of English companies and thus the situation in Québec was 
one where, as the popular saying went, “capital speaks English and labour speaks French.” The 
only French speaking institution that seemed to have any real control in the Province was the 
Catholic Church. It controlled education, social agencies, civil society, hospitals, etcetera. This 
colonial history firmly establishes two key elements to the Québec self-understanding: language 
and religion.755 
What effect might this history have on Maghrébine Muslim immigrants in the twenty-
first century? France and Britain have a history of colonial conflict which uniquely affects 
Québec and its related political policies. The Québec independence movement grew out of 
frustration with Anglophone political and economic power in province, something firmly 
established out of the English colonial presence in the country. They opposed the economic 
backwardness of the province of Québec, where “capital speaks English,” and the socio-
economic inferiorization of French Canadians. As a result, language policy becomes important; 
the official language of the market and state determines who has the clearest path to management 
positions. This then can lead to a stronger emphasis on speaking French above anything else. It is 
significant, then, that my informants come from French speaking countries of origin, and former 
colonies of France at that. Both Québec and North Africa were the settings of French colonial 
effort, and consequently have some shared historical experiences. Furthermore, because of the 
dominance of the English language in most of the North American colony, any groups that can 
add strength to the French language in Québec are potentially welcomed.756 
Like the emphasis placed on language that arose out of the colonial battle between France 
and Britain, Catholicism also gained an important place in the self-understanding of the 
																																																						
754	While	the	majority	opinion	tends	to	be	that	this	colonial	relationship,	and	the	conquest	of	New	France	by	the	
British,	set	up	francophone	Québec	as	distinct	and,	more	importantly,	a	minority	community	in	Canada	pitted	
against	the	Anglophone	provinces	that	surround	it,	there	are	other	possibilities	for	viewing	this	history.	Mann	
suggests	that	while	some	see	the	minority	position	of	French	Canadians	as	an	obstacle	others	see	it	as	a	challenge	
and	she	argues	that	those	who	see	it	as	a	challenge	emphasize	“either	healthy	competition	or	interested	
cooperation	between	French	and	English	Canadians”	(Mann,	Dream	of	Nation,	19-20).	In	short,	this	history	is	not	
always	understood	as	a	“conflict	between	two	opposing	peoples.”	
755	I	discuss	the	importance	of	the	French	language	and	the	Catholic	religion	to	national	identity	in	the	final	part	of	
this	chapter.	It	is	simply	important	to	note	that	this	distinction,	this	difference	between	“us”	and	“them,”	which	
leads	to	a	strong	identity	formation,	begins	in	the	colonial	period.	The	colonial	experience	provides	the	historical	
fodder	for	the	seeds	of	national	identity	to	grow.	
756	For	more	on	the	effect	of	colonial	history	on	ethnic/religious	minorities:	Eid,	Being	Arab;	Khan,	Muslim	Women.	
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inhabitants of New France. Unlike the Protestant majority, and a diverse Protestantism at that, 
that surrounded them, the settlers of New France, as I’ve noted, were almost all Catholic. The 
Québec Act of 1774 only solidified the position of Catholicism in the future province and added 
to the unique identity of the inhabitants of the region. While the emphasis on Catholicism as an 
essential part of the Québécois identity has all but disappeared today, a fact I discuss later in this 
chapter, the colonial period sets up the Catholic religion and the province’s relationship to 
religion as different from the rest of the country. Whether religion plays a significant role in 
peoples’ lives, or in the definition of what it means to be Québécois(es), in Québec now one can 
still see this influence in the numbers of Québécois(es) who personally identify as Roman 
Catholic. According to the 2011 National Household Survey (NHS), 87.9 percent of the Québec 
population declared a religious affiliation, compared to 76.1 percent of the Canadian population. 
More specifically, 74.6 percent of the population of Québec identified as Roman Catholic.757 
This relationship to Catholicism, which is firmly established in the colonial period, inevitably 
has an affect on minority religious communities in the province. Maghrébine Muslims are just 
one of many religious minorities in a heavily Catholic province.  
Inevitably, with 74.6 percent of the population claiming one religious affiliation, anyone 
who is a part of the 25.4 percent non-Catholic community may feel like an “other” in some 
regard. While one’s religious affiliation tends to have more complicated implications for one’s 
acceptance in Québec because of its relationship to secularism, this general Catholicism adds 
another layer of possible tension for my informants. 
French colonization of a different kind also influences the experience of North African 
Muslims in Québec. The French colonial influence on Québec, as mentioned above, is a 
significant factor in the reception of North African Muslims in that province. Sharify-Funk 
points out that “the persistence of a common Francophone cultural and intellectual sphere 
renders core constructs of French culture and history consequential (though by no means 
																																																						
757	Statistics	Canada.	2013.	Québec	(Code	24)	(table).	National	Household	Survey	(NHS)	Profile.	2011	National	
Household	Survey.	Statistics	Canada	Catalogue	no.	99-004-XWE.	Ottawa.	Released	September	11,	2013.	
http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/2011/dp-pd/prof/index.cfm?Lang=E	(accessed	February	4,	2016).	A	telling	
comparison,	using	this	data	base,	is	between	Vancouver	and	Montréal.	Roughly	1	in	2	people	in	Vancouver	have	
“no	religious	affiliation”	(288,434	out	of	590,205)	while	1	in	6	in	Montréal	have	“no	religious	affiliation”	(560,650	
out	of	3,752,475).	So	the	idea	that	Québec	is	rigidly	secular,	often	read,	antagonistic	toward	religion	affiliation,	
does	not	seem	to	have	a	statistical	founding.	That	being	said,	levels	of	“practice”	are	extremely	low	in	Québec,	
with	Catholics	in	the	province	participating	in	far	lower	levels	of	religious	practice	than	Canadian	Catholics	outside	
Québec.	So	this	identification	with	Catholicism	is	potentially	one	of	“cultural”	religious	identification.	
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determinative) for Québec.”758 The negative colonial memory and its related perceptions of 
Muslims in France, as I discussed in Chapter 2, inevitably leak into the French-Canadian 
context.759 As a result, Muslims in French Canada may face colonial discrimination on two 
fronts. They are French-speaking citizens fighting against the English in North America, but they 
are also immigrants from lower status French colonies which are viewed negatively by the 
country from which Québec takes many of its policy cues. All these things being considered, 
Arab Canadians, in comparison to Arabs in France,760 “have never been historically caught up in 
a colonialist/colonized relationship with their host society.”761 While Muslims in Québec may 
have to fight against negative stereotypes and perceptions of their religious tradition, these 
negative perceptions do not necessarily come from a direct colonial history but from more recent 
interactions between Islam and the West, from immigration patterns/numbers, and from the 
relationship between religion and the state in Québec.  
 
6.3 Immigration Patterns and Demographics of (Maghrébine) Muslims to Canada/Québec 
 
The history of Québec as a French colony, and its relationship to British colonial rule, has a 
direct impact on the immigration patterns and policies that are present in the province today. The 
emphasis on the uniqueness of Québec in Canada, and its French self-understanding, are 
essential to the immigration history in the province. Before we can address the specific migration 
of Maghrébine Muslims to Québec, though, it is important to understand the general patterns of 
Muslim migration to Canada. Again, like my treatment of this theme in Chapter 2, my focus is 
primarily on the immigration patterns and policies that are directly related to Muslim and 
Maghrébine immigration to Canada, and more specifically Québec, rather than immigration 
patterns and policies in Canada/Québec in general. 
																																																						
758	Meena	Sharify-Funk,	“Governing	the	Face	Veil:	Québec’s	Bill	94	and	the	Transnational	Politics	of	Women’s	
Identity,”	International	Journal	of	Canadian	Studies	43	(2011):	140.	
759	Regarding	decolonization	and	its	effect	on	the	relationship	between	and	among	France,	Québec	and	Canada,	
see:	Robin	S.	Gendron,	Towards	a	Francophone	Community:	Canada’s	Relations	with	France	and	French	Africa,	
1945-1968	(Montréal	and	Kingston:	McGill-Queen’s	University	Press,	2006);	and	David	Meren,	“An	Atmosphere	of	
Liberation:	The	Role	of	Decolonization	in	the	France-Québec	Rapprochement	of	the	1960s,”	Canadian	Historical	
Review,	vol.	92,	no.	2	(2011):	263-294.	
760	I	acknowledge	that	not	all	Arabs	are	Muslims.	But	this	stands	true	for	Muslims	as	well.	Muslim	Canadians,	in	
comparison	to	Muslims	in	France,	have	also	“never	been	caught	up	in	a	colonialist/colonized	relationship	with	their	
host	society,”	since	Canada	is,	at	its	base,	not	a	colonialist	power.		
761	Eid,	Being	Arab,	176.	
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6.3.1 Three Migratory Movements of Muslims to Canada 
Like in France, three phases of Muslim immigration can be seen in Canada since the late 
nineteenth century.762 Sharon McIrvin Abu-Laban breaks down the migration of Muslim families 
to North America into three phases: the Pioneer Families, the Transitional Families and the 
Differentiated Families.763 The first phase of Muslim immigration, the “Pioneer Families” as 
Abu-Laban labels them, began in the late nineteenth century and lasted until the Second World 
War. According to McDonough and Hoodfar, these first Muslims were mostly “traders from 
Syria and Lebanon, who wandered selling goods in the newly developing Northwest.”764 These 
traders would cross back and forth between Canada and the United States, and thus census 
reports in 1871 report 13 Muslims in Canada, while the “1881 census does not report any.”765 By 
1901 Canada’s Muslim community had “grown” to 47 members, mostly in Alberta and 
Saskatchewan.766 Furthermore, with the implementation of “two restrictive Orders-in-Council 
enacted in 1908 by the Canadian government” there was a significant slowing of Arab 
immigration to Canada at that time.767 Moreover, Canada’s continuous passage law highly 
restricted immigrants from “Asian and Arab lands.”768 Those immigrants who were still making 
their way to Canada had a specific demographic profile. Like the early immigration patterns of 
																																																						
762	For	further	sources	which	give	overviews	of	Muslim	immigration	to	Canada	see:	Sharon	McIrvin	Abu-Laban,	
“Family	and	Religion	among	Muslim	Immigrants	and	their	Descendants,”	in	Muslim	families	in	North	America,	eds.	
Earle	H.	Waugh,	Sharon	Abu-Laban	and	Regula	Burckhardt	Qureshi	(Edmonton:	University	of	Alberta	Press,	1991);	
Tina	W.	L.	Chui	and	John	Flanders,	“Immigration	and	Ethnocultural	Diversity	in	Canada:	National	Household	Survey,	
2011,”	Statistics	Canada,	
http://publications.gc.ca.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/collections/collection_2013/statcan/CS99-010-2011-1-eng.pdf—a	
good	source	for	overall	statistics	on	immigration	numbers	and	patterns	as	of	the	2011	NHS;	Eid,	Being	Arab;	
Kazemipur,	The	Muslim	Question	in	Canada;	Patricia	Kelly,	“Muslim	Canadians:	Immigration	Policy	and	Community	
Development	in	the	1991	Census,”	Islam	and	Christian-Muslim	Relations,	vol.	9,	no.	1	(1998):	83-102;	Sheila	
McDonough	and	Homa	Hoodfar,	“Muslims	in	Canada:	From	Ethnic	Groups	to	Religious	Community,”	in	Religion	
and	Ethnicity	in	Canada,	eds.	Paul	Bramadat	and	David	Seljak	(Toronto:	Pearson	Education	Canada,	2005);	Esmail	
Shakeri,	“Muslim	Women	in	Canada:	Their	Role	and	Status	as	Revealed	in	the	hijab	Controversy”	in	Muslims	on	the	
Americanization	Path?,	eds.	Yvonne	Yazbeck	Haddad	and	John	L.	Esposito	(Atlanta:	Scholars	Press,	1998),	159-178;	
Zabel,	Arabs	in	the	Americas	-	specifically	Darcy	A.	Zabel,	“The	Arab	Diaspora	in	the	Americas:	Latin	America,	the	
United	States	and	Canada,”	1-17;	and	Zine,	Islam	in	the	Hinterlands.	Although	some	of	these	sources	are	now	fairly	
dated,	they	do	provide	good	overviews	of	early	Muslim	immigration	to	Canada.	
763	Abu-Laban,	“Family	and	Religion,”	13.		
764	McDonough	and	Hoodfar,	“Muslims	in	Canada,”	136.	
765	Abu-Laban,	“Family	and	Religion,”	14.	
766	Zine,	Islam	in	the	Hinterlands,	5.		
767	Eid,	Being	Arab,	3.	
768	Zabel,	Arabs	in	the	Americas,	8.	This	law	was	an	amendment	to	the	Immigration	Act	in	1908	that	restricted	any	
immigrant	from	landing	in	Canada	who	did	not	come	directly,	on	continuous	passage,	from	their	country	of	origin.	
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Muslims in France, this first wave of immigration to Canada was made up mostly of young, 
male, unskilled workers. They also believed that their migration was only temporary and they 
wanted to accumulate as much money as possible and return to their home countries.769  
Although there are some demographic similarities, there were some differences present in 
the early North American Muslim immigrant experience from the immigrant experience in 
Europe as we see represented in Cesari’s migratory movements in Chapter 2. First, they were 
much fewer in number and had no real contact with family or others back in their homeland; 
“ocean travel was expensive, arduous, and time consuming and letters took a very long time.”770 
This made it difficult to set up and maintain communities in their host land. Further, while the 
French had some interaction with Islam before the first wave of migration in the twentieth 
century through their colonial efforts in Muslim-dominant nations, Canada’s first real interaction 
with Islam came with these Syrian traders in the late nineteenth century. Islam at that time was a 
generally unknown tradition, and Muslims were marked as distant outsiders.771 Because they 
were viewed as outsiders, and because the maintenance of transnational linkages was difficult in 
this early phase, the Muslim community began as a fairly unified, pan-ethnic and pan-national 
tradition in Canada. 
The second wave of migration that Abu-Laban outlines is what she calls the “Transitional 
Families.” This phase took place between post-World War II and 1967.772 It is in this phase that 
Muslim immigration to Canada increased dramatically. According to Eid, 97 percent of Arab 
migrants who came to Canada between 1882 and 1997 came after 1950.773 In comparison to 
1901 where there were only 47 members of the Muslim community, by 1951 there were three 
thousand.774 While the second phase in France was merely an intensification of the first, with 
unskilled labourers being brought into the country to fill a labour shortage, the situation was a bit 
different in Canada. This second phase instead brought a large group of students and 
professionals onto Canadian soil from Muslim countries.775 During this time, immigrants from 
																																																						
769	Eid,	Being	Arab,	4.	
770	Abu-Laban,	“Family	and	Religion,”	15.	
771	Ibid.,	14.	
772	Abu-Laban,	“Family	and	Religion,”	18.	
773	Eid,	Being	Arab,	7.	Arab	and	Muslim	are	not	synonymous	here,	but	a	large	portion	of	those	considered	Arab	
migrants	would	have	been	Muslim.	The	point	is	simply	to	show	that	the	largest	portion	of	migration	from	Arab	
countries	(which	are	highly	populated	by	Muslims)	occurred	since	1950.	
774	Zine,	Islam,	5.	
775	Eid,	Being	Arab,	9.	
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North Africa, the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent came to North America “to study and 
advance professionally. Most of these newcomers were young, unmarried men from well-
established families, potential elites in their countries of origin.”776 Instead of coming to Canada 
to work and send money back home to their families, they were being sent by well-to-do families 
to advance in education and career.777 Like in France, the economic setting was prosperous in 
Canada at the time and there were abundant job and career opportunities to be had. Abu-Laban 
suggests that this cohort of immigrants had much to do with introducing a “significant twist in 
North America’s exposure to and understanding of Muslims.”778 Muslims were now seen not so 
much as outsiders, but as business people, doctors and engineers. Although a large portion of 
these immigrants were educated professionals, there was also a large portion of refugees coming 
to Canada from countries torn apart by civil war.779 
It is essential to take a moment and explore the impact of the 1967 Canadian Immigration 
Act which highly influenced the type of immigrants coming to Canada before I address the third 
and final phase of Muslim immigration to the country. Under the 1967 Act, immigrants were 
now able to “apply for immigration on the basis of a point system based on education, training, 
skills, status as a refugee based on humanitarian grounds or as sponsored applicants of existing 
Canadian relatives.”780 This point system is a significant difference between immigration policies 
in Canada and France, and the resultant Muslim communities in both locales.781 The most 
significant difference between the two communities based on the point system of immigration is 
that Muslim immigrants in Canada tend to be of a higher socio-economic status than those in 
France.782 Beyer similarly expresses that  
																																																						
776	Abu-Laban,	“Family	and	Religion,”	18.	
777	A	pattern	that	continues	for	Maghrébine	Muslims	in	Québec	today.	
778	Abu-Laban,	“Family	and	Religion,”	18.	
779	Eid,	Being	Arab,	8.	Refugees	came	from	Lebanon,	Israel	(out	of	the	Arab-Israeli	conflicts),	Jordan,	Syria	and	
North	Africa	(the	Algerian	war	of	independence).		
780	Zabel,	Arabs,	8.	
781	See	Khan,	Of	Hockey	and	Hijab,	116;	Laurence	and	Vaisse,	Integrating	Islam,	x;	Regula	Burckhardt	Qureshi,	
“Transcending	Space:	Recitation	and	Community	among	South	Asian	Muslims	in	Canada,”	in	Making	Muslim	Space	
in	North	America	and	Europe,	ed.	Barbara	Daly	Metcalfe	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	1996),	46.		
782	José	Casanova	explains	the	differences	between	American	and	European	immigration	patterns	in	his	article	
“Religion,	European	Secular	Identities	and	European	Integration,”	Transit	27	(2004),	Accessed	December	3,	2016,	
http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2004-07-29-casanova-en.html.	While	Québec	is	closer	to	the	American	model	
outlined	in	this	article,	it	still	shows	some	influence	from	the	French	model.	This	becomes	clear	when	looking	at	
the	case	of	Muslim	immigration	to	Québec.	On	the	one	hand,	as	is	the	case	in	Europe,	and	specifically	in	France,	
most	of	Québec’s	Muslim	immigrants	come	from	one	region	of	origin,	namely,	the	Maghreb.	This	is	an	area	where	
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the non-Christian religious populations of these countries [Canada and the US] are not 
nearly as dominated by Muslims as is the case in many European countries, even though 
in each case Muslims still constitute the single largest religious identity among immigrant 
groups after Christianity. Above all, both North American countries have pursued 
deliberate immigration policies that have had the effect of favouring more educated 
people with a greater average amount of human capital on arrival.783 
 
While the introduction of the point system had a clear and significant impact on the kind of 
immigration that would follow in Canada, this change did not happen overnight and the second 
phase, with a new influx of business people, doctors, and engineers, as I mentioned above, found 
validation in this system. It was consequently not a hard stop transition between Abu-Laban’s 
second and third phases of immigration. Furthermore, family reunification and refugee 
immigration continued, and continue, to be important aspects of immigration to Canada after 
1967; thus immigrants from all socio-economic statuses and education levels continue to 
immigrate to Canada alongside those who would enter according to the point system. 
The final stage of Muslim immigration began in 1968 and continues to the present day. 
Abu-Laban labels this cohort the “Differentiated Families.” This phase is different in both host 
and home characteristics. Not only do the Muslim immigrants in this wave come from countries 
with “different geopolitical social characteristics from those of the previous immigrant eras” but 
“the receiving societies have altered too.”784 The most important difference between this cohort 
and early cohorts according to Abu-Laban is a greater sensitivity to normative Islam. Muslim 
immigrants in this phase of immigration then are “more likely to emphasize the public 
demonstration of religious beliefs.”785 Eid states that,  
whereas most Arab migrants coming to Canada between 1945 and the early 1970s were 
secular and highly educated, this new migratory wave included many semi-educated and 
religious migrants who felt the need to institutionalize their faith through the 
establishment of mosques and religious organizations.786   
 
In France, the third wave of immigration highlighted by Cesari brought about visibility because 
of an expanded community of Muslim immigrants, while in Canada this third wave ushered in a 
																																																						
Québec	falls	in	line	with	the	European	model.	On	the	other	hand,	like	the	American	model,	Québec’s	Muslim	
immigrants	come	from	diverse	backgrounds	when	it	comes	to	socio-economic	status.	
783	Beyer,	“Growing	up	in	Canada,”	293.	
784	Abu-Laban,	“Family	and	Religion,”	21.	
785	Ibid.,	22.	It	is	with	this	phase	where	the	issue	of	the	hijab	becomes	a	prominent	question,	as	well	as	a	re-
emphasis	on	food	law.	
786	Eid,	Being	Arab,	10.	
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new public presence because the immigrants themselves “are more willing to stand out as 
different.”787 Furthermore, in this phase, thanks partially to globalization and technological 
development, these immigrants are able to maintain transnational connections with greater ease 
than previous immigrants.788 As a result, what happens in home countries has a greater impact on 
what happens in the Muslim communities in Canada because they can now be effected by them 
in a way that was not possible before.789 
 
6.3.1.1 Demographics of Muslims in Canada Today 
Considering how recent of a phenomenon Muslim immigration to Canada is, these waves of 
immigration have led to a significant population of Muslims in the country. Unlike France, 
which does not document religion in its census information, Canada has a history of doing so. 
There are some “wrinkles” to this data though, as Kazemipur points out. First, 
the question on religion in the “long-form” census is administered only in every other 
census (e.g. 1981, 1991, 2001, and 2011). Second, starting with the 2011 census, filling 
out the long-form was declared optional…This means that the 2001 census offers the last 
reasonably reliable data available for the purpose of estimating the population of faith 
groups. In the case of Muslims, an additional problem is that, in 1941, the category 
“Muslim” was dropped from the Canadian census questionnaire, only to be reintroduced 
forty years later.790 
 
All three of these wrinkles mean that there are significant gaps in our knowledge of the actual 
numbers of Muslims present in Canada now and in the past. There are none the less some good 
estimates presented by various groups. Kazemipur states that there were roughly 579,640 
Muslims in Canada in 2001 (based on the 2001 census data) and 940,000 in 2011 (according to 
																																																						
787	Abu-Laban,	“Family	and	Religion,”	23.	With	new	discussions	around	religion	in	the	public	sphere,	and	
specifically	Islam	in	the	public	sphere,	it	will	be	interesting	to	see	if	a	fourth	phase	of	Muslim	immigration	to	
Canada	will	be	delineated.	
788	Vertovec	discusses	the	new	changes	to	transnationalism.	He	suggests	that	while	migrants	have	always	engaged	
in	forms	of	transnationalism,	globalization,	and	especially	the	advancement	of	communication	technology,	has	
allowed	for	greater	impact	of	homeland	on	the	migrant	and	migrant	on	the	homeland	(Vertovec,	Transnationalism,	
15).	
789	This	wave	of	immigration	has	an	affect	in	post-Quiet	Revolution,	and	nationalistic	Québec.	It	leads	to	a	
heightened	concern	about	the	social	and	cultural	influence	of	immigrants	from	religious	minority	groups.	
According	to	Adams	(2007),	there	are	two	specific	factors	that	account	for	this	heightened	concern:	(1)	Québec’s	
own	anxiety	about	preserving	their	own	minority	culture	and	language	within	the	North	American	setting,	and	(2)	
their	rejection	of	“traditional	values”	in	the	Quiet	Revolution	which	leads	to	hesitation	about	the	influx	of	such	
values	from	elsewhere	(Michael	Adams,	Unlikely	Utopia:	The	Surprising	Triumph	of	Canadian	Pluralism	[Toronto:	
Viking,	2007]).	I	discuss	these	factors	further	later	in	this	chapter.	
790	Kazemipur,	Muslim	Question,	25.	
	 242	
Pew Research Center studies in 2011).791 He goes on to show that if projected estimates are 
accurate, the Muslim population, which is currently about 2.8 percent of the total Canadian 
population, will rise to approximately 6.6 percent by the year 2030.792 Immigration rates are 
partially to thank for these large numbers of Canadian Muslims, with high fertility rates in the 
community being the other. In terms of immigration, again, according to Kazemipur, the 
proportion of Muslim immigrants in the overall immigrant population in Canada has risen from 
approximately two percent in 1970 to approximately 20 percent in 2000.793  
While one may imagine that 2.8 percent of the total population (if one considers the 2011 
numbers) would not be felt in a country as geographically large as Canada, it is essential to note 
that the Canadian Muslim population is unevenly distributed among the Canadian provinces. 
Ontario houses the largest population of Muslims, at 61 percent (again, using the 2011 numbers, 
this equates to approximately 573,400 Muslims living in Ontario), with Québec coming in 
second at 19 percent (approximately 178,600 according to the 2011 numbers). Moreover, the 
concentration in each of these provinces is largely restricted to the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) 
and to Montréal.794 
 
6.3.2 Maghrébine Muslim Immigration in Québec 
The larger patterns of immigration that I described above are reflected in the situation in Québec, 
with some important nuances.795 The immigration of Muslims to Québec followed the same 
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waves: a small first wave made up of male, unskilled workers; a second, post-war wave of 
students and professionals; and a third wave consisting of religiously visible differentiated 
families, as Abu-Laban labels them. There were also two distinct waves of Muslim immigration 
to Québec that overlapped with these general patterns found in the rest of the country. First, pre-
Quiet Revolution Québec, not unlike the rest of the country at that time, was only interested in 
certain kinds of immigrant groups taking up residence in the province. While in the rest of the 
country immigration before the implementation of the point system was often influenced by 
desires for certain ethnic groups, the Québécois government was not interested in any 
immigration before the 1960s.796 As Joseph Carens argues, Pre-Quiet Revolution immigrants 
were seen as threats to the closed communal identity that existed at the time in Québec, an 
identity that was imagined as rural, French, and Catholic.797 With the implementation of the 
point system of immigration in 1967, and the reimagining of communal identity in Post-Quiet 
Revolution Québec, the immigration pattern to this province changed. Instead of seeing 
immigrants as a threat to communal identity, these communities were now seen as full of 
potential to aide in the nationalist endeavour; francophone immigrants were seen as a potential 
support to the French-Québécois identity rather than a threat. So, there was a change in “type” of 
immigrant to Québec post-1960. Like the rest of the country, the immigrants who were arriving 
in Québec after 1967 were from a relatively high socio-economic status, they were able to gain 
Canadian citizenship relatively quickly, and immigration was seen as central to nation 
building.798 While there were similarities present at this time between Québec and the rest of 
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Canada, there were some important distinctions that arose at this time, and were only solidified 
by the Canada-Québec Accord on Immigration in 1991. 
Because of the new way of viewing immigration after the 1960s, Québec became 
interested in gaining control over the immigration to the province. Growing out of the concern to 
make sure that the distinct society that was growing out of the fertile soil of the Quiet Revolution 
was nourished and not trampled under foot, the Québec government focused on better selection 
and integration of immigrants in the province. Not only would immigration strengthen the 
developing Québécois economy but it had the potential to bolster the population of French 
speakers in the province, thus enhancing the francophone nature of Québec society.799 To reach 
these goals, though, Québec needed more say in the processes of selecting and integrating 
immigrants—hence the establishment of the Canada-Québec Accord. As stated in the Accord 
itself, “in order to meet the needs and the particular situation of Québec” the Accord covers  
the selection of persons who wish to reside permanently or temporarily in Québec, their 
admission into Canada, their integration into Québec society, and the determination of 
levels of immigration to Québec.800  
 
While the federal government maintains control over family reunification and refugee 
immigration, Québec gains complete control over the selection within the economic immigration 
category and hence can give high priority to French-speaking immigrants.801 Not only does 
Québec gain control over the selection of immigrants but it also gains control of the programs 
and policies in place to aid in the integration of immigrants to the province. Integration programs 
can also be streamlined to support the acquisition and development of French. 
 
6.3.2.1 Language 
The stress placed on language is one of the two significant distinctions between Québec’s 
approach to immigration and that of the rest of Canada, specifically as it relates to the “skilled 
worker” category of immigration. While in the rest of Canada one gains equal points for 
knowledge of French or English as a skilled worker,802 Québec gives the principal applicant 16 
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points for oral and written knowledge of French and only 6 points for knowledge of English.803 
Additionally, in Québec if the spouse of the applicant also knows French then an extra 6 points 
are awarded, while there are no extra points given if the spouse has a knowledge of English.804 
These factors make a clear statement about Québec’s self-understanding as a political 
community: French is at the heart of its understanding of itself as a distinct society.805 Because 
permanent residents have the ability, and right, to leave the province into which they initially 
immigrate, there have to be specific policies in place that help in the retention of the immigrant 
community. For Québec, emphasizing French language in the immigrant community makes 
leaving the French-speaking province to resettle elsewhere in Canada a more difficult task for 
those who only have knowledge of this official language and not English. This emphasis on 
French helps to keep the immigrants that the province spent so much time and money on 
bringing to Québec in the province. According to Carens, to make sure that immigrants in the 
province add to the Francophone society and do not detract from it, 
Québec should increase the proportion of French speakers among the immigrants, should 
improve French-language training for others, should strengthen the position of French as 
a common language and the language of public life, and should ensure that the 
francophone community is open to the “full participation of people of different 
origins.”806 
 
So not only are the numbers of French speaking immigrants increased, but the kinds of language 
training and support that exists in Québec for immigrants is completely geared toward the French 
language. 
According to Turgeon and Bilodeau, the historical tendency, especially before the 1960s, 
was for immigrants in Québec to adopt English over French. This tendency occurred for two 
reasons. First, English was seen as the language of upward mobility and business in North 
America. So it was the smarter choice for immigrants socially and economically. Second, pre-
Quiet Revolution nationalism in Québec was not welcoming of outsiders and thus immigrants 
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offered	equal	points	for	either	language	(26).	
804	“Permanent	Workers:	Selection	Factors.”	
805	Carens,	“Immigration,”	29.	
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were encouraged, specifically by the Catholic school system, to attend English schools.807 
Thanks to the policies and practices in place in Québec since the Canada-Québec Accord that I 
have outlined above, this trend is changing and the situation is now drastically different. Instead 
of choosing English, “in 2006, for the first time in history, the majority of allophones (51 
percent) in Québec tended to use French at home.”808 It would appear that the efforts to 
encourage the French-speaking nature of Québec society through immigration policies and 
procedures are working. 
 
6.3.2.2 Immigrant Origins 
This emphasis on French immigration and integration policies leads directly to the second major 
distinction between Québec and the rest of Canada, namely, the origins of immigrants in the 
province. While in the rest of Canada the linguistic and ethnic background of its immigrant 
communities are vast and varied, in Québec the majority of immigrants come from French-
speaking countries. For example, in Québec between 2006 and 2011, as reported in the NHS, the 
five most important national sources of recent immigration were Algeria (9 percent of all recent 
immigrants), Morocco (8.2 percent), France (7.6 percent), Haiti (6.6 percent) and China (5.1 
percent); Tunisia provided 1.9 percent of immigration during these years.809 When examining the 
overall immigrant population in Québec, not just those “recent” immigrants who arrived between 
2006 and 2011, this pattern is also evident. The five most significant countries of origin for all 
immigrants in Québec according to the 2011 NHS are Haiti (7.1 percent), France (6.9 percent), 
Italy (5.9 percent), Morocco (5 percent) and Algeria (4.9 percent).810 It is clear that immigrants 
are being sought out and are in fact coming to Québec from French-speaking nations.811  
This trend has a direct impact on the immigration of Muslims to Québec, as North Africa 
serves as one of the most significant pools from which immigrants come to Québec. In the 1960s 
as Québec was re-envisioning itself, Maghrébine immigration was sought after by Québec 
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(one	quarter)	of	all	immigrants	come	from	Algeria	or	Morocco,	in	Québec	Algeria	and	Morocco	account	for	roughly	
10	percent.		
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because it fulfilled all the check boxes for ideal immigrant groups, i.e. educated, professional, 
urban, francophone, and familiar with Western life, thanks to the French colonial presence. In 
fact, “le mariage entre les immigrants maghrébines et le Québec avait tout pour marcher.”812 It is 
worthy of note that in the beginning of Maghrébine migration to Québec, Maghrébines were seen 
as the ideal immigrant community; a situation that might be viewed differently today under new 
feelings of Islamophobia in the West and the rise of militant forms of Islam around the globe. 
While the countries of the Maghreb are not entirely made up of Muslims and, as a result, one 
cannot argue that all Maghrébines migrating to Québec are Muslim, one can make a fairly strong 
case that the majority would be. For example, Castel argues that if one simply looks at 
immigrants coming from Algeria, 82 to 85 percent of Algerians in Québec are Muslim.813 One 
can imagine similar percentages from Morocco and Tunisia.814 In fact, according to McAndrew 
and Bakhshaei, North African Muslims make up 60 percent of all Muslim immigrants to 
Québec.815 This in turn leads to a significant North African Muslim community in Québec, and 
considering that most immigrants to Québec settle in the region of Montréal, this community is 
mostly located there. According to Oakes and Warren, if we look at 2004 as an example, “nearly 
86 percent of new arrivals settled in the greater metropolitan region of Montréal.”816 Castel’s 
work on Algerian immigrants to Québec supports this by stating that out of 13,545 
“Québécois(es) d’origines Algériennes” 12,615 (93 percent) live in the Montréal region.817 
Furthermore, 80 percent of specifically North African Muslim immigrants live in Montréal 
according to McAndrew and Bakhshaei.818 Finally, if one looks at the 2011 NHS, 9.6 percent of 
																																																						
812	“The	marriage	between	Maghrébine	immigrants	and	Québec	had	everything	to	work”	(Castel,	“Mariage,”	232).	
813	Castel,	“Mariage,”	201.	
814	There	is	a	significant	Jewish	cohort	amongst	the	Moroccan	immigrant	community.	
815	McAndrew	and	Bakhshaei,	“Difficult	Integration,”	938.	
816	Oakes	and	Warren,	Language,	134.	
817	Castel,	“Mariage,”	224.	
818	McAndrew	and	Bakhshaei,	“Difficult	Integration,”	938.	In	their	article,	McAndrew	and	Bakhsahei	explain	the	
actual	and	projected	numbers	of	Muslims	in	Québec.	They	explain	that,	according	to	the	“2001	census,	the	last	one	
to	include	questions	on	religion,	more	than	100,000	informants	claimed	to	be	of	Islamic	faith,	which	amounted	to	
1.5	percent	of	the	Québec	population.	Although	still	low,	this	figure	showed	a	major	increase	of	141	percent	since	
1991.	Moreover,	taking	into	account	the	annual	intake	of	immigrants	from	Muslim	countries,	it	is	estimated	that	
by	2011,	the	number	of	Muslim	immigrants	had	almost	doubled	(to	around	180,000),	while	Statistics	Canada	
predicts	that	by	2031,	there	will	be	more	than	half	a	million	Muslims	in	Québec,	representing	11	percent	of	the	
total	Québec	population”	(937-938).	In	the	2011	NHS,	3.15	percent	of	the	total	population	of	Québec	was	Muslim	
(243,430	people	checked	this	box).	This	is	above	the	predicted	amount	presented	in	McAndrew	and	Bakhshaei.	
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the population in Montréal reported Islam as their religious affiliation.819 All of these studies 
taken together give the picture of a significant North African Muslim community concentrated 
on and around the island of Montréal. 
 
6.3.2.3 Maghrébine Immigration to Québec 
It is clear why Québec wanted immigrants to come from the Maghreb, but it is important to 
understand why immigrants from the Maghreb wanted to come to Québec. Looking at Algeria as 
a case study we can see some of the clear reasons why immigrants from the Maghreb were 
choosing to not only leave their country of origin but also why they were selecting Québec over 
France. In his chapter in Louis Rousseau’s Le Québec après Bouchard-Taylor: Les identités 
religieuses de l’immigration, Castel presents seven socio-historical conditions to take into 
account for why Algerians have migrated to Québec over the years.820  
First, the war of independence in Algeria in the 1960s, as I discussed in Chapter 2, leads 
to complicated relations between Algeria and France. So those immigrants who wanted to leave 
Algeria for a variety of reasons could choose Québec to stay in a French speaking location but 
not have to move to the country from which they were trying to gain independence.  
Second, the Algerian revolution that comes out of the war of independence leads to 
nationalist fervour and an Arabization of Algeria. For those not interested in either of these 
trends, migration to Québec becomes an attractive option. During these first two time frames, the 
Algerians who were migrating to Québec were mostly workers who came to aid in the 
construction of major projects like James Bay and the Olympic stadium.821  
The third socio-historical condition was the Berber Spring and the social crisis of the 
1980s. During this time frame the immigrant population was mostly university students,822 
seeking a North American style education.  
Fourth, and highly important, is the Black Decade, i.e. the 1990s. During this time a 
massive civil war occurred in Algeria where, between 1992 and 1997, 100,000 to 150,000 lives 
were lost.823 At this time, the type of immigration changes slightly, and while there are still 
																																																						
819	“NHS	Focus	on	Geography	Series:	Montréal,”	Statistics	Canada,	last	modified	23	October	2015,	
http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/2011/as-sa/fogs-spg/Pages/FOG.cfm?lang=E&level=4&GeoCode=2466023.		
820	Castel,	“Mariage,”	203-208.	
821	Castel,	“Mariage,”	210.	
822	Ibid.,	210.	
823	Ibid.,	205.	
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workers and university students migrating from the Maghreb to Québec, large numbers of 
refugees also migrate at this time. This coincides with the timing of the Canada-Québec Accord 
and Québec generally gaining more control over immigration to the province. Thus, migration 
from Algeria to Québec in the 1990s jumps from 1,130 immigrants between 1986 and 1991 to 
8,385 between 1996 and 2001.824 
The sixth and seventh socio-historical conditions that Castel highlights are the 
educational revolution and the reimagining of family structure. These two reasons lead to a 
greater desire by some Algerians to leave the country and attend school and build families in a 
North American context. Ultimately, many of the Maghrébine immigrants that made their way to 
Québec between the 1960s and 2001 were actively sought out by the Québec government and 
came to Québec out of a desire to better their, and their families’ lives in a context that allowed 
for the pursuit of what they saw as the American/Canadian dream.825 
What awaits immigrants in the host context is often not perfectly aligned with the 
expectations they have before their migration, and the migration process itself has large effects 
on the way of life for these immigrants. For example, while many North African immigrants 
were sought after by the Québec ministry of immigration because of their strength in French and 
their educational levels, when they arrive in Québec they often found that these two factors did 
not help them in gaining employment in their field. Unemployment among immigrant groups is 
high,826 and this trend is reflected in the situation of Maghrébine immigrants in Québec. In fact, 
unemployment among immigrants in Québec is higher than the Canadian average for 
immigrants. According to McAndrew and Bakhshaei, “the unemployment rate for recent 
immigrants (five to ten years) to Québec is almost double that of Canada overall.”827 They argue, 
convincingly so, that this higher proportion of unemployment is directly linked to the fact that 
immigrants in Québec are sought after for the knowledge of French, and yet the labour market in 
																																																						
824	Ibid.,	210.	
825	This	was	reflected	in	my	informant	group.	Many	of	the	people	with	whom	I	spoke	commented	on	coming	to	
Canada	because	they	were	directly	recruited	by	a	government	official	in	their	country	of	origin.	Furthermore,	many	
people	explained	to	me	that	Canada	seemed	like,	and	was	promised	to	be,	a	place	where	they	could	use	their	
education	and	job	experience	to	gain	a	better	situation	for	themselves	and	their	families.		
826	Jedwab,	“Economic	Integration,”	208-209.	
827	McAndrew	and	Bakhshaei,	“Difficult	Integration,”	937.	
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Québec, and in Montréal specifically, where we know most immigrants in Québec live, requires 
bilingual skills.828  
Beyond the struggle for employment, migration to the Québec/Montréal context can 
colour the daily experience of immigrants in other ways. Unlike in France, where 
communautarisme among the Maghrébine Muslim community is common based on the 
immigration patterns and trends to the country, North African Muslim immigrants in Québec do 
not live in ghettos. Although there is a “Petit Maghreb” in Montréal, this is not actually where 
Maghrébines live in large numbers. Instead, Maghrébine Muslim immigrants live throughout the 
region, with slightly higher concentrations (one out of ten people) living in the neighbourhoods 
“d’Ahuntsic-Cartierville, de Villeray-Saint-Michel-Parc-Extension, de Côte-des-Neiges-Notre-
Dame-de-Grace, et de Saint-Léonard.”829 As argued by Castel, 
si la société d’accueil québécoise, dans le cadre de sa réalité métropolitaine, ne manifeste 
pas de tendance à engendrer des ghettos (Manai et Richard, 2010, p.52), les arabo-
musulmans Québécois n’ont pas davantage tendance à former d’enclaves.830 
 
Unlike the situation in Paris, Maghrébine Muslims in Montréal do not face real issues of physical 
communautarisme.  
This lack of geographic concentration often means that there is regular interaction with 
“the other” on a daily basis, a tendency that my informants spoke about frequently. They tended 
to live in apartment buildings or neighbourhoods that consisted of families of diverse identities, 
including long-standing, or “pure laine” Québécois(es). While North African Muslim immigrants 
in Québec are already dealing with the fact of moving from a Muslim milieu to a non-Muslim 
milieu, the fact that there are no real concentrated communities in Montréal leads to a heightened 
feeling of living outside of a Muslim context and perhaps to a heightened feeling of the need to 
practice one’s tradition, as we’ll see. While in the Maghreb, practicing Islam is almost inevitable, 
in Canada, and especially in Montréal where one lives outside of a religious enclave, practicing 
Islam becomes intentional.831 All that being said, according to Milot and Venditti the Muslim 
culture of the Maghreb is one of “Islam à la carte,” meaning that depending on the country, the 
																																																						
828	Ibid.,	937.	
829	Castel,	“Mariage,”	224.	
830	Ibid.,	227.	“If	the	Québec	host	society,	in	its	metropolitan	reality,	does	not	show	a	tendency	to	create	
ghettos…Arab	Muslim	Québécois	do	not	have	a	greater	tendency	to	form	enclaves.”	
831	I	address	this	trend	in	chapters	7	and	8.	
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region, the ethno-cultural group, etcetera, immigrants will privilege certain practices over 
others.832 As a result, Maghrébine Muslim immigrants in Montréal may be “more practicing,” 
but what that “practicing” actually looks like may vary to quite a large extent. This flexibility of 
“necessary practice” becomes all the more important in a post-Quiet Revolution Québec where 
the relationship between church and state, and the resultant opinion of religion, is especially 
complicated. 
 
6.4 The History of Church/State Relations in Québec: Quiet Revolution, Laïcité, 
Interculturalism and the Bouchard-Taylor Commission 
 
Québec has a distinct approach to secularism and a unique understanding of (often labelled, 
rejection of) Canadian multiculturalism that creates a distinctive setting within which 
Maghrébine Muslim immigrants live. To understand Québec’s version of laïcité and the 
province’s unique policy of interculturalism, it is essential to explore the history of church and 
state relations in the province. What is it about this history that leads to a strong rejection of 
religion in the public sphere, albeit “softer” than in France, and to a general discomfort with 
particular kinds of religious expression? Furthermore, how does this history influence Québec’s 
approach to multiculturalism, namely, interculturalism? Specifically, how does the province’s 
relationship to “the church” influence the Québec side of the intercultural coin? 
The history of the relationship between church and state in Québec is similar to that of 
France, but simply more recent.833 Eid states that, similar to France, the Catholic Church, before 
the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, “exerted a profound influence over most institutions, both in 
the private and public spheres.”834 Eid goes on to explain how, before the Quiet Revolution in 
Québec, culture was deeply rooted in religion and it “was impossible to think of the French-
																																																						
832	Milot	and	Venditti,	“C’est	au	Québec,”	241-293.	
833	Concerning	Church-State	Relations	in	Pre-Quiet	Revolution	Québec,	see:	Adams,	Unlikely	Utopia;	Michael	D.	
Behiels,	Prelude	to	Québec’s	Quiet	Revolution:	Liberalism	Versus	Neo-Nationalism,	1945-1960	(Montréal:	McGill-
Queen’s	University	Press,	1985);	Dickinson	and	Young,	A	Short	History	of	Québec—specifically	Chapter	7,	Church,	
State	and	Women	in	Capitalist	Society,	1890s-1930s”	and	8,	“From	Depression	to	Quiet	Revolution”;	and	Eid,	Being	
Arab.	
834	Eid,	Being	Arab,	xi.	
	 252	
Canadian and Catholic identities as separate entities.”835 Even the provincial party in control of 
Québec between 1944 and 1960, the Union Nationale under the leadership of Maurice Duplessis, 
was strongly aligned with the Catholic clergy.836 The government and the church supported one 
another in their efforts and made it almost impossible to take control away from both powers 
until Duplessis died in 1959. While Duplessis’ tenure as premier was seen as the “La Grande 
Noirceur (The Great Darkness)”837 by liberals, similar to that of the Dark Ages before 
Modernization, many also viewed it as a time of religious and cultural purity in Québec. 
Duplessis’ efforts to suppress many modernizing forces in Québec throughout his years as 
premier actually added fuel to the fire to modernize in Québec, and after a couple of new leaders 
tried to take over the Union Nationale after Duplessis’ death, the Liberal party, under the 
leadership of Jean Lesage, was elected, and thus began the Quiet Revolution—normally viewed 
as the large push in the province to modernize and secularize. As Eid states, “within less than 
twenty years, the close ties between Québec’s Roman Catholic Church and the state had largely, 
if not completely, been severed.”838 This severing is normally viewed as being a direct result of 
the Quiet Revolution, to which we now turn. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
835	Eid,	Being	Arab,	33.	Michael	Adams	in	his	work	Unlikely	Utopia	also	makes	the	connection	between	pre-Quiet	
Revolution	Pure	Laine	Québécois	identity	and	Roman	Catholicism.	He	argues	that	to	be	“Pure	Laine	Québécois(e)”	
at	this	time	was	to	be	both	French	and	Catholic	(114).	
836	Donald	Cuccioletta	and	Martin	Lubin,	“The	Quiet	Revolution:	A	Noisy	Evolution,”	Québec	Studies,	vol.	36	(Fall	
2003/Winter	2004):	127.	
837	Adams,	Utopia,	113;	Mann,	Dream	of	Nation,	298.	
838	Eid,	Being	Arab,	xi.		
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6.4.1 Three Approaches to the Quiet Revolution839 
While the majority of people view the Quiet Revolution as the moment when the province 
removed education, health care and social services from the hands of the Catholic Church, there 
are other factors that were at work and influence what we now label the Quiet Revolution. There 
have been many works written on the Quiet Revolution and its many aspects; I focus on 
Gauvreau’s categorization of the ways of viewing this event/process, as he provides a summary 
of the various approaches that others have taken. He suggests that in general the Quiet 
Revolution has been described by most historians as at base  
a series of political reforms undertaken by the Liberal government of Premier Jean 
Lesage between 1960-1966. In a larger sense, these historians apply the term to the 
period extending from 1960-1980, an era which they maintain was characterized by “the 
triumph of neo-liberalism and neo-nationalism.”840  
 
While these are the simplest ways of describing what constitutes the Quiet Revolution, Gauvreau 
goes on to suggest that there are two historiographical currents that dominate the understanding 
of what actually happened during the Quiet Revolution. These two currents are (1) the orthodox 
liberal, and (2) the revisionist. I add Gauvreau’s own work to this categorization and label his 
approach as (3) the modern Catholic approach.841 Briefly, according to Gauvreau, the orthodox 
																																																						
839	For	various	overviews	and	approaches	to	the	Quiet	Revolution,	see:	Yves	Bélanger,	R.	Comeau	and	C.	Métiver,	
eds.,	La	Révolution	tranquille:	40	ans	plus	tard,	un	bilan	(Montréal:	VLB,	2000);	Claude	Couture,	Le	mythe	de	la	
modernization	du	Québec	(Montréal:	Editions	du	Meridien,	1991);	Cuccioletta	and	Lubin,	“The	Quiet	Revolution”—
Cuccioletta	and	Lubin	argue	that	modernity,	while	given	a	push	by	the	Quiet	Revolution	was	already	well	underway	
prior	to	it;	Dickinson	and	Young,	A	Short	History	of	Québec—specifically	Chapter	9,	“The	Quiet	Revolution”;	Pierre	
Fortin,	“Québec’s	Quiet	Revolution,	50	Years	Later,”	Inroads:	A	Journal	of	Opinion,	vol.	29	(Summer	2011):	90-99;	
Alain	G.	Gagnon	and	Mary	Beth	Montcalm,	Québec,	Beyond	the	Quiet	Revolution	(Scarborough,	ON:	Nelson	
Canada,	1990);	Alain	G.	Gagnon	and	Michel	Sarra-Bournet	eds.,	Duplessis:	Entre	la	grande	noirceur	et	la	société	
libérale	(Montréal:	Editions	Québec	Amerique,	1997);	Michael	Gauvreau,	The	Catholic	Origins	of	Québec’s	Quiet	
Revolution,	1931-1970	(Montréal:	McGill-Queen’s	University	Press,	2005)—Gauvreau	categorization	of	the	
approaches	to	the	QR	is	what	I	will	be	primarily	using	in	this	section;	Jocelyn	Létourneau,	“Transmettre	la	
révolution	tranquille,”	in	La	Révolution	tranquille:	un	bilan,	eds.	Yves	Bélanger,	R.	Comeau	and	C.	Métiver	
(Montréal:	VLB,	2000),	79-88;	Mann,	Dream	of	Nation,	specifically	Chapter	19,	“Noisy	Evolution,”	where	Mann	
shows	that	the	Québec	government	of	the	1960s	during	the	Quiet	Revolution	“appropriated	the	strength	of	three	
key	institutions	that	had	gone	into	the	making	of	French	Canada:	religion,	language	and	the	family”	(301),	thus	
establishing	a	strong	basis	for	nationalism;	Fernand	Ouellet,	“La	révolution	tranquille,	tournant	révolutionnaire?”	
in	Les	Années	Trudeau,	La	recherche	d’une	société	juste,	eds.	T.S.	Axworthy,	and	P.E.	Trudeau	(Montréal:	Le	Jour,	
1990),	333-362;	Gilles	Paquet,	Oublier	la	Révolution	Tranquille	(Montréal:	Liber,	1999);	and	Ronald	Rudin,	Faire	de	
l’histoire	au	Québec	(Sillery:	Septentrion,	1998).	
840	Gauvreau,	Catholic	Origins,	3.	
841	Gauvreau,	in	his	work	Catholic	Origin	gives	a	label	to,	and	an	overview	of,	the	first	two.		His	own	work	is	an	
example	of	the	third,	which	I	have	labelled	“modern	Catholic”	here.	So	this	categorization	is	a	combination	
between	his	and	my	own.	
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liberal view argues that the Quiet Revolution is a fight between modernization and 
traditionalism. He argues that people who hold this view see the Quiet Revolution as being at its 
base a war between a Catholic Duplessis State and the secular middle class, which ends up 
winning the battle.842 A large component of this fight is economic in nature. Since Duplessis’ 
government “maintained that solutions to social and economic problems were private rather than 
public issues,” Québec became placed on the peripheral of the North American economy.843 Add 
to that “Québec’s cultural division of labour,” i.e. that Anglophones held a “disproportionately 
large number of the province’s higher-status positions, while Francophones tended to be 
clustered in lower-paying positions,” and you have the perfect breeding ground for revolution, 
quiet or not.844 In this we see the “duopoly” that existed in the province before the Quiet 
Revolution: “Anglos ruling commerce, the Church ruling the people, and the politicians 
brokering between the two.”845 The importance of taking back the economy, from Anglophones 
and the Church, and becoming “maîtres chez nous,”846 was consequently essential in the 
revolutionary process according to many orthodox liberals. 
The second current that Gauvreau outlines in his work is the Revisionist current. Instead 
of seeing the Quiet Revolution as an abrupt break between Church and State and an abrupt 
modernization of the province, Revisionists view Québec’s state and social structure as being 
fully modern as early as the 1840s; the Quiet Revolution is only a gradual outworking of 
processes already at play.847 While it may be gradual, it still ends up in the same place as the 
orthodox liberal camp, that is, with the strict separation of church and state based on severe 
anticlericalism. 
Finally, debating against these two currents, which both firmly view Catholicism as an 
object that is being acted upon, with no agency of its own in the modernization process, 
Gauvreau suggests that there is another way to view what happened during the Quiet Revolution. 
Instead of Catholicism being the “repository of tradition” and thus innately unable to be in line 
with the modernization process at work in the province, Gauvreau suggests that for three decades 
																																																						
842	Gauvreau,	Catholic	Origin,	6.	
843	Gagnon	and	Montcalm,	Québec,	41.	
844	Ibid.,	44.	
845	Adams,	Utopia,	114.	
846	Adams,	Utopia,	113;	Gagnon	and	Montcalm,	Québec,	25.	
847	Gauvreau,	Catholic	Origin,	6.	This	is	the	stance	of	Cuccioletta	and	Lubin,	“The	Québec	Quiet	Revolution.”	
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there was a growing ideological diversity in the church that prepared it to modernize alongside 
the other institutions in Québec.848 He argues that, in fact,  
the Quiet Revolution was not, as both the “orthodox liberals” and “revisionists” have cast 
it, about the evisceration of Catholicism from Québec society and state. Rather, it was an 
attempt through a variety of institutional strategies to make Catholicism coterminous with 
aspects of modernity, and in so doing, to anchor it more firmly in Québec public 
culture.849 
 
For Gauvreau, the anticlericalism that came out of the Quiet Revolution did not equate to 
antireligious sentiment.850 One can see the possibility of a Gauvreauian view of the Quiet 
Revolution at work in the province when looking at the numbers from the 2011 NHS. As I 
mentioned above, in this survey 74.6 percent of the population of Québec identified as Roman 
Catholic.851 So, in spite of what the orthodox liberals and revisionists may want to believe about 
what happened during the Quiet Revolution, it is clear that Catholicism, as Gauvreau puts it, is 
firmly anchored in Québec public culture even fifty years after the fact—a different, more 
modern Catholicism, but Catholicism nevertheless.852 
While we may be able to see the historical possibility of the third, modern Catholic 
option, this does not remove the influence of the first two on the general public’s opinions and 
understandings of history. While it might be well intentioned and argued that the Quiet 
Revolution was not necessarily a stark break between traditional Catholicism and modern 
society, and that Catholicism itself was not the paragon of tradition but was instead engaged in 
the process of modernization on the level of lay belief and practice, the general understanding of 
history by most Québécois(es) seems to reflect the opposite. The most prevalent idea in the 
common imaginary is that of the orthodox liberal view: that the Quiet Revolution represents a 
hard fought, and abrupt, battle between the secular state and the traditional church, which 
ultimately resulted in the strict separation of church and state and the fear of any return to 
clerical/religious power. 
																																																						
848	Gauvreau,	Catholic	Origin,	7-9.	Mann	makes	a	similar	argument	in	her	work,	suggesting	that	the	“Catholic	
Church	may	even	have	given	the	state	a	helping	hand”	in	the	modernization	and	secularization	process	(301).	
849	Gauvreau,	Catholic	Origin,	12-13.	
850	Ibid.,	354.		
851	“National	Household	Survey.”	
852	Géraldine	Mossière	provides	an	overview	of	some	of	the	ways	that	Catholicism	still	exists	as	an	important	
identity	in	Québec,	but	is	also	transformed	by	religious	diversity	in	the	province	in	her	“Religion	in	Québec	and	
Otherness	at	Home:	New	Wine	in	Old	Bottles?”	Québec	Studies,	vol.	52	(Fall/Winter	2012):	95-110.	
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The closeness of this past, of the overarching power of the Catholic Church and the fight 
to gain independence from it, makes the notions of separation of church and state especially 
prevalent in Québec.  Because of this, any group that represents a challenge to this hard-fought 
separation is viewed with great suspicion, and even, hostility. It is not difficult to see how 
observant Muslims would be one such group that challenges this notion. In fact, they were 
seen as an affront to the secular and hedonistic kingdom of post-Quiet Revolution 
Québec, free at last from the iron grip of the Catholic Church. The kippa and the hijab 
and the strict sexual code of some Jews and Muslims reminded Québecers of the 
religiosity they had rejected decades ago.853  
 
So, any ethnic or religious community that is seen as a possible threat to the separation of church 
and state is seen as just that, a threat. Religious symbols, of which food can be one, in this 
context can, as a result, become political. 
The nearness of this history of battle between the church and the state in Québec is an 
important element of which to take note. Unlike in France where the death knoll of the pervasive 
power of the Catholic Church rang out over one hundred years ago,854 the end of this power in 
Québec is much more recent. Québécois(es) who were a part of this fight are still alive and still 
personally remember the power that the church once had. They remember the nuns on the street 
and in the corridors, with their headcovers and eyes pointed to the ground. Thus, the response to 
Muslim immigrants is perhaps differently motivated for Québécois(es) than for the French. 
Québécois(es) remember what it was like to be under the power of the Catholic Church and any 
group that threatens such a pervasive influence of religion over both public and private life is 
seen as a risk to a return of such an existence in Québec. This history directly impacts the 
province’s understanding of secularization and the integration of immigrants to this secular 
society. I now turn to Québec’s unique approached to both secularization and immigrant 
integration. 
 
 
 
																																																						
853	Haroon	Siddiqui,	“Muslims	and	the	Rule	of	Law,”	in	Belonging	and	Banishment:	Being	Muslim	in	Canada,	ed.	
Natasha	Bakht	(Toronto:	TSAR,	2008),	7.	
854	Bowen,	Headscarves,	21.	During	the	Third	Republic,	c.	1905	with	the	passing	of	the	law	of	separation	of	church	
and	state.	
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6.4.2 Laïcité /Interculturalism in Québec 
With a mix of influence from Canadian multiculturalism policies and France’s colonial and 
secular past, Québec provides a unique case in the debates about secularization, immigration and 
the consequent integration of immigrants. In this section I explore how Québec has interacted 
with France’s notion of laïcité, resulting in its own “laïcité à la Québécoise.” I then briefly 
address Québec’s view on Canada’s multiculturalism policy and how this too influences the 
integration of immigrant communities in this province.855 
Founded as a colony of France, the influences of French history and policy are evident in 
Québec. As mentioned above, Sharify-Funk suggests that “close historic ties with France are an 
additional influence on attitudes toward minority cultures in general, and toward Islam and 
Muslims in particular.”856 These historic ties affect what Sharify-Funk calls the “unique 
circumstances of Québec,” and she points out two factors as being particularly influential: 
France’s colonial history in North Africa and laïcité.857 She suggests that while Québec generally 
settled the secular/religious debate with the Quiet Revolution in favour of secularism, France has 
had a much more and continued “tumultuous struggle for a secular state.”858 
 
6.4.2.1 Open vs Rigid Secularism in Québec 
While some see the secular/religious debate as settled in Québec post-Quiet Revolution, the 
situation appears to be more fluid than many imagined. In fact, there seems to be a wavering, or 
																																																						
855	For	further	reading	on	laïcité/interculturalism	see:	Jean	Baubérot,	Une	laïcité	interculturelle:	Le	Québec,	avenir	
de	la	France?	(France:	Editions	de	l’Aube,	2008);	Gérard	Bouchard,	Interculturalism:	A	View	from	Québec	(Toronto:	
University	of	Toronto	Press,	2015);	Gérard	Bouchard,	“What	is	Interculturalism?”	McGill	Law	Journal,	vol.	56,	no.	2	
(2011):	395-468;	Sarah	Jean	DesRoches,	“Québec’s	Interculturalism:	Promoting	Intolerance	in	the	Name	of	
Community	Building,”	Ethics	and	Education,	vol.	9,	no.	3	(2014):	356-368—argues	that	Québec’s	interculturalism	
reinforces	intolerance	in	Québec’s	public	sphere;	Richard	Harris,	“Interculturalism,”	in	Multicultural	America:	A	
Multimedia	Encyclopedia,	ed.	Carols	E.	Cortés	(Sage	Publications,	2013);	Micheline	Milot,	“Dualisme	des	
conceptions	de	la	laïcité	au	Québec	et	en	France,”	La	revue	Tocqueville,	vol.	3,	no.	1	(2013):	17-42;	François	Rocher,	
Micheline	Labelle,	Ann-Marie	Field,	and	Jean-Claude	Icart,	Le	concept	d'interculturalisme	en	contexte	québécois:	
généalogie	d'un	néologisme	(Saint-Lazare,	QC:	Gibson	Library	Connections,	2008);	François	Rocher	and	Micheline	
Labelle,	“L'interculturalisme	comme	modèle	d'aménagement	de	la	diversité:	Compréhension	et	incompréhension	
dans	l’espace	public	Québécois,”	in	La	diversité	québécoise	en	débat:	Bouchard,	Taylor	et	les	autres,	ed.	Bernard	
Gagnon	(Montréal:	QuébecAmérique,	2010),	179-203;	Sharify-Funk,	“Governing	the	Face	Veil,”	135-163;	and	
Charles	Taylor,	“Interculturalism	or	Multiculturalism?”	Philosophy	and	Social	Criticism,	vol.	38,	4-5	(2012):	413-423.	
856	Sharify-Funk,	“Governing,”	140.		
857	Ibid.,	140.	Baubérot	agrees	with	Sharify-Funk	and	presents	a	historical	overview	of	the	influence	of	France’s	
concept	of	laïcité	on	Québec	in	his	work	Une	laïcité	interculturelle.	
858	Sharify-Funk,	“Governing,”	140.	
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even a conflict, between two different ways of being secular in the province. Adelman and Anctil 
in their work Religion, Culture and the State break down these two forms of secularization in 
Québec.859 They suggest that there is a difference between open and rigid secularism based on 
how the state prioritizes a set of four key principles that are essential to any model of 
secularization. These four principles are: (1) freedom of conscience and religion, (2) the right of 
individuals to religious and moral equality, without discrimination (direct or indirect), based on 
convictions of conscience or religious convictions, (3) separation of church and state and (4) 
state neutrality towards religion.860 According to Adelman and Anctil rigid secularism prioritizes 
the third and fourth principles over the first two and can lead to a “greater restriction of the 
practice of religion in the name of neutrality.”861 This is the model that seems to be operative in 
France. Open secularism, on the other hand, prioritizes the principles in the opposite direction 
and is “based on the protection of freedom of religion, even if this calls for the relativization of 
the principle of neutrality.”862 At the level of the state, this second, more open secularism is what 
is active in Québec.  
According to the findings of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission, which I discuss in detail 
below, there are three important characteristics of open secularism. The first is that open 
secularism is  
an institutional arrangement that is aimed at protecting rights and freedoms. State 
neutrality towards religion and separation of church and state are not seen as ends in 
themselves, but as means to achieve the fundamental twofold objective: respect for 
religious and moral equality, and freedom of conscience and religion.863 
 
In this, the Bouchard-Taylor Commission is in line with the definition of open secularism as 
outlined by Adelman and Anctil above, namely, that the first two principles of secularism are the 
goal and the second two, the means to achieve that goal.  
Second, unlike rigid secularism, which may erode religious belief in the population, open 
secularism does not “serve to neutralize or erase religion as an identity marker.”864 This is an 
																																																						
859	These	two	forms	of	secularization	are	similar	to	Fetzer	and	Soper’s	categorization	of	strict	and	soft	laïcité	in	
France	that	I	discussed	in	Chapter	2.	
860	Adelman	and	Anctil,	Religion,	Culture,	and	the	State,	87.	
861	Ibid.,	87.	
862	Ibid.,	87.	
863	Ibid.,	91.	
864	Ibid.,	91.	
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important characteristic of the form of laïcité that is present in Québec, that is only furthered by 
the policy of interculturalism which I address below.  
In an open secular state, one can maintain one’s religious identity publicly alongside 
one’s other various identities. This is because of the third characteristic of open secularism as 
found in the Bouchard-Taylor Commission, namely, that “open secularism is directed at state 
institutions but not at individuals who use these institutions or even work in them as 
employees.”865 While this idea has been challenged many times in Québec, especially with the 
proposal of Bill 60 (the Charter of Québec Values) by the Parti Québécois in 2013, Bouchard 
and Taylor highlight the importance of applying secularism to institutions and not people. It is 
these characteristics which highlight the difference between the secularism that is found in 
France and that in Québec. While in Québec, individuals can maintain their religious identities in 
public, even to the point of wearing symbols of those identities in various public institutions, in 
France the importance of state neutrality over individual rights is stressed. We can see an 
example of this in the ban on headscarves in public schools in France. 
 
6.4.2.2 Québécois Interculturalism 
Baubérot furthers the discussion of French versus Québécois laïcité and posits that the Québec 
model of laïcité both deviates from and moves closer to the French model. It is the interaction of 
laïcité with Québec’s interculturalism that makes it distinct and Baubérot suggests that 
Québécois laïcité is “une laïcité interculturelle.”866 It is the crisis of reasonable accommodation 
which will be looked back upon as the key moment in the constructions of such an intercultural 
laïcité.867  
Before exploring the intercultural side of this laïcité, it is important to briefly address the 
multiculturalism against which it is pitted in the rest of Canada. While rigid laïcité encourages 
the suppression of cultural diversity, multiculturalism in Canada has the exact opposite goal in 
mind. In fact, according to Karim, Canada “is the only one (country) to have a law recognizing 
the cultural diversity of its population.”868 The multicultural character of Canada allows ethnic, 
																																																						
865	Adelman	and	Anctil,	Religion,	91.	
866	Baubérot,	Laïcité	interculturelle,	233.	I	explore	this	intercultural	laïcité	below,	when	discussing	interculturalism	
in	Québec.	
867	Baubérot,	Laïcité	interculturelle,	248.	
868	Karim	“Crescent	Dawn,”	268.	
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racial, religious identities to not only be recognized but to have an active role in the Canadian 
public sphere. It follows that Canada’s multiculturalism policy prevents strict laïcité from being a 
viable policy option.  
Multiculturalism has some potential negative connotations for minorities. By allowing 
different groups to maintain their unique identities, multiculturalism, according to Cesari and 
McLoughlin, “reinforces the exceptionality of Muslim immigrants without providing them with a 
means for real social advancement.”869 This is only one of the many potential drawbacks of 
multiculturalism, outlined by critics of the policy.  
According to Leroux, Québec has six reasons for rejecting multiculturalism.870 The 
second half of these critiques is the most important for the purposes of this study.871 These 
unique rejections come from the idea that (1) multiculturalism is a political strategy to neutralize 
the Québécois identity, i.e. to put it on level playing field with all other ethnic identities in the 
country, and consequently not recognize its place as a founding nation,872 (2) multiculturalism is 
a “post-national ideology that challenges the relative hegemony of any national group,” and (3) 
multiculturalism is alien to Québec’s own model of cultural pluralism.873 
Whereas multiculturalism restricts the kind of secularization that is viable in most of 
Canada, Québec’s approach to multiculturalism, different from the rest of the nation according to 
many in Québec, results in a different working out of secularization and leaves open the door for 
the possibility of a unique laïcité to be at work in the province. Eid in his work on Arabs in 
Montréal elucidates this difference:  
whereas Canadian multiculturalism pursues a politics of recognition of cultural 
differences, Québec’s politics of immigration attempts to achieve a difficult balance 
between two objectives: accommodating cultural diversity while integrating ethnic 
minorities in the French-speaking community.874  
 
																																																						
869	Cesari	and	McLoughlin,	European	Muslims,	3.	
870	Darryl	Leroux,	“Québec	Nationalism	and	the	Production	of	Difference:	The	Bouchard-Taylor	Commission,	the	
Herouxville	Code	of	Conduct,	and	Québec’s	Immigrant	Integration	Policy,”	Québec	Studies	49	(Spring/Summer	
2010):	109.	
871	The	first	three	critiques	that	Leroux	outlines	are	common	critiques	of	multiculturalism.	These	are	that	(1)	
multiculturalism	is	seen	as	being	an	elite	discourse,	coming	from	above	(something	that	Québec	firmly	rejected	
with	the	Quiet	Revolution),	(2)	multiculturalism	is	held	up	as	an	ethical	norm,	and	(3)	that	it	is	pushed	as	a	
historical	necessity.	(Leroux,	2010,	109).	
872	This	critique	is	also	highlighted	in	Tim	Nieguth	and	Aurélie	Lacassagne,	“Contesting	the	Nation:	Reasonable	
Accommodation	in	Rural	Québec,”	Canadian	Political	Science	Review	3,	no.	1	(2009):	13.	
873	Leroux,	“Québec	Nationalism,”	109.	
874	Eid,	Being	Arab,	189.	
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To achieve this balance the Québec government adopt a policy of interculturalism. 
Sharify-Funk states that “multiculturalism has always been contested in the province of 
Québec,” because of the fear of the “erosion and eventual erasure of Francophone identity and 
culture.”875 Rather than a policy which protects various identities, the French view 
multiculturalism as a policy which in facts endangers identity. To protect the Québécois identity 
that is seen as possibly under threat by the multicultural model the policy of interculturalism 
tends to be preferred in Québec. Sharify-Funk effectively lays out the differences between 
multiculturalism and interculturalism in her article analyzing the Bouchard-Taylor report. She 
states that, 
while both ideals are founded in the ideal of pluralism, they differ in that multiculturalism 
allows difference to exist side by side (which, in its worst form, may lead to 
ghettoization), while interculturalism assumes that people of different cultures will 
interact with, and be transformed by, encounters with each other while maintaining some 
basic social values.876  
 
Those who immigrate to Québec, or who are part of an ethnic or linguistic minority group, then 
are expected to adopt a Québécois identity while at the same time maintaining their many and 
various other identities which are respected in a country such as Canada. Interculturalism 
respects differences and accommodates pluralism but expects a common culture to be promoted 
and maintained in the province.877  
What is the base of the promoted common culture? Language. According to Adelman and 
Anctil, while multiculturalism is allegedly language blind, interculturalism is language bound.878 
While language is often seen as the most significant characteristic of the common culture, Gérard 
Bouchard presents seven components of Québec interculturalism as “integrative pluralism,” of 
																																																						
875	Sharify-Funk,	“Governing,”	140.	
876	Sharify-Funk,	“Muslims	and	the	Politics	of	“Reasonable	Accommodation,”	543-544.	Both	multiculturalism	and	
interculturalism	are	ideals,	which	are	often	more	similar	to	the	other	than	their	proponents	might	argue.	The	key	
difference	is	that,	on	the	whole,	intercultural	Québec	and	its	resultant	culture	is	less	diverse	than	the	rest	of	
multicultural	Canada.	This	means	that	the	“transformation”	as	Sharify-Funk	calls	it,	or	the	“accommodation”	that	
must	take	place	in	Québec	for	members	of	minority	communities	is	clearer	and	more	straightforward.	As	Charles	
Taylor	suggests	in	his	foreword	to	Bouchard’s	Interculturalism:	A	View	from	Québec,	interculturalism	is	best	suited	
to	a	context	where	there	is	a	historic	cultural	majority.	As	I	note	below,	Québec	has	a	clear	cultural	majority	(with	
70%	of	Québecois	claiming	French	ancestry,	speaking	the	French	language	and	having	family	heritage	in	Québec,	
which	makes	it	distinct	from	the	situation	outside	of	Québec	which	is	much	more	diverse	in	ancestry,	language	and	
heritage.	
877	Oakes	and	Warren,	Language,	41.	
878	Adelman	and	Anctil,	Religion,	4.	
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which language is only one.879 Those seven components are: (1) “respect for rights, in a spirit of 
democracy and pluralism”; (2) “promotion of French as the main language of civic life and 
shared culture”; (3) consideration of the Québec nation as made up of (a) a francophone majority 
and (b) ethnocultural minorities; (4) an emphasis on integration; (5) “promotion of interactions, 
rapprochement and intercultural exchanges as means of integration”; (6) the development of a 
shared culture with contributions from the majority culture and minority cultures; and (7) “the 
promotion of a Québec identity, sense of belonging, and national culture” made up of the 
majority culture, the minority cultures and the shared culture mentioned above.880 
Interculturalism is at its foundation, tolerance and respect for differences within a French 
language setting.881 What is noteworthy is that, although language is considered the crux of the 
common culture in Québec, the crisis of reasonable accommodation which erupted in the mid-
2000s was not based primarily on language accommodations, but on religious ones. 
 
6.4.2.3 The Bouchard-Taylor Commission 
As Québec’s official policy with regard to cultural pluralism, interculturalism gets clarified and 
made more specific through the reasonable accommodation debates and the Bouchard-Taylor 
Commission.882 This commission was meant to clarify exactly what is reasonable 
accommodation and how this process was being worked out in intercultural Québec. The call for 
the commission, and the need for clarification of reasonable accommodation and 
interculturalism, came out of a series of events that were reported in the media throughout 2006 
and into early 2007. These included but were not limited to, a young girl wearing a hijab to play 
soccer, requests for worship spaces in public facilities, a young Sikh man wearing a kirpan to 
school, requests for separate swimming times in public pools to accommodate gender 
segregation, and a YMCA in the Montréal neighbourhood of Outremont tinting its windows at 
																																																						
879	Bouchard,	Interculturalism:	View	from	Québec,	32.	
880	Bouchard,	Interculturalism:	View	from	Québec,	32-33.	
881	Leroux,	“Québec	Nationalism,”	107.	
882	For	further	explorations	of	the	Bouchard-Taylor	Commission	and	its	effect	see:	Adelman	and	Anctil,	Religion,	
Culture,	and	the	State;	Gérard	Bouchard	and	Charles	Taylor,	Building	the	Future:	A	Time	for	Reconciliation,	Report	
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Les	identités	religieuses	de	l’immigration,	ed.	Louis	Rousseau	(Québec,	QC:	Presses	de	l’Université	du	Québec,	
2012),	1-32;	and	Sharify-Funk,	“Muslims,”	535-553.	
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the request of the Hasidic Jewish community across the street.883 The final straw came with the 
infamous town of Herouxville introducing its town charter. Despite being 100 percent French 
speaking, 96 percent Catholic and with no Muslims, Jews or Sikhs living there at the time, the 
town introduced a code of behaviour for immigrants that included forbidding women from being 
stoned, carrying a weapon to school, and covering one’s face.884 The media representation and 
public opinion around these events led people to believe that society had perhaps “gone too far” 
in accommodating immigrant communities in the province.885  
Although the accommodation crisis was mostly a crisis of perception,886 it none the less 
led premier Jean Charest to appoint a two-man commission to investigate the issue of reasonable 
accommodation in Québec; this would become known as the Bouchard-Taylor commission.887 
After ten months, more than 900 briefs and more than 240 testimonies during 31 days of public 
hearings, Bouchard and Taylor found that in general Québec was doing alright with the issue of 
reasonable accommodation and that the perceived increase in accommodation cases was just 
that, a perception.888 In fact, when considering the French definition of “accommodement,” 
negotiations which use compromise and goodwill, the commission found that on the ground 
“accommodements” were already happening, and that these “issues were easily resolved if left to 
the good sense of the Québécois within civil society.”889  
Curiously, the Bouchard-Taylor Commission itself may have led to an increase in anxiety 
about, and resistance to, “other” cultures. A study conducted by Leger Marketing for the 
Association of Canadian Studies one year after the Bouchard-Taylor commission showed that 40 
percent of Francophones viewed non-Christian immigrants as a threat to Québec society, 
compared to 32 percent in 2007.890 Furthermore, and especially relevant to this study, only 40 
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to	the	French	language	that	is	thought	to	be	at	the	base	of	the	common	culture.	
884	Jasmin	Zine,	“Unsettling	the	Nation:	Gender,	Race	and	Muslim	Cultural	Politics	in	Canada,”	in	Islam	in	the	
Hinterlands:	Muslim	Cultural	Politics	in	Canada,	ed.	Jasmin	Zine	(Vancouver:	University	of	British	Columbia	Press,	
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885	Sharify-Funk,	“Muslims,”	538.	
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888	Adelman	and	Anctil,	Religion,	31.	
889	Ibid.,	114.	
890	Adelman	and	Anctil,	Religion,	100.	Language	is	a	significant	factor	in	this.	While	the	Leger	study	showed	an	
increase	in	anxiety	and	resistance	among	Francophone	Québécois(es),	non-Francophones	showed	significantly	
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percent of Francophones had a positive attitude toward Muslims (down from 57 percent before 
the Bouchard-Taylor Commission).891 In light of these hesitations or perceptions, one may 
expect an increase in negative behaviours towards members of minority groups, especially 
Muslims, in Québec. But instead, the Bouchard-Taylor Commission found that one’s belief and 
one’s practices are not always in line. In fact, “one might carry negative stereotypes about a 
group as an abstraction that shapes your attitudes, but in day-to-day practice, those attitudes do 
not affect behaviour.”892 So, although the majority Francophone culture may report some 
negative perceptions of some minority immigrant groups, particularly Muslims, the situation on 
the ground is often one of cordial relations between neighbours, especially if those neighbours 
speak French. 
Keeping all of these intricacies of the Québec setting in mind, Malak suggests that, 
“despite its acknowledged imperfections, Canada remains the best space and environment for 
Muslim culture and identity to flourish in a pluralist, secular state.”893 While Muslims, and other 
immigrants, in Québec must integrate amidst some deeply held political and social policies, there 
are also policies that are in place to allow these immigrants perhaps more of an opportunity than 
in a country such as France, to create and live out a “Québécois Islam”—as long as “Islam du 
Québec” strengthens, rather than weakens, the French-speaking national identity.  
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
smaller	numbers.	For	example,	in	regards	to	non-Christian	immigrants,	only	thirty-two	present	of	non-
francophones	harboured	the	same	fears	as	francophones,	and	this	was	a	decline	from	thirty-four	percent	in	2007.	
Another	example	of	this	difference	between	francophone	and	non-francophones	post-Bouchard-Taylor	was	that	
“only	25	percent	of	Francophones	thought	they	had	a	responsibility	to	make	a	greater	effort	to	accept	minority	
groups’	customs,	while	74	per	cent	of	non-francophones	thought	they	should	make	a	greater	effort.”	(Adelman	
and	Anctil,	Religion,	101).	
891	Ibid.,	101.	
892	Ibid.,	104.	This	seems	to	continue	to	be	the	case	on	the	ground	in	Québec	up	until	the	introduction	of	Bill	60,	
and	moreover,	the	increase	in	sensationalized	terrorist	attacks	around	the	globe	with	the	creation	of	ISIS.	My	
fieldwork	occurred	in	a	pre-Charter	of	Québec	Values	and	pre-ISIS	Québec	and	is	reflective	more	of	the	Bouchard-
Taylor	Commission	Québec.	
893	Amin	Malak,	“Towards	a	Dialogical	Discourse	for	Canadian	Muslims,”	in	Belonging	and	Banishment:	Being	
Muslim	in	Canada,	ed.	Natasha	Bakht	(Toronto:	TSAR,	2008),	75.	
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6.5 Québécois Nationalism 
 
Starting as a colony of France, an island in a sea of British colonies, Québec has a long history of 
national identity politics and negotiations.894 The questions of “what does it mean to be 
Québécois(e)?” and “who can claim this identity?” are always at the forefront of the discussion 
in Québec. As a minority culture, trying to maintain its culture amidst the encroaching Anglo-
Canadian and Americanized cultures that surround it, is a difficult and persistent aspect of life in 
the province. While the Québec “nation” may be a minority within North America, the culture 
itself is fairly homogeneous. For example,  
in Québec, fully 70 percent of the population claim French ancestry, have French as their 
mother tongue, and have family heritage in Québec stretching back three generations or 
more. This is a province that, although diverse, has a dominant ethnic and linguistic 
majority—a “nous.”895 
 
When comparing this to the rest of Canada, which has no clear majority and is in fact made up of 
multiple minorities, there arises a different understanding to what it means to be a part of the 
“nous.” While in the rest of the country, what makes you different is what makes you part of 
“us,” there is the potential for a different working out of the national “nous” in Québec. 
According to Turgeon and Bilodeau, newcomers who speak a different language and profess a 
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different culture may be viewed as a threat to the minority nation. If one adds to that the fact that 
newcomers are more likely to express loyalty to the central state than the minority nation,896 one 
can understand the potential hesitancy to include such newcomers in the national “nous.”897 But 
what is this “nous” based on in Québec? 
 First, the very idea of a Québécois “nation” is something that must be addressed. There 
are two different possible meanings to the word nation in Québec, according to Adelman and 
Anctil. First, nation is simply the citizenry of a country of a state. One is a part of the nation if 
one has citizenship in that locale and “citizenship in its classical sense refers to certain duties and 
rights associated with one’s membership of the polity.”898 One is part of the Canadian nation 
because one is a Canadian citizen. While some may argue that Québec is, or should be, a 
separate country, with separate citizenship, most do not intend this meaning of “nation” when 
referring to Québec. It is the second definition of nation which becomes the focus in Québec, 
namely that nation can also refer to a “distinct people characterized by common descent and an 
accrued shared history that includes a common language and culture.”899 Considering the 
quotation describing the “ethnic and linguistic nous” above which clearly highlights ancestry, 
language and culture, we can assume that this second understanding of nation is what is 
generally at work in Québec.900 The Québécois people do not see themselves as citizens of a 
separate country (though many would wish that to be the case), but instead as a distinct type-two 
nation located within a type-one nation, a nation within Canada.901  
 
 
																																																						
896	Can	see	this	trend	in	my	data,	where	my	informants	claim	Canadian	identity	over	Québécois	identity.	
897	Turgeon	and	Bilodeau,	“Minority	Nations,”	317.	
898	Oakes	and	Warren,	Language,	18.	
899	Adelman	and	Anctil,	Religion,	75.	
900	We	can	see	the	first	definition	of	nation	at	work	in	the	province	when	we	examine	the	two	referenda	for	
independence	in	Québec.	In	these	referenda,	all	Québec	citizens	voted,	i.e	they	were	part	of	the	national	
community.	Other	French	Canadians	who	would	share	the	ethnic	national	identity,	as	outlined	by	Adelman	and	
Anctil,	with	Québécois	did	not	have	the	right	to	vote.	So	there	is,	or	has	been,	clearly	some	presence	of	the	first	
definition	of	national	identity	at	work	in	the	province.	
901	Jasmin	Zine,	“Introduction,”	in	Islam	in	the	Hinterlands:	Muslim	Cultural	Politics	in	Canada,	ed.	Jasmin	Zine	
(Vancouver:	University	of	British	Columbia	Press,	2012),	26.	My	data	reveals	a	complex	interaction	between	these	
two	types	of	nation	as	outlined	here	for	my	informants.	The	difference	between	the	two	types	of	nation	are	made	
evident	in	the	claims	to	nationhood	that	my	informants	make	in	Montréal.	In	fact,	my	informants	seem	to	separate	
the	two	into	separate	categories	of	citizenship	and	nationality.	Furthermore,	a	third	“national”	identity	becomes	
highlighted,	especially	for	2nd	generation	people	in	Montréal,	and	that	is	Montréal	identity	itself	(Oakes	and	
Warren,	Language,	146).	
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6.5.1 Characteristics: Language, Economy, Religion 
While the idea of the Québécois nation was firmly rooted in both Catholicism and the French 
language before the 1960s, the Quiet Revolution changed this root system as did the 
establishment of the independentist movement and the Parti Québecois. The secularization and 
consequent removal of the Catholic side of the national identity leads to a heightened emphasis 
on French as the distinguishing factor of Québécois nationalism. As Adams states, with a poetic 
flourish, “with the communion host now absent from the tongues of Québec Catholics, the 
tongue itself became a preoccupation.”902 In fact, the “French Fact” becomes the absolute crux 
on which Québec nationalism rests, post-Quiet Revolution. It is the defining characteristic, the 
main form of attachment to the Québec nation and the “indispensable tool of integration.”903 As I 
argued in the section on immigration above, in an effort to maintain the uniqueness of the 
Québec nation, all new members of the nation must speak French. This “French Fact” was 
highlighted with the introduction of The Charter of the French Language (famously known as 
Bill 101) in 1977. This Charter not only made French the language of commerce and business in 
the province, but it also restricted access to English schools to a small population of people, 
namely those children who had a parent who received most of their education in an English 
language school in Québec.904 This article on the Language of Instruction effectively removed 
the right of immigrant children to attend English language schools and forced education in 
French upon all immigrant communities.905 
Carens argues that with French as the ultimate and sole focus of the nationalist agenda, 
the door opens for a clear form of multiculturalism in the province, even if the Québécois people 
choose to reject that term in favour of interculturalism. The fact remains that if the collective is 
defined “with almost an exclusive emphasis on the French language as the shared cultural 
commitment” and with a general de-prioritization of the specific culture, ethos, history and way 
																																																						
902	Adams,	Utopia,	116.	
903	Oakes	and	Warren,	Language,	94.	
904	Gagnon	and	Montcalm,	Québec,	183.	Chapter	VII	of	the	Charter	addresses	Commerce	and	Business,	and	
Chapter	VIII	addresses	Education,	or	the	Language	of	Instruction	as	it	is	called	in	the	Charter.	“Charter	of	the	
French	Language,”	last	modified	January	1,	2016,	accessed	February	16,	2016,		
http://www2.publicationsduQuébec.gouv.qc.ca/dynamicSearch/telecharge.php?type=2&file=/C_11/C11_A.html.	
A	later	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	decision	extended	this	to	children	who	had	a	parent	who	received	most	of	their	
education	in	an	English	language	school	anywhere	in	Canada.	
905	My	husband,	the	child	of	two	immigrants	from	France,	remembers	as	he	puts	it,	“being	kicked	out	of	English	
school”	with	the	implementation	of	Bill	101	in	the	province.		
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of life that used to define “Francophone Québecer,” then Québec will begin “to look more and 
more like a French-speaking version of English-speaking, multicultural Canada.”906 If the 
“French Fact” is the only fact on which the nation is defined then one can see the possibility for 
Carens’ thesis to play out on the ground in Québec.  
The problem is that, as I outlined when discussing interculturalism and the Bouchard-
Taylor Commission, the shared culture that minorities are expect to integrate into clearly has 
more than language as its base. Language plays a key role in Québec nationalism, but it is not the 
sole concern.907 One example is the significance of progressivism to Québécois nationalism. 
Québécois pride themselves on being more progressive than the rest of Canada, especially 
regarding social services, peace activism, feminism, human rights, labour rights, 
environmentalism, etcetera, many of which really grew out of the Quiet Revolution. 
Progressivism, as reflected in these realms is a large part of the Québécois national identity, 
which is reflected in their willingness to pay extremely high taxes to support many of these 
initiatives.908 
While the push towards secularization, and the resultant emphasis on the French language 
and progressivism in the national identity are some of the largest effects of the Quiet Revolution, 
there were also significant reforms in the economic realm of the province at the time. With the 
expansion of Hydro Québec by Québec Premier René Levesque, Québec’s economy grew 
exponentially and was seen as a symbol of the strength and initiative of the provincial 
government to complete ambitious projects. Furthermore, while Catholicism was removed from 
the national identity, a secularism swept in to take its place. It was not enough to simply remove 
Catholicism to the private sphere and redefine the Québécois nation based on economy and 
language, but a secular, anti-clerical, character was adopted. These economic and social 
innovations of the 1960s Quiet Revolution, which strengthened the Québec identity and society, 
led to an increase in nationalistic fervor and began a push toward sovereignty. In fact, the neo-
nationalists who arose out of the Quiet Revolution were committed to reformulating and 
redefining “traditional French-Canadian nationalism so as to reflect their intense commitment to 
																																																						
906	Carens,	“Immigration,”	68,	72.	
907	Again,	Bouchard	outlines	7	components	to	Québec	interculturalism	(Bouchard,	Interculturalism:	View	from	
Québec,	32-33).	
908	This	emphasis	on	progressivism	may	have	an	impact	on	Muslims	living	in	the	province.	Islam	is	often	painted	as	
a	tradition	that	is	a	threat	to	progress,	which	would	not	sit	well	with	the	national	self-understanding	of	many	in	
Québec.	
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building a modern, secular, Québécois nation-state in the province of Québec.”909 It becomes 
clear how the Quiet Revolution and the neo-nationalism that grew out of it provided fertile 
ground for the development of the sovereignty movement and specifically the development of 
the Parti Québécois (PQ).  
The PQ was formed in 1968 under the leadership of René Levesque and in less than 10 
years went from “registering less than 10 percent of the vote” to winning the provincial election 
in 1976.910 While this first PQ government failed in its attempt to gain sovereignty for Québec, it 
did advance many policies (economic, cultural and linguistic) that helped Québécois nationalism 
to flourish. As Keating states, “given the electoral pendulum in Québec, it was only a matter of 
time before the PQ returned to power, and this duly occurred in 1994.”911 This time around the 
PQ government did not wait long before proposing another sovereignty vote and leaders of the 
“yes” side used nationalist doctrine to support the drive for sovereignty and vice versa. Lucien 
Bouchard, leader of the federal Bloc Québécois party, even called sovereignty the “magic wand” 
for Québécois solidarity.912 For many in the province, then, the nationalist agenda was not only 
linguistic, but also firmly economic, secular and political—a Catholic form of secularity, but 
secular nevertheless. At the time, Québec became the most socially-progressive province in 
Canada, including strong support for gender rights, among the many others I described above. 
The influx of individuals/communities that threatened any aspect of this nation could be 
seen as problematic for those who held a “not just about French” notion of what it means to be 
Québécois(e). In this there is an important generational divide. Those who lived through the 
Quiet Revolution and feel as though the battle for secular, socially-progressive Québec was 
fought in their backyards tend to highlight the secular nature of Québec nationalism over their 
children’s generation. This fear over the death of a national culture, whether linguistically or 
otherwise based, can lead to a greater need for feeling secure and, as a result, to the potential for 
what Jasmine Zine calls “paranoid nationalism” in parts of Québec.913 This type of nationalism 
can lead to fear of any group that may be viewed as wishing to remain distinct. While the 
majority of Muslim Canadians (57 percent) believe that most Muslims in Canada wish to adopt 
																																																						
909	Behiels,	Prelude	to	Québec’s	Quiet	Revolution,	xi.	
910	Keating,	Nations	against	the	State,	81.	
911	Ibid.,	84.	
912	Ibid.,	85.	
913	Zine,	“Unsettling,”	55.	
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Canadian customs, non-Muslim Canadians tend to think (again 57 percent) that Muslims wish to 
remain distinct from society at large.914 This makes the potential for a “Québécois Islam” 
particularly difficult. 
 
6.5.2 “Québécois Islam” Definitional Issues915 
Unlike the situation in France where there is clear discussion of the possibility, or lack thereof, of 
an “Islam de France,” the need to define a “Québécois Islam” or “Islam du Québec” is not a 
pressing issue in the province. With the operative principle of interculturalism at work, the idea 
that there would be an “Islam du Québec” would only highlight the principle itself, namely that 
both one’s minority identity is respected while at the same time being fully integrated into the 
common culture that I described above. For many Québécois(es), the presence of an “Islam du 
Québec,” would be a triumph of the intercultural model. The question becomes, on the ground, 
do Muslims in Québec feel as though they can claim the Québécois national identity that is 
outlined above? Do they feel that they can live their Muslim identity to the fullest extent while at 
the same time integrating into the “shared Québec cultural identity”? Do they feel as though they 
can claim both the “Québécois” and the “Muslim” side of a possible “Islam du Québec?” 
In Québec, the situation is often seen as being similar to that of France when it comes to 
this “national” form of Islam. While for many being French-speaking is the key factor in the 
process of becoming Québécois(e), Eid suggests that the  
Frenchification process amounts to more than mere language acquisition; it also entails, 
in keeping with a Republican ideology à la Francaise, that immigrants eventually blend 
in, identify with, and participate in, Québec’s dominant French-speaking culture.916 
 
This French-speaking culture is inevitably made up of more than just the language, no matter 
how people may argue otherwise. Being French-speaking may be the most fundamental and 
important characteristic of the Québec national identity, but it is not the only characteristic, as I 
																																																						
914	Adams,	Utopia,	93.	
915	For	insight	into	some	of	the	various	ways	that	Muslims	interact	with	“being	Muslim”	in	Canada	see:	Natasha	
Bakht,	ed.,	Belonging	and	Banishment:	Being	Muslim	in	Canada.	For	the	purposes	of	the	discussion	around	
“Québécois	Islam”	see	especially	Haroon	Siddiqui’s	chapter	“Muslims	and	the	Rule	of	Law,”	in	this	anthology.	For	
other	sources	on	Islam	in	Canada	and	Québec	see:	Beyer	and	Ramji,	Growing	up	Canadian;	Karim,	“Crescent	
Dawn,”	262-277—“the	particular	challenge	that	Muslims	in	Canada,	as	well	as	those	in	other	Western	countries,	
face	is	the	perception	of	essential	difference	from	other	groups”	(274);	Muhammad	Nimer,	The	North	American	
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Zine,	“Unsettling,”	41-60.	
916	Eid,	Being	Arab,	190.	
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argued above. To protect the shared culture of the “nation,” especially in Québec where it is seen 
as under threat from outside forces, certain “foreign” cultural practices are expected to be kept 
separate from the French or Québécois identity. This is why, although mostly French-speaking, 
Muslim immigrants to Québec may still feel as though claiming both sides of the “Québécois 
Muslim” identity is a difficult thing to do. 
 
6.5.3 “Québécois Islam” Identity Issues 
The Republican mindset can be seen in Québec’s policy of interculturalism which I discussed 
above. Groups are not expected to ignore their unique identities,917 but they are expected to unite 
around a common Québécois identity. In contrast to Canada’s policy of multiculturalism, which 
critics in Québec suggest has been “the main contributor to the crystallization of fragmented 
ethno-cultural communities undermining social cohesion,” interculturalism insists on some level 
of assimilation, similar to the French Republican model.918 Immigrants are expected to “interact 
with, and be transformed by, encounters with each other while maintaining some basic social 
values (finding a middle ground between ‘mosaic’ and ‘melting pot’).”919 Sharify-Funk explains 
that the perceived need to preserve the founding, official culture of Québec leads to this need for 
and emphasis on interculturalism in Québec.920 After all, “how can the French-speaking majority 
welcome others when it is uncertain about its own future and what its parameters have become 
under pressure from mass culture, globalization, and the abandonment of traditional modes of 
life?”921 This uncertainty not only leads to a strong forms of nationalism, but to heightened 
pressure to leave aside possibly threatening identities to the “official culture” of Québec. The 
question then arises, because of this emphasis on preserving the Québécois culture: Is it possible 
for Muslims to be publicly both “Québécois(e)” and “Muslim”? 
 Because of the complicated dance between communautarisme and individual rights that 
exists in all of Canada, especially in Québec, the awkward response to this question is “both yes 
and no.” While Muslim immigrants in the province are expected to adapt to, and adopt, the 
																																																						
917	The	unique	identities	apply	also	to	the	variations	of	Muslim	identities	present	in	Québec.	There	is	not	one	sole	
“Muslim	identity”	in	the	province,	but	instead,	a	great	diversity	of	sectarian	and	interpretive	approaches	to	Islam.	
This	means	that	there	is	not	one	sole	way	that	Muslims	in	the	province	interact	with	the	Québécois	identity.	
918	Eid,	Being	Arab,	190.	
919	Sharify-Funk,	“Muslims,”	544.	
920	Ibid.,	544.	
921	Adelman	and	Anctil,	Religion,	11.	
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French-speaking Québécois identity, their individual identities, whether religious or otherwise 
are inherently respected based on the policy of pluralism that exists in the province. The fact that 
Québec is understood to be a pluralist society, as clearly indicated in the policy statement made 
by the Québec government in 1990 called Let’s Build Québec Together: Vision: A Policy 
Statement on Immigration and Integration, means that any strong version of cultural assimilation 
is not possible.922 So while French serves to bind those living in Québec in a common culture, 
there are limits to this binding—at least according to the official democratic and pluralist policies 
at work in the province. 
 Whether or not the official policy indicates that one can hold on to and live out one’s 
various identities alongside the “Québécois” identity, public opinion on the matter can vary 
dramatically. One may assume that as long as immigrants speak French and thus aid in the 
continuation of the French-speaking culture they would be not be seen as a threat, and in fact 
would be a benefit to the Québécois communal identity. There is an fascinating diversity of 
opinion that arises when considering this idea. For example, as I discussed in the section on 
immigration earlier in this chapter, the largest population of immigrants to Québec comes from 
North Africa and is consequently both French-speaking and Muslim. In fact, “in 2010, 
approximately 37% of immigrants admitted to Québec were from Africa (the majority being 
from Maghreb).”923 Furthermore, unlike in other cases of immigration, where knowledge of 
French is low, this is not the case for Maghrébine immigrants, especially Algerian immigrants, of 
whom about 97.7 percent know French.924 According to the “French Fact” of Québec national 
identity and the official policy that exists in the province, this immigration should be seen as 
ideal. In fact, when the government proposed to restrict any one continent’s contribution to 
immigration to 25 percent,925 the general population rejected this proposal wholeheartedly as this 
would restrict the influx of French-speaking North African immigrants to Québec.926 This seems 
like a clear preference for immigrants who speak French no matter what other identities they 
hold. Yet, there is a “significant degree of anti-Muslim prejudice in Québec (as in other parts of 
																																																						
922	Carens,	“Immigration,”	47.	
923	“The	Changing	Face	of	Québec	Immigration,”	Canada	Visa,	accessed	February	16,	2016,	
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924	Castel,	“Mariage,”	219.	
925	Some	sources	say	30%.	
926	McAndrew	and	Bakhshaei,	“Difficult	Integration,”	943.	
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Canada and the West more generally).”927 Nieguth and Lacassagne explain that in spite of giving 
priority to immigration from the Maghreb out of a desire for French-speaking immigrants, fear of 
the Muslim “other” plays into “the notion of a “self” whose very identity is under threat and 
therefore needs to be protected all the more vigorously.”928 For many in Québec, they did not 
fight hard to defend their cultural identity against the English that surrounded them, or fight hard 
to develop a socially-progressive culture, just, in their eyes, to have another threat come in and 
not only take the Anglophones’ place but drive gender and sexual identity rights back a 
century.929 
 This means that the Muslim side of a Muslim immigrant’s hyphenated identity may be 
more restricted than one may imagine. In fact, “visible cultural difference” continues to be an 
issue in Québec, as is made evident by the proposal of Bill 94.930 There is an understanding at 
work in many Western locations, in Canada, and especially in Québec, that “if one holds Muslim 
identity he/she is seen as immediately having divided loyalties, between which he/she must 
choose.”931 The same does not necessarily apply to Catholic Québécois(e), which is telling. 
As I suggested in Chapter 2, it is important to note the conflation of the term Islam, or 
Muslim, with many other identity labels, usually ethnic or national. In Québec, “Arab” and 
“Muslim” are sometimes seen as expressing the same thing.932 As noted by Eid, “because 
prejudicial representations of Islam often fuel Western perceptions of Arabs, it becomes harder 
for Canadian Muslims of Arab origin to dissociate their religious from their ethnic identity.”933  
This fusing of ethnic and religious identity can lead to frustration. Zabel expresses the 
frustration behind such a situation for someone whose religious/ethnic identity is seen as “other.” 
She states: “I got tired of feeling that I could only be either Arab (and therefore foreign) or 
Canadian (and therefore ‘normal’). I got tired of having to demonstrate that I could be both and 
still be ‘normal.’”934 That being said, other studies have shown that there is a distinction to be 
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made between ethnic and religious identity markers in Québec, with ethnic identities being more 
respected and liked than religious ones.935 McAndrew and Bakhshaei show that language does in 
fact matter in the perception of Québécois(es). According to McAndrew and Bakhshaei, a 2010 
study showed that when the word Arab or Muslim was used, the response by Québécois(es) was 
more favourable than when the word Islam was used. In fact, 41 percent of Québec informants 
said they had a very unfavourable opinion of Islam, followed by 21 percent having an 
unfavourable opinion of Judaism.936 The problem seems to be religion in general, rather than 
ethnicity or even religious individuals937—but in the case of Islam, the antipathy to public 
expressions of religion, which remind the older Québec population of the time when priests and 
nuns walked the streets and met with political leaders behind closed doors, is aggravated by the 
perceived socially regressive nature of Muslim immigrants.  
 One may wonder if this negative attitude toward religion in general, and Islam in 
particular, has an impact on the practices of, and feeling of belonging of Muslims in the 
province. I was surprised to learn that, according to a 2003 study, “Muslim immigrants in 
Québec do not exhibit a high degree of religious identification, or practices—much less in fact 
than their counterparts in the rest of Canada.”938 Specifically, this study showed that only 55 
percent of Muslims in Québec considered religion important, compared to 64 percent in Canada 
overall, and only 13 percent defined themselves as strong religious believers, compared to 31 
percent in Canada overall.939 It is hard to know if this difference in religious identification and 
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religious	extremism.		
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practice is a result of the cultural context in Québec compared to the rest of Canada, or if it is 
attributed to the fact that the Islam of the Maghreb is an “Islam à la carte,” or if it is merely a 
matter of reporting, but Maghrébine Muslim immigrants in the province potentially de-
emphasize this side of their hyphenated identities for any or all of these reasons. What might this 
reveal about the general feeling of belonging in the province? 
As Zine argues in her introduction to Islam in the Hinterlands, “far from being 
isolationist, Muslims in Canada feel an allegiance to the nation and a sense of pride as 
Canadians”940 This general feeling of belonging and allegiance to Canadian identity is reflected 
in my data set as well, as I demonstrate in my Québec data chapter. While my informants did not 
so much claim Québécois identity as they did Canadian identity, Baubérot shows that the same 
feelings of belonging and identification with the national Québécois identity are present among 
Muslim immigrants in Québec as well. According to his 2008 study, 
les nombreux migrants que j’ai interviewés m’ont à peu près tous livré le même message: 
jusqu’à présent, nous sommes bien au Québec (bien par comparaison avec d’autres 
territoires, bien malgré les difficultés), nous nous sentons Québécois, nous ne demandons 
pas mieux qu’être parmi les artisans du Québec de demain. Mais attention, si le Québec 
dérape, si son “nous” n’est pas inclusif, nous irons ailleurs.941 
 
For the Muslims in Baubérot’s study, and potentially others, Québec has an inclusive “nous” of 
which they feel comfortable being a part. They feel comfortable being both “Québécois(e)” and 
“Muslim” and as a result feel comfortable engaging in practices that reflect both of these 
identities. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have explored the four orienting principles active in Québec that may affect the 
Maghrébine Muslim immigrant community in the province, namely, colonialism, immigration, 
secularization and nationalism. I interrogated what restrictions or aides might be in place to 
hinder, or to help, Muslim immigrants in Québec in their identity negotiations and integration 
																																																						
940	Zine,	“Introduction,”	7.	
941	“The	numerous	immigrants	that	I	interviewed	for	the	most	part	all	gave	me	the	same	message:	up	until	now,	
we	are	comfortable	in	Québec	(especially	in	comparison	to	other	places,	even	in	light	of	the	difficulties),	we	feel	
Québécois(e),	we	don’t	ask	anything	more	than	being	part	of	the	artisans	of	Québec	of	tomorrow.	But	rest	
assured,	if	Québec	skids,	if	its	“us”	is	not	inclusive,	we	will	go	elsewhere”	(Baubérot,	Laïcité	interculturelle,	250).	
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processes. I examined these contextual particularities to set the stage, so to speak, for the 
everyday experience of my informants in Québec, especially their interactions with food and 
food practices. 
In this endeavour, I asked the question: Can Muslims in Québec feel comfortable 
claiming both sides of their “Québécois Muslim” identity? The answer that I provided 
throughout this chapter is a complicated “both yes and no.” This is due in part to the colonial 
history in the province, which I showed firmly establishes French and Catholicism as orienting 
characteristics of the common Québec culture. I argued that this inevitably affects the 
Maghrébine Muslim immigrants of my study as they directly feed into one aspect of this culture 
while in the same moment detract from, or remain on the outside of, the other. While their 
culture and language are familiar, thanks in part to both Québec and North Africa being former 
colonial enterprises of France, their religious traditions are seen as foreign and threatening to the 
minority nation that was started as a French colony in a sea of English. It follows that any food 
practices that highlight this difference, or that seem to threaten the self-understanding of the 
minority nation, may be considered problematic. On the other hand, those food practices that 
feed into this separation, this uniqueness, this common Québécois culture, may be lauded and 
encouraged. 
This common Québécois culture, which finds its beginnings in the colonial experience, 
consequently affects the immigration policies of the province. In the second section of this 
chapter I outlined the various migratory movements of Muslims to Canada and then the specific 
immigration of Muslims to Québec. I showed that for the Québec government, who hold a large 
degree of control over the immigration to the province with its own ministry of immigration, 
maintaining French as the language of society is essential in its selection and integration of 
immigrants in their province. These resultant immigration policies directly affect my informants 
as they belong to the most prominent community of immigrants to the province, namely 
Maghrébines. While in the rest of Canada immigrant linguistic and ethnic backgrounds are vast 
and varied, I showed how in Québec, the largest immigrant communities to the province are 
from French-speaking countries of origin. After discussing the reasons that Maghrébine 
immigration has been historically attractive to the Québec government and society, I presented 
Castel’s argument for why immigration to Québec might be attractive for the Maghrébine 
immigrant him/herself. I then concluded this section of this chapter by showing how various 
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immigration policies might affect immigrants on the ground level in Québec, namely through a 
brief exploration of unemployment and the lack of ghettoization in Montréal. Overall, while one 
may assume that the linguistic similarity and strength offered by the influx of Maghrébine 
Muslim immigrants to Québec would provide a comfort for both sides, it becomes clear that this 
is not always the case, due to the complicated relationship between religion and the state found 
in the province.  
Because of this fact, I then explored the history of secularization and its implications for 
minority religious communities in Québec. In pre-Quiet Revolution Québec, Catholicism was 
foundational to French Québécois self-understanding as a distinct nation within a nation, and the 
affect of this religious culture can still be felt in the province today, making anyone who holds a 
religious affiliation outside of Catholicism potentially feel on the outside. These feelings of 
“otherness” are only increased with the arrival of the Quiet Revolution and the laïcité that sprung 
from it. While on the policy level, differing religious identities would be welcome in the 
collective culture post-Quiet Revolution, the situation on the ground is often different. I 
presented the three possible approaches to the Quiet Revolution as found in Michael Gauvreau’s 
work The Catholic Origins of Québec’s Quiet Revolution, 1931-1970. Gauvreau suggests that 
alongside the orthodox liberal and the revisionist modes of understanding the Quiet Revolution, 
which see the Quiet Revolution as ending in the evisceration of Catholicism from Québec 
society, one may also see it as a means of making Catholicism coterminous with modernization 
and therefore taking up an important place in Québec common culture. While it is possible to see 
this continuation of Catholicism in Québec post-Quiet Revolution, the more common experience 
is one of hostility toward religion in the public sphere. Those Québécois(es) who “fought the 
good fight” to remove religion from the public sphere are as a result hesitant to allow for any 
religious manifestation in public, leading to the possible restriction of public displays of one’s 
religious identity in the province, including one’s engagement with distinct food practices, as we 
will soon see. For many Muslims, who may not see the same degree of separation between their 
public and private lives, this approach to religious life may inherently conflict with their self-
understanding. On the flip side, the image of Islam as a religion which inevitably wants a say in 
public life, including discussions concerning social policies, may lead post-Quiet Revolution 
Québécois(es) to question the acceptability of Islam in the Québécois nation. For them, religious 
practice is meant to be kept in the private sphere, and thus requests for halal food in public 
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institutions, or any other expression of religious food practice in public, may be met with 
hostility. 
After addressing the Quiet Revolution in Québec, I continued by exploring the resultant 
policies of secularization and interculturalism that emerged in the province.  First, I presented 
Adelman and Anctil’s open versus rigid secularism, of which they argue that open secularism is 
what is active in Québec, in comparison to France which practices rigid secularism. Based on the 
protection of “freedom of religion,” in comparison to “freedom from religion,” neutrality is not 
necessarily the end goal of the laïcité that is active in Québec. I showed how this allows for 
religion to remain as an identity marker for people in the province, as long as that identity is in 
conversation with and transformed by, to some extent, the common Québecois culture. This is 
the basis of the province’s policy of interculturalism, which I tackled next. In this section I show 
how, according to Gérard Bouchard, interculturalism can be understood as integrative pluralism 
within a French language setting. This intercultural self-understanding becomes important in the 
development of Québecois nationalism. 
The idea that there exists a unique Québec nation adds another contextual element within 
which immigrants to the province must interact that is not present in other provinces of Canada. 
While a Muslim immigrant to Ontario or Manitoba or British Columbia, or any other province or 
territory, for that matter, may feel as though they are simply part of the multicultural mosaic that 
makes up the Canadian nation, a Muslim immigrant to Québec must negotiate their identity 
within a specific “national” understanding, not based on the multicultural mindset but an 
intercultural one. The fact that there is a common “national” culture with which any immigrant is 
expected to interact, and be changed by, makes the situation in Québec distinctive.  
After exploring the characteristics of the common national culture in Québec, namely, 
language, economy and religion, I examined the possibility of a “Québecois Islam.” I claimed 
that with the operative principle of interculturalism at work, the idea that there would be an 
“Islam du Québec” would only highlight the principle itself, namely that both one’s minority 
identity is respected while at the same time being fully integrated into the common culture that I 
described in this chapter. For many Québécois(es) the presence of an “Islam du Québec” would 
be a triumph of the intercultural model. That being considered, I posited whether Muslims in 
Québec felt as though they could actually claim both sides of a potential “Québécois Muslim” 
identity. I showed that while Muslims in Québec, who are by and large French-speaking, thanks 
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to the immigration policies I addressed above, feed into one aspect of the Québec common 
culture, they are also seen as a threat to the secular, socially-progressive characteristics of that 
common culture as well.  
How might this affect minority immigrant communities’ food practices? In the rest of the 
country, the immigrants’ distinct food practices are celebrated not only as evidence of Canada’s 
multicultural mosaic, but as part of the very foundation of Canadian food culture. In Québec, the 
one province that has some understanding of a “national” food culture, immigrants may feel 
more pressure to adjust their food practices to fall in line with “common culture.” Overall, 
considering that the common culture, and thus, “national” identity is based on the French 
language and a secular self-understanding, the Maghrébine Muslim immigrants of my study may 
feel both part of and yet inherently separate from the “Québécois” identity and food practices 
will often reflect this tension. The next two chapters address these questions and show how the 
four factors I presented in this chapter affect the daily experiences of my informants in Montréal. 
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Introduction to the Montréal Case Study: Food as Bridge for the Transnational Immigrant 
 
I pulled my car into a snow bank that should have been a parking spot, cursing the Montréal 
winter in which I found myself, while trying to maintain my researcher composure. I was outside 
of an apartment building in the east end of Montréal, a neighbourhood I had never been to, but 
appeared to be like many of the other neighbourhoods in the city. I had been in Montréal for a 
couple of weeks and had been struggling with the snow, the narrow streets of my Plateau 
neighbourhood, which only became narrower in the depths of winter, and the unfamiliar accents 
all around me. After months away in France I was “at home” in my own country, but feeling 
incredibly out of place, acutely aware of my outsider Anglophone Ontarian status in the heart of 
a Francophone Québécois neighbourhood. As I turned off my car, I prayed that I could get to the 
door without having to have a conversation with a Québécois-speaking local, an experience that 
always left me devastated and unsure that I had actually learned any French at all in my six visits 
to France. Luckily the snow was keeping most people at bay on this particularly wintery day and 
I made a smooth transition from my car to my informant’s door.  
As soon as my informant opened the door, welcomed me with French kisses and spoke a 
simple sentence of greeting, I took a deep breath in, my shoulders relaxed and I felt at ease. This 
drastic difference in feeling from the loneliness I had been experiencing, to immediate familiarity 
and ease, revealed to me just how comfortable I had become in the Maghrébine community in 
France. For the first time since arriving in Montréal I felt “at home.” Sitting in her living room, 
drinking mint tea and talking French with a French/Maghrébine accent was so refreshing to me, 
so familiar, so comfortable.942 As much as I was not fully an insider in the Maghrébine 
community in Paris, I apparently became more integrated there than I could have anticipated. 
Chatting with that Algerian woman in Montréal put me at ease. I felt safe and happy. I 
loved talking about France and colonialism with her. I loved speaking about Islam and food. I 
felt as though I could have been in Paris in one of my Maghrébine informants’ living room that 
afternoon, other than the mounds of snow outside. It struck me as funny that my own research 
seemed to apply to my own experience in the moment. I write about Maghrébine immigrants 
																																																						
942	Here	we	can	see	the	effect	of	memory	on	the	data-gathering	process.	As	I	described	in	Chapter	1,	my	memories	
of	my	time	in	the	field	in	Paris	were	providing	me	with	some	semblance	of	insider	status	in	the	Montréal	
community	right	from	the	beginning.	Furthermore,	this	jolt	back	into	comfort	was	thanks	to	my	own	embodied	
forgetting.	See	Coleman,	“On	Remembering	and	Forgetting,”	220.	
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who use food to connect to homeland, to connect with their broader transnational community, to 
feel at home—and that is exactly what food was doing for me on that day. By drinking mint tea, 
I was transported to Paris, to the café at the Grande Mosquée, to a place of comfort and security. 
I am not North African. I am not Muslim. But when I drink mint tea or eat a plate of couscous I 
feel a part of that community, and at that moment, it felt like home to me, strangely enough, 
much more so than the Canadian context I was living in.943 I wondered how similar that feeling 
was for my potential informants in Montréal. 
The arguments made in the next two chapters are based on the data I collected during my 
six-month fieldwork in Montréal, Québec, in 2013. These chapters explore three important 
themes that arose from my data analysis of my interviews and participant observation in the 
Maghrébine Muslim community in Montréal, namely: identity, transnationalism, and practice. 
Within each of these themes I explore the role that food and food practice play, and show how, 
for the group of Maghrébine Muslims whom I studied in Montréal, food is an important field of 
entry and understanding into more overarching areas of one’s lived experience as an immigrant. 
Food, in fact, is one of the main realms within which my respondents negotiated their 
transnational immigrant identities in the context of secular Québec. 
 
 
 
 
  
																																																						
943	This	experience	similarly	happened	to	me	with	the	Eid	Al-Adha.	I	had	not	eaten	Maghrébine	food	in	a	couple	of	
months	and	had	generally	been	out	of	the	loop	of	that	community	for	that	time.		I	wrote	in	my	journal	from	that	
day:	“We	started	with	tea,	coffee	and	sweets	as	people	joined	“la	fête.”	I	had	forgotten	how	delicious,	how	
comforting,	mint	tea	is.	As	I	sipped	at	the	tea	and	heard	my	friends	speaking	a	mix	of	Arabic	and	French	around	me	
I	felt	at	home”	(Oct	15,	2013).	Furthermore,	this	experience	continues	to	happen	to	me.	With	every	couscous	that	I	
make,	with	every	pot	of	mint	tea,	I	am	immediately	taken	back	to	so	many	afternoons	in	my	informants’	living	
rooms,	and	I	immediately	feel	a	sense	of	“home,”	which	equates	to	the	feeling	I	get	when	I	smell	my	mother’s	
apple	cider	cooking	on	Christmas	Eve.	
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Chapter 7: “Tout le monde est chez soi ici”944: Food as a Lens into Identity Negotiations 
and Transnational Efforts in Montréal 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
As I mentioned in the introduction to these Montréal case study chapters, the ability of “familiar” 
food, smells, and tastes, to transport, transform, and identify was evident from my first day in the 
field in Montréal. The essential nature of food not only for myself, but also for my informants, 
framed all my work in this community, from that first afternoon in that informant’s living room, 
until the celebration of the Eid Al-Adha eight months later in another’s home. 
As transnational Muslims in Québec, my informants experienced similar things to the 
situation I describe above on a daily basis in their lives in Montréal. Throughout this next chapter 
I reveal how food helped to identify them in the dominant non-Muslim Québec context. It served 
as a means of distinction between “us” and “them,” which is essential in any identity negotiation. 
For the informants in my study these differences were made evident in not only “what” but 
“how” one ate. Not only did my informants see themselves as distinct from the non-Muslim 
Québécois(es) because they did not eat pork, drink alcohol and only consumed halal meat, but 
also because they were ingredient checkers, did not eat to excess, did not waste food, ate 
communally and would not so easily eat at restaurants. These approaches to food were both 
culturally and religiously important to many of my informants and were what they saw as 
distinguishing marks between their identity group and the “others.” 
While the Maghrébine Muslim immigrants of my study in Montréal saw themselves as 
distinct in many ways, for the most part they also saw themselves as similar to other Canadians; 
they were comfortable in their transnational identities. For this reason, I spend the second half of 
this chapter addressing the role that food plays in how my informants created and maintained 
their transnational connections. I argue that not only did eating specific things in specific ways 
allow them to cross the border between home and host-land, but it allowed them to create home 
in host-land as well. For many of my informants, food was the access point to memories of the 
homeland and thus to the home identity. Because of the large distance between Québec and the 
Maghreb, these transnational actions were especially important for my Montréal informants since 
																																																						
944	130727_001—“Everyone	is	home	here.”	
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physically traversing the distance was difficult and expensive. What is critical to note here is that 
by being free to express the Maghrébine and Muslim side of their transnational identity, these 
informants were often more excited to make efforts toward claiming and presenting the 
Canadian/Québécois side of their transnational identity as well. My Montréal informants were 
adamant about maintaining traditional religious and cultural food practices from the Maghreb 
and yet also engaged with and produced cultural food items and experiences from Québec. 
Integration was not about assimilation; it was not necessary to leave one’s culturally and 
religiously specific practices aside, but one could hold them alongside the Québécois common 
culture. 
 
7.2 The National, Transnational and the Religious: Identity Negotiations Among 
Maghrébine Muslim Immigrants in Montréal 
 
As I stressed in Chapter 3 on Maghrébine Muslim immigrants in France, identity negotiation and 
consolidation are foundational to the immigrant experience. When trying to find one’s place in a 
new setting, one must explore from where one has come and the kinds of identities that one 
wishes to hold, or inevitably will hold. This applies in the Québec case as well. As it was for my 
informants in France, identity negotiation is complex and multivalent for my Québécois(es) 
informants, and therefore I cannot apply a perfect typology of identity negotiation to their 
experience. While in the France case study, good examples of all four of Salman Akhtar’s 
typology of identity negotiations were present. In Québec, the identity negotiation and 
presentation process was fairly consistent, with most of my informants falling into a hybrid 
category between Akhtar’s Ethnocentric and Bi-Cultural categories that I call “Transnational” 
identity negotiation. I return to how this identity negotiation process is illustrated through my 
informants’ food practices later in this chapter. 
To begin, it is important to note some simple statistics on how people identify themselves 
when asked a straightforward question about their identity. As I suggested in chapter 3, when 
asked, “comment voulez-vous que je vous identifie,”945 a person’s first response is often telling 
of the primary identity that they hold. In the case of my informants in Montréal, the group was 
fairly evenly split between religious and national primary identity. Of my 32 informants, 12 
																																																						
945	“How	would	you	like	me	to	identify	you?”	
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claimed Muslim identity first (38 percent of informants), 19 claimed national identity (59 
percent), whether Canadian (nine informants) or nation of origin (ten informants), and finally, 
one informant claimed gender as her primary/first identity (3 percent).946 There was no real 
consistency in how people stressed primary identity based on country of origin. Whether 
someone was born in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia or Canada, the responses were spread across the 
board between national and religious identifications, and between Canadian and Maghrébine. 
Gender, on the other hand, did appear to have an affect on which identity is claimed first. For 
women, 46 percent claim Muslim identity first whereas only 20 percent of the men interviewed 
claimed Muslim identity as their first identity. Instead, 50 percent of male informants claimed 
Canadian identity first and 18 percent of females did. For those claiming one of the Maghrébine 
identities first, gender did not appear to play any significant role, with 32 percent of females 
claiming this and 30 percent of males claiming Maghrébine identity first. Overall, while in Paris 
there were a great variety of responses to the identity question, in Montréal there was much more 
consistency, with people generally professing religious or national identity as their first, and 
often primary, identity.947 
 
7.2.1 “All Canadians are Immigrants”: National Identity Claims 
When it comes to national identity only 11 of my informants in Montréal did not claim Canadian 
identity to some extent. Only 11 people specifically stated that they were “not Canadian.” The 
other 21 informants all gladly professed this national identity, or professed their desire to claim 
it, even if not all of them actually held Canadian citizenship. There may be multiple explanations 
for the ease with which my informants claimed this identity, in comparison to the French 
situation that I described in Chapter 3 where national identity seemed to be a much more difficult 
and often unclaimed identity for immigrants. First, the fact that there is no colonial history 
between Canada and the Maghreb may be an underlying reason why Maghrébines in Canada 
may have less inner conflict in claiming the national identity than they would in France. One 
																																																						
946	It’s	important	to	note	that	none	of	my	informants	claimed	“Québécois”	identity	as	their	primary	identity.	In	
fact,	only	two	of	my	informants	claimed	this	identity	at	all.	I	address	the	idea	of	“Québécois”	identity,	and	the	way	
that	my	informants	interact	with	it,	below	in	section	5.2.1.1.	
947	It	is	possible	that	there	are	other	identities	that	my	informants	may	see	as	primary,	which	they	did	not	profess	
here.	Or	they	may	see	one	of	the	identities	that	they	proclaimed	later	in	their	list	as	their	primary	identity.	
Furthermore,	how	one	identifies	oneself	may	change	dependent	on	what	stage	of	the	immigration	trajectory	they	
are	currently	at,	and/or	what	identity	is	contested	or	important	to	them	at	that	moment	in	time.	
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informant in Montréal explained to me that during colonization by the French in Algeria native 
Algerians were given identity cards that said “Français(e) musulman(e).” They were not 
considered Algerians and they were not considered just French.948 As I presented in Chapter 2, 
Muslims in Algeria were labeled as “Français(e) musulman(e),” an act that may understandably 
lead to the lack of desire of claiming “French Muslim” identity now. Canada does not have this 
same history with the Maghreb so there may be less hesitation in claiming a “Canadian Muslim” 
identity.949 
Beyond the simple lack of a colonial history in Africa, the general openness to diversity 
and to religious and cultural difference in Canada (or at least the perceived openness) is another 
possible reason for people’s desire to profess a Canadian identity. One informant expressed to 
me that he was proudly Canadian, and it was because of the diversity of Canada that he saw as 
the “richesse du Canada—une diversité qui fait que c’est un pays qui est riche, et ça donne de 
beaux mélanges, une mixité.”950 For many like him, this diversity of Canada, and more 
importantly the acceptance of this diversity, as often represented by “open secularism,”951 is 
what made them proud to hold this national identity. One woman explained to me at great length 
about an anecdotal experience that she and her children had undergone that led to a greater pride 
in Canadian identity. She explained how her son had gone to a school barbeque, and after 
explaining why he could not eat the meat that was being prepared the teacher went and bought 
him, and the other young Muslim students present, halal meat so they could enjoy the barbeque 
with everyone else. She went on to express how this solidified not only her own Canadian 
identity but also that of her son.  
C’est un barbecue pour tout le monde, tu manges, tu manges, tu ne manges pas, allez-y. 
Mais ce geste-là, ça lui fait une marque à l’intérieur jusqu’à maintenant. “Tu te rappelles 
																																																						
948	Personal	correspondence	with	the	researcher,	Feb	8,	2013.	Also,	Shepard,	Invention	of	Decolonization,	2.	
949	I	return	to	the	comparison	of	historical	backgrounds	and	their	effect	on	the	Maghrébine	Muslim	immigrant,	in	
the	conclusion	to	this	dissertation.	
950	130727_001—“The	richness	of	Canada.	A	Diversity	that	makes	it	a	rich	country	and	that	gives	beautiful	blends,	
a	mix.”	
951	The	anecdotal	experiences	that	I	describe	here	are	an	excellent	vignette	into	the	“open	secularism,”	defined	by	
Adelman	and	Anctil,	at	work	in	Montréal.	As	I	discussed	in	Chapter	6,	in	a	context	governed	by	open	secularism,	
one	can	hold	religious	identity	publicly	alongside	other	identities,	as	under	this	type	of	secularism	the	protection	of	
freedom	of	religion	is	primary	“even	if	this	calls	for	the	relativization	of	the	principle	of	neutrality” (Adelman	and	
Anctil,	Religion,	87).	
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l’année passée?” Donc maintenant, il cherche l’halal, il mange l’halal. Mais il sait qu’il 
est canadien. Il défend son pays.952 
 
For this woman, and her son, this proof of acceptance of difference is what made them feel like 
there was nothing standing between them and claiming the Canadian identity. Throughout my 
time in the field in Montréal, I heard many other examples like this one, of Québécois(es) going 
out of their way to make sure that everyone in the group was accommodated, no matter their 
cultural or religious background. For the informants who delivered these stories, it was clear that 
these anecdotal experiences had a large effect on their own understanding of who they were and 
how they could relate to the broader Canadian national identity.953 These experiences gave the 
necessary evidence to my informants that Canadian identity was for all, no matter one’s origins 
and practices.954 
Unlike in France, where there seemed to be a difference between French citizenship and 
French nationality in my informants’ approach to claiming that identity, in Québec the response 
was much more straightforward. One simply claimed or did not claim Canadian identity 
regardless of one’s actual citizenship. For example, of the 16 informants who had Canadian 
citizenship, 13 claimed the identity, two did not, and one claimed Québécois identity.955 On the 
other hand, of the 14 informants who did not hold Canadian citizenship, eight consequently did 
																																																						
952	130518_001—“It	was	a	barbeque	for	everyone,	you	eat,	you	eat,	you	don’t	eat,	go	on.	But	this	gesture,	that	
made	a	mark	in	him	up	to	this	day.	‘You	remember	last	year?’	So	now,	he	looks	for	halal,	he	eats	halal,	but	he	
knows	that	he	is	Canadian.	He	defends	his	country.”	
953	See	Valerie	Amiraux	and	Javiera	Araya-Moreno,	“Pluralism	and	Radicalization:	Mind	the	Gap!,”	in	Religious	
Radicalization	and	Securitization	in	Canada	and	Beyond,	eds.	Paul	Bramadat	and	Lorne	Dawson	(Toronto:	
University	of	Toronto,	2014),	92-119.	Amiraux	and	Araya-Moreno	suggest	that	anecdotal	experiences	have	more	
power	to	change	perceptions	than	grand,	overarching	stereotypes.	In	this,	not	only	might	the	Muslim	immigrant	
change	his/her	opinion	of	the	“other”	but	the	“other”	may	change	his/her	opinion	about	the	Muslim	immigrant	
within	these	interactions.	In	order	for	these	anecdotal	experiences	to	happen,	there	must	be	interaction	among	
and	between	groups.	A	problem	arises	from	the	uneven	distribution	of	Muslims	in	Canada.	As	I	discussed	in	
Chapter	3,	the	majority	of	Muslim	immigrants	in	Québec	live	in	Montréal.	For	a	study	such	as	mine,	which	is	
situated	in	Montréal	proper,	this	is	good	news:	there	is	plenty	of	opportunity	for	a	Muslim	immigrant	to	interact	
with	non-Muslim	Québécois.	These	anecdotal	experiences	are	simply	less	possible	in	other	regions	of	Québec,	
where	Muslim	populations	are	practically	non-existent,	allowing	for	the	potential	for	overarching	stereotypes	to	
remain	unchallenged.	
954	These	findings	directly	contradict	the	findings	by	Margarita	Mooney	in	her	study	of	Haitian	immigrants	in	
Miami,	Montréal	and	Paris.	She	suggests	that	because	of	Québec	secular	nationalism	“private	religious	belief	and	
practice	are	tolerated,	yet	public	religious	expressions	and	faith-based	service	institutions”	are	not,	and	therefore	
the	incorporation	of	immigrants	is	weakened	there	(Mooney,	“Religion	as	a	Context	of	Reception,”	100).	Because	
Québec	nationalism	was	generally	missing	from	my	informants’	experience,	and	Canadian	nationalism	was	more	
prevalent,	the	data	that	I	collected	presents	quite	a	different	picture	from	Mooney’s	of	immigrant	incorporation	in	
Québec.	
955	I	return	to	the	difference	between	Canadian	and	Québécois	identity	below.	
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not claim the identity, while four did and two suggested that they would like to. Finally, of the 
two informants in the process of gaining Canadian citizenship, one already claimed the identity 
and the other did not. Overall, people simply claimed the identity if they felt like it was one with 
which they identified. There was no real extra thought put into whether one could claim this 
identity or whether one would be accepted as Canadian or not, by the “non-immigrant” 
Canadians that surround them. In fact, the idea of the accessibility of the Canadian identity to 
anyone who wanted it was supported by the very fact that there is no such thing as “non-
immigrant” Canadians, according to many of my informants. For these informants, Canadian 
identity was accessible and claimed easily because “everyone is an immigrant” in Canada. As 
one informant suggested, 
c’est vrai, on se sent chez nous. Je me sens chez moi. Et quand on discute avec des gens, 
on dit, oui, tout le monde est chez soi ici.… Même pour un canadien de souche…il a des 
ancêtres qui étaient immigrants. Donc nous avons les mêmes droits.956 
 
This view that “everyone is an immigrant” in Canada leads to a stronger emphasis on the cultures 
and identities of origin for many recent immigrants, but also for Canadians in general, according 
to my informants.  
Because everyone is Canadian, the need to express this identity is not as visceral as the 
need to go back in family history and experience to explain how one came to the nation full of 
immigrants. When explaining to me why one’s national identity of origin held such an important 
place in one’s politics of identity, one young woman explained it to me as follows: 
Parce qu’en général quand tu rencontres des gens ici, ce n’est pas important pour eux de 
savoir si tu es canadienne ou pas, parce que tu finis par l’avoir, mais ils veulent plus 
savoir: tu es de quelle origine? Jusqu’à date, avec la plupart des gens avec qui je parle, on 
vient vraiment plus parler de ton origine. Les gens demandent plus ton origine. Parce 
qu’on finit tous par être des canadiens, parce que dans le fond les canadiens, ce sont tous 
des immigrés. Depuis 400 ans, c’est tout le monde qui a immigré. (Elles rigolent.) On 
s’entend qu’y en a qui ont leurs grands-parents, ça fait 200 ans, 300 ans, mais l’origine, si 
tu demandais à leurs arrières, arrières, grands-pères, ils vont te dire: on vient de… puis ils 
vont donner un autre pays.957 
																																																						
956	130727_001—“It’s	true,	we	feel	at	home.	I	feel	at	home.	And	when	we	talk	with	people,	we	say	‘yes,	everyone	
is	home	here.’	We	do	not	have	the	right	to	say,	even	for	a	Canadian	born,	even	he	was	an	immigrant	once.	He	has	
ancestors	that	were	immigrants	so	we	all	have	the	same	rights.”	Note	that	in	this	quotation	and	the	following	one,	
Aboriginal	Canadians	are	excluded	from	the	discussion,	although,	strictly	speaking,	even	their	ancestors	were	also	
once	immigrants,	but	the	time	clock	is	set	further	back.	
957	130615_003—“Because	in	general	when	you	meet	people	here,	it	is	not	important	for	them	to	know	if	you	are	
Canadian	or	not	because	you	finish	by	having	it	[Canadian	citizenship],	but	they	want	to	know	more	what	your	
origins	are.	Up	until	now	the	majority	of	people	that	I	speak	with,	we	really	just	talk	about	your	origins.	People	ask	
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She and others viewed this as true for multi-generational Canada-born Canadians as well.958 For 
my informants, this is a distinct difference between the Canadian situation and the French 
situation. While in France the things that make you similar are the things that you must stress to 
show your national identity, in Canada it is the origins that make you different that ultimately 
make you fit with the national identity. 
 
7.2.2 (Almost) Non-existent Québécois(e) Identity 
Considering the complex history of Québec within Canada, a history that I explored in Chapter 6 
of this dissertation, one may wonder how the context of Québec may influence the national 
identity that immigrants to Québec may hold. While Québécois national identity is a prevalent 
issue on the ground in Québec, it was largely missing from my informants’ answers to the 
question of how they would identify themselves. In France, many of my informants would be 
quick to explain the historical and cultural influences behind their desire and/or ability to claim 
French national identity, but this was not the case in Québec.  
I was quite surprised by this finding. Having become aware of the fact that there was a 
different national identity expressed in Québec than in the other provinces in Canada that I had 
visited, I expected that this would be a distinction that would be engrained in my informants as 
well. I was uncomfortable on many occasions during my fieldwork in Québec, based on the fact 
that I held Canadian and not Québécois identity. Based on this experience and what I knew about 
the importance of professing a Québécois identity against a Canadian one, I predicted that, 
instead of Canadian identity, my informants would claim Québécois identity as an effort to fit in 
																																																						
more	about	your	origins.	Because	we	all	finish	by	being	Canadians,	because	in	the	end	Canadians	are	all	
immigrants.	For	400	years,	everyone	is	an	immigrant.	[they	laugh].	We	agree	that	there	are	some,	they	have	their	
grandparents	here	for	200	years,	300	years,	but	their	origins,	if	you	ask	their	great,	great,	grandparents,	they	will	
tell	you	‘we	come	from…,’	and	they	will	give	you	another	country.”	Another	informant	similarly	expressed:	“Et	c’est	
comme	ça	que	ma	procédure	à	commencer.	Ici,	on	ne	reconnait	pas	les	vrais	canadiens	des	autres.	Parce	que	c’est	
un	monde	qui	est	riche	de	toutes	les	cultures.	Mais	les	gens	disent,	une	fois	que	tu	as	la	citoyenneté,	ça	y	est,	je	
suis	canadienne,	mais	quand	on	pose	la	question	on	voit	que	l’on	est	tous	venu	un	peu	de	partout”	(130703_004).	
958	When	the	former	informant	was	explaining	her	understanding	of	the	situation	of	overarching	Canadian	
immigrant	identity	to	me,	I	was	taken	back	into	my	own	history	and	experience	with	defining	myself	as	a	Canadian.	
I	remembered	explaining	to	other	Canadians	when	I	was	growing	up	in	rural	Ontario,	not	that	I	was	Canadian,	but	
that	I	was	German	and	English.	My	Canadian	identity	was	a	given,	and	innately	in	that	identity	my	former	
immigrant	identity	was	also	a	given,	so	the	interest	immediately	turned	to	what	made	me	different	from	those	
other	immigrant	Canadians	around	me	and	not	what	made	me	similar.	
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with the culture that was immediately surrounding them. Instead, only two informants959 really 
claimed a Québécois identity. One in particular explained his national identity to me as follows:  
Et bien, puisqu’on est au Québec, le nationalisme canadien, on ne le sent pas vraiment. Je 
pense qu’on ne voit pas beaucoup de drapeaux canadiens à Montréal. Donc, je ne veux 
pas mentir en disant que je me sens pas Canadien parce que tous les Québécois, ben [et 
bien], la plupart des Québécois ne se sentent pas Canadiens. …Ben, disons que je me 
sens plus Montréalais, à la limite Québécois, que Canadien.960 
 
What is important to note here is that this informant was my one and only second generation 
Maghrébine in my Québec case study. It was clear from this response, and other conversations 
between this informant and myself, that this “born-Québécois” identity had a significant effect 
on how he viewed his national identity. He was acutely aware of the distinction between 
Québécois and Canadian identity and consequently saw the need to state this difference.  
First-generation Maghrébines, on the other hand, either did not acknowledge the 
difference, or simply did not think it applied to them. For example, one young woman also 
explained that there was a distinction between Québécois and Canadian identity. In response to 
my question about identity she responded that after being Muslim and Tunisian she was 
Canadian. In fact, she stated, 
je dirais plutôt Canadienne. Je ne me vois pas avec la culture Québécoise, honnêtement. 
J’ai toujours vécu au Québec, je n’ai jamais été ailleurs au Canada mais si quelqu’un me 
demande si je suis plus Québécoise ou Canadienne, je dirais plus Canadienne.961 
 
This young woman was, in fact, the only other informant to make a clear distinction between 
Québécois and Canadian national identity in her interview.962 What is noteworthy about this is 
that she had lived in Québec for most of her life. She was born in the Maghreb but came to 
																																																						
959	130806_004;	130807_001.	
960	130807_001—“Well,	since	we	are	in	Québec,	Canadian	nationalism,	we	don’t	really	feel	it.	I	think	we	do	not	see	
many	Canadian	flags	in	Montréal.	So,	I	do	not	want	to	lie	by	saying	that	I	don’t	feel	Canadian	because	all	
Québécois(es),	well	the	majority	of	Québécois(es)	do	not	feel	Canadian…Well,	let’s	say	that	I	feel	more	like	a	
Montréaler,	borderline	Québécois,	than	Canadian.”	
961	130517_001—“I	would	say	more	Canadian.	I	do	not	see	myself	with	the	Québec	culture	honestly.	I	have	always	
lived	in	Québec,	I	have	never	been	elsewhere	in	Canada	but	if	someone	were	to	ask	me	if	I	was	more	Québécois(e)	
or	Canadian,	I	would	say	more	Canadian.”	
962	One	other	informant	mentioned	both	the	Canadian	and	Québécois	identities	as	separate	identities	that	one	
could	hold,	but	clearly	distinguished	them	as	national	and	provincial	identities,	not	two	separate	national	
identities:	“Oui,	j’ai	déjà	la	nationalité.	Y	a	deux	ou	trois	jours	ma	fille	ma	posé	la	question:	‘Maman	est-ce	que	je	
suis	Canadienne	ou	Marocaine	ou	Québécoise?’	Je	lui	ai	dit:	les	3.	(Elles	rigolent.)	Elle	a	6	ans	et	demi	et	elle	m’a	
posé	cette	question	il	y	a	deux	ou	trois	jours.	Maman	je	suis	quoi?	Je	lui	dis:	les	3.	Si	on	te	pose	la	question	tu	vas	
dire,	je	suis	Canadienne,	comme	on	habite	au	Canada,	mais	on	habite	la	province	du	Québec,	donc	tu	es	
Québécoise,	et	tu	es	Marocaine	d’origine.	Donc,	tu	dois	parler	des	3”	(130529_003).	
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Canada while she was still a baby and all her siblings were born in Québec. While she is 
technically a first-generation (some would call this the 1.5 generation) Maghrébine in Québec, 
she was for all intents and purposes raised in Québec. This may explain her awareness that 
“something must be said about the difference between Québécois and Canadian identity,” yet she 
still saw herself as more Canadian than Québécoise. 
 
7.2.2.1 Food as Symbol of Québécois Identity  
Although most of my informants did not speak about a distinct Québécois identity, or a notion of 
“Québécois(e)” being equal to “Canadien(ne)” in their responses about their own identities, they 
did seem to acknowledge the Québécois identity in subtler ways, especially as it related to food 
practice.963 For example, many informants would speak about Québécois food, often in 
opposition to Maghrébine or Muslim food. Food was not only central to their understanding and 
presentation of who they were as Maghrébines but also in their understanding of who and what 
made someone Québécois(e). “I’m not sure what you Québécois(es) eat or consider Québécois 
food, but if you are Algerian (or Moroccan, or Tunisian) you eat this” was a common perspective 
that my informants offered to me. In fact, I had informants suggest that “people eat their own 
food,” whether Chinese or Muslim or Québécois.964  
Food is one way to present your identity to others, and many informants would tell me 
stories of experiencing Québécois(es) presenting Québécois identity through food experiences. 
For example, one woman told me an elaborate story of her cousin’s Québécois wife wanting to 
make the family a “Québécois meal” in an effort to show them her traditions and who she was. 
This informant explained how this young woman had put such an effort forward to demonstrate 
Québécois food, but the Maghrébines at the table had a difficult time appreciating the sugary, 
bland dishes placed in front of them. In spite of the relative disaster of converting the 
Maghrébines to Québécois eating, it was a time of learning, a time of laughter, and a time of 
appreciating the other. As my informant said, “C’est là où on a découvert d’ailleurs le 
Québec…Et pour te dire que nous aussi on a découvert la cuisine Québécoise comme ça.”965 She 
																																																						
963	The	argument	for	the	role	of	food	in	marking	identity	was	made	in	the	first	chapter	of	this	dissertation.	
964	130401_001.	
965	130401_001—“In	fact,	it’s	there	that	we	discovered	Québec…and	to	tell	you	that	we	also	discovered	the	
Québec	cuisine	in	that	manner.”	
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stressed to me that it was in the process of sharing this meal that she discovered what Québec 
was. It was not just about Québec cuisine, but Québec itself.966 
 
7.2.3 Home Country (Nation of Origin) National Identification 
The second major identity category that my informants claimed was their nation of origin: 
Algerian, Moroccan or Tunisian.967 Food played an essential role in defining this identity for my 
informants. In fact, food was sometimes seen as the principal way of presenting oneself. For 
some of my informants, the discussion about identity was a secondary process. The first process 
was to present oneself, or meet the other, via food practice. Discussion of those identities then 
followed. For example, one young woman expressed that, 
en premier lieu, la première chose que l’on peut faire pour présenter notre pays, c’est 
avec la nourriture, et avec nos habillements parce qu’on a des habits traditionnels. Et 
après ça, c’est autour de la discussion que l’on peut se connaître. On est comme ça…, nos 
traditions sont comme ça, on pense comme ça. C’est après le couscous et le tajine.968 
 
Not only is food a primary means of presenting one’s home national identity, but it is also an 
enduring means (even for those who are not born in the country with which they are trying to 
identify). My second-generation Tunisian informant expressed this fact to me when he spoke 
about maintaining traditional food practices of the “homeland” in the host land. He suggested 
that “je crois que c’est important de garder la nourriture, qu’elle soit santé ou non, parce que ça 
																																																						
966	The	possible	role	of	food	in	Québécois	identity	became	particularly	poignant	during	my	fieldwork	with	the	
emergence	of	“Pastagate”	in	Québec	(http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2013/02/21/Québec-italian-ban-
pasta_n_2733882.html).	The	importance	of	how	we	name	food,	the	language	of	food	for	French	Québécois	
identity	came	into	focus.	Food	almost	became	an	outworking,	a	symbol	of	French	language	identity	that	plays	such	
a	significant	role	in	Québécois	identity	formation.	The	OQLF	(Office	Québécois	de	la	langue	francaise),	in	an	
attempt	to	make	sure	that	only	French	was	found	throughout	the	province,	turned	its	focus	to	the	food/restaurant	
industry.	Members	of	the	OQLF	investigated	restaurants,	particularly	Italian	restaurants,	and	demanded	changes	
to	non-French	names	such	as	pasta,	caffe,	botteglia	di	vino,	etc.,	to	reflect	the	French	words	for	these	products.	
The	OQLF	quickly	reversed	itself	on	this	request,	but	the	fact	that	they	had	made	the	request	in	the	first	place,	with	
support	from	the	opposition	political	party,	raised	concerns.	
967	One	may,	rightly,	assume	that	the	current	politics	of	the	home	context	have	a	significant	effect	on	the	identity	
politics	of	immigrants	from	those	locations.	For	example,	one	may	assume	that	the	events	of	the	Arab	Spring	
would	impact	the	ways	that	my	informants	understand	themselves	as	individuals	from	the	countries	directly	
involved	in,	and	impacted	by	these	events.	What	is	remarkable	is	that	none	of	my	informants	discussed	these	
events	with	me	when	addressing	their	home	identities.		
968	130615_002—“In	the	first	place,	the	first	thing	that	we	can	do	to	present	our	country,	it’s	with	food	and	
clothing	because	we	have	traditional	garments.	And	after	that,	it’s	around	discussion	that	we	can	get	to	know	one	
another.	We	are	like	that	…	our	traditions	are	like	that,	we	think	like	that.	It’s	[That	discussion	comes]	after	the	
couscous	and	the	tajine.”	
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fait partie de l’identité d’un peuple.”969 Food is part of a communal identity that must be 
protected.970 
The focus on one’s nation of origins was evident in the engagement with the home 
context national identity. In fact, 10 of my informants responded with this identity first, while all 
32 informants claimed it to one degree or another. It was the most overarching identity in this 
case study. For the 10 informants who claimed this identity first, it was fairly straightforward: a 
simple statement of “I am Algerian, Moroccan, Tunisian,” etcetera. For the rest of my 
informants, this identity was relegated more to the realm of origins. In fact, 11 of my informants 
used the words “d’origine algérienne,” “marocaine,” or “tunisienne.”971 What is worth noting is 
that those who specifically used the words “d’origine…” all emphasized their Canadian identity 
to a large extent. It was either the first identity they mentioned, or it was the one they stressed. 
As I mentioned above, it seems as though many of my informants thought that to be Canadian is 
to have “origins” elsewhere. It followed that those informants who wanted to highlight their 
Canadian identity often claimed their Maghrébine identity in this “of origins” kind of way. 
 
7.2.4 “Être musulman(e)”: Religious Identity Negotiations 
The third and final identity that was significantly expressed972 was one’s religious identity, 
namely the Muslim identity. Thirty of my 32 informants claimed Muslim identity with ease. For 
these informants, no matter the manifestation of this identity, Islam was one of their central 
orienting worldviews and self-understandings. For the other two informants, Islam was a minor 
identity, a cultural identity, and one that was present in their lives but not one that they felt 
particularly attached to as an identity per se. One spoke of it as a culturally inevitable identity,973 
while the other viewed it as a religious identity and as such something that is private and not “un 
critère d’identification pour moi.”974 This informant went on to explain to me that even if she did 
not claim that identity herself, other people would inevitably label her as Muslim because she 
																																																						
969	130801_001—“I	think	that	it	is	important	to	protect	the	food,	whether	it	is	healthy	or	not	because	it	is	part	of	
the	identity	of	a	people.”	
970	My	informants	were	engaging	in	what	can	be	called	“Gastronationalism”	in	relationship	to	their	home	national	
identities.	On	this	issue	see	DeSoucey,	“Gastronationalism,”	432-455.	
971	“Of	Algerian,	Moroccan	or	Tunisian	origins.”	
972	Gender	was	the	only	other	identity	claimed	by	my	informants,	and	only	one	informant	emphasized	this	type	of	
identity.	
973	130731_003.	
974	130706_001—“A	criterion	of	identification	for	me.”	
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was Algerian. The idea of being “born Muslim” came into play. One other informant also spoke 
of this “born Muslim” identity, saying that “musulman, en fait c’est une appartenance à une 
religion. Mais nous, on l’est par naissance.”975 He agrees with the previous informant that one’s 
Muslim identity is not so much an identity as an affiliation, yet explains how one “is” a Muslim 
simply by consequence of where one is born.  
Unlike the situation in France where many informants spoke of a “born Muslim” identity, 
in my Québec case study, this religious identity was much more of a chosen identity; it was not 
something someone was simply born into but something someone chose. One young man 
explained it to me as follows. He said, “Je suis musulman par naissance, donc je n’ai pas changé 
quelque chose, je n’ai pas changé en fait. Mais, après, maintenant je le suis par choix. Plus 
qu’avant.”976 For this informant, being Muslim was not just a simple matter of being from the 
Maghreb and inevitably being Muslim. It was not a cultural identity that one could not escape, 
but instead it was a religious identity that was chosen by and professed for oneself. 
 Ultimately, for many of my informants, being Muslim went beyond just being “born 
Muslim” or just doing one’s prayers, or another variation of singular action that led to identity. 
Instead, “being Muslim” was more than just prayer and the veil, it was also the things of 
everyday. It is a mix of belief and practice, personal and practical connection, not just one or the 
other.  
Notre religion ne se limite pas seulement à la prière et au voile. C’est un tout: ce que l’on 
mange, ce que l’on fait, notre relation avec le voisinage, avec notre environnement; c’est-
à-dire, tenir un environnement propre, ça fait partie de notre religion. Ne pas faire mal 
aux gens, ça fait partie de notre religion. Notre religion c’est notre vie. C’est-à-dire, du 
lever du jour jusqu’au soir, c’est ça la religion. Ce n’est pas uniquement faire la prière et 
porter le voile, c’est un tout. C’est ça la religion.977 
 
Since religion is seen as the stuff of the everyday, food takes up an important place in the 
Muslim identity for my informants.978 After explaining to me that to be a Muslim is to get 
																																																						
975	130806_005—“Muslim,	in	fact	it’s	a	religious	affiliation.	But	we,	we	are	it	[Muslim]	by	birth.”	
976	130806_004—“I	am	Muslim	by	birth,	therefore	I	did	not	change	anything,	I	did	not	change	in	fact.	But,	
afterwards,	now,	I	am	[Muslim]	by	choice.	More	than	before.”	
977	130520_002—“Our	religion	is	not	limited	to	just	prayer	and	the	veil.	It’s	a	totality:	what	we	eat,	what	we	do,	
our	relationship	with	our	neighbours,	with	our	environment;	that’s	to	say,	maintaining	a	clean	environment	is	part	
of	our	religion.	To	not	harm	others,	that	is	part	of	our	religion.	Our	religion	is	our	life.	That	means	from	sunrise	to	
night,	that	is	religion.	It	is	not	only	to	do	the	prayers	and	to	wear	the	veil,	it’s	a	totality.	That	is	the	religion.”	
978	We	can	see	McGuire’s	definition	of	lived	religion	at	work	here.	Again,	McGuire	argues	that	“lived	religion	is	
constituted	by	the	practices	people	use	to	remember,	share,	enact,	adapt,	create,	and	combine	the	stories	out	of	
which	live.	And	it	comes	into	being	through	the	often-mundane	practices	people	use	to	transform	these	
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married, one young woman went on with her explanation of what it means to be a Muslim in the 
following way: 
Être musulmane aussi c’est: ne pas boire du vin et de l’alcool...C’est aussi faire le 
carême, un minimum d’un mois par année. Mais il y a d’autres jours où l’on peut faire 
ça...On ne mange pas bien le porc. Par exemple, on a une liste bien précise. On ne peut 
pas manger des animaux qui sont morts avant que la personne les égorge. C’est très 
important [qu’]on doit vider l’animal du sang qui n’est pas bon pour la santé. C’est dans 
notre religion… Vous avez un autre point de vue que l’on respecte, bien sûr, mais c’est 
dans notre religion.979 
 
For this informant, and many like her, food is central to what makes someone “Muslim,” 
including what distinguishes Muslims from others. 
One of the distinctions that arose within the Muslim identity category related to one’s 
outward religious practices. Although there were some who considered themselves “not great 
practitioners,” it seemed as though there was a larger population of informants who engaged in a 
significant number of religious and cultural Muslim practices in Montréal than I encountered in 
Paris. Because of the immigrant experience in Canada, and the fact that Islam is not the majority 
religious identity in the country, practice and the understanding of oneself as a practicing Muslim 
increases for many of my informants. For example, one man explained to me how he saw 
himself as more of a practicing Muslim in Canada than in the Maghreb.  
J’ai remarqué q’ici au Canada, j’ai pratiqué ma religion plus qu’au Maroc. Bien sûr je 
fais ma prière, je fais le ramadan, les fêtes, les deux fêtes que l’on a. La fête du ramadan 
et la fête du mouton, le sacrifice. Je pratique ma religion quotidiennement parce que je 
cherche les produits halal. Je dois me comporter comme un vrai musulman parce que je 
trouve que c’est une responsabilité. Ce n’est pas comme au Maroc, parce que [où] la 
plupart, puisque 99,99%, sont musulmans. Mais ici je dois pratiquer ma religion jour par 
jour, heure par heure, par mon comportement, parce que je dois donner l’exemple aux 
autres.980 
																																																						
meaningful	interpretations	into	everyday	action”	(McGuire,	Lived	Religion,	98).	Here	my	informants	show	how	
food	is	one	of	the	central	mundane	practices	that	they	use	to	transform	their	stories	into	action.	
979	130430_004—“To	be	Muslim	is	also	to	not	drink	wine	and	alcohol…it	is	also	to	do	the	fast,	a	minimum	of	one	
month	a	year.	But	there	are	other	days	where	we	can	do	that	as	well…we	do	not	eat	pork.	For	example,	we	have	a	
very	precise	list.	We	cannot	eat	animals	that	were	dead	before	a	person	slaughters	them.	That	is	very	important.	
We	have	to	empty	the	animal	of	its	blood,	which	is	not	good	for	one’s	health.	That	is	in	our	religion…You	have	
another	point	of	view	that	we	respect	of	course,	but	it	is	in	our	religion.”	
980	130430_006—“I	noticed	that	here	in	Canada	I	practiced	my	religion	more	than	in	Morocco.	Of	course	I	do	my	
prayers,	I	do	Ramadan,	the	festivals,	the	two	festivals	that	we	have.	The	festival	of	Ramadan	and	the	festival	of	the	
lamb,	[or]	the	sacrifice.	I	practice	my	religion	daily	because	I	look	for	halal	products.	I	have	to	behave	like	a	real	
Muslim	because	I	find	that	it	is	a	responsibility.	It	is	not	like	in	Morocco	because	the	majority	there,	almost	99.99%,	
are	Muslims.	But	here	I	have	to	practice	my	religion	day	by	day,	hour	by	hour	by	my	behaviour	because	I	have	to	
give	an	example	to	others.”	
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For this informant, his identity as “practicing Muslim” was only highlighted in the Canadian 
context; it would not have been an identity that he stressed in Morocco, as there would have been 
no need to do so in that context. 
In Jennifer Selby’s work on Muslim communities in the suburbs of Paris, in Petit 
Nanterre, we can see that some of her informants reflected the same kind of pattern in their 
experiences.981 Her informants express, like mine do, how in the Maghreb you do not need to 
emphasize certain things, because there everyone does them, but in France you have to 
emphasize these practices because they are what make you distinct.982 While for Selby’s 
informants this trend is represented in prayer, dress, family values, etc., for my informants this 
emphasis on religious identity is signified by food practice. This is again reflective of the 
“minority status effect” that I discussed in Chapter 3. I argue elsewhere that “minority identity 
status can lead to certain aspects of identity becoming more prevalent in the immigrant location 
than they might be in one’s homeland” and that “food and food practice may be one area where 
this minority status effect may be evident.”983 I explain there, like I do throughout this work, that 
while not eating pork, not drinking alcohol, fasting for Ramadan, or one’s engagement with any 
other commonly understood “religious” food practice, may not be essential to one’s Muslim 
identity in a Muslim-majority context, in a context where one’s Muslim identity is the minority 
these kinds of practices take on a more symbolically important role in identity presentation. 
Not only was it a matter of “needing to practice” more in Canada than in the Maghreb, 
but it was also a matter of ease. Comparatively, people in Canada seemed to feel freer to be a 
practicing Muslim. Rubina Ramji similarly found that many of her informants felt freer to be 
Muslim in Canada than they did in their “home” countries.984 For my Montréal informants, there 
did not appear to be the same pressure to change one’s practices, especially food practices, as 
there was in France. From what I gathered in talking with Maghrébines in Montréal, keeping a 
strict practice seemed easier than it was for my informants in France; it was simply out of the 
question for them to eat pork, drink alcohol and violate rules around halal meat.  
																																																						
981	Selby	specifically	addresses	the	expectation	placed	on	young	women,	who	migrate	from	the	Maghreb	to	marry	
men	in	Petit	Nanterre,	to	be	even	more	practicing	than	they	were	in	the	Maghreb.	
982	Selby,	Questioning	French	Secularism,	164-165.	
983	Brown,	“‘Tell	me	what	you	eat,”	45.	
984	Rubina	Ramji,	“A	Variable	but	Convergent	Islam:	Muslim	Women,”	in	Growing	up	Canadian:	Muslims,	Hindus,	
Buddhists,	eds.	Peter	Beyer	and	Rubina	Ramji	(Montréal	&	Kingston:	McGill-Queen’s	University	Press,	2013),	115.	
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For my Montréal informants, one is meant to maintain these traditions. My informants 
would argue that they felt free to maintain their religious practice and as a result they did exactly 
that. I wonder if the fact that Canadians in general put less emphasis on food might be a reason 
for this. For example, here in Canada it is not often that lunch is provided in businesses and 
schools. Instead people bring their own lunches to school and work and can bring what they want 
to eat. In France, on the other hand, lunch is often provided both in the schools and in businesses. 
Life revolves around food and consequently differences in food practices become more evident. 
One of my informants mentioned to me that sometimes it is difficult when she is at school and 
people want to eat all together and she has to ask whether or not something is halal or not.985 
However these communal meals at work are not as common in Canada as they are in France. 
Although the distinction between levels of practice existed and was commonly engaged 
by my informants in Montréal, it seemed to be much more complicated than in Paris. On the one 
hand, in Paris the differences often revealed complex and variant interactions between one’s self 
understanding as a “cultural” and/or “religious” Muslim, and revealed the many ways in which 
my informants in Paris lived out their Muslim identity through their practices. In Montréal, on 
the other hand, many of my informants would call themselves “non-practicing,” and yet would 
engage in most of the commonly understood “religious obligations,” from the five pillars, to 
keeping halal, not eating pork, not drinking alcohol, etcetera. There was a great deal of 
consistency in practice among my Montréal informants. 
Beyer and Ramji address these issues by presenting a ten-point scale on which they base 
their three categorizations of Muslim identity among their respondents in their study. These three 
categories are the “highly involved,” the “moderately to somewhat involved” and the “non-
religious.” Beyer in his chapter in their book suggests that while the “highly involved” adhere to 
a consistent standard of Muslim orthodoxy, usually based on the five pillars, “the highly 
involved Muslims showed great variation on virtually every one of the details that composed 
their otherwise common ‘orthodox’ model of Islam.”986 The “moderately to somewhat involved” 
Muslims “used the same standards [as the highly involved] but did not feel that they had to 
																																																						
985	Personal	communication,	Field	journal,	April	24,	2013.	
986	Beyer,	“Islam,	Hinduism,	and	Buddhism,”	60.	
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conform to them as strictly”; their religion was just one factor among many in their lives.987 
Finally, the “non-religious” rejected identification with Islam in general, or as Muslims.988 
While my informants in France would have fit into all categories across Beyer and 
Ramji’s ten-point scale, my Montréal informants would be concentrated in the “highly involved” 
category that Beyer describes. There was a great deal of consistency in practice, and Islam was a 
central identity in their lives, but there was also a great deal of variation presented within that 
understanding of orthodoxy. For example, “non-practicing,” or better yet “not a great 
practitioner” in Montréal were often used as a self-identity label when one compared oneself to 
exceptionally devout Muslims, or simply when one felt like there was always more that they 
could do. One of these informants explained it to me as follows: 
Je suis pratiquant, mais je ne suis pas un grand pratiquant. Mais je fais de mon mieux 
pour faire notre rite…Je fais ma prière. Nous avons un rite de 5 fois par jour. Ça nous 
permet aussi de nous laver chaque fois qu’on le fait. Le ramadan on fait un mois dans 
l’année. On fait le jeûne une fois par année. C’est tout. Comme je vous l’ai dit, je suis 
juste pratiquant—pas plus que ça.989 
 
In the standards that were set out by many of my informants in Paris, this man would have been 
considered a highly practicing Muslim without question or quantification, but in Montréal there 
is a feeling that the idea of “practicing” must be qualified.  
Even those who claim that they are fully practicing Muslims sometimes show a different 
level of practice in their actions. For example, one of my informants in Montréal professed that 
she only ate fish when she ate outside of her home, but one afternoon when we were out for 
lunch she ordered a chicken curry dish. This experience made me wonder how many people tell 
me that they keep strictly halal and yet eat differently in their everyday lives. What did it actually 
mean to them to keep halal? To be practicing?990 
																																																						
987	Beyer,	“Islam,	Hinduism,	and	Buddhism,”	60.	
988	Beyer,	“Islam,	Hinduism,	and	Buddhism,”	60.	
989	130517_002—“I	am	practicing	but	I	am	not	a	great	practitioner	but	I	do	my	best	to	perform	our	rites…I	do	my	
prayers.	We	have	a	rite	of	five	times	a	day.	That	permits	us	as	well	to	wash	ourselves	each	time	that	we	do	it.	
Ramadan	we	do	one	month	in	the	year.	We	do	the	fast	once	a	year.	That’s	it,	like	I	told	you,	I	am	just	practicing,	
not	more	than	that.”	This	informant	gave	this	answer	in	response	to	my	question	“Donc	vous	avez	dit	que	vous	
êtes	musulmans.	Qu’est-ce	que	ça	veut	dire	pour	vous?	Et	est-ce	que	vous	avez	des	pratiques	spécifiques	que	vous	
faites?”	(So,	you	said	that	you	were	Muslim/	What	does	that	mean	to	you?	Do	you	have	specific	practices	that	you	
do?)	
990	Here	we	can	see	the	benefit	of	being	in	the	field,	seeing	lived	religion	in	action.	As	Orsi	states,	being	in	the	field	
“forces	an	acknowledgement	of	and	engagement	with	something	messier	than	the	controlled	marshalling	of	
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 While for some of my informants “non-practicing” was an identity label that they would 
give themselves, it also functioned as a tool used by others to make sense of those people who 
claim Muslim identity but who “are not quite Muslim enough” by their standards. In fact, it was 
an identity label used by some of my informants to help explain how someone could be a 
Muslim and yet still engage in “non-Muslim” behaviours and practices, specifically as they 
related to alcohol and pork. 
Oui, il y a des musulmans. Ce n’est pas tous les musulmans qui sont pratiquants. Je ne 
connais pas, mais je vois. Je vois des musulmans qui prennent de l’alcool, qui mangent le 
porc. Peut-être, tu me dis, un pratiquant; je te dis oui, Rachel, il ne va pas prendre 
l’alcool, il ne va pas prendre le porc. Mais un musulman, je te réponds: non.991 
 
For this informant, a practicing Muslim would not consume alcohol, but a non-practicing 
Muslim would be able to and still claim the identity of “Muslim.” After all, according to another 
informant,  
ce n’est pas tous les musulmans qui sont pratiquants parce qu’il y a des musulmans qui 
boivent. Et peut-être, je ne sais pas, je n’en ai pas rencontré mais peut-être il y a des 
musulmans qui mangent le porc, et pourtant ils sont musulmans et c’est des non 
pratiquants.992  
 
For this informant, a Muslim who drinks alcohol or even eats pork is still a Muslim, but by 
his/her actions firmly places him/herself in the non-practicing camp. They would perhaps place 
an individual such as this in Beyer’s “moderately to somewhat involved” category; not removing 
their Muslim identity from them, but also making sense of how they, as a “highly involved” 
Muslim, could claim this identity alongside someone who does not hold to the same orthodoxy. 
Another informant explained how food practices, such as the consumption of alcohol, could be 
clear illustrations into the debate over what it means to claim Muslim identity, to “be a Muslim.” 
																																																						
letters	on	a	page,	something	less	predictable,	and	demands	a	different	kind	of	attentiveness.	The	world	of	the	text	
is	really	not	the	world”	(Orsi,	Between	Heaven,	164).	
991	130518_001—“Yes	there	are	Muslims.	It	is	not	all	Muslims	who	are	practicing.	I	do	not	know	them,	but	I	see	
[them].	I	see	Muslims	who	consume	alcohol,	who	eat	pork.	Maybe,	if	you	say	to	me,	a	practitioner,	I	would	tell	you	
yes,	Rachel,	he	would	not	consume	alcohol,	he	will	not	take	pork.	But	a	Muslim,	I	would	respond	no.”	Another	
stated,	“il	y	a	des	musulmans	qui	mangent	même	le	porc.	Avant	d’être	des	musulmans	ce	sont	des	êtres	humains.	
Il	y	a	des	musulmans	qui	ne	pratiquent	pas.	Il	y	a	des	non	musulmans	qui	ne	mangent	pas	le	porc,	qui	ne	boivent	
pas	l’alcool.	Ce	n’est	pas	la	religion,	ça	dépend	de	la	conscience	de	la	personne.	Est-ce	qu’il	est	pratiquant,	est	ce	
qu’il	n’est	pas	pratiquant?	C’est	ça”	(130430_006).	
992	130612_001—“It’s	not	all	Muslims	who	are	practicing	because	there	are	Muslims	who	drink.	And	maybe,	I	don’t	
know,	I	haven’t	met	any,	but	maybe	there	are	Muslims	who	eat	pork	and	yet	they	are	Muslims	and	they	are	non-
practicing.”	
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When responding to my inquiry whether there were Muslims who drank alcohol, he gave me the 
following response: 
On va dire oui, ils se disent musulmans parce que… là on va rentrer dans c’est quoi la 
définition d’un musulman. Parce qu’un musulman, il ne devrait pas boire. Parce qu’un 
musulman qui va boire, il ne peut pas faire la prière pendant 40 jours, tandis qu’un 
musulman, il doit faire sa prière 5 fois par jour. Là, on doit se questionner: est-ce que 
c’est vraiment un musulman, parce qu’il ne peut pas faire sa prière en ayant bu. Puis il ne 
peut pas la faire pendant 40 jours. Dans les 40 jours, comment on peut le nommer? Est-ce 
qu’il est toujours musulman? C’est ça, mais il y en a qui se disent musulmans, mais on va 
dire que ce sont des pécheurs…Donc oui, on va dire musulman non pratiquant, pécheur. 
Je ne sais pas exactement comment le nommer mais je mets un point d’interrogation sur 
sa situation pendant la période.993 
 
For this person we can see that one’s drink practice, or lack thereof, is foundational to the very 
discussion of what it means to be a Muslim in the first place. Furthermore, “non-practicing 
Muslim” can serve as an identity label that practicing Muslims can place on others whom they 
feel are not fully able to claim the “authentic” Muslim identity.  
Whatever the case, whether one claims this identity as religious or cultural, born or 
chosen, imposed or implied, food and food practices play a significant role in what it means to 
“be Muslim.” While the classic food practices that are representative of Muslim identity are 
Ramadan, pork, alcohol, halal, these were not the only ones mentioned as being essential to 
one’s identity as a Muslim in Canada.  
In a context such as Canada where these relatively well known practices are not so 
contested as in some other locations, other practices move to the forefront of practice and 
identity. For example, the issue of gelatin came up for many of my informants when speaking 
about Islam and food.994 For these informants, the avoidance of gelatin is a part of one’s religious 
																																																						
993	130615_003—“We	will	say	yes,	they	call	themselves	Muslims	because…	there	we	are	going	to	enter	into	what	is	
the	definition	of	a	Muslim.	Because	a	Muslim	should	not	drink.	Because	a	Muslim	who	is	going	to	drink,	he	cannot	
do	his	prayers	for	40	days,	but	a	Muslim	has	to	do	his	prayers	5	times	a	day.	We	have	to	ask,	is	he	really	a	Muslim?	
Because	he	cannot	do	his	prayers	having	had	a	drink.	As	a	result,	he	cannot	do	his	prayers	during	40	days.	So	in	the	
40	days,	what	can	we	call	him?	Is	he	still	a	Muslim?	There	it	is,	but	there	are	some	who	call	themselves	Muslim	but	
we	say	that	they	are	sinners…so,	yes,	we	will	say:	non-practicing	Muslim,	sinners.	I	do	not	know	exactly	how	to	
label	them	but	I	put	a	question	mark	on	that	situation	in	place	of	a	period.”	
994	The	avoidance	of	gelatin	was	important	for	many	of	my	informants	in	Montréal	because	gelatin	is	often	made	
from	pork;	since	one	cannot	consume	pork,	one	cannot	consumer	gelatin,	or	so	the	argument	goes.	Note	that	not	
all	gelatin	comes	from	pork:	cows	(and	other	animals)	are	also	sourced.	This	fact	would	not	remove	the	problem	
for	believers	such	as	this	person	because	the	dead	cows	that	are	used	to	gather	this	collagen	would	typically	not	
have	been	slaughtered	according	to	halal	(or	kosher)	standards.	There	are	vegan	alternatives	to	gelatin	such	as	
agar-agar,	guar	gum,	and	pectin.	A	related	issue	for	Muslims	in	Canada	is	the	rennet	found	in	cheeses.	That	too	has	
traditionally	been	animal-based,	though	there	are	now	lab-based	and	vegetable-based	alternatives	available.	
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food practice, and a part of what makes them Muslim in Canada. In responding to my question 
about the relationship between Islam and food many informants immediately brought up gelatin. 
For example, here’s one answer that uses the slippery slope argument: 
Oui, seulement de la viande halal, et on ne mange pas les yoghourts avec la gélatine. Il y 
a des personnes qui disent, ok c’est un petit pourcentage. Mais même ça, ça vient du porc, 
donc on ne mange pas la chose là où l’on trouve de la gélatine, par exemple. Parce que 
cette fois, si c’est une petite quantité, l’autre fois on va dire: Ok, pour la gélatine il n’y a 
pas de problème, pourquoi on n’essaie pas autre chose? Donc il vaut mieux acheter ce qui 
est halal.995  
 
For many informants, this mention of the avoidance of gelatin was one of the first, if not the first, 
link between Islam and food that they would bring up.996 Furthermore, because of this focus on 
taking the identity of practicing Muslim to the next level, many of my informants had become 
obsessive ingredient verifiers, making sure that every single ingredient in every single product 
they purchased was halal. They became the community of “ingredient checkers” in a world 
surrounded by those laissez-faire shoppers who throw anything in their cart: 
On a un problème de lire les ingrédients. Quand on est sur un rayon, on trouve des gens 
qui prennent les produits et les jettent dans le chariot. Nous, il faut les lire. S’il y a de la 
gélatine, s’il y a des produits qui sont péchés, alors c’est normal. Parce que la gélatine 
c’est la peau du porc qui se transforme en forme gélatine pour donner cette forme aux ice 
creams, aux yogourts pour lui donner cette forme, pour ne pas que ça se fende. Mais en 
réalité, c’est très déconseillé pour la santé.997 
 
Whereas in a place like France the fact of keeping halal or not drinking alcohol was enough of a 
contested practice as to distinguish a specific identity, it was almost as if, in Canada, my 
informants needed something even finer with which to identify themselves, something more 
distinct to draw the line between “us” and “them.”998 
  
																																																						
995	130430_004—“Yes,	only	halal	meat,	and	we	do	not	eat	yoghurt	with	gelatin.	There	are	people	who	say,	ok	it’s	
only	a	small	percentage.	But	even	that,	that	comes	from	pork,	and	so	we	do	not	eat	things	where	we	find	gelatin	
for	example.	Because	this	time	it’s	a	small	quantity,	the	next	time	we	will	say:	O.k,	for	gelatin	there	is	no	problem,	
why	don’t	we	try	something	else.	So	it	is	better	to	buy	what	is	halal.”	
996	130430_005;	130505_001;	130519_001;	130520_001;	130529_003;	130615_003.	
997	130615_001—“We	have	a	problem	of	reading	ingredients.	When	we	are	in	an	aisle,	we	find	people	who	take	
products	and	throw	them	in	their	shopping	cart.	For	us,	we	must	read.	If	there	is	gelatin,	if	there	are	products	that	
are	forbidden,	so	it’s	normal.	Because	gelatin	is	pig	skin	that	they	transform	into	gelatin	to	give	this	form	to	ice	
cream,	to	yogurt	to	give	it	this	form,	so	that	it	doesn’t	split.	But	in	reality	it	is	highly	discouraged	for	one’s	health.”	
998	This	directly	challenges	Phillip	Connor’s	conclusions	about	the	effect	of	welcoming	versus	less-welcoming	
contexts	of	reception	on	the	religious	outcomes	of	Muslim	immigrants	in	his	work	Immigrant	Faith.	I	will	return	to	
this	in	Chapter	9	when	I	address	Connor’s	findings	in	more	depth.	
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7.2.5 Classifying “Us” Against “Them” as a Means of Identity Construction 
Ultimately, whether one claimed Canadian, Maghrébine or Muslim identity (and often all three), 
food played a significant role in defining what it meant to be any of these given identities. This is 
because the process of identity formation is grounded in a basic need to categorize oneself and 
the people around oneself into groupings of “us” and “them.” As I have argued previously, this 
form of othering often works itself out through food; food serves a dual function of solidarity and 
separation.999 This was very obviously the case in Montréal. My informants spoke about the 
differences between themselves and the non-Maghrébine/Muslim Québécois(es) who surrounded 
them in food practice. They posited that barriers or boundaries between the groups were made 
obvious in food preferences and practices. Finally, on the positive side of the spectrum, they 
spoke about the ability of food to bridge the gap between “us” and “them” and allow for a deeper 
level of connection and understanding between the various identity groups. 
 
7.2.5.1 “We” eat differently than “they” do: Food as Distinguishing Symbol 
As I discussed in the previous section, the kinds of foods that one eats often mark one off as a 
member of a particular group and not another; they mark who is a part of the collective “we.” 
My informants gave many examples of things that they did or did not consume as examples of 
opposition to the things that non-Muslim Québécois(es) may eat. Furthermore, this process of 
“othering” through food was also prevalent among the non-Muslim Québécois(es), at least 
according to my informants.  
One informant explained an anecdote to me that reveals this possible separation of “us” 
and “them” via what people eat. He spoke about the fact that when the word “halal” is placed on 
a storefront it pretty much automatically prevents non-Muslims from entering the store. He 
suggested that Québécois(es) do not actually understand what halal refers to. They think that 
they cannot eat halal meat, that it is “not for them.” He said that, moreover, when non-Muslim 
Québécois(es) enter a halal butcher shop they feel out of place because the other people in the 
store often let them go ahead of them and watch what they purchase, etcetera. Although they do 
																																																						
999	Anderson,	Everyone	Eats,	125;	Fischler,	“Commensality,”	529;	Harvey,	“Respectfully	Eating,”	39-40;	Sutton,	
Remembrance	of	Repasts,	5.	
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this out of hospitality and curiosity, it often leaves the non-Muslim customer feeling awkward 
and out of place, and reinforces the notion that halal butcher shops are only for Muslims.1000  
Alongside the consumption of “our meat,” the abstention from pork and alcohol are the 
most commonly cited examples of the food practices that are appropriate for “us” but not 
“them.” These examples are well documented above and will be further discussed below, but 
what is significant here is that my informants went further than the question of “what do ‘we’ 
eat?” to the question of “how do ‘we’ eat?” in an effort to distinguish Maghrébine Muslim 
identity from the majority non-Muslim Québécois identity surrounding them. In this effort, five 
differences in “how” one eats were brought to the fore.  
First, in comparison to “them” many of my informants spoke of the fact that “we” do not 
eat to excess.  
Ils nous conseillent de ne pas manger, sauf si on a faim, et quand on mange de ne pas 
manger jusqu’à en avoir mal au ventre. C’est-à-dire, manger jusqu’à s’assouvir, donc 
manger juste ce que l’on a devant nous et ne pas manger plus qu’il en faut. On ne mange 
pas sauf si on a faim, et quand on mange il ne faut pas en abuser.1001 
 
This was an important distinguishing factor mentioned by many of my informants that was 
grounded in both cultural practice and religious conviction. I had multiple informants explain to 
me that part of “being Muslim” was to not eat to excess, and in fact there was a formula to make 
sure that one respected this distinguishing factor. That formula was that one should consider the 
stomach as broken into three parts: one for liquid, one for food and one for air. One should never 
overfill the part that is reserved for food because then one would be taking away from the 
essential space for the other two.1002 This way of eating was not only a strictly cultural practice 
but was given more weight by being tied to a saying of the Prophet.1003 
Par exemple, le Prophète Muhammad, que la paix et le salut soient sur lui, a dit: Il y a pas 
pire réservoir à remplir que l’estomac. Donc, il faut éviter de trop manger. Mais si 
quelqu’un ne peut pas, au moins qu’il varie entre un tiers de nourriture, un tiers de l’air et 
																																																						
1000	Personal	correspondence	with	researcher,	Field	Journal,	Feb	22,	2013.	
1001	130517_002—“They	counsel	us	to	not	eat	unless	we	are	hungry,	and	when	we	eat	to	not	eat	to	the	point	
where	we	have	stomach	pain.	That	means,	to	eat	just	until	one	is	satisfied,	so	to	eat	just	what	is	in	front	of	us	and	
to	not	eat	more	than	we	need.	We	do	not	eat	unless	we	are	hungry,	and	when	we	eat	one	must	not	abuse	it.”	
Other	informants	who	also	stressed	“not	eating	too	much”:	130520_001;	130529_003.	
1002	130430_002;	130501_001;	130615_003.	
1003	Specifically,	there’s	a	hadith	that	states:	“I	heard	the	Messenger	of	Allah	say:	‘A	human	being	fills	no	worse	
vessel	than	his	stomach.	It	is	sufficient	for	a	human	being	to	eat	a	few	mouthfuls	to	keep	his	spine	straight.	But	if	
he	must	[fill	it],	then	one	third	of	food,	one	third	for	drink,	and	one	third	for	air”	(Ibn	Majah,	Book	29,	3349,	as	
found	at	http://sunnah.com/urn/1274570).	
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un tiers de liquide. Parce que ça remplit plus rapidement avec le liquide… des trucs 
comme ça.1004 
 
The formula for guaranteeing that one can maintain this vital practice is laid out by the Prophet 
and thus is given great emphasis as a distinguishing mark for those who belong to this insider 
group.  
This was not the only way of eating that Muhammad emphasized, according to my 
informants. Another prophetic injunction that many of my informants mentioned, and the second 
difference in “ways of eating” that was mentioned by my informants, was the fact that, “unlike 
‘they,’ who can eat with any hand they desire, ‘we’ should only eat with our right hand.”1005 For 
example,  
Oui, la façon de manger: vous, par exemple, vous mangez [et] vous n’avez pas de 
problème à manger avec la main gauche. Nous, on mange avec la main droite. Même 
avec les fourchettes on doit manger avec la main droite. (Il rit.) C’est très important pour 
nous.1006 
 
This informant, like many others, clearly uses the “we” and “they” language when speaking 
about his food habits. He is quick to mention that these practices are “important for us,” 
insinuating that there is a “them” for whom they are not important. Identity comes through 
comparison. 
 A third distinguishing way of eating, which has grounding in the Quran, is an emphasis 
on not wasting food.1007 The importance of “ne pas gaspiller” (to not waste) was mentioned 
throughout the interviews. The practice of “not wasting” became prevalent for my informants in 
																																																						
1004	130807_001—“For	example,	the	Prophet	Muhammad,	peace	and	salvation	be	upon	him,	said:	there	is	no	
worse	tank	to	fill	than	the	stomach.	Thus,	one	must	avoid	eating	too	much,	but	if	one	cannot,	at	least	he	should	
vary	between	one	third	of	food,	one	third	of	air	and	one	third	of	liquid.	Because	that	fills	more	quickly	with	liquid,	
stuff	like	that.”	
1005	This	may	be	related	to	hadith	that	state	that	Muhammad	ate	with	the	three	fingers	of	his	right	hand,	and	
commanded	others	to	do	so	as	well.	One	of	these	hadith	states:	“When	any	of	you	intends	to	eat	[meal],	he	should	
eat	with	his	right	hand,	and	when	he	[intends]	to	drink	he	should	drink	with	his	right	hand,	for	Satan	eats	with	his	
left	hand	and	drinks	with	his	left	hand”	(Sahih	Muslim,	2020,	as	found	at	http://sunnah.com/muslim/36/139).	
1006	130430_006—“Yes,	the	way	of	eating:	you	for	example,	when	you	eat	you	do	not	have	an	issue	with	eating	
with	the	left	hand.	Us,	we	eat	with	the	right	hand.	Even	with	forks	we	must	eat	with	the	right	hand.	[He	laughs].	
That’s	very	important	for	us.”	This	distinction	was	also	clearly	mentioned	by	130731_002.	
1007	Specifically,	the	verses	which	state:	“It	is	He	who	has	produced	gardens,	both	trellised	and	untrellised,	and	date	
palms	and	field	crops,	all	varying	in	taste,	and	the	olive	and	the	pomegranate,	both	similar	and	dissimilar.	Eat	their	
fruits	when	they	bear	fruit	and	give	away	what	is	due	of	them	on	the	day	of	their	harvest.	Do	not	waste	anything.	
He	does	not	love	the	wasteful”	(6:141);	“O	Children	of	Adam,	dress	yourself	properly	whenever	you	are	at	worship:	
and	eat	and	drink	but	do	not	be	wasteful:	God	does	not	like	wasteful	people”	(The	Quran,	7:31).	
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the Canadian context where people waste food often and in large quantities, according to my 
informants. The ease with which Canadians ignored the essential practice of avoiding waste was 
sometimes attributed to the fact that in Canada there was not the same level of poverty as other 
places in the world. One informant explained that, in Islam, 
il est interdit de gaspiller. On tient à toujours avoir en tête qu’il y a des êtres humains qui 
meurent de faim. Puisque l’on est dans cette abondance, surtout ici au Canada, on mange 
mais on ne doit pas oublier qu’il y a d’autres gens, pour ne pas gaspiller.1008  
 
In comparison to those who may, in the presence of abundance, ignore the fact that there are 
those who do not have food, Muslims do not forget this fact. This relationship with food is such 
an essential element of one’s food practice that one could be judged if one did not uphold it.1009 
Even if there was not a specific prophetic injunction against wasting food, many of my 
informants still saw this as an essential food practice that separated them, that marked them as 
Muslim, in a context where “others” behave differently—or so they imagine. Note that the 
comparison that is drawn here is not value neutral, i.e. it’s not “we do this and they do that,” but 
“we are more careful with our food and they are less careful.” The “they” is generalized and the 
“we” is idealized. 
The next “way of eating”—the fourth in my sequence here—that was argued to be 
different for my informants is the practice of eating communally. This could mean simply an 
emphasis on eating as a community, on sharing food, but it could also mean specifically the kind 
of plate on which a meal is served. Eating from communal plates is seen as essential to building 
feelings of closeness and bonding within the group, and is a totally different approach than one 
may find in the “modern world.” For example, one middle-aged man suggested that this practice 
is an essential differentiating practice for his community. He said: “Il y a aussi comme des 
normes—toujours en se référant à l’Islam. Par exemple, quand on mange dans un seul plat, [une] 
chose que l’on trouve rarement ici avec la civilisation moderne [où] chacun mange dans son 
																																																						
1008	130430_002—“It	is	forbidden	to	waste.	We	have	to	try	to	always	have	in	our	minds	that	there	are	people	who	
die	of	hunger.	Since	we	are	in	this	abundance,	especially	here	in	Canada,	we	eat	but	we	must	not	forget	that	there	
are	other	people,	so	we	do	not	waste.”	The	importance	of	not	wasting	food	was	also	mentioned	by	130430_004.	
1009	130615_003—“Parce	qu’on	est	vraiment	jugé	pour	ça.	Si	toi	tu	manges	et	le	restant	tu	le	jettes	dans	la	
poubelle	et	puis	y	a	un	autre,	même	s’il	n’est	pas	à	coté	de	toi	mais	y	a	un	autre	qui	meurt	de	faim,	tu	es	jugé	pour	
ça.	Parce	que	c’est	quand	même	la	responsabilité	de	chaque	personne	de	penser	aux	autres	aussi.	C’est	vraiment	
au	niveau	de	l’Islam.”	
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plat.”1010 This practice was not just a culturally specific practice in the mind of some of my 
informants, but also one that was seen as essential in Islam.1011 I had other informants explain to 
me the importance of communal eating, as most ideally represented by eating from one plate, in 
the many meals that I shared with members of the community. The feeling of “partager” 
(sharing) is given a visceral aspect around the communal plate.1012 Here we see a North African 
cultural practice being universalized to Islam. 
 The final—and fifth—“way of eating” that my informants explained to me as 
differentiating them from others was strictly modern and cultural, although often based on 
religious obligations. The practice of eating at restaurants, or rather, not eating at restaurants, was 
a significant marker of difference for the community that I was studying. The discourse of “for 
‘you’ it is not an issue but for ‘us’ it is” was prevalent in this regard. For example, one informant 
explained this difference as follows: 
On se prive de plusieurs choses…pour vous c’est une activité d’aller au restaurant, d’aller 
je ne sais pas, c’est normal pour vous de passer par la route et de passer par McDonald et 
prendre un hamburger. Pour nous, on n’y pense même pas. Donc pour manger, soit on 
prépare à la maison soit on doit chercher les restaurants qui font de la viande halal. Ça 
fait un peu “mind working.”1013 
 
The inability to go to a non-halal restaurant is just one of the reasons why “restaurant-going” was 
used as a mark of distinction between my informants and the larger “you” of the non-Muslim 
Québécois group that they envisioned around them. Another reason was simply that if one went 
to a restaurant, specifically a non-halal restaurant, there would be things that one could not eat 
and this would make one feel alienated from the group. Therefore, it was not a worthwhile 
experience for them.1014 Whatever the case, this inability to eat at the same place as certain 
“others” was another means of distinguishing those who were in the group from those who were 
																																																						
1010	130430_002—“There	are	also	standards,	as	always,	with	reference	to	Islam.	For	example,	when	we	eat	from	
one	plate,	something	we	find	rarely	here,	with	modern	civilization,	each	person	eats	from	his	own	plate.”	
1011	Perhaps	finding	its	significance	in	Hadith	such	as	“The	messenger	of	Allah	said:	‘Eat	together	and	do	not	eat	
separately,	for	the	blessing	is	in	being	together”	(Ibn	Majah,	3287,	as	found	on	http://sunnah.com/urn/1273950)	
1012	Participant	Observation,	July	13,	2013.	
1013	130615_002—“We	deprive	ourselves	of	many	things…for	you	it’s	an	activity	to	go	to	a	restaurant,	to	go,	I	don’t	
know,	it’s	normal	for	you	to	go	along	the	road	and	to	pass	by	McDonald’s	and	to	get	a	hamburger.	For	us,	we	don’t	
even	think	about	it.	So,	for	eating,	we	either	prepare	at	home	or	we	have	to	search	for	the	restaurants	that	use	
halal	meat.	That	makes	a	bit	of	‘mind	working.’”	
1014	130807_001.	
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outside of the group; it was one of the clear examples of barriers between “us” and “them” that 
many of my informants felt. 
 These barriers, or boundaries, between “us” and “them” as evidenced not only by what, 
but where and how, one eats were one clear realm where my informants professed some tension 
between their identity group and those that surrounded them. Whether one could go to a 
restaurant was just one example of these subtle boundaries that were in place. While a meal out 
at a restaurant was easy enough to avoid for many of my informants, meals shared together at 
school or at work made the difference more prominent.  
C’est vrai. Des fois quand on est dans des, par exemples, dans les universités et il y a 
comme un dîner communautaire, c’est vrai, des fois je sens une grande gêne. C’est pas 
que je sens de la pression mais c’est une pression comme indirecte. C’est parce que tout 
le monde est content, tout le monde a ramené un plat, et pour demander à l’autre “je 
m’excuse, mais qu’est-ce que tu as mis dans le plat?”… c’est pas tout le monde qui 
comprend ça. Alors ici, c’est vrai, ici … j’essaie d’éviter ce type de situation, sauf si la 
personne elle est déjà consciente que nous, on [ne] mange pas [ça]…oui ça je vais 
manger, mais si je ne suis pas sûr, non, je ne le mange pas. C’est parce qu’en même 
temps j’ai peur de brimer la personne qui est avec moi, “Ah qu’est-ce que tu as 
fait?”…j’aimerais pas poser ce genre de question, mais ça c’est difficile.1015 
 
One’s food practices may affect the kinds of social interactions one has and affect one’s group 
involvement and identification. “They” are the ones who can go to a potluck at school or work, 
whereas “we” are the ones who cannot. “They” are the ones who can eat at anyone’s house, “we” 
are the ones who cannot. Another informant explained,  
par exemple, le fait que je ne peux pas manger de porc, le fait que je ne peux pas manger 
de viande qui n’est pas certifiée halal, ça me bloque. Je ne peux pas m’inviter, je ne peux 
pas manger chez eux...je n’irais pas manger, c’est sûr.1016  
 
																																																						
1015	130424_001—“It’s	true.	There	are	times	where	we	are,	for	example,	at	a	university	and	there	is	like	a	
communal	dinner,	it’s	true,	sometimes	I	feel	a	great	discomfort,	and	it’s	not	that	I	feel	pressure	but	it’s	an	indirect	
pressure.	It’s	because	everyone	is	happy,	everyone	brings	a	dish.	Then	to	ask	the	other:	‘Pardon	me,	but	what	did	
you	put	in	the	dish?’	…	because	not	everyone	understands	that.	So	here,	it’s	true,	…	I	try	to	avoid	that	kind	of	
situation	unless	the	person	is	already	aware	that	we	do	not	eat	[certain	foods]…yes	then	I	will	eat	but	if	I	am	not	
sure,	no,	I	will	not	eat.	It’s	because,	at	the	same	time	I	am	afraid	of	insulting	the	person	who	is	with	me,	‘What	did	
you	do?’…I	would	prefer	not	to	pose	this	kind	of	question	but	it	is	difficult.”	
1016	130430_005—“For	example,	the	fact	that	I	cannot	eat	pork,	the	fact	that	I	cannot	eat	meat	that	isn’t	certified	
halal,	that	blocks	me.	I	cannot	be	invited,	I	cannot	go	eat	at	their	house…I	will	not	go	eat	that	is	certain.”	
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While my informants would invite me in to their homes for meals,1017 helping me to bridge the 
boundary between “us” and “them,” the fact that they felt that they could not go and eat at a non-
Muslim’s home was a boundary marking behaviour. 
It is not simply a matter of feeling like one cannot eat, or does not want to ask the 
question and make the situation awkward, but it is also a matter of feeling that people may be 
presenting a subtle notion of what it means to identify with a certain identity by what is the 
offering on the table.  
Ça, je l’ai remarqué une fois. A mon lieu de travail, il y avait le party de Noël et ils ont 
voulu organiser un dîner de Noël dans un restaurant. On était dans les services 4 ou 5 
musulmans. On avait de la difficulté. Finalement on n’est pas allé. Mais ça faisait partie 
du menu, l’alcool…et c’est comme s’ils essayaient d’imposer leurs idées.1018 
 
According to this informant, by eating in places with particular menu items, the organizers of the 
event may be presenting ideas about who they are and who one is expected to be to be a part of 
the group: “eat/drink this and you are one of ‘us.’” Having frequently been on the other side of 
this equation (the “them”), it is fair to say that non-Muslim Canadians rarely if ever determine 
menus to deliberately exclude others; exclusion rather comes typically through carelessness, 
compounded by ignorance of how deeply food issues can matter to those in the minority (halal, 
kosher, vegan, vegetarian, gluten-free, diabetic, etc.). This reality, however, is perceived 
differently by my informants. 
 Overall, my informants went further than the traditional Muslim food practices when 
distinguishing what made them different from others in relationship to food, so that it was not 
only a matter of what one ate, but how.1019 In this, they presented five different “ways of eating” 
between their group and the imagined “other.” My informants suggested that “we” are different 
from “them” because “we” (1) do not eat to excess, (2) only eat with our right hand, (3) do not 
waste food, (4) eat communally and (5) do not eat at restaurants. These were barriers that were in 
place, whether real or imagined, between “us” and “them.” 
 
																																																						
1017	Unlike	in	Paris	where	I	only	shared	meals	with	five	of	my	informants	in	their	homes,	in	Montréal	I	was	invited	
to	share	food	in	22	of	my	32	informants’	homes	(68.75%).	
1018	130520_001—“That	I	noticed	one	time.	At	my	place	of	work,	there	was	a	Christmas	party	and	they	wanted	to	
organize	a	Christmas	dinner	in	a	restaurant.	We	were	4	or	5	Muslims	in	the	service.	We	had	difficulty	and	in	the	
end	we	did	not	go.	But	that	was	part	of	the	menu,	alcohol…and	it	was	as	if	they	were	trying	to	impose	their	ideas.”	
1019	Douglas,	“Deciphering,”	66;	Fischler,	“Commensality,”	529;	Harvey,	“Respectfully	Eating,”	39-40;	Sutton,	
Remembrance	of	Repasts,	5.	
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7.2.5.2 Food as Bridge Between “Us” and “Them” 
The idea that food places boundaries or barriers between “us” and “them” was countered by the 
idea that it could also be a bridging element for those very boundaries.1020 I had informants 
suggest that, in fact, “they” were sympathetic of “our” foodways. Unlike some of the previous 
informants, who suggested that there was a boundary between “us” and “them” because they 
could not go to a restaurant together, that their approach to restaurant eating was different than 
other, more dominant approaches in Montréal, there were also informants who suggested that 
eating together was a common practice in Montréal. This was the case because “they” 
understood “us,” “they” were accepting of “us.”1021 The meeting of cultures, of different groups, 
can occur over food. There may be two separate groups, and what or how they eat may define 
these groups to some extent, but this difference can also be a point of entry, a place where 
meeting can occur. As Fischler argues, commensality “counteracts the essential, basic, 
biological, ‘exclusive selfishness of eating’ and turns it into, at the very least, a collective, social 
experience.”1022 In fact, he posits that eating together creates bonding, a bonding that is possible 
because it promotes equality among commensals.1023 
This is particularly true in Montréal, where curiosity and openness toward the other is 
common. For example, one informant explained to me the bridging power of food and its 
prevalence in Montréal: 
Ici au Québec, les deux cultures sont en train de se chevaucher, et c’est très bien. Il y a 
pas mal de point commun. Quand on découvre de plus en plus les Québécois, on 
commence, je ne dirais pas à les aimer mais à les apprécier…Et honnêtement, je les 
apprécie maintenant dans leurs… même dans leurs habitudes. Parfois, au début, je 
trouvais que c’était anormal qu’ils fassent ceci ou cela mais avec le temps je commence à 
les connaître. Et je pense qu’eux aussi commencent à nous connaître sur nos traditions, 
																																																						
1020	It	is	important	to	note	that	these	binaries	between	“us”	and	“them”	are	imagined	and	not	real.	There	are	many	
different	non-Muslim	subgroups,	especially	in	a	context	such	as	intercultural	Québec,	which	have	various	ways	of	
addressing	the	question	of	who	eats	what	and	with	whom?	Many	of	these	binary	statements	serve	a	larger	
psychological	role	than	a	real	means	of	distinguishing	between	groups.			
1021	130517_001—“Je	n’ai	jamais	trouvé	de	tension,	je	n’ai	jamais	trouvé	de	problèmes.	J’ai	plusieurs	amis	
québécois	et	quand	ils	sortent	faire	une	fête,	ils	savent	que	je	ne	bois	pas;	donc	ils	respectent	vraiment	mon	choix.	
Quand	on	va	dans	un	restaurant,	ils	savent	qu’ils	ne	doivent	pas	me	commander	du	porc	ou	de	la	viande.	Ils	me	
considèrent	végétarienne.	Ils	savent	que	c’est	du	poisson	ou	du	poulet,	un	plat	végétarien.	Je	n’ai	jamais	trouvé	
qu’il	a	des	tensions.”	(I	have	never	found	tensions,	I	never	found	problems.	I	have	many	Québécois	friends	and	
when	they	go	out	to	celebrate,	they	know	that	I	do	not	drink,	so	they	respect	my	choice.	When	we	go	to	a	
restaurant,	they	know	that	they	should	not	order	me	pork	or	meat.	They	consider	me	vegetarian.	They	know	that	it	
is	fish	or	chicken,	a	vegetarian	dish.	I	never	found	that	there	are	tensions.)	
1022	Fischler,	“Commensality,”	531.	
1023	Ibid.,	534.	
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nos plats, etc. C’est de bons augures. Et enfin je pense que la nourriture est l’un des 
vecteurs qui peut tisser un lien fort entre des populations, parce que dans la culture, d’une 
façon générale, la nourriture est un élément essentiel, très important.1024 
 
For this informant, and others like him, food is one of the essential tools for building bridges 
over the boundaries that are placed between communities. It is through sharing food that bonds 
are created, between groups rather than within groups at the expense of excluding the “other.” As 
another informant explained to me when presenting the centrality of food,  
parfois on ne comprend pas ce que dit l’autre, mais on mange avec lui; donc on 
commence à comprendre. Et chez nous, du point de vue culture, quand tu manges avec 
quelqu’un, c’est partager son repas, il devient presque un frère pour nous.1025  
 
This informant suggests that while there are two different groups present in this sort of exchange, 
eating together breaks down some of the barriers between these groups. Food becomes an access 
point to “them.”1026  
 While this access to the “other” through food is a possibility in any setting, it is 
particularly successful in a place such as Québec/Canada where a national food culture is not as 
restricted as a place such as France. Québécois(es)/Canadians are seen as particularly good at 
approaching the other through food because “we” do not have our own, distinct food culture that 
we are trying to protect.1027 One informant told me the following story as an example of this fact. 
Il y avait un monsieur et deux femmes. Ils ont avoué ça. Ils ont dit: “le plus beau en nous, 
c’est que l’on a accepté les autres cuisines et on a goûté de tout.”...Après, je leur ai dit 
“moi j’en connais rien de votre cuisine” et ils m’ont dit, “nous, on n’a pas grand-chose.” 
(Elle rigole.) C’est ça qu’ils m’ont dit. “Notre cuisine ça ne goûte rien. C’est ça la cuisine 
																																																						
1024	130517_002—“Here	in	Québec,	the	two	cultures	are	in	the	process	of	overlapping	and	that	is	really	good.	
There	are	many	common	points.	When	we	discover	more	and	more	the	Québécois(es),	we	begin,	I	won’t	say	liking	
them,	but	appreciating	them…and	honestly,	I	appreciate	them	now	in	their…	even	in	their	habits.	Sometimes	early	
on,	I	found	it	abnormal	that	they	did	this	or	that	but	with	time	I	begin	to	know	them.	And	I	think	that	they	as	well	
begin	to	know	us	through	our	traditions,	our	dishes,	etc.	It’s	good	omens.	And	in	the	end	I	think	that	food	is	one	of	
the	vectors	that	can	build	a	strong	bond	between	populations.	Because	in	culture,	in	a	general	sense,	food	is	an	
essential	element,	very	important.”	
1025	130727_001—“Sometimes	we	do	not	understand	what	the	other	said	but	we	eat	with	him	and	we	begin	to	
understand.	And	for	us,	from	a	cultural	point	of	view,	when	you	eat	with	someone,	it’s	sharing	his	meal,	he	
becomes	almost	like	a	brother	for	us.”	
1026	“Pour	approcher,	il	découvre	des	choses	qu’il	n’a	pas	goûté	avant	et	comme	ça,	ça	donne	l’occasion	à	des	
discussions,	pour	s’ouvrir	sur	des	autres	cultures,	sur	des	autres	idées,	sur	des	autres	religions.	C’est	comme	une	
occasion”	(130612_001).	
1027	Many	Québécois(es)	would	argue	that	Québec	does	have	more	of	a	food	culture	than	the	rest	of	Canada.	Using	
foods	such	as	poutine,	pate	chinois,	the	food	at	the	cabin	au	sucre	(tarte	au	sucre,	baked	beans,	pork	dishes),	
tourtieres,	smoked	meat,	Montréal-style	bagels,	St-Hubert	rotisserie	chicken,	pouding	chomeur,	etcetera,	as	
examples.	
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canadienne, elle ne goûte rien. Heureusement que l’on a ça, on a accueilli les autres 
cultures. Donc on a goûté de tout.”1028 
 
Embedded in this response is stereotypical Canadian humility (“our food is tasteless compared to 
yours”) and openness to other tastes, but the response clearly pleased this informant, who felt 
that his food traditions were honoured—needed, even, to enrich the broader culture. It might be 
“their” food, but in light of Canadian multiculturalism it becomes a part of “our” identity. This is 
reminiscent of Fischler’s statement that “if eating a food makes one become more like that food, 
then those sharing the same food become more like each other.”1029 The Canadian/Québécois(e) 
may integrate “their” food practices as a means of understanding the Canadian/ Québécois “us.” 
As a result, this lack of concern for protecting a type of food culture allows for a protection of 
the food cultures of the “other.”  
Many of my informants consequently told anecdotal stories of non-Muslim 
Québécois(es) going out of their way to make sure that they would have cultural and religiously 
appropriate food to eat, thus allowing them to continue their abundant food practices from back 
home.1030 This consequently served as one effective means of maintaining their transnational 
identities. 
 
7.3 A Split Centre of Gravity: Navigating Transnational Belonging for Maghrébine Muslim 
Immigrants in Montréal 
 
Although I have discussed the various identities that my Montréal informants hold separately 
above, these numerous identities interact as a part of my informants’ overarching transnational 
identity. Before addressing the transnational identities and practices of my informants in 
Montréal, specifically their transnational food practices, I would like to briefly address my use of 
transnationalism here. First, as I discussed in Chapter 4, I take Vertovec’s definition of 
transnationalism as the base of my own understanding of the term so that transnationalism 
																																																						
1028	130703_004—“There	was	a	man	and	two	women.	They	confessed	just	that.	They	said	‘the	most	beautiful	thing	
about	us	is	that	we	accept	other	cuisines	and	we	taste	everything.’	…After	I	said	to	them	‘I	myself	do	not	know	
anything	about	your	cuisine’	and	they	said	to	me,	‘we	do	not	have	much.’	(She	laughs.)	That’s	what	they	told	me.	
‘Our	cuisine	tastes	of	nothing.	That	is	Canadian	cuisine,	it	tastes	of	nothing.	Luckily	we	have	that	[the	fact],	we	
welcome	other	cultures.	So	we	have	tried	everything.’”	
1029	Fischler,	“Commensality,”	533.	
1030	130518_001;	130615_002;	130731_002.	
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encompasses “sustained cross-border relationships, patterns of exchange, affiliations and social 
formations spanning nation-states”1031 I would like to develop this further, and discuss why I use 
transnational instead of diaspora in this context. Vertovec describes how “diaspora” can refer to 
three things: “(a) the process of becoming scattered, (b) the community living in foreign parts, or 
(c) the place or geographic space in which the dispersed groups live.”1032 For the purposes of my 
exploration below, I am using Vertovec’s second definition of diaspora. 
When trying to determine whether a group should be labeled as transnational or diasporic 
the principal orientating question that I ask is “Where is the identity’s centre of gravity?”1033 In 
considering this question, I would argue that individuals and groups who profess a strong 
longing for home, with their identifying centre of gravity firmly located in the homeland, are 
individuals and groups on which one can place the identity of “diasporic.” On the other hand, 
transnational individuals and groups have a comfort with many homes, moving between those 
homes (whether physically or psychologically) with none necessarily claiming one’s identity 
more than the other. While there was some presence of the “myth of return” in my informants’ 
experiences (one informant explained to me that many Maghrébines keep houses in the Maghreb 
even though no one lives there,1034 or some profess a desire to retire in the Maghreb1035), most 
were quite comfortable in their Canadian home, while still feeling as though they were connected 
to a “home” at a distance. Their feet were firmly placed on either side of the transnational fence, 
with their identity strongly placed in both the Maghreb and Canada. Canada had become “home” 
but the Maghreb (whether Morocco, Algeria or Tunisia) was still their orientating 
“homeland.”1036 In agreement with Peggy Levitt, I see transnational migrants as “individuals 
																																																						
1031	Vertovec,	Transnationalism,	2.	
1032	Vertovec,	Transnationalism,	130.	
1033	Parts	of	this	section	are	published	in	Rachel	Brown,	“Bread	Beyond	Borders:	Food	as	a	Lens	into	Thomas	
Tweed’s	Theory	of	Religion,”	Bulletin	for	the	Study	of	Religion	(forthcoming	2017).	
1034	Personal	correspondence	with	the	researcher,	April	1,	2013.	
1035	Personal	correspondence	with	the	researcher,	March	1,	2013.	
1036	For	some	the	homeland	was	specific	to	one	of	the	countries	of	the	Maghreb,	but	for	others,	all	three	countries	
acted	as	an	orientating	homeland.	In	a	context	such	as	Canada,	where	the	distance	between	homeland	and	host-
land	is	large,	similar	regional	identities	can	begin	to	act	as	national	bonding	factors.	For	example,	in	Paris	there	are	
large	communities	of	Moroccan,	Algerian	and	Tunisian	immigrants	and	as	a	result	in	that	context	one	can	easily	
maintain	a	specific	national	identity;	the	immigrant	is	surrounded	by	enough	of	his	national	compatriots	to	solidly	
support	his	national	identity.	In	Montréal,	on	the	other	hand,	the	Maghrébine	community	is	much	more	interlaced,	
with	regional	Maghrébine	identity	sometimes	taking	on	more	importance	in	one’s	transnational	practice.	Following	
from	this	regional	identity,	the	Algerian	immigrant	can	make	not	only	an	Algerian	dish	to	feel	connected	to	the	
homeland	but	also	a	Moroccan	dish.	His	identity’s	centre	of	gravity	is	in	Canada,	Algeria	and	more	broadly	the	
Maghreb.	
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who live aspects of their social, economic and political lives in at least two settings.”1037 Another 
essential reason why I have chosen the word “transnational” and not “diasporic” to describe the 
Maghrébine Muslim community in Montréal is simply because of the self-understanding of my 
informants. I would argue that most of my informants, and the people with whom I interacted 
more generally in my field work, would not see themselves as part of a diasporic community 
(they are not praying “next year in Algiers”). Instead they were comfortable with the fluid 
movement between various identities and places that is essential to transnational identity.1038 
 
7.3.1 The Many Means of Bridging the Gap Between Homeland and Host-land 
While my informants move between both homeland and host-land, there is still a gap both 
physically and psychologically that must be bridged. There are various ways that this gap is 
traversed. Before exploring the role of food in the transnational agenda, I briefly explain how my 
informants bridge this gap.1039 While in France the need to recreate homeland in host-land was 
less prevalent, because of the closer distance of France to the Maghreb and frequent trips back 
“home” this need was much greater in Montréal. In Québec, where distances are much farther 
than between France and the Maghreb in terms of space, climate and culture, the transnational 
effort is much more important and deliberate. Canada seems more foreign, not having a colonial 
relationship to the Maghreb, and there is less overlap in culture and experience, making the two 
sides of the transnational land that the immigrant straddles quite distinct. Because of this, the 
action that the individual or group must take to bridge the two sides of one’s transnational 
identity may be much more deliberate than consequential in Montréal. Levitt posits that one 
deliberate way that that migrants maintain connection to their sending communities via religion 
is to “engage in informal, popular religious practices that affirm their continued attachments to a 
																																																						
1037	Levitt,	“You	know,	Abraham,”	850.	
1038	Levitt	posits	that	diasporic	studies	tend	“to	treat	migrant	and	nonmigrant	religious	life	as	discrete	entities	
rather	than	as	occurring	within	the	same	transnational	social	field	and	influencing	each	other”	(Levitt,	“You	know,	
Abraham,”	848).	Because	I	focus	specifically	on	the	migrant’s	religious	life	in	his/her	host	context,	Levitt	would	
most	likely	argue	that	I	am	in	fact	conducting	diasporic	studies	and	not	transnational	studies.	
1039	I	already	mentioned	the	“myth	of	return”	above.	This	means	of	staying	connected	to	the	homeland,	with	an	
ideal	of	returning	one	day,	is	a	powerful	means	to	cross	the	psychological	boundary	between	homeland	and	host-
land.	The	transnational	migrant	may	not	be	able	to	physically	bridge	the	large	gap	between	the	Maghreb	and	
Montréal,	but	envisioning	a	“one	day”	where	they	may	be	able	to	do	so	helps	him/her	to	feel	connected	to	that	
homeland	in	the	here	and	now.	Even	if	one	hopes	to	retire	in	the	Maghreb,	there	is	also	a	strong	sense	that	one	
will	stay	in	Canada,	and	this	desire	to	“return	home”	is	more	a	psychological	trope	than	an	actual	plan	(Personal	
correspondence	with	the	researcher,	Field	Journal,	April	1,	2013).	
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particular sending-country group or place.”1040 These informal actions take on an  important role 
in the migrant experience. 
One of these deliberate actions that many of informants took in Montréal was to organize 
and construct their living spaces in ways reminiscent of their living spaces in the Maghreb. One 
evening during a meal with an informant she explained what houses in the Maghreb are like and 
proceeded to tell me how immigrants set up their homes in the host-land as a result. She 
explained that Maghrébines like to have all the rooms closed off from one another. Most 
importantly they like a closed kitchen, which proves difficult in Canada where people like open 
concept home spaces. They do not like having a living room that you enter directly from the 
front door. In her apartment for example, they made the dining room the living room so that 
people could come in the front door and not necessarily see the people in the living room. They 
also had a curtain hung up in the doorway between the kitchen and the “living room” so that 
those two rooms felt separate.1041 I had noted on previous occasions during my fieldwork that 
many of my informants had set up their living rooms with multiple couches, often with elaborate 
Moroccan style furniture.1042 I had noticed this fact so often that I wrote the following in my field 
journal: 
We also spent a long time talking about the new living room that they would be installing 
in the next couple of weeks. They live in a very normal Canadian split-level house, but 
are going to transform the living room to a traditional Moroccan living room and the 
pride and excitement for this task was evident. They are having traditional Moroccan 
couches built along with matching tables and all of the cushions and tapestries will 
match. At another’s house on Saturday I also noticed that her living room seemed very 
traditional and was told that it was very Moroccan. Again, as I have noted before, most 
Maghrébine living rooms look well suited to host a large amount of people. It is clear that 
receiving guests is incredibly important in their culture. This informant who was building 
her new living room was pleased that she would have a traditional living room for 
Ramadan this year and has invited me back to see it when it is done and to celebrate with 
them.1043  
 
As I noted in this field journal entry, my informants lived in “very normal Canadian” homes, and 
yet when one walked in to the home one was transported to another land, to the Maghreb and the 
“homeland.” This home structure became so clear that I was able to start identifying someone’s 
																																																						
1040	Levitt,	“You	know,	Abraham,”	851.	
1041	Participant	observation,	Field	Journal,	May	20,	2013.	
1042	Participant	observation,	Field	Journal,	May	18,	2013.	
1043	Field	journal,	May	19,	2013.	
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cultural background before I even knew from where he or she had come. For example, one 
afternoon I went to interview an informant on my own (without my usual Maghrébine hostess) 
and immediately identified the living room set up. As soon as I entered the living room space I 
got my first hint that the woman I was meeting with was Moroccan. I did not know her 
nationality before arriving at her house, and could not tell by the look of the apartment, but as 
soon as I saw the living room it was clear. There were multiple couches/beds lining all the walls 
of the living room, creating a mini amphitheatre of seating and extra sleeping space. There were 
elaborate, colourful, and Mediterranean style couch coverings, pillows and drapes, which all 
matched. The table was decorated with a tray on which was a traditional Moroccan tea pot and 
tea glasses. I expressed how much I enjoyed the Moroccan style living room, and she seemed 
impressed that I even noticed or would know what it meant. For her it was a sense of pride, but a 
fact not normally noticed by an “outsider.”1044 By structuring their outwardly appearing 
Canadian homes in inward Maghrébine ways, these informants took deliberate steps to connect 
with the homeland in real and tangible ways. 
 
7.3.2 Food as Transnational Bridge  
While some of the transnational efforts touch on the tangible, others address subtler ways of 
connecting to one’s homeland. Ultimately, the role of memory in transnational practice is 
essential for those who live at a distance too large to bridge physically. As argued by Sutton, it is 
through memory that one accesses the past and imagines oneself in relation to that past.1045 The 
process of making those memories come to life is another way that my informants connect to the 
homeland. This process is essential for “remembering” where one came from, without which one 
may feel lost and confused. As one informant explained to me, “après je peux vous dire que 
quelqu’un qui ne tiens pas à sa culture, à ses normes, les normes de son pays, tu le trouves un 
petit peu perdu. Il faut garder cette culture-là. Il faut être fier d’elle. Tu es fier d’avoir une culture 
comme ça.”1046  
																																																						
1044	Participant	observation,	Field	Journal,	May	29,	2013.		
1045	Sutton,	Remembrance	of	Repasts.	
1046	130518_001—“After,	I	can	tell	you	that	a	person	who	does	not	hold	on	to	his	culture,	his	norms,	the	norms	of	
his	country,	you	will	find	him	a	bit	lost.	One	must	guard	that	culture.	One	must	be	proud	of	it.	You	are	proud	to	
have	a	culture	like	that.”	
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 This feeling of being lost often comes from the fact that one feels far from one’s origins 
when one does not engage in memory-accessing practices. For one informant, this was 
noticeable specifically through what she ate or did not eat. For her, “c’est important pour moi 
parce que l’on a grandi en consommant les plats marocains. Si parfois je ne mange pas un plat 
marocain, je me sens comme si je suis éloigné de mon origine.”1047 Ultimately, attachment to the 
homeland is often done through memory and food plays important role in memory making and 
recall.1048 
For many, memories of the homeland are tied to and evoked by foods and smells, 
because, “c’est des odeurs qui ramènent des souvenirs.”1049 According to one informant, 
accessing memories, whether through food or some other means, is an essential aspect of the 
immigrant experience. While all people need this access to their homeland, she argues, “certaines 
personnes ont besoin de se retrouver dans leur communauté” in order to find that “d’autres 
personnes comme moi se contentent d’épices.”1050 Engaging in certain food practices, making 
particular dishes, seasoning with specific spices, gathering around a table that is set in a 
particular way, in a kitchen that is set up like it would be in the homeland, are all means of 
accessing “home” for the Maghrébine immigrant in Montréal. These practices traverse time and 
space, recreating places and times for the people engaged in them.  
I remember one afternoon going to an informant’s home for an interview and lunch, and 
her explaining this experience to me. She explained that many of the dishes we were enjoying 
(chorba, saffron chicken, tajine) were dishes common for Ramadan and so lunch would take us 
back to Ramadan. She reflected the conclusion that Sutton posits, that referencing and using 
specific foods “has the effect of placing one in time.”1051 When she sat and smelled the chorba in 
front of her and looked at the tajine across the table she commented that she was being taken 
back in time and place to Algeria during Ramadan.1052 For many informants, like this woman, 
using food to access memory was a way of recreating “home” in one’s current “home,” i.e. the 
																																																						
1047	130615_002—“It’s	important	for	me	because	we	grew	up	eating	Moroccan	dishes.	If	sometimes	I	do	not	eat	a	
Moroccan	dish,	I	feel	as	though	I	am	away	from	my	home/origin.”	
1048	Sutton,	Remembrance	of	Repasts,	2,	74,	89,	100-101.	
1049	130501_001—“It’s	scents	that	bring	memories.”	
1050	130706_001—“Certain	people	need	to	be	in	their	community”…other	people	like	me,	simply	spice.”	
1051	Sutton,	Remembrance	of	Repasts,	28.	
1052	Participant	observation,	Field	Journal,	May	2,	2013.	
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host-land. In fact, she noted, one feels like “home” when one cooks and enjoys food from the 
homeland. 
C’est ça, je trouve que ma mère, quand elle fait les plats traditionnels, ça nous touche 
parce que c’est vraiment notre enfance. C’est la nourriture que l’on a connue quand on 
était jeune. On n’allait pas dans les restaurants. Quand j’avais 5, 6 ans, je n’allais pas 
dans les restaurants comme je vais maintenant, donc je n’avais pas accès à une grande 
variété. C’est pour ça que maintenant j’en mange. C’est vraiment quelque chose qui me 
touche.1053 
 
For this women and other informants like her, by making the home food “on se sent comme si on 
était dans notre pays,”1054 “on se sent chez soi.”1055 The power of food to traverse boundaries is 
so strong that some even use food as a means to escape the realities of the Canadian context. To 
feel nostalgia for the homeland, and even to flee winter (“évader l’hiver”) and evoke the summer 
of the Maghreb, informants make dishes from back home to figuratively leave the reality of 
Canada behind for the dream of the warm homeland. 
 As a result, people eat the food from the homeland in larger percentage, more than they 
eat the food of the host-land. Although, my informants did state that they make food from 
outside the homeland from time to time, they eat “their” food primarily. Let us remember that, 
with one exception, we are dealing with first-generation immigrants for whom “home” is still 
vivid. In fact, one informant suggested that this was a “normal” pattern for people of any 
background. For her, she ate “les plats algériens. Et tous les Algériens mangent leurs plats, les 
Iraniens mangent leurs plats, les Indous, les Tunisiens, les Marocains mangent leurs plats. Mais 
de temps en temps on fait des exceptions.”1056  
 I had informants explain that while they try other dishes, especially Canadian dishes, for 
the most part the base of their cooking was Maghrébine.1057 For some, cooking majority 
Maghrébine food is simply a matter of habit; the home food is what they are used to. For 
example, one informant explained that “c’est l’habitude. Moi je suis arrivé ici, j’avais l’âge de 33 
																																																						
1053	130517_001—“That’s	it,	I	find	that	when	my	mother	makes	traditional	dishes,	that	touches	us	because	it’s	
really	our	childhood.	It’s	the	food	we	knew	when	we	were	young.	We	didn’t	go	to	restaurants.	When	I	was	5,	6	
years	old,	I	didn’t	go	to	restaurants	like	I	go	now	so	I	didn’t	have	access	to	much	variety.	It’s	for	that	reason	that	
now	I	eat	it,	it’s	really	something	that	touches	me.”	
1054	130517_001—“We	feel	as	if	we	are	in	our	country.”	
1055	130612_001—“We	feel	at	home.”	
1056	130401_001—“Algerian	dishes.	And	all	Algerians	eat	their	dishes,	Iranians	eat	their	dishes,	Hindus,	Tunisians,	
Moroccans	eat	their	dishes.	But	from	time	to	time	we	make	exceptions.”	
1057	130430_004;	cooks	70%	Moroccan	food	at	home,	130430_006;	cooks	80%	Algerian	food	at	home,	
130501_001.	
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ans … c’est toute une vie que j’ai passé là-bas; pour changer après 33 ans c’est un peu difficile, 
et c’est ça.”1058 On the other hand, for many, the food practice is the easiest form of connection 
to the homeland. When everything else around them feeds their Canadian or Western identity, 
the traditional dishes of the Maghreb feed their home identity. When I asked one informant why 
it was important for her that she prepare traditional dishes from the Maghreb she illustrated this 
fact. She explained that “c’est ma culture. Je suis là au Canada mais je garde toujours ma culture. 
Elle est là, elle est née avec moi, elle a grandi avec moi, donc je ne peux pas. Je cuisine d’autres 
plats, mais le couscous c’est ma culture, c’est depuis que je suis née.”1059  
 This informant and others like her make the home food in larger percentage because they 
want to “rester liés, pour ne pas perdre le lien avec le pays,”1060 while nevertheless remaining 
open “aux plats que l’on ne connait pas.”1061  
 Finally, informants also stressed the importance of cooking the home food as a means of 
educating their children about the homeland. It was essential in passing on the Maghrébine side 
of one’s transnational identity. 
Toujours on parle des anciens temps à nos enfants. Ma maman faisait ça, ma maman…donc 
ils savent maintenant que ça c’est un plat marocain, ça c’est un plat…Ils savent, ils 
différencient. Quand tu mets le poulet avec l’olive, c’est un plat marocain—spécialement 
c’est un plat marocain. Ils savent. Il faut que les enfants sachent ça. C’est comme ça qu’on 
tient notre culture: avec la cuisine et avec beaucoup d’autres choses.1062 
 
Consistency with one’s food practice from back home is important, in sum, because of habit, 
because of a desire to maintain links with the homeland, and because of the need to educate the 
younger generations. 
 While most of my informants largely cook the home food, a significant difference than 
the cohort I interviewed in France, there were clear indications of the mixing of the two sides of 
one’s transnational identity in one’s food practice. This was evidenced in people having dishes 
																																																						
1058	130424_001—“It’s	habit.	I	arrived	here	when	I	was	33	years	old,	…	it	was	a	whole	lifetime	that	I	passed	there,	
to	change	after	33	years	is	a	bit	difficult,	and	that’s	it.”	
1059	130518_001—“It’s	my	culture.	I	am	here	in	Canada,	but	I	always	keep	my	culture.	It	is	there,	it	was	born	with	
me,	it	grew	with	me,	so	I	cannot.	I	cook	other	dishes,	but	couscous	is	my	culture,	it	is	since	I	was	born.”	
1060	130731_002—“Remain	attached,	so	to	not	lose	the	link	with	the	country.”	
1061	130430_002—“[We	remain	open	to]	dishes	that	we	do	not	know.”	
1062	130518_001—“We	always	speak	about	the	old	days	to	our	children.	My	mother	made	this,	my	mother…so	
they	know	now	that	it	is	a	Moroccan	dish,	that’s	a	dish…they	know,	they	differentiate.	When	you	put	chicken	with	
olives,	it’s	a	Moroccan	dish,	it’s	specially	a	Moroccan	dish.	They	know.	It’s	necessary	that	the	children	know	that.	
That’s	what	maintains	our	culture.	With	cuisine	and	with	many	other	things.”	
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from both their Maghrébine and their Québécois/French homes at the same time. For example, 
one evening during Ramadan, this mixing of both side of transnational identity was clearly 
represented in the dessert table. For the most part the meal consisted of entirely Maghrébine 
food, but there was an important addition of a Québécois/French element. After a feast of purely 
Maghrébine fare, the mint tea and Maghrébine sweets were placed on the table, alongside a 
lemon meringue pie, a dessert that my Algerian host pointed out was her favourite dessert.1063 
Here we see an example of the “Dual National” identity according to Peggy Levitt,1064 and an 
example of Paulette Kershenovich Schuster’s “parallel eating.”1065 To an outside eye, this dessert 
seemed out of place considering all of the dishes that had preceded it, and yet, it was a natural 
inclusion in the Ramadan meal for this transnational informant. These combinations of cultures 
and contexts in food practice do not just show up in what is placed on the table beside particular 
dishes, but also within a single dish itself. One informant explained to me how she took a 
Québécois dish and altered it with Maghrébine ingredients as an inevitable outworking of the 
fact that “on vit avec deux cultures,” and: 
on essaie de prendre de celle-ci et de celle-là et on fait un mélange…C’est bien de mélanger 
deux choses différentes, puis ça donne quelque chose de bien. C’est s’inspiré de deux 
choses pour faire quelque chose de bien. Et tout le monde l’a aimé.1066 
 
Food is clearly representative not only of one’s connection to the homeland but also to the host-
land. 
 That being said, food practices that support the connection to the homeland become more 
prevalent in the host-land context than those practices would have been in the homeland. While 
one may not need to stress one’s Canadian identity through what one eats, not only because 
Canada does not have a distinct food culture but also because one is in a context where everyone 
eats in their own way, the need to stress one’s Maghrébine identity outside of the Maghreb is 
strong. This is why there is not only consistency of food practice with what one did in the 
Maghreb in the transnational context, but why there is in fact an increase in homeland food 
																																																						
1063	Participant	Observation,	Field	Journal,	July	11,	2013.	
1064	Levitt,	God	Needs	No	Passport,	77.	
1065	Kershenovich	Schuster,	“Habaneros	and	Shwarma,”	290.	
1066	130520_001—“We	live	with	two	cultures….	We	try	to	take	from	this	and	from	that	and	we	make	a	mix…It’s	
good	to	mix	two	different	things	because	it	gives	something	good.	It’s	inspired	by	two	things	to	make	something	
good.	And	everyone	liked	it.”	She	went	on	to	say,	“Je	mélange,	je	fais	le	pâté	chinois	[a	variation	of	Shepherd’s	Pie]	
à	ma	façon.	Je	fais	la	poutine,	des	fois	je	la	fais.	Je	mélange	tout.”	
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traditions outside of the homeland. One informant gave a clear example of this increase in 
homeland food practice in the following story:  
Il ne faut pas dire que c’est juste pour les enfants parce qu’on a cette nostalgie du pays. 
Par exemple, quand j’étais en Algérie, je ne préparais jamais le pain. Quand je suis au 
Canada, je prépare le pain. Quand en Algérie je leur dis que je prépare le pain. “Ah bon?” 
C’est bizarre parce qu’on achetait le pain. Je ne préparais pas mon propre pain. Mais ici, 
tellement que l’on aime cette nostalgie on prépare notre pain. Il y a beaucoup de choses 
que je ne faisais pas en Algérie, mais ici je les fais.1067 
 
When in a context where one’s homeland identity and practice is not the norm, one may have to 
ramp up one’s efforts in order to maintain the transnational connection.  
 The increase in verifying of ingredients on any given product is another realm where 
transnational Muslims demonstrate their connection to a homeland where such verification was 
not necessary. Many women offered stories similar to the following: 
Puisque j’habite ici quand je fais le magasinage avec mes enfants, je vérifie toujours la 
composition des ingrédients de chaque aliment que j’achète parce que je ne dois pas 
trouver de la gélatine, c’est-à-dire le porc, parce que le porc, on ne peut pas le manger 
dans notre religion. Quand j’étais dans mon pays, comme c’est un pays musulman, on ne 
se souciait pas avec quoi ça avait été fait, mais maintenant ici on devient de plus en plus 
vigilant. Vu le contexte je respecte bien, c’est le pays qui nous a accueilli, on le respecte 
bien, mais en même temps je dois respecter Dieu, ce que Dieu m’a dit de manger qu’en 
soit pour moi ou pour mes enfants.1068 
 
																																																						
1067	130520_002—“One	cannot	say	that	it	is	just	for	the	children	because	we	have	this	nostalgia	for	our	country.	
For	example,	when	I	was	in	Algeria,	I	never	made	bread.	When	I	am	in	Canada,	I	make	bread.	When	in	Algeria	I	tell	
them	that	I	make	bread	‘Oh	really?’	It’s	strange	because	we	bought	bread.	I	never	made	my	own	bread.	But	here,	
because	I	love	that	nostalgia,	we	make	our	bread.	There	are	lots	of	things	that	I	did	not	do	in	Algeria	but	I	do	there	
here.”	
1068	130430_001—“Because	I	live	here	when	I	do	the	shopping	with	my	children	I	always	verify	the	composition	of	
ingredients	in	every	product	that	I	buy	because	I	cannot	find	gelatin,	that	is	pork,	because	we	cannot	eat	pork	in	
our	religion.	When	I	was	in	my	country	because	it	was	a	Muslim	country	we	did	not	worry	about	what	it	was	made	
with	but	now,	here,	we	have	become	even	more	vigilant.	Given	the	context,	I	respect	well,	it’s	the	country	that	
welcomed	us,	we	respect	it	well	but	at	the	same	time	we	must	respect	God,	what	God	told	me	to	eat	whether	for	
myself	of	for	my	children.”	Here’s	another	instance:	“en	Algérie	ou	dans	les	pays	arabes	c’est	tout	halal,	donc	on	ne	
se	pose	pas	la	question.	Depuis	que	l’on	va	à	l’étranger,	bien	que	je	vous	dis	que	certains	imams	nous	disent	même	
à	la	mosquée	que	lorsque	l’on	est	dans	un	pays	étranger	et	que	l’on	n’a	pas	le	choix	on	peut	manger	non	halal—ce	
n’est	pas	une	faute	grave—mais	tant	que	le	halal	existe	autant	l’utiliser”	(130401_001)	;	In	Algeria	or	in	the	Arab	
countries	it’s	all	halal;	thus,	one	doesn’t	ask	the	question.	Since	we’ve	gone	abroad,	even	though	I’m	telling	you	
that	some	imams	tell	us,	even	at	the	mosque,	that	when	one	finds	oneself	in	a	foreign	country	and	we	don’t	have	a	
choice	one	can	eat	non-hallal	food,	it’s	not	a	major	problem—but	to	the	extent	that	halal’s	available,	use	it.”	
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While one respects the host context, one tries hard to maintain one’s practice as one did in the 
homeland. It is an effort that often requires not only a consistency, but an increase in religious 
and cultural food practices. 
 If these food practices are essential to the transnational Maghrébine Muslim in Montréal, 
then the necessary ingredients for these practices must be available. If my informants were 
cooking 70, 80, 95 percent Maghrébine dishes in Montréal, the availability of these ingredients 
becomes particularly important. All my informants suggested that it was easy to access all the 
necessary ingredients from the Maghreb in Montréal. As one informant pronounced, “On n’a pas 
de difficulté à trouver les ingrédients. On trouve tout, sur les épiceries, je ne dirais pas halal, 
mais les épices. On arrive à préparer tous les plats que l’on veut préparer.”1069  
 Beyond just the facility of finding the necessary ingredients for various traditional dishes, 
one can, in fact, find even more than one could in the homeland in the transnational context. One 
young woman explained to me “qu’au Québec, c’est rendu que tu peux faire n’importe quel plat 
de n’importe quel pays, n’importe quelle culture.”1070 In fact, she went on to explain:  
Je pense que même ici on a accès à plus de choses que dans nos pays parce qu’ici ils sont 
disponibles toute l’année…Je trouve que c’est plus facile ici de magasiner, d’aller au 
magasin, d’acheter les choses et de cuisiner.1071  
 
For other informants, it was not only the seasonal accessibility of ingredients but also the fact 
that one could find ingredients from all regions of the Maghreb that made the transnational 
context easier to cook traditional dishes.1072 We saw the same phenomenon earlier with my 
Parisian informants. While in the Maghreb they would only have access to the ingredients of 
their region, while in Canada they had access to all ingredients, allowing for a greater ease of 
access to multiple traditional dishes. 
																																																						
1069	130430_002—“We	don’t	have	any	difficulty	finding	the	ingredients.	We	find	everything,	in	the	grocery	stores;	I	
won’t	say	halal,	but	the	spices.	We	manage	to	prepare	all	of	the	dishes	that	we	want	to	prepare.”	
1070	130517_001—“In	Québec,	it’s	come	to	the	point	that	you	can	make	any	dish	from	any	country,	any	culture.”	
1071	130517_001—“I	think	that	here	there	is	even	access	to	more	things	than	in	our	country	because	here	they	are	
available	all	year…I	find	it	easier	here	to	shop,	to	go	to	the	store,	to	buy	things	and	to	cook.”	
1072	“Il	y	a	toutes	les	choses.	Tout	le	Maroc	il	est	là.	Je	trouve	même	des	choses	parfois,	je	me	dis,	je	n’ai	jamais	
pensé	l’acheter	au	Maroc,	tiens	je	vais	l’acheter”	(130529_003);	“on	peut	trouver	tout,	même	plus	que	chez	nous.	
Par	exemple,	ici	on	peut	importer	des	choses	de	tout	le	Maroc,	toutes	les	régions	marocaines.	Par	exemple,	au	
Maroc,	pour	trouver	un	produit	il	faut	chercher	un	petit	peu.	Est-ce	que	vous	avez	le	produit	de	la	ville	de	Safi,	par	
exemple?	Safi	s’éloigne	de	400km	de	chez	moi,	de	la	capitale	de	Raba.	Ici	on	peut	tout	trouver,	on	peut	trouver	des	
tajines,	tout”	(130615_001).		
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 Although it seems as though it is easy to access all of the necessary ingredients to make 
traditional Maghrébine food, there are still some people who bring things back with them from 
the Maghreb.1073 There are those who bring couscous, spices, etcetera, from the Maghreb when 
they come back from visits to the homeland.1074 Even if one can find the ingredients, and often 
even more, there is still a desire to have a physical connection to the homeland through the 
ingredients that one cooks with. One woman explained that, “même les épices pour la chorba, je 
les ramène d’Algérie. Ça se vend ici, mais je ne les ai jamais utilisées—pour la chorba surtout, je 
ramène celles de l’Algérie.”1075 As can be seen with this example, even if one has access to the 
necessary ingredients, there is still possibly something missing in the host-land that one can only 
gain access to in the homeland. Hence, people try and bring that difference back with them when 
they visit the homeland. Like my informants in France, many attribute this difference, that 
missing “je ne sais quoi,” to a difference in taste—both real and imagined. I had informants 
explain to me that even if one could find all necessary ingredients, the vegetables, meat, grains, 
everything tastes better in the Maghreb.1076 For most of my informants, like those in Paris, this 
difference in taste came from the belief (they called it a fact, but evidence belies their claims) 
that in the Maghreb the ingredients were organic while the ingredients in Canada were 
industrial.1077  
																																																						
1073	A	similarity	to	my	Parisian	informants,	and	to	those	represented	in	studies	by	Kershenovich	Schuster,	
“Habaneros	and	Shwarma,”	290;	Sutton,	Remembrance	of	Repasts,	81.	
1074	130430_001;	130430_006;	130706_001,	130731_002;	one	informant	who	expressed	that	she	did	not	bring	
back	ingredients	from	Algeria,	but	instead	ingredients	from	France.	While	she	could	find	everything	she	needed	to	
make	Algerian	dishes,	French	ingredients	were	a	different	story:	“il	y	a	des	gens	qui	ramènent	des	choses	de	
l’Algérie.	Moi	je	n'ai	jamais	rien	ramené.	Quand	je	vais	en	France,	je	ramène	du	fromage	et	de	chocolat.	Mon	fils	il	
me	dit	chocolat.	Moi	je	ramène	une	variété	de	fromages	français	parce	que	j’aime	beaucoup	ça.	À	part	ça,	je	n’en	
ai	rien	du	tout…	des	gâteaux	algériens	peut-être,	de	l'Algérie.	Des	gâteaux	algériens	qu’on	me	donne”	
(130731_003).	
1075	130520_002—“Even	the	spices	for	chorba,	I	bring	them	from	Algeria.	They	sell	them	here,	but	I	never	use	
them—for	chorba	especially,	I	bring	the	ones	from	Algeria.”	
1076	130401_001.	
1077	“Ça	dépend	de	la	viande.	Elle	n’a	pas	le	même	goût.	Ici	c’est	plus	industrialisé.	En	Algérie,	maintenant	ça	change,	
mais	avant	c’était	plus	biologique.	On	avait	vraiment	les	fruits	de	saison,	les	légumes	de	saison.	Ici	tu	peux	trouver	
les	fruits	et	les	légumes	à	n’importe	quelles	saisons.	Mais	ça	n’a	pas	le	même	goût	car	ils	ont	été	congelés,	puis	ils	
ont	été	grossis	avec	 les	produits	chimiques.	Alors	que	chez	nous	c’est	vraiment	biologique.	 Ici,	 il	 y	a	des	 fermes	
spéciales	biologiques.	Chez	nous	c’est	vraiment	biologique	à	toute	l’échelle	du	pays	parce	qu’on	a	vraiment	les	fruits	
de	saison,	les	légumes	de	saison.	Les	choses	d’été,	tu	ne	peux	pas	les	trouver	en	hiver.	C’est	vraiment	chaque	légume	
mais	ça	a	un	goût	et	une	odeur	différente”	(130520_001);	“ça	ce	n’est	pas	par	rapport	à	la	disponibilité	des	choses	
mais	c’est	plus	par	rapport	au	goût.	Parce	que	l’on	trouve	que	les	légumes,	étant	donné	que	c’est	comme	tous	avec	
des	pesticides;	ça	ne	goûte	pas	la	même	chose.	Là-bas	tu	trouves	des	choses	plus	biologiques.	Tu	vas	prendre	des	
carottes	et	ça	ne	va	pas	être	des	carottes	parfaites,	des	carottes	moches,	des	vrais	carottes	finalement.	C’est	des	
carottes	bio.	C’est	ça	qui	fait	la	différence	du	goût.	C’est	vraiment	cet	aspect-là.	Mais	sinon,	tu	vas	trouver	tous	les	
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For others, the difference in taste is purely psychological.1078 For example,  
il y a des gens qui disent, le goût ce n’est pas le même. Ici c’est du chimique. Mais je 
crois que c’est la même chose, je crois que c’est psychique. Lorsque tu es loin de quelque 
chose, ça te manque. C’est comme le passé chez tout le monde. Le passé est toujours 
bon.1079 
 
This informant stresses how when someone is far from something or somewhere that you miss, 
that person engages in psychological means of traversing the distance between themselves and 
that missed thing or place. 
 Overall the desire to maintain connection to the homeland is strong in the community of 
Maghrébine Muslims that I studied in Montréal. Whether it was through the actual structure of 
the eating spaces, the kind and amount of home food one consumed, the search for culturally and 
religiously accurate ingredients, or any other number of bridging activities, the focus of their 
daily experience was largely on getting back to some notion of home with which they could 
identify. With such a strong focus on creating a new homeland that bridges both sides of one’s 
transnational identity the question becomes: Can one be integrated and transnational? 
7.3.3 Can Integration and Transnationalism go Hand in Hand? 
If one considers “integration” as “assimilation,” or as a process of giving up one’s past identities 
to be a part of the national “we” (as is often the case in France), it becomes easy to see how 
transnational efforts may preclude integration. In a context such as France, where any action 
considered outside the French norm is considered evidence of a lack of integration, transnational 
efforts can be seen as fodder for communautarisme and lack of integration. The Canadian 
context seems to provide a different backdrop for transnational immigrants to engage in 
transnational practices and yet still proclaim fully integrated status. Because of a general lack of 
tension over religious identity and practice in Canada, according to my informants, immigrants 
																																																						
légumes	ici	aussi”	(130615_003);	“Le	goût	non.	(Elles	rient.)	Je	ne	sais	pas	pourquoi.	Même	mon	mari	me	dit	ça.	C’est	
moi,	c’est	la	même	personne	qui	prépare	la	même	chose,	je	la	prépare	là-bas,	elle	goûte	mieux	qu’ici.	Je	ne	sais	pas	
pourquoi…Et	pourtant	c’est	les	mêmes	ingrédients.	Les	légumes	peut-être	parce	que	chez	nous	c’est	frais,	ça	vient	
directement	des	champs”	(130731_002).	
1078	Others	express	that	the	psychological	difference	lies	in	the	missing	familial	ambiance,	and	eating	in	culturally	
and	religiously	accurate	ways	helps	to	re-establish	that	missing	ambiance	(130430_004;	130615_001;	
130615_002).	As	I	presented	in	Chapter	4,	Kershenovich	Schuster	argues	that	taste	is	socially	and	culturally	
influenced	(Kershenovich	Schuster,	“Habaneros	and	Shwarma,”	297).			
1079	130404_001—“There	are	people	who	say,	the	taste	is	not	the	same.	Here	it’s	chemical.	But	I	believe	that	it	is	
the	same	thing,	I	think	that	it	is	psychic.	When	you	are	away	from	something,	you	miss	it,	it’s	like	the	past	for	
everyone.	The	past	is	always	good.”	
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feel more capable of integrating into the Canadian/Québécois context. They feel like they at least 
have a chance to be “fully integrated” and yet “fully Maghrébine/Muslim” (a right not outwardly 
given to similar communities in similar Western contexts, such as France). When interviewing 
my informants about integration many stressed their ability to integrate while at the same time 
not giving up their religious and cultural traditions. In fact, many spoke about the ease with 
which they could live their religious lives in Canada. One informant explained how the desire to 
live both a Canadian and Muslim life was viewed in the Canadian context. He explained: 
j’ai remarqué c’est que l’on pratique facilement notre religion ici au Canada. On n’a pas 
trouvé de difficultés. Le mot magique que je trouve ici, quand vous parlez avec les gens, 
ils vous disent, “ça ne nous dérange pas.”1080  
 
Unlike in France where differentiating practices were viewed as more problematic, in the 
Québécois/Canadian context my informants expressed that there was little tension over these 
kinds of practice.1081 In fact, some of the transnational practices in which they engaged in the 
host-land actually strengthened their ability to integrate. 
 The issue of communautarisme was an often-mentioned reason for the lack of integration 
in the French context. It is sometimes argued that communautarisme prevents integration and 
that Muslim communities are particularly prone to communautarisme. One rebuttal against such 
a claim may be the emphasis on hospitality in the Maghrébine Muslim community. One may 
argue that, with the lack of emphasis on the “need” to integrate as understood as “to assimilate,” 
immigrants feel free to maintain practices that are essential to their religious and cultural lives in 
the homeland, i.e. hospitality. My informants spoke about how essential maintaining a context of 
hospitality outside of the Maghreb was for their cultural and religious self-understanding.1082  
 This trait allows for a higher level of integration, more reaching out between 
communities, and more of an emphasis of interacting with the “other” than one may expect. By 
being free to express one’s religious convictions while at the same time being a part of Canadian 
																																																						
1080	130430_006—“I	noticed	that	we	practice	our	religion	easily	here	in	Canada.	We	have	not	found	difficulties.	The	
magic	word	that	I	found	here,	when	you	speak	to	people,	they	will	say	to	you	‘that	doesn’t	bother	us.’”	
1081	130401_001;	130517_002.	
1082	As	I	mentioned	above,	many	of	my	informants	set	up	or	constructed	their	kitchens	and	living	rooms	in	such	a	
way	as	to	make	hospitality	easy.	There	were	many	couches,	all	which	could	double	as	beds,	and	the	general	flow	
was	such	that	people	could	easily	flow	into	the	space	and	be	comfortable	in	it	for	long	periods	of	times.	No	one	
needed	to	sit	on	the	floor,	or	on	an	uncomfortable	folding	chair.	Instead,	all	people	could	be	comfortably	seated	in	
the	living	room	for	many	hours	of	discussion,	or	even	to	sleep	for	the	required	three	days	that	one	is	expected	to	
house	a	visitor,	according	to	the	religious	tradition.	
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society, informants felt as though there could be a greater reaching out to one’s neighbours of all 
backgrounds and identities. In a non-communitaristic setting such as Montréal, where there is no 
real “Muslim neighbourhood,” one’s neighbours are varied and consequently one’s interactions 
with the larger community are inevitable. As I argued in Chapter 6, even the “petit Maghreb” 
neighbourhood in Montréal is not highly populated by Maghrébines. In fact, many Maghrébines 
come into this neighbourhood to do some shopping but then they return home, to 
neighbourhoods made up of various ethnic and cultural backgrounds. In terms of reaching out to 
one’s neighbours, then, this is not just to fellow Muslims, but also to the “Québécois(e) de 
souche,” Italian, or Polish neighbour down the hall.  
 
7.3.3.1 Hospitality as Means of Integration 
Many of my informants reflected on the importance of hospitality in Islam and the role that it 
plays in their lives in Québec. For these informants, welcoming someone into one’s house and 
providing the best of the best for them was essential to their religious practice, something that 
brought great blessing.1083 For example, one informant explained to me why performing 
hospitality was especially important. She expounded that “on aime ça parce qu’on a été éduqué 
comme ça, et aussi dans l’Islam quand on reçoit du monde, quand nos invités sortent, il y a des 
anges qui restent chez nous.”1084 
Hospitality is not only about having the space to house people, but is also about how one 
demonstrates the welcome. This welcome is often professed through food. When I asked one 
informant what was the place of hospitality in Islam, she explained the centrality of food for any 
understanding of hospitality when she exclaimed that, “nous, quand tu fais hospitalité, tu 
prépares de la bonne nourriture pour tes invités… La nourriture c’est un signe d’hospitalité pour 
nous.”1085 It is not just any food that one is expected to prepare, though. Instead, one is expected 
to welcome in abundance, not just with meager offerings. This abundant welcoming is 
considered part of one’s religious and cultural obligations. 
C’est notre religion. Notre religion, on ne peut pas [la] vivre séparé des gens. Inviter les 
gens c’est vraiment dans l’Islam. Inviter les gens, bien les recevoir, préparer les meilleurs 
																																																						
1083	130424_001;	130505_001.	
1084	130519_001—“We	like	that	because	we	were	educated	like	that,	and	also	in	Islam	when	we	receive	people,	
when	our	guests	leave,	there	are	angels	who	stay	with	us.”	
1085	130731_002—“For	us,	when	you	engage	in	hospitality,	you	make	good	food	for	your	guests…food	is	a	sign	of	
hospitality	for	us.”	
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plats, c’est notre religion. D’ailleurs nos coutumes viennent de notre religion. Dans notre 
religion il faut être très généreux avec un invité, il faut bien recevoir les invités. Par 
exemple, je ne peux pas inviter quelqu’un pour lui donner juste un café. Si quelqu’un 
frappe à ma porte et il rentre, le minimum que l’on peut lui offrir c’est un café avec des 
gâteaux. Ça c’est le minimum. Je ne peux pas inviter une personne pour juste prendre un 
café. C’est le minimum chez nous. Et dans notre religion, il faut être très généreux avec 
un invité.1086 
 
This extensive hospitality was something that I experienced directly in my fieldwork on multiple 
occasions.1087 Because the Maghrébine Muslim immigrants whom I was interviewing were also 
comfortably situated in their Canadian context, because they felt much freer to be both Canadian 
and Muslim or Maghrébine the doors were much more easily opened. Here we can see how food 
plays a role in Phillip Connor’s third theme of “integrating faith,” in the Canadian context. As he 
sees it, that quality is embedded in religion, and religious expression, of which hospitality is an 
example, according to my informants, helps the immigrant in their integration.1088 Hospitality is 
in fact, according to one informant, a way to bring together “toutes les cultures, tous les gens. 
																																																						
1086	130520_002—“It’s	our	religion.	Our	religion	we	cannot	live	separately	from	people.	To	invite	people	is	core	
Islam.	Invite	people,	receive	them	well,	prepare	the	best	dishes,	it’s	our	religion.	Besides,	our	customs	come	from	
our	religion.	In	our	religion,	you	must	be	very	generous	with	a	guest,	you	must	receive	your	guests	well.	For	
example,	I	cannot	invite	someone	and	just	give	them	a	coffee.	If	someone	comes	to	my	door	and	enters,	the	
minimum	that	we	can	offer	him	is	a	coffee	and	cakes.	That	is	the	minimum.	I	cannot	invite	a	person	just	for	a	
coffee.	That’s	the	minimum	for	us.	And	in	our	religion,	one	must	be	very	generous	with	a	guest.”	
1087	I	recall	experiencing	this	abundant	hospitality	to	the	extreme	one	afternoon	when	I,	along	with	a	colleague,	
went	to	an	informant’s	home	for	a	meal	and	an	interview.	Already,	the	fact	that	my	colleague	was	welcome	to	join	
me	was	a	significant	sign	of	my	informant’s	hospitality.	We	showed	up	on	a	Sunday	afternoon	to	a	feast	for	both	of	
us,	with	vegetarian	dishes	made	especially	for	my	colleague	who	was	pescatarian.	There	was	chorba	with	meat	and	
an	onion	and	cheese	soup	made	specifically	for	my	friend.	There	were	boureks	with	meat	and	boureks	with	tuna	as	
well	as	the	little	potato	pancakes.	There	was	a	shrimp	dish	for	my	colleague	and	a	veal	and	chicken	dish	for	the	rest	
of	us,	with	salad	and	homemade	bread	rounding	it	all	out.	The	veal	dish	was	accompanied	with	zucchinis	stuffed	
with	ground	beef	and	spices.	The	chicken	was	served	on	top	of	a	mound	of	vermicelli	noodles.	It	was	all	around	
delicious.	We	talked	around	the	table	about	how	the	women	learned	to	cook,	and	the	similarities	and	differences	
between	their	culture	and	others.	My	informant’s	children	joined	us	for	the	meal	and	timidly	shared	their	own	
experiences	with	food.	After	the	meal	was	complete,	or	so	I	thought,	as	per	usual	we	were	not	allowed	to	help	
clean	up,	and	we	headed	into	the	living	room	to	chat	and	drink	tea.	My	informant	and	her	daughter	then	began	to	
bring	out	the	tea	and	sweets	to	the	table	and	we	were	taken	aback	by	how	much	food	there	was.	She	had	made	
brownies	and	small	chocolate	and	pistachio	tarts	as	well	as	a	traditional	Algerian	sweet	made	with	couscous	and	a	
filing	of	dates.	Then	they	brought	out	a	plate	of	cheesecake.	Once	we	had	finished	the	interview	and	did	not	think	
it	was	possible	to	fit	any	more	food	in	us,	my	informant	then	asked	her	daughter	to	bring	in	the	strawberries.	She	
had	made	up	small	cups	of	sliced	strawberries	in	lovely	light	syrup	for	us	to	enjoy.	We	spent	4	hours	eating;	it	just	
did	not	stop.	After	we	left,	we	noted	how	they	took	out	their	best	serving	dishes	and	teacups	for	us	and	how	we	
were	treated	like	absolute	royalty.	Despite	this	huge	demonstration	of	hospitality,	more	than	one	could	have	
expected,	my	informant	still	humbly	suggested	that	her	actions	were	not	spectacular,	that	she	had	simply	
welcomed	us	as	she	would	have	welcomed	any	guest.	In	that	moment	I	was	no	different	than	a	member	of	her	
family,	coming	home	from	a	long	journey.	
1088	Connor,	Immigrant	Faith,	74.	I	will	address	Connor’s	four	themes	in	more	depth	in	Chapter	9.	
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Même si [on a] des religions, des cultures différentes, on dit que l’être humain partout, c’est un 
être humain.”1089 In this case, integration is to interact with all human beings, no matter the 
culture or religion, to be open to all. That is the ideal.1090 
 
7.3.3.2 Definitions/Understandings of Integration 
For most of my informants, integration did not mean that one had to change one’s practices. 
Food practices were just one realm where this fact was evident. Informants stated that “ce n’est 
pas parce que je vais manger du porc et boire de l’alcool que je suis intégré, pas du tout.”1091 
Whether one ate strictly according to Muslim religious traditions or not, or whether one ate a mix 
of cultural foods or not, it did not have an effect on one’s integration. Another informant 
explained how this notion of requiring change in some food practices had no effect on one’s 
integration by showing how absurd a request such as this may be.  
Est-ce que je suis obligé d’aller prendre un verre pour que je me sente intégré? Non. Ça je 
ne peux pas me le permettre. Maintenant si le Québécois m’accepte comme je suis, je 
l’accepte comme il est. Je ne vais pas interdire à quelqu’un de boire de l’alcool pour que 
je me sente en sécurité. Non.1092 
 
Just as bizarre as it would be for this informant to tell a non-Muslim Québécois(e) that they 
cannot drink in order for him to feel secure, a non-Muslim Québécois(e) should not be able to 
tell a Muslim person that they have to drink to show some form of security and integration. On 
the other hand, food can be a positive means of integration. As one young woman explained to 
me, “je regrette vraiment qu’au Québec on ne met pas l’accent sur la tradition culinaire. Et ça, 
par contre, c’est un bon moyen d’intégrer les gens.”1093 Food can or cannot be a way to 
demonstrate one’s integration and can and cannot be a tool that people use to integrate the other. 
Overall, integration is a mutual thing, engaged in by both sides. 
																																																						
1089	130612_001—“All	cultures,	all	people.	Even	if	the	religions,	the	cultures	are	different,	we	say	that	a	human	
being	everywhere	is	a	human	being.”	
1090	This	idea	that	hospitality,	as	represented	by	food	practice,	can	assist	in	“integration”	is	not	exclusive	to	the	
Muslim	community.	In	fact,	Desjardins	and	Desjardins	also	highlight	the	role	of	hospitality	in	integration,	in	
reference	to	the	Sikh	Langar	(Desjardins	and	Desjardins,	“Food	the	Builds,”	12).	
1091	130430_005—“It’s	not	because	I	am	going	to	eat	pork	or	drink	alcohol	that	I	am	integrated,	not	at	all.”	
1092	130517_002—“Am	I	obligated	to	go	for	a	drink	so	that	I	feel	integrated?	No.	That	I	cannot	allow	myself.	Now	if	
a	Québécois(e)	accepts	me	as	I	am,	I	accept	him/her	as	they	are.	I	am	not	going	to	forbid	someone	from	drinking	
alcohol	so	that	I	feel	secure.	No.”	
1093	130706_001—“I	really	regret	that	in	Québec	we	do	not	put	an	accent	on	[a	particular]	culinary	tradition.	On	
the	other	hand,	[not	doing	so]	is	a	good	way	to	integrate	people.”	
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 My informants were clear in explaining that integration was not just about their 
integration into Québécois society, but the efforts of the Québécois society to integrate to them 
as well. It was a mutual effort. It was reflective of Micheline Milot’s “two-way street approach to 
integration” in Canada.1094 The same informant who suggested that food could be a good means 
to integrate people stressed that  
l’intégration n’est pas unilatérale. Ce n’est pas uniquement à l’immigré(e) de se fondre/ 
de s’assimiler intégralement dans la société en refoulant sa personnalité. C’est également 
à l’Etat d’accueil de mettre en place les moyens nécessaires à son insertion.1095 
 
Not only is it a responsibility of the state to make sure that the immigrant could engage his/her 
integration, but it is also the responsibility of the regular citizen to offer mutual acceptance and 
understanding. Another informant expressed this view as follows: 
Je préfère la reconnaissance, même pas la tolérance. Parce que la tolérance ok, ok je [ne] 
t’aime pas mais je te tolère. La reconnaissance, je crois que c’est mieux. La 
reconnaissance, et la reconnaissance mutuelle. L’intégration mutuelle. J’essaie de 
m’intégrer mais j’attends à l’autre aussi d’intégrer.1096 
 
Other informants, like this one, spoke of integration as a mutual process. Many used the words 
“mutual acceptance” as a way to explain what it meant to be integrated.1097 For these informants, 
religious and cultural idiosyncrasies were not important, but instead the base acceptance, 
recognition, and ultimately respect for the “other” was what integration was all about. 
For many of my informants, integration is primarily about respect, between and among 
various parties. As the informant mentioned above, if the majority Québécois culture accepts him 
																																																						
1094	Milot,	“Modus	Co-vivendi,”	117.	
1095	130706_001—“Integration	is	not	unilateral.	It	is	not	uniquely	on	the	immigrant	to	blend/	to	assimilate	fully	into	
the	society	by	repressing	his	personality.	It’s	equally	up	to	the	welcoming	State	to	put	the	necessary	mediums	in	
place	for	his	insertion.”	As	I	discussed	in	Chapter	6,	this	often	involves	an	effort	by	the	Québécois	government	to	
provide	services	for	immigrant	communities	to	learn	the	common	culture	in	Québec	to	which	immigrants	are	
expected	to	integrate.	
1096	130404_001—“I	prefer	recognition.	Not	even	tolerance.	Because	tolerance:	ok,	ok,	I	do	not	like	you	but	I	
tolerate	you.	Recognition	I	believe	is	better.	Recognition	and	mutual	recognition.	Mutual	integration.	I	try	to	
integrate	but	I	wait	for	the	other	as	well	to	integrate.”	
1097	“C’est	comme	ça	que	je	vois	mon	intégration.	Ils	m’acceptent	comme	je	suis,	je	les	acceptent	comme	ils	sont”	
(130517_002);	“Et	si	je	rencontre	par	exemple	une	personne	du	Québec,	j’accepte	aussi	leurs	valeurs	comme	ils	
vont	accepter	mes	valeurs.	C’est	une	acceptation	de	plusieurs	cotés”	(130615_002);	“L’intégration	c’est	que	je	
t’accepte	ou	tu	m’acceptes	en	tant	qu’être	humain.	C’est	la	fraternité	humaine,	avant	la	religion.	Tout	ça	c’est	des	
choses.	Mais	je	ne	touche	pas	à	ta	religion,	tu	ne	touches	pas	à	ma	religion.	Je	ne	touche	pas	à	tes	coutumes.	Je	les	
respecte,	tu	respectes	mes	coutumes.	Et	comme	ça	on	arrive	à	être	en	collaboration”	(130731_002).		
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for who he is, then he is integrated. The centrality of respect for the understanding of integration 
was clearly outlined by one of my informants when she explained to me the following: 
Moi, Rachel, il y a une chose que je peux vous dire: quand tu respectes n’importe qu’elle 
personne qui est devant toi, il te trouve le respect, tu es intégré. Automatiquement tu es 
intégré. S’il n’y a pas ce respect entre les deux religions différentes, la même religion, tu 
ne peux pas être intégré. Même si tu es dans ton pays, le Maroc, et tu changes de vie, 
c’est que tu es immigrante. Mais il faut ce respect-là.1098 
 
According to this informant, whether someone is in his or her homeland or in their host-land, if 
there is respect there is integration.  
Respect for the laws of the society is also an important aspect of integration, according to 
my informants.1099 One explained how integration was on two levels: interior and exterior. For 
her, the exterior integration was about respecting the laws, but more importantly the interior 
integration was about “le respect entre les gens…ce n’est pas que moi je dois me changer 
complètement pour devenir Québécoise; ce n’est pas ça l’intégration pour moi.”1100 If respect is 
present between and among groups, then according to these informants integration is present. 
Food can be one way to show this respect, as the following extract shows: 
Avec mes voisins il n’y a pas de problèmes. Ils mangent, ils trouvent que c’est 
intéressant. Le fait de préparer et de partager avec eux, ils trouvent ça vraiment, ils disent 
“mais pourquoi?” et je dis, “c’est juste parce que vous êtes mes voisins, et dans notre 
religion on doit respecter le voisin. On doit montrer que vous êtes très important pour 
nous.”1101 
 
It is a religious obligation to respect one’s neighbours, this informant notes, and that respect is 
shown through food. Other informants highlighted the respect of specific food practices as 
evidence of integration. Whether it was respecting the non-Muslim who eats pork and drinks 
alcohol or having the respect of the non-Muslim Québécois(e) about the fact that they do not eat 
																																																						
1098	130518_001—“For	me	Rachel,	I	can	tell	you	something,	when	you	respect	any	person	who	is	in	front	of	you,	he	
finds	some	respect,	you	are	integrated.	Automatically	you	are	integrated.	If	there	is	not	this	respect	between	the	
two,	different	religions,	same	religion,	you	cannot	be	integrated.	Even	if	you	are	in	your	country,	Morocco	and	you	
change	your	life,	it’s	that	you	are	an	immigrant.	But	there	must	be	this	respect”;	“L’intégration,	à	mon	avis,	c’est	de	
respecter	les	autres”	(130615_001).	
1099	130520_001—“Alors,	c’est	les	lois	et	le	respect	des	gens	du	pays	d’accueil”	(130505_001).	
1100	130520_002—“Respect	between	people…it’s	not	that	I	have	to	change	completely	to	become	Québécois(e);	
that’s	not	integration	for	me.”	
1101	130430_004—“With	my	neighbours	there	is	no	problem:	they	eat,	they	find	that	interesting.	The	fact	of	
preparing	and	sharing	with	them,	they	find	that	very…	they	say	‘but	why’	and	I	say	‘it’s	just	because	you	are	my	
neighbours,	and	in	our	religion	we	must	respect	our	neighbour.	We	must	show	that	you	are	very	important	to	us.’”	
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pork or drink alcohol, these were clear examples that respect, and correspondingly integration, 
was present.1102 
 For most of my informants, integration is not about changing one’s cultural or religious 
traditions to assimilate into the Québécois culture. As I argued above, integration had nothing to 
do with change as much as it had to do with acceptance, understanding and respect. Some of my 
informants spoke about the fact that integration was about putting some efforts forward to 
highlight the Québécois/Canadian side of one’s transnational identity. Informants spoke about 
how one should try to live “comme eux,”1103 or live your life “à la Québécoise, à la 
canadienne,”1104 or even this: “tu fais ta vie comme chacun qui est né ici,” which can show by 
the fact that “tu fais les courses comme lui.”1105  
Another clear example of this change toward living more like a Canadian is the emphasis 
on following Canada’s Food Guide.1106 When I spoke with a group of women at a mosque about 
their food practices in Canada and their integration processes, they spoke about adopting some 
“Canadian practices” such as the tenets of the Food Guide.1107  
While most of these informants spoke about the fact that one could change toward a 
Canadian way of life and still not lose any of one’s cultural or religious traditions, one informant 
explained how one can lose certain parts of one’s homeland identity by trying to live in line with 
the Québécois(e). Although Maghrébine/Muslim hospitality tends to thrive in the Québécois 
context this informant spoke about how such an integral trait can change in the integration 
process. She explained how it was “normal back home” for her to share whatever food she was 
making with the neighbours or with her co-workers, but that it is seen as strange in the 
Québécois context, and because of that, “j’ai perdu un peu de ça ici. J’ai vraiment perdu un peu 
de ça ici. Parce que c’est différent. Et de l’un, on n’a pas le temps, on travaille. Et de deux, c’est 
																																																						
1102	130430_001;	130505_001;	130615_002.	
1103	130401_001—“Try	to	live	like	them”;	“Mais	s’intégrer	dans	ce	pays,	vivre	comme	les	Québécois.	Sortir	comme	
les	Québécois,	faires	des	études	comme	les	Québécois.	Voir	la	vie	comme	les	Québécois.”	
1104	130727_001—“Like	the	Québécois(e)	or	like	the	Canadian.”	
1105	130529_003—“You	live	your	life	like	everyone	who	is	born	here…you	do	your	grocery	shopping	like	them.”	
1106	The	Canadian	Food	Guide	is	a	nutrition	guide	provided	by	Health	Canada.	It	is	translated	into	10	other	
languages	other	than	English	and	French	(http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/fn-an/food-guide-aliment/order-
commander/guide_trans-trad-eng.php).	Many	sites	for	new	immigrants	across	the	country	highlight	the	Guide,	
such	as:	http://settlement.org/ontario/health/nutrition-and-healthy-living/healthy-living-and-nutrition/eating-
well-with-canada-s-food-guide/.		
1107	Participant	Observation,	Field	Journal,	May	22,	2013.	
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différent ici.”1108 Because of a desire to not seem strange, to not stand out and to embrace the 
“Québécois way,” some traits were changed.1109 
While minor changes were made to one’s daily life based on an effort to embrace the 
Québécois side of one’s transnational identity, there was generally a great deal of consistency 
with one’s practices, especially food practice, in the Maghreb for my informants. Integration was 
more about respect and acceptance and even celebration of difference than it was about 
change.1110 Again, this is not surprising given the fact that my informants were almost all first-
generation immigrants. Integration was, in fact, seen as a process of mutual advancement and 
enrichment. 
On peut très bien vivre ensemble, c’est un enrichissement mutuel. Je prépare du pâté 
chinois, quelque chose que j’ai découvert ici, je le mange, ça ne me dérange pas. Et 
d’autres personnes ne le mangent avec moi. Mais il n’y a pas que ça, la vie ici elle est 
différente de chez nous. Il y a des activités que l’on ne faisait pas chez nous, que l’on fait 
maintenant, parce qu’ici on fait ça, tant que ce n’est pas interdit, ce n’est pas illicite. Si on 
a envie de le faire, on va le faire.1111 
 
In Québec, for my informants, integration is about fully embracing both sides of one’s 
transnational identity, about being both in Canada and in the Maghreb, and in bringing that 
																																																						
1108	130520_001—“I	lost	that	a	bit	here.	I	really	lost	that	a	bit	here.	Because	it’s	different.	For	one,	we	don’t	have	
the	time,	we	work.	And	second,	it’s	different	here.”	
1109	Another	informant	told	me	of	wanting	to	help	an	elderly	neighbour	of	hers	by	visiting	with	her	and	making	her	
food,	etc.,	but	she	was	told	by	others	that	she	could	not	do	such	a	thing	in	Québec,	that	she	had	to	realize	that	it	
wasn’t	like	“back	home,”	and	so	she	told	me	that	“j’essaye	de	me	reprogrammer”	(I	try	to	reprogram	myself)	
because	the	Québécois	culture	was	different	than	her	Algerian	culture	(130424_001).	
1110	Due	to	space,	and	the	focus	of	this	work,	I	cannot	fully	explore	one	of	the	significant	aspects	of	integration	for	
my	informants:	the	role	of	work.	This	is	a	significant	issue	for	immigrants	who	come	to	Québec	because	they	are	
sought	after,	as	immigrants,	because	of	their	work,	yet	when	they	arrive	they	typically	cannot	work	in	their	
respective	domains.	For	these	informants,	integration	comes	through	work.	If	one	can	work	in	the	society,	then	
one	is	integrated;	an	opportunity	not	granted	to	many.	“Parce	que	l’intégration	ça	passe	par	le	travail.	Si	on	ne	
travaille	pas,	on	ne	peut	pas	parler	d’intégration.	Ça	c’est	comment	je	vois	les	choses.	Maintenant,	l’intégration	
pour	moi	aussi	ne	veut	pas	dire	adopter	les	mêmes	pratiques	culturelles.	Intégration,	c’est	être	en	harmonie	avec	
son	entourage,	avec	sa	société.	Ça	ne	veut	pas	dire	se	décolorer	et	laisser	tout	ce	que	l’on	avait	avant	comme	
culture	qui	était	notre	identité	et	paramètre	identitaire;	on	les	jette	et	puis	ok,	et	on	se	met	à	imiter	telle	ou	telle	
personne	pour	être	intégré.	Ça	me	parait,	ça	n’a	pas	de	sens”	(130430_002);	“l’intégration	professionnelle	facilite	
les	autres	niveaux	d’intégration.	C’est	ça	le	problème”	(130430_006);	“je	commençais	à	m’intégrer	mais	je	pourrais	
dire	toujours	comme	je	ne	travaille	pas	encore,	je	ne	suis	pas	encore	intégrée.	Parce	que	ça	demande	qu’il	faut	
travailler,	il	faut	avoir	un	poste	et	travailler	dans	la	société.	C’est	là	que	je	dirais	que	je	suis	intégré”	(130703_004);	
“Intégrer	c’est	travailler”	(130723_001),	etc.,	e.g.	130519_001;	130520_001;	130807_0001.		
1111	130519_001—“We	can	easily	live	together,	it’s	a	mutual	enrichment.	I	make	shepherd’s	pie,	something	that	I	
discovered	here,	I	eat	it,	that	doesn’t	bother	me.	And	others	don’t	eat	it	with	me.	But	there	is	not	just	that,	life	
here	is	different	than	back	home.	There	are	activities	that	we	did	not	do	back	home,	that	we	do	now	because	here	
we	do	that,	as	long	as	it	is	not	prohibited,	that	it	is	not	unlawful.	If	we	want	to	do	it,	we	are	going	to	do	it.”	
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richness of the two sides together into something new; a process which is facilitated by strong 
religious and cultural practices brought from the “homeland.” 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
 
I began this chapter with an exploration of the various ways that my informants identify 
themselves, interact with, and present those identities through their food practice in Montréal. In 
terms of national identity, two thirds of my informants claimed Canadian identity to some extent. 
Many of my informants argued that Canada’s general openness to diversity, as well as their 
perception that “everyone is an immigrant in Canada” made them feel comfortable claiming 
Canadian identity, whether they had Canadian citizenship or not. Furthermore, I argue in this 
chapter that the emphasis on one’s origins led to all my Montréal informants claiming their 
nation of origin as one of their primary identities. What is fascinating in regards to national 
identity is that, for my informants, Québécois identity did not seem to come into play in their 
own identity negotiations. While two of my informants claimed this national identity, the other 
30 did not. My informants did show some understanding of a separate Québécois national 
identity when they spoke about Québécois food. They did not use the word “Canadian” food but 
spoke about the various foods that could be part of the Québécois national identity. 
After discussing my informants’ national identifications, I explored their religious 
identity claims. For 30 of my 32 informants, Muslim identity was one of their central, orienting 
self-understandings. For these informants, their religious identity was not just made up of belief 
or institutional practice, but of the things of everyday. Here food played an essential role in one’s 
religious identity. For many of my informants, food was central to what made someone 
“Muslim.”  
Within the discussion of Muslim identity, I challenged the simplistic understanding of the 
sometimes-posited subcategories of “practicing” and “non-practicing” Muslim. I showed how, 
for my informants in Montréal, non-practicing could refer to someone who felt like they could do 
more, or to someone who was not going “far enough” in their practice. In fact, I showed how in 
Montréal my informants often felt the need to “go further” in their practice, to go beyond the 
traditional Muslim food practices to demonstrate their Muslim identity.  
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I then addressed how my informants saw themselves as different, as holding different 
identities from the non-Maghrébine/Muslim Québécois(es) who surrounded them; “we” are 
different than “them,” according to my informants. Food was the realm within which my 
informants demonstrated these identity differences. My informants often felt like they needed to 
go further than the common differences in foodways to draw lines between “us” and “them” and 
as a result, they mentioned five differences in “how” “we” eat differently than “them.” I explored 
the argument that my informants would make that “we” are different from “them” because “we” 
(1) do not eat to excess, (2) only eat with our right hand, (3) do not waste food, (4) eat 
communally and (5) do not eat at restaurants. In this section, we can see how my informants use 
binary distinctions that overemphasize difference, in the face of vast variation, to highlight the 
positive value of their home culture in the face of unfamiliar practices in the host land. 
I close this section by exploring how food can also be a means of accessing this 
imagined, unfamiliar, “other.” In this I showed how for my informants in Montréal food can act 
as a powerful means of bridging the gap, often perceived as being larger than it actually is, 
between communities. I argue that this bridging through food is particularly successful in a place 
like Québec/Canada where multiple food cultures are seen as accepted and encouraged as part of 
the national food culture, leading to a great ease of maintenance of transnational identity through 
food. 
This led me into an exploration of my informants’ transnational identities and efforts in 
the second half of the chapter. I explained that for the Montréal informants of my study 
“transnational” is a better label for their identity and experiences than “diasporic” because they 
were comfortable with the fluid motions between various places and identities that are essential 
to the transnational experience. Because my informants saw themselves as firmly located in both 
the home and host land identities they needed a means of bridging the gap between the two, 
whether real or imagined. Beyond just constructing their home spaces in ways reminiscent of 
their lives in the Maghreb, my informants used specific food and food practices to help gain 
access to both sides of their transnational identity. I argued how for many of my informants 
using food to access memory was a way of recreating “home” in one’s new “home.” Beyond just 
a means of bridging the gap between home lands, my informants also prepared home food out of 
habit and out of a desire to educate their children about this side of their transnational identity. I 
went on to show that while maintaining connection to one’s home land through food was 
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important to my informants, they also engaged in food practices that allowed them to tap into the 
host land side of their transnational identity. In this context, they spoke of the various ways that 
they prepared and consumed Québécois food as well. 
After discussing how my informants saw themselves as bridging the two sides of their 
transnational identity, particularly through food practice, I discussed the idea of integration and 
its role in transnational experience. I presented the idea that by being able to maintain homeland 
characteristics, such as hospitality, in Montréal, my informants were able to “integrate” more 
easily into their Québec context. They interacted with their neighbours, in a joint process of 
integration, which often fostered mutual respect. My informants saw integration as a mutual 
effort between themselves and the host society, suggesting that both sides needed to make efforts 
of acceptance, understanding and respect. Both sides could use food as a tool to aid in this 
endeavour. 
My informants did suggest that part of their integration efforts had to do with fostering 
the Canadian/Québécois side of their transnational identity. They did not feel the need to 
assimilate fully into Québécois culture by leaving behind their culturally and religiously specific 
practices and identities, but to make some effort to understand and incorporate parts of the 
Québécois culture into their own daily experience. Food, again, was a good avenue through 
which to pursue this, for example by following Canada’s Food Guide. 
Throughout this chapter I have addressed the role that food plays in my informants’ 
various identity negotiations and in their transnational efforts. In this process, I have mentioned 
several food practices which my informants perform as a means of aiding in these processes. I 
continue the exploration of food practice in the next chapter as it specifically relates to the 
understanding of culture and religion. 
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Chapter 8: “Il y a la culture d’une part et il y a la religion d’autre part”1112: Religious and 
Cultural Food Practices in Montréal 
 
8.1 Introduction: Culture vs. Religion 
 
As I discussed in Chapter 5, people often make a distinction between cultural and religious 
practices and values. Coming up with a definition of either of these terms is an especially 
difficult task; coming up with a universally acceptable definition is impossible. Like in Paris, 
instead of imposing a definition of religion and culture onto my informants in Montréal, I sought 
out their own understandings of what these terms meant. While most did not give a clear 
definition of these terms they did suggest that there were two distinct realms within which their 
practices or values lay, even if a particular practice or value could lie in both. While Ahmed 
argues that one cannot break apart any given phenomenon into perfect categories of culture 
versus religion, for my informants, “il y a la culture d’une part et il y a la religion d’autre 
part.”1113 
There is clearly a difference between the two, in their view, and my informants offer 
some suggestion as to what those differences are for them. First, my Montréal informants would 
often interchange the word “tradition” for culture. Traditions are understood as changing, 
depending on place and time. Religion on the other hand is more stable, has more universal ideas 
and expectations. While “la culture, les traditions, sont liées à la culture musulmane” they are 
different from “la religion musulmane, [qui] est beaucoup plus diversifié.”1114 While cultures are 
specific to certain groups and times, religion, according to my informants, is “pour toute 
l’humanité. Ce n’est pas pour un arabe ou un africain; c’est pour tout le monde.”1115 
Alongside the universal versus distinct argument, some informants also argued that there 
was a difference between culture and religion based on its locus in either public or private life. 
																																																						
1112	130727_001—“There	is	culture	on	one	hand	and	religion	on	the	other.”	
1113	Ibid.	Ahmed	addresses	this	in	What	is	Islam,	116.	
1114	130404_001—“The	culture,	the	traditions,	are	linked	to	the	Muslim	culture…the	Muslim	religion,	that	
[referring	to	Muslim	culture]	is	much	more	diverse.”	
1115	130517_002—“For	all	humanity,	it’s	not	just	for	an	Arab	or	an	African;	it’s	for	everyone.”	
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These informants presented the idea that religion is private versus culture being more of a public 
expression of identity. One informant explained this idea to me as follows: 
D’abord, la religion c’est quelque chose qui est propre à moi. Je ne dois pas imposer ma 
religion à quelqu’un d’autre….Ma religion reste propre à moi, les choses personnelles 
restent propres à moi. Je peux intégrer dans les choses qui sont communes. Je n’ai pas de 
problèmes dans ce sens-là.1116 
 
This informant clearly differentiated between what he could change and what he could not. 
While his religion was private and unchangeable, the aspects that were more public were more 
changeable; there were things that are “purement culturel”1117 and things that are “religieux.” 
 In this chapter I show how these kinds of distinctions are represented by and enacted in 
the food practices of my informants in Montréal. Consequently, I explore the fourfold typology 
of food practice that I presented in Chapter 5 as it applies to the Montréal case study. I present 
each of the seven individual food practices and discuss the various means of argumentation that 
my informants make for engaging in these traditions. While there are variations in practice in 
Montréal there is a great deal more consistency of engagement with these seven practices than 
was the case in my Paris study.  
 
8.2 Fourfold Typology of Food Practice  
 
Food practice is one of the biggest realms of debate as to what is cultural and what is religious. 
The line between culture and religion can be blurry when you consider normally “religious” 
practices that are continued by people who “do not care about the religion,” “are not religious,” 
etcetera. One informant presented this casually when she explained to me that she had grown up 
in a non-religious home and then went on to talk about the (normally understood) religious 
practices that her family performed. She explained, “Je n’ai pas été élevé dans un milieu 
religieux, personnellement. Mes parents s’en foutaient. On faisait le carême, on ne mangeait pas 
de porc, ça s’arrêtait là. Le reste, tout était permis.”1118  
																																																						
1116	130430_006—“First	of	all	religion	is	something	that	I	keep	to	myself.	I	must	not	impose	my	religion	on	
someone	else…My	religion	is	kept	to	myself,	personal	things	are	kept	to	myself.	I	can	integrate	in	the	things	that	
are	common.	I	have	no	problem	with	that.”	
1117	130430_001—“Purely	cultural.”	
1118	130401_001—“I	was	not	raised	in	a	religious	setting	personally.	My	parents	didn’t	care.	We	did	the	fast,	we	
didn’t	eat	pork,	but	it	stopped	there.	Everything	else	was	permitted.”	
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There is a great diversity of responses as to what is religious and what is cultural. How 
someone acts in relation to their food practice may be primarily dictated by culture (according to 
their own understanding and explanation), or by religion, or a mix of both. Some find it easy to 
distinguish between the two realms and others find the lines much more difficult to draw. For the 
most part, food is seen as cultural, except for “deux ou trois trucs qui sont en rapport avec la 
religion,”1119 or, as another informant suggested, “ce qui est interdit est interdit, et les traditions 
diffèrent.”1120 For the most part, “religious” is often given as a label if the practice or value can 
be found in the Quran as injunction (not just food mentioned in the Quran, or else olive oil, 
dates, camel milk, etcetera, would be considered religious foods), or in the Sunnah as something 
that the Prophet did that the community would like to follow. The situation is similar to the one I 
noted in Paris. There is a spectrum of religion and cultural food practices and how they relate to 
obligation and flexibility. As I mentioned in Chapter 5, food practices were often then labelled as 
religious or cultural depending on whether they were grounded in religious texts or tradition. So, 
the hierarchy of religious practice worked out in this way. 
 
 
 
 Because of this similarity, the four categories of food practice that I posited in Chapter 5 
can also apply to my Montréal case study. Those categories are: (1) the Quranically-documented 
and “prescribed” food practices, i.e. the abstention from consuming pork and alcohol, practicing 
																																																						
1119	130520_001—“Two	or	three	things	that	are	related	to	religion”;	“Mais	d’autre	chose	qui	est	acceptable	et	pas	
acceptable,	ce	n’est	pas	la	religion	à	100%	parce	que	ce	qui	est	interdit	dans	la	religion,	dans	le	texte,	ce	qui	est	pas	
beaucoup,	6	ou	7	choses:	le	sang,	tout	ce	qui	est	mort,	cochons,	4	ou	5	[autres].	(Il	réfléchit)	Je	dois	réciter	en	
arabe.	Mais	d’autre	chose	que	l’on	ne	mange	pas,	que	l’on	n’approche	pas,	que	l’on	n’accepte	pas,	c’est	la	culture”	
(130404_001).	
1120	130520_002—“What	is	forbidden	is	forbidden	[understood	as	religiously	forbidden]	and	traditions	are	
different.”	
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the fast of Ramadan and the obligation to eat properly-butchered animals (halal). (2) the 
Quranically-based but not prescribed category, e.g. the lamb of the Eid Al-Adha. (3) The Sunnah 
inspired food practices, e.g. dates and milk, and (4) the purely cultural food practices, e.g., 
couscous and other traditional dishes. While in Paris informants may have given cultural reasons 
for their keeping of the commonly understood “religious practices,” in Montréal most of my 
informants engaged in such practices because of religious reasons.1121  
 In Montréal, there was a large effort by my informants to give more than just a religious 
reason for their practice. Food practices would be neatly tucked into the categories but then they 
would also give more “cultural” reasons for these practices. In this way, the Maghrébine Muslim 
immigrants of my study tended to be influenced by the culture to show how the practices they 
engaged in were not only based on religious conviction, but had a “more solid scientific” 
grounding as well. I often felt like my informants felt the need to give a culturally-significant 
reason for their religious practice, almost in a defense against a perceived attack on the logic of 
the religious practice. One informant explained that,  
il y a 30 ans en arrière, mon père me parlait toujours que les gens voulaient des preuves 
scientifiques. De 1980 à çà, tous les étudiants parlaient de découvertes scientifiques, et 
aujourd’hui, en 2013, on est conscient que la manière la plus saine pour notre santé est la 
manière islamique.1122 
 
For many of my informants Islamic practice did not go against the modern, Western emphasis on 
science, but instead was the perfect outworking of this approach. I explore these arguments from 
“logic” when I address each category of practice.1123 
 
 
 
																																																						
1121	I	address	the	possible	reasons	for	this	difference	in	labeling	practices	“cultural”	or	“religious”	in	Paris	versus	
Montréal,	in	Chapter	9.	Furthermore,	even	though	I	contrast	the	categories	of	“culture”	and	“religion,”	as	I	did	in	
Chapter	5,	I	still	provide	insight	into	the	varied	ways	that	my	informants	interact	within	and	across	these	
categories,	thus	revealing	the	“human	and	historical	phenomenon	of	Islam”	that	Ahmed	suggests	is	lost	in	this	very	
effort	(Ahmed,	What	is	Islam,	116).	
1122	130615_001—“Thirty	years	ago,	my	father	always	told	me	that	people	wanted	scientific	proof.	From	the	80s	to	
here,	all	students	spoke	of	scientific	discovery.	In	2013,	one	is	aware	that	the	healthiest	way	for	our	health	is	the	
Islamic	way.”	
1123	I	will	further	explore	why	my	informants	felt	the	need	to	give	“logical”	explanations	when	I	compare	the	Paris	
and	Montréal	data	sets	in	Chapter	9.	
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8.3 Quranically-Documented and “Prescribed” Food Practices 
 
The first category covers the Muslim food practices that are most commonly understood as 
strictly religious: the “Quranically-documented and ‘prescribed’ food practices.” These are the 
practices that are seen as universal and usually obligatory. Like in Paris, when examining the 
four different practices in this category a slight hierarchy of obligation appears, with the 
Ramadan fast being the most religious, followed by pork abstention, then alcohol abstention, and 
finally eating halal meat.  
8.3.1 Ramadan 
The fast for Ramadan is easily considered the most “religious” of Muslim food practices for my 
Montréal informants and as a result it was the most commonly practiced. Thirty one of my 
informants fasted for the month of Ramadan, leaving only one informant who did not.1124 For 
those who label themselves as practicing, religious Muslims, Ramadan is always present. For 
those who have a more cultural approach to their Muslim identity, Ramadan still remains 
essential. It is the foundational Muslim food practice because of its place in the five pillars of 
Islam and in the Quran.1125 Even those who do not pray five times a day, or practice the other 
pillars, still fast during Ramadan.1126 Ramadan is labeled as a “sacred month” by many of my 
informants. One informant explained how this practice was more than merely religious; it was 
part of a larger sacred moment for Muslims. She explained “Oui, le jeûne c’est vraiment sacré. 
Le mois de ramadan c’est un mois où l’on doit être relax, zen…. C’est vraiment un mois plus que 
sacré.”1127 Because this month and its affiliated practices are considered “more than sacred,” it is 
considered a serious sin not to fast during Ramadan.  
Par exemple, si quelqu’un ne jeûne pas pendant le ramadan, comment on dit ça? C’est 
…en dehors de la bénédiction de Dieu. C’est comme s’il affronte Dieu. C’est vraiment un 
péché très grand.1128  
 
																																																						
1124	This	informant	sees	herself	as	not	really	Muslim,	but	just	coming	from	a	Muslim	culture	and	family.	She	
celebrates	Muslim	holidays,	and	holds	a	religious	morality,	but	that	is	far	as	she	would	argue	that	her	Muslim	
identity	goes	(130706_001).	
1125	As	noted	in	Chapter	5,	the	Quranic	verses	that	explain	the	fast	for	Ramadan	are:	2:185,	187.	
1126	130806_004.	
1127	130529_003—“Yes,	the	fast	is	very	sacred.	The	month	of	Ramadan	is	a	month	where	we	must	be	relaxed,	
chilled	out	(Zen)….It’s	really	a	month	that	is	more	than	sacred”;	so	too	130615_001.	
1128		130615_002—“For	example,	if	someone	does	not	fast	during	Ramadan,	how	do	we	say	it?….	It’s	outside	of	the	
blessing	of	God.	It’s	as	if	he	confronts	God.	It’s	a	huge	sin.”	
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This clearly placed the practice of the Ramadan fast in the religious category. 
 When personally experiencing the Ramadan fast, its religious elements became poignant 
to me.1129 For those who are practicing out of religious conviction or obligation the practice 
appears to be much easier than for those who may do so simply out of culture or experience. For 
example, I could see these differences in my own experience of Ramadan, both on the days that I 
fasted and on the days that I did not. When I was fasting, although I found it difficult to wait 
until the evening prayer to eat, the women I was with seemed to have no issue. On our first day 
of Ramadan the women with whom I was breaking the fast got lost in conversation and barely 
realized that it was time for the iftar (the name of the break-fast meal during Ramadan). There 
was not such a sense of urgency about it. The women explained to me about the power of 
intention, about how God rewards those who fast and follow him. The funny thing was that we 
were just talking and no one was really watching the clock, so when the call to prayer came on 
they were all surprised. Even though I seemed to be much more aware of my grumbling stomach 
than they were of theirs, their sense of calm helped to quell the vicious hunger that would have 
normally been at work inside me. There was no rush to eat, but we calmly sat at the table and 
waited for the call to prayer to finish, and then we took our dates and milk and broke the fast.1130 
This intentional element became clear to me when breaking the fast surrounded by people who 
were not fasting or who were just doing so out of culture. When I broke the fast with my one 
informant who does not generally keep the fast I could definitely sense this difference. I reflected 
on it as follows in my field journal. 
I found the last hour today to be particularly difficult. When I am surrounded by others 
who are also fasting, it is not as tough. But tonight, being surrounded by a group of girls 
who were not fasting [or who didn’t have a religious reason to do so], who were drinking 
beer on the hot summer evening and were talking all about food, made it so incredibly 
difficult. I was counting the minutes until I could break the fast. My host [who was a self-
																																																						
1129	In	both	my	Paris	and	Montréal	fieldwork	experiences	I	fasted	for	some	of	the	month	of	Ramadan.	In	Paris,	I	
fasted	for	10	days.	In	Montréal,	I	fasted	for	15	(half	of	the	month).	In	Paris	I	found	the	experience	to	be	difficult	
because	of	the	summer	heat	and	the	desire	to	go	out	for	meals	with	my	friends	before	the	setting	of	the	sun.	In	
Montréal,	the	heat	and	long	hours	were	again	a	factor	in	making	the	fast	difficult,	although	most	of	my	evenings	
were	spent	at	informants’	homes	so	there	wasn’t	the	same	desire	to	go	out	for	dinner	with	friends.	Some	days	felt	
easier	than	others,	and	just	when	I	thought	that	it	was	getting	easier,	it	would	prove	to	be	difficult	again.	In	both	
cases,	I	stopped	fasting	because	I	felt	as	though	I	had	been	sufficiently	saturated	in	my	fasting	experience	and	
because	I	felt	as	though	the	lack	of	energy	and	focus	that	often	characterized	my	fast	days	was	detrimental	to	my	
work	in	the	field.	I	felt	less	focused,	less	able	to	capture	all	the	little	nuances	in	the	field	when	I	was	trying	to	keep	
myself	from	not	passing	out.	
1130	Participant	Observation,	Field	Journal,	July	10,	2013.	
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proclaimed cultural Muslim] had set aside dates for me and a glass of water and as soon 
as the moment came, I jumped up from my seat and grabbed them.1131 
 
In my admittedly very limited experience of fasting there seemed to be a different sensitivity to 
the practice when practicing it religiously, as it was meant to be, as most of my informants would 
argue, in comparison to simply doing so for the experience of it. I felt my hunger more deeply on 
the days I fasted with my culturally Muslim informants or when I fasted on my own than when I 
fasted with my informants who were fasting out of religious conviction. 
 Although the fast for Ramadan was largely seen as a strictly religious practice by my 
informants, like all the practices in this category, and the other categories for that matter, my 
informants would find culturally significant reasons to engage in the practice as well. At base, 
they fasted because it was a religious obligation to do so, because it was cited in the Quran and 
was part of the five pillars of Islam, but they also expressed other reasons for why it was a 
beneficial practice. One informant explained the logic, as they understood it, behind the religious 
obligation to fast. After explaining the various religious reasons for the fast she noted the 
following: 
De l’autre côté ça a été prouvé que le corps de l’être humain a besoin de jeûner de temps 
en temps pour éliminer toutes les toxines de la nourriture mauvaise qu’il a dans le corps. 
Il a besoin de jeûner. Ça a un côté médical aussi; on commence à se poser des questions 
et à chercher.1132 
 
For this informant, and others like her, one looks beyond the simple reason that the practice is 
“Quranically-documented and prescribed” and seeks out a scientific reason as well for any 
practice.  
 This search and its conclusions are logical given the belief that God is behind the food 
practice, and the Muslim understanding of God that makes him all-knowing, and able to transmit 
his knowledge to humans. Within that frame of reference, how could Ramadan not be good for 
people? Outside this frame of reference, the logic is on shakier grounds. 
 
 
																																																						
1131	Field	journal,	July	14,	2013.	
1132	130520_001—“On	the	other	hand	it	has	been	proven,	that	the	human	body	needs	to	fast	from	time	to	time	to	
eliminate	all	of	the	toxins	from	bad	food	that	he	has	in	his	body.	He	needs	to	fast.	That	has	a	medical	side	as	well,	
and	we	begin	to	ask	ourselves	questions	and	to	search.”	
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8.3.2 Pork 
The second type of food practice in this category is the abstention from eating pork. Similar to 
the Ramadan fast, thirty one of my informants did not eat any pork, while one did.1133 The 
injunction to not eat pork is firmly grounded in the Quran and is strictly mentioned as 
“haram.”1134 I had informants explain, simply and purely, that they did not eat pork because it 
was “interdit dans ma religion”1135 because “c’est un verset Quranic qui dit [c’est] haram, la 
consommation de la viande porcine.”1136 The practice is clearly based in religious text and 
values, and thus the argument was made that, “si notre Dieu nous a interdit cette chose, c’est 
qu’elle va nous faire mal. On ne va pas discuter.”1137 For this informant, and others like her, 
there was no need for further arguments than the fact that it was forbidden and documented in 
the divinely-delivered Quran. 
 For some of my informants, on the other hand, cultural arguments were also important. 
Although cultural arguments are made in support, the practice of abstaining from pork is 
considered more of a religious than a cultural practice. My one informant who views herself as 
more of a cultural than a religious Muslim eats pork, and yet maintains other culturally Muslim 
practices. If it were at base cultural, she would not eat it either. One can see the cultural influence 
on the practice when one considers that some do not know why they engage in the practice other 
than the fact that they have done so since they were young. As one informant purported, “ils ne 
prennent pas le porc parce que …c’était mis dans leur tête quand ils étaient jeunes: ‘On mange 
pas de porc, on mange pas de porc.’”1138 It is not so much a religious argument that is given, but a 
cultural one for the religious practice. Furthermore, another informant explained how this 
practice, which is at base religious, can become cultural. 
Je pense qu’à la base c’est religieux, ensuite c’est devenu culturel…. Le porc, 
culturellement, il n’y avait pas de porc en Algérie quand j’étais petit. Ça n’existait pas, ça 
ne se vendait pas. Ma mère ne mange pas de porc. Donc, en plus, culturellement, ils nous 
ont dégoûté du porc: le porc est dégueulasse, le porc est un animal très sale. C’est pour 
																																																						
1133	Again,	this	informant	was	the	same	one	who	did	not	fast	for	Ramadan	and	viewed	herself	as	more	culturally	
Muslim	than	religiously	so.	
1134	As	noted	in	Chapter	5,	the	verses	that	are	used	to	support	this	injunction	are	as	follows:	The	Quran,	2:173;	5:3;	
6:145;	16:115.	
1135	130424_001—“Forbidden	in	my	religion”;	see	also	130430_001;	130520_002.	
1136	130424_001—“There	is	a	Quranic	verse	that	says	the	consuming	of	meat	from	pigs	is	‘haram.’”	
1137	130529_003—“If	our	God	forbade	us	from	this	thing,	it’s	because	it	will	do	us	harm.	We	are	not	going	to	
discuss	it.”	
1138	130731_003—“They	do	not	take	pork	because	it	was…	it	was	put	in	their	head	when	they	were	young.	‘We	
don’t	eat	pork,	we	don’t	eat	pork.’”	
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ça, beaucoup, que je ne mange pas de porc. C’est plus par habitude que par 
conviction.1139 
 
It is for this reason that it is possible, according to some of my informants, to find atheists with 
Muslim origins who do not eat pork.1140 This supports Bergeaud-Blackler’s conclusion that the 
cultural revulsion around pork consumption is so strong in the Maghreb, that it is almost not 
necessary to give religious reasoning, or support for, the abstention from consuming it.1141 
 The logical arguments for this religious practice also came to the fore. I spoke with a PhD 
candidate in Islamic Studies, who also happened to be a Maghrébine Muslim, and he explained 
how strict the interdiction against pork is, for both religious and cultural reasons. He explained 
that there is no argument that can be made for eating pork, there is absolutely no reason to eat it. 
It is entrenched in the Quran and is clear as day. When another informant asked him what the 
reason is behind not eating pork, he gave a classic explanation: not only is the meat weak, but the 
pig only has one stomach and consequently the food it eats does not get properly digested and is 
toxic, which then makes the meat of the pork toxic for humans to eat. He then asked if we would 
like to know the real reason why it is forbidden, the reason that Muslims do not want to admit. I 
responded with an “of course.” He then began to explain that the pig is the only animal where the 
male does not get jealous of the female. He explained that if another pig mates with his female, 
the male pig does not care, and this sort of lack of jealousy of the female is completely against 
Arab culture. He suggested that the person who eats pork then takes on this characteristic to 
some level and becomes less jealous of others around the women in his life.1142 I was surprised 
by this argument; I had never heard it before and did not hear it again, nor could I find textual 
support for it, but it proved to be a striking example of people finding logical reasons to not 
engage in a particular practice. 
																																																						
1139	130806_004—“I	think	that	at	its	base	it	is	religious,	and	after	it	became	cultural…pork,	culturally,	there	was	not	
pork	in	Algeria	when	I	was	young.	It	did	not	exist;	it	was	not	sold.	My	mother	did	not	eat	pork.	Moreover,	
culturally,	they	made	us	feel	disgusted	about	pork:	pork	is	disgusting,	the	pig	is	a	very	dirty	animal.	It’s	for	that	
reason	that	I	do	not	eat	pork.	It’s	more	of	a	habit	than	a	conviction.”	
1140	130404_001.	
1141	Bergeaud-Blackler,	“Social	definitions	of	halal	quality,”	102.	
1142	Personal	Correspondence,	Field	Journal,	March	1,	2013.	What	is	noteworthy	about	this	response	is	it	highlights	
the	centrality	of	food	to	identity.	As	I	have	argued	food	is	a	means	of	presenting,	and	of	labeling	others’,	identity.	
After	all,	“we	are	what	we	eat.”	If	we	are	what	we	eat,	we	take	on	the	characteristics	of	the	things	we	are	eating.	
This	idea	seems	to	be	at	play	in	this	informant’s	idea	of	why	pork	is	problematic.	
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 The more common “logical” reason given for this practice was related to health. Some 
informants explained that pigs were created to clean the planet; they consequently ate everything 
and were considered dirty and best to be avoided.1143 While many would state this idea as a 
matter of fact, without any real grounding, others would go further and cite specific studies or 
scientific knowledge for why the abstention from pork was the only logical way to go. One of 
my informants, a medical doctor, took this approach. He explained to me, 
Je sais ça parce que j’ai fait des recherches, mais sinon les gens ne le savent pas. Mais il y 
a maintenant 27 maladies qui sont liées au fait de manger du porc. Surtout quand on 
mange du porc on ne le cuit pas suffisamment, donc ce ver là, ou les œufs de ce ver là, 
vont rester vivant. Ils vont sporuler et, une fois dans le corps humain, ils vont prendre 
forme et ça forme des maladies. Mais les milieux hospitaliers savent ça, ils reçoivent des 
gens atteint d’infections liées à ça. Mais on n’en parle pas car c’est tout un commerce, un 
business, ça fait tourné l’économie.1144 
 
There was clearly a scientific reason to this religious practice given by this informant (in this 
case, accompanied by a bit of conspiracy theory)—and by many others who cited the health 
reasons for not eating pork. Both cultural and religious reasoning was given for this normally 
understood religious practice. 
8.3.3 Alcohol 
A similar situation arises for the practice of abstaining from alcohol. When examining my 
informants’ practices, there is the slightest bit more flexibility in this practice than in the 
abstention from pork, with 30 of my informants abstaining and two consuming alcohol.1145 Some 
of my informants saw the abstention from alcohol as a religious obligation while others saw it as 
a cultural practice. While it was “Quranically-documented and prescribed” the lack of clarity in 
the Quran regarding this practice may be a reason for why it is not as clear-cut of an 
injunction.1146 For example, one informant explained the effect of the language of the Quran in 
this case to me. He said,  
																																																						
1143	130615_001.	
1144	130727_001—“I	know	this	because	I	did	research,	but	if	not	people	would	not	know	this.	But	there	are	27	
illnesses	that	are	now	linked	to	the	fact	of	eating	pork.	Especially	when	we	eat	pork,	we	do	not	cook	it	sufficiently	
so	the	worms	or	the	eggs	of	the	worms	will	remain	living.	They	will	populate	and	once	in	the	human	body,	they	will	
take	form,	and	that	causes	sickness.	But	hospital	settings	know	that,	they	receive	people	who	are	suffering	with	
infections	related	to	it.	But	we	do	not	talk	about	it	because	it	is	commerce,	a	business,	it	turns	the	economy.”	
1145	Again,	the	cultural	Muslim	and	a	mid-thirties	Algerian	male.	
1146	As	I	described	in	Chapter	5,	the	commonly	cited	verses	in	the	Quran	to	support	the	abstention	from	alcohol	are	
as	follows:	2:219;	4:43;	5:90-91.		
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Ça me vient à l’esprit que dans le Coran, si on lit très bien les versets Coraniques ... il n’y 
a pas de verset Coranique qui dit que l’alcool c’est haram. Le Bon Dieu nous a dit les 
conséquences de la consommation de l’alcool et il dit à la fin “attention n’approchez 
pas”; c’est un ordre, mais ce n’est pas dit que c’est haram…Une fois, j’ai eu une 
discussion avec des gens qui consomment de l’alcool, c’est ce qu’ils m’ont répondu en 
fait. Ils m’ont dit que ça n’a pas été dit dans le Coran que c’est haram.1147 
 
Other informants focussed on the stages of the injunction against alcohol as the reason why there 
may be some confusion as to whether the practice is a religious obligation or not.1148 Regardless, 
whether the practice is considered haram or simply something one must avoid, it is argued as 
being religious because of its place in the Quran. 
 Most of my informants would argue that it was a strict religious obligation to not drink 
and yet they all seemed to know Muslims who broke this obligation. The argument was typically 
made not that these folks were not practicing Muslims, but instead, Muslims who sinned, who 
did not follow Islam quite as closely as others, etcetera. 
L’Islam c’est comme le code de la route. Il y a des personnes qui vont le respecter de 
50%, d’autres à 60%, d’autres à 70%. Aussi ça dépend du cheminement spirituel, de 
l’éducation, il y a plusieurs paramètres qui rentre. On ne les juge pas, parce que ça 
dépend de tous les paramètres dont je t’ai parlé tout à l’heure, mais oui, il y a des 
personnes qui prennent de l’alcool. Oui. Ils savent que c’est…Un musulman va jamais te 
dire que l’alcool n’est pas…un péché. Il n’y a pas quelqu’un qui va te dire ça, mais il va 
te…donner d’autre raisons. Peut-être c’est la pression au milieu du travail, ça dépend, son 
entourage…mais il n’y a pas quelqu’un qui va te dire “non, c’est pas un péché.”1149 
																																																						
1147	130517_002—“It	comes	to	mind	that	in	the	Quran,	if	we	carefully	read	well	the	Quranic	verses	…there	is	not	a	
Quranic	verse	that	says	that	alcohol	is	Haram.	God	told	us	the	consequences	of	the	consumption	of	alcohol	and	he	
said	in	the	end	‘Be	careful,	do	not	approach	it’;	that’s	an	order,	but	it	does	not	say	that	it	is	haram…One	time,	I	had	
a	discussion	with	people	who	drink	alcohol,	and	that	what	they	told	me.	They	told	me	that	it	was	not	said	in	the	
Quran	that	it	is	haram”;	So	also:	“Oui,	par	exemple,	pour	l’alcool,	c’est	écrit	dans	le	Coran	…	évitez-le.	Ce	n’est	pas	
écrit	le	mot	interdit.	Il	y	a	des	musulmans	qui	en	prennent.	Mais	l’alcool	nous	a	été	interdit	car	quand	tu	bois	de	
l’alcool	tu	as	[perdu]	un	peu	les	idées”	(130529_003).	
1148	“Donc	la	première,	c’est	l’alcool	est	bon,	bon	pour	la	santé,	mais	il	est	mauvais	pour	autre	chose.	Et	ce	qui	a	de	
mauvais	l’emporte	sur	ce	qu’il	y	a	de	bon.	Donc	les	gens	ont	dit,	on	va	faire	un	petit	régime,	on	va	réduire.	Puis	la	
deuxième,	c’était	n’approchez	pas	de	la	prière	en	ayant	bu	de	l’alcool;	comme	ça	vous	saurez	ce	que	vous	direz.	Et	
puis	la	troisième,	c’est	éviter,	en	terme	arabe,	si	vous	voulez	la	satisfaction	d’Allah.	Alors,	ce	n’est	pas	écrit	et	des	
gens	jouent	sur	ça.	Ils	disent,	oui	ce	n’est	pas	écrit	clair.	Alors	qu’en	arabe	le	mot	‘éviter’	c’est	beaucoup	plus	
important,	il	a	plus	de	poids	que	le	mot	haram.	Haram	c’est	dans	certaines	circonstances,	mais	éviter	c’est	dans	
toutes	les	circonstances	(130727_001).		
1149	130424_001—“Islam	is	like	the	highway	code.	There	are	people	who	will	respect	it	50%	of	the	time,	others	at	
60%	and	others	at	70%;	also	that	depends	on	the	spiritual	path,	education,	there	are	many	parameters	that	enter	
into	play.	We	do	not	judge	those	people,	because	that	depends	on	all	of	the	parameters	that	I	told	you	about	
earlier,	but	yes,	there	are	people	who	drink	alcohol.	Yes,	they	know	that	it’s…	a	Muslim	will	never	tell	you	that	
alcohol	is	not	something	that	is	not	a	sin.	There	is	no	one	who	would	tell	you	that,	but	he	will	tell	you,	he	will	give	
you	other	reasons.	Maybe	it	is	the	pressure	at	work,	it	depends,	[or	perhaps]	his	entourage,	but	there	is	no	one	
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Instead of placing people in the category of “not a real Muslim”—something that happens often 
when people act in ways that seem to conflict with a general understanding of religious 
membership—my informants would explain the situation in another way so as to not take away 
the person’s Muslim identity, but to merely qualify it. Like Beyer’s categorization of Muslim 
identity along a ten-point scale,1150 my informants seemed to believe that people practice to 
differing levels and alcohol is one realm where this is evident. The notion of culture and religion 
can be blurred here.  
 The context in which one finds oneself sometimes leads to more flexibility in this 
practice. My informants sometimes spoke about living in France, where alcohol is much more 
prominent and accessible, with this possibly leading to changes in practice.1151 Other informants 
suggested that people will come back to practicing lives later on in life and will stop drinking, 
but that many drink when they are young; it is accessible and acceptable.1152 One informant 
described the various contexts that one may find oneself in where this abstention from alcohol is 
not as culturally driven.  
En Algérie, il y a beaucoup de musulmans qui le prennent. Il y a une région au sud, là où 
je faisais parfois mes missions, il y a des gens qui reviennent de la mosquée après avoir 
pratiqué une prière donnée, après ils prennent de l’alcool normalement. C’est étonnant 
mais c’est comme ça. En Algérie il y en a beaucoup; ici aussi, il y en a beaucoup. En 
France, parce que j’ai fait mes études en France, il y en a aussi énormément de 
musulmans qui prennent de l’alcool, et même qui mangent du porc le plus normalement 
du monde.1153 
 
In these contexts, where alcohol is accessible, it seems as though many leave the religious 
injunction aside and take on a more cultural reason to engage in this practice. 
 Another aspect of the injunction against alcohol that helps to reveal some of its cultural 
elements is the fact that it is considered more acceptable for a man to drink alcohol than a 
																																																						
who	will	tell	you	’no,	it’s	not	a	sin.’”;	see	also:	“C’est	interdit	mais	il	y	en	a	qui	transgressent”	(130430_002);	“Oui,	il	
y	a	des	musulmans	qui	boivent.	Ils	savent	que	ce	n’est	pas	halal,	mais…(silence)”	(130505_001).	
1150	Beyer,	“Islam,	Hinduism,	and	Buddhism,”	58-60.	
1151	130401_001.	
1152	130404_001.	
1153	130517_002—“In	Algeria,	there	are	many	Muslims	who	drink	it.	There	is	a	region	in	the	south,	I	did	some	of	my	
missions	there;	there	are	people	who	come	back	from	the	mosque	after	practicing	a	certain	prayer;	afterwards	
they	drink	alcohol	normally.	It’s	shocking	but	it’s	like	that.	In	Algeria,	there	are	many;	here	as	well,	there	are	many.	
In	France,	because	I	did	my	studies	in	France,	there	are	also	a	large	number	of	Muslims	who	drink	alcohol	and	also	
who	eat	pork	as	normally	as	the	rest.”	
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woman. If it were strictly religiously forbidden, the gender of the consumer would have no effect 
on the acceptability of the practice. One of my informants who drank alcohol explained that 
“culturellement, c’est très mal vu qu’une femme boive de l’alcool,” and because “la règle est la 
règle, si elle ne s’applique pas de la même manière pour tous, je préfère m’inscrire dans le 
groupe le plus privilégié.”1154 She justified her lack of practice by the fact that to her it was 
culturally malleable.  
 Whether someone used religious or cultural reasons to explain the injunction against 
alcohol, logical arguments were also made for the reason why someone should abstain from it. 
One informant spoke of the fact that one cannot drive after having consumed alcohol and so it 
was logically problematic to consume it. She posited that, 
parce que vous voyez dans ces sociétés-là, c’est interdit pour vous de conduire quand 
vous buvez. Donc ce n’est pas bien de boire. (Elles rigolent.) Si c’était une bonne chose, 
on ne peut pas dire, ne buvez pas de l’eau quand vous conduisez, vous ne pouvez pas 
prendre du coca cola; donc ça donne à réfléchir pourquoi je n’ai pas le droit [de boire de 
l’alcool]. C’est pas bon pour la santé, ce n’est pas bon.1155 
 
Whether or not it was because we cannot drive when having consumed alcohol or we cannot 
drink alcohol when we take certain medications,1156 these reasons were seen as clear, logical 
reasons for the religious injunction against this consumption practice. 
8.3.3.1 Alcohol vs. Pork 
Where the complexities of the role of culture and religion become evident is in the comparison of 
the injunction against pork and the one against alcohol. Although most of my informants did not 
consume either product, as I explained above, all my informants knew Muslims who consumed 
alcohol, but barely any could come up with an example of Muslims who ate pork. Mohammed 
Benkheira, in his article on Muslim food prohibitions, similarly states that although, “du point de 
																																																						
1154	130706_001—“Culturally	it	is	frowned	upon	for	a	woman	to	drink	alcohol….	The	rule	is	the	rule,	if	it	is	not	
applied	in	the	same	way	for	all	I	prefer	to	register	in	the	more	privileged	group”;	so	also:	“Tous	les	Algériens	ne	
boivent	pas,	quoi	que	les	hommes,	ils	boivent;	ne	croyez	pas	qu’ils	ne	boivent	pas.	Mais	en	général,	les	femmes	ne	
boivent	pas”	(130731_003).	
1155	130430_004—“Because	you	see	in	those	societies,	it’s	forbidden	for	you	to	drive	when	you	drink.	So	it’s	not	
good	to	drink.	[They	laugh.]	If	it	was	a	good	thing,	we	cannot	say	don’t	drink	water	when	you	drive,	you	cannot	
drink	coca	cola,	so	that	makes	one	think	why	I	do	not	have	the	right	[to	drink	alcohol].	It’s	not	good	for	one’s	
health,	it’s	not	good.”	
1156	"Je	trouve	que	ça	n’a	aucun	sens	franchement	d’interdire	la	consommation	d’alcool	et	de	la	permettre	dans	les	
restaurants.	C’est	une	complication	de	vie.	Et	même	si	tu	as	des	problèmes	de	santé,	le	médecin	t’interdit	de	boire	
de	l’alcool.	Si	tu	consommes	un	médicament,	il	est	interdit	de	consommer	les	deux	simultanément.	Je	crois	que	
c’est	assez	clair	pour	tout	le	monde	que	l’alcool	n’est	pas	bon	pour	notre	santé”	(130615_001).	
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vue pénal, il vaut mieux manger du porc que boire du vin, les Maghrébins transgressent plus 
facilement le second interdit que le premier.”1157 If the injunction against alcohol is considered to 
be at the same level as that against pork, and sometimes even more problematic as we see in 
Benkheira, then what led to this difference in actual practice? First, a large portion of my 
informants argued that there was no difference between the two practices: both are religious food 
obligations and cultural influences do not matter.1158 As one informant exclaimed, “C’est 
exactement la même chose. Il faut tout écarter à 100%...C’est interdit, c’est catégorique, c’est 
blanc ou noir.”1159  
 Although this informant and the others like her saw the issue as black and white, others 
argued for larger grey areas in the discussion. Some would argue that fundamentally it was the 
same and yet there was a difference in practice on the ground of the two. 
C’est un peu bizarre parce que la restriction est la même, les deux sont vraiment interdits 
mais vous pouvez trouver plusieurs musulmans qui boivent mais vous n’allez pas trouver 
des musulmans qui mangent du porc. Je n’ai jamais compris pourquoi. Si tu leur dis, tu 
manges du porc? Ils disent non, c’est impossible que je mange du porc malgré qu’ils 
boivent. C’est la même chose, mais c’est bizarre.1160 
 
For these informants, the situation is bizarre, almost unexplainable.1161 Others come up with 
reasons why there is a difference, and most of those have to do with cultural influence. 
 For some, the way that the two practices were written about in the Quran is the reason for 
this difference in approach. As I explained above, the language around the injunction against 
alcohol is muddier than that for pork, despite the fact that the Quran is clear that Muslims should 
not drink alcohol. Why? While pork is explicitly labeled as haram in the Quran, alcohol is not, 
and for that reason there is more room to argue for exceptions to the rule.1162 For others, it is the 
																																																						
1157	Benkheira,	“Alimentation,”	266.	“From	the	criminal	point	of	view,	it	is	better	to	eat	pork	than	to	drink	wine,	
Maghrébines	more	easily	transgress	the	second	interdiction	than	the	first.”	
1158	1304301_001;	130430_003;	130430_004;	130430_006;	1305050_001;		130519_001;	130520_002.	
1159	130501_001—“It’s	exactly	the	same	thing.	One	must	exclude	everything	to	100%...It’s	forbidden,	it’s	
categorical,	it’s	black	and	white.”	
1160	130517_001—“It’s	a	bit	strange	because	the	restriction	is	the	same,	both	are	very	much	forbidden	but	you	can	
find	many	Muslims	who	drink	but	you	will	not	find	Muslims	who	eat	pork.	I	never	understood	why.	If	you	ask	them	
‘you	eat	pork?’	They	say	‘no,	it’s	impossible	that	I	could	eat	pork’	despite	the	fact	that	they	drink.	It’s	the	same	
thing	but	it’s	bizarre.”	
1161	“They	are	exactly	the	same,	so	much	so	that	if	someone	feels	they	can	consume	alcohol	they	can	also	consume	
pork,	and	yet,	people	in	Algeria	will	drink	alcohol	but	not	eat	pork”	(130518_001);	see	also:	“Oui	c’est	ça,	pour	
l’alcool	tu	peux	trouver	des	musulmans	non	pratiquants	qui	boivent	de	l’alcool,	mais	le	porc	c’est	vraiment	interdit.	
Il	y	a	une	certaine	difference”	(130731_002).	
1162	130807_001;	130706_001.	
	 348	
fact that alcohol is more readily available in the Maghreb than pork.1163 The other informant who 
consumed alcohol explained his practice and the difference between the approach to alcohol and 
pork in this manner. He would not eat pork but he did drink alcohol, and when I asked him what 
the difference was he responded as follows: 
Mais, culturellement, c’est quasiment plus facile de boire que de manger du porc...Je 
pense que c’est parce que l’alcool est plus à la base dans notre culture que le porc. Nous, 
la viande, c’est plus l’agneau ou du mouton, par rapport aux asiatiques pour qui le porc 
est tout pour eux. J’imagine mal comment ils font ça là-bas. Pour nous, ce n’est pas 
vraiment difficile. Je [ne] me prive pas en ne mangeant pas de porc. Ça m’est égal. Ce 
n’est pas comme si j’aime ça et que je ne le mange pas. Mais, l’alcool ça a toujours été 
là.1164 
 
For this informant, and others like him, pork was not present, it was not something he would 
miss out on, but alcohol was.1165 In fact alcohol was often a part of young peoples’ lives in the 
Maghreb, while pork was not.1166 One of these products was made more normative while the 
other was kept as foreign, strange, bad.1167 
 This fact generally led to a different level of cultural revulsion or digust surrounding the 
two practices. One informant explained how the two products were viewed differently in a 
cultural sense. He suggested that  
il y a le silence. Socialement c’est plus facile pour l’alcool que pour le porc. Pourquoi? 
Parce qu’ils ont associé le porc à quelque chose de malsain. Le porc est omnivore, le porc 
mange n’importe quoi. C’est plus une révulsion pour le porc que pour l’alcool. 
Socialement, c’est peut-être plus accepté [de boire], c’est moins une violation de la 
religion.1168 
 
																																																						
1163	As	I	argued	in	Chapter	5,	alcohol,	specifically	wine,	has	been	a	prominent	market	in	the	Maghreb	since	France’s	
colonization	of	the	region.	Wine	was	not	just	present,	but	a	part	of	the	market	economy	of	Algeria	and	Morocco.	
Pork	is	almost	non-existent.	
1164	130806_004—“But	culturally,	it’s	much	easier	to	drink	than	to	eat	pork…I	think	it	is	because	alcohol	is	more	
present	in	our	culture,	at	its	base,	than	pork.	For	us,	meat	is	more	lamb	or	sheep,	compared	to	Asians	for	whom	
pork	is	everything.	I	cannot	imagine	how	they	do	it	there.	For	us,	it’s	not	very	difficult.	I	am	not	deprived	by	not	
eating	pork.	I	do	not	care,	it’s	not	as	if	I	like	it	and	I	do	not	eat	it.	But	alcohol,	it	was	always	there.”	
1165	130517_002;	130529_003.	
1166	130723_001.	
1167	One	should	note	that	alcohol	consumption	differs	from	pork	and	halal	eating	because	it’s	physically	addictive.	
Once	hooked	(and	this	differs,	of	course,	from	person	to	person)	it	is	far	more	difficult	to	stop	drinking	alcohol	than	
it	is	to	stop	eating	pork.	
1168	130806_005—“There	is	a	silence,	socially	it	is	easier	for	alcohol	than	for	pork.	Why?	Because	they	managed	to	
associate	pork	with	something	unhealthy.	The	pig	is	an	omnivore;	the	pig	can	eat	anything.	It’s	more	of	a	repulsion	
for	pork	than	for	alcohol.	Socially,	that	may	be	more	accepted,	it’s	less	of	a	violation	of	the	religion.”	
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Here the informant expands the cultural effect to the religious realm. It is not only less of a social 
or cultural violation but is consequently less of a religious violation. For another of my 
informants this difference in violation was evident in her own thoughts about how she would feel 
if she ate pork versus if she drank alcohol. Through a colourful explanation of what she imagined 
would happen in the two circumstances, we can see how disgust is a strong emotional, and even, 
physical response.  
Il sait que le porc c’est pire que l’alcool. Personnellement, je sens que si je vais manger 
du porc, je sens que ça va partir dans tous mes tissus, ça va habiter mon corps. (Elles 
rigolent.) Alors le liquide pour moi, plus ou moins ça peut disparaitre mais le porc je vais 
sentir que j’ai un morceau quelque part qui appartient définitivement.1169 
 
Similarly, other informants spoke about the effect of eating with your eyes in the Maghrébine 
culture. They related this to the question of eating pork and suggested that pork is not attractive 
to them. It is not an attractive looking thing and there is not the same pull toward eating it. 
Alcohol on the other hand, specifically a cold, crisp beer on a hot summer’s day, is incredibly 
nice to look at and consequently more tempting.1170 The elaborate visualizations of pork and 
alcohol that are present in the Maghreb influenced how each substance was viewed, in spite of its 
religious significance. So much so that Bergeaud-Blackler suggests that “the distaste for pork in 
Muslim societies is so profound that it is hardly even necessary to forbid its consumption.”1171 
Pork is “culturally” inherently more problematic. 
8.3.4 Halal Meat 
The final of the four “Quranically-documented and ‘prescribed’” practices is that of consuming 
halal meat.1172 This practice was the most varied of the four, although there is still a large amount 
of consistency of practice in the data set. Of my 32 informants, 27 ate halal meat exclusively, 
three ate mostly halal but would sometimes eat non-halal meat, and two have no interest in 
keeping halal.1173 Despite some slight variation, halal was generally seen as absolutely central, 
																																																						
1169	130430_005—“He	knows	that	pork	is	worse	than	alcohol.	Personally,	I	feel	that	if	I	eat	pork,	it	will	spread	in	all	
of	my	tissues;	it	will	live	in	my	body.	[They	laugh.]	Whereas	liquid,	for	me,	that	can	disappear	more	or	less,	but	
pork	I	will	feel	like	I	have	a	piece	of	it	somewhere	that	will	stay	indefinitely.”	
1170	Personal	correspondence	with	the	researcher,	Field	Journal,	February	22,	2013.	
1171	Bergeaud-Blackler,	“Social	Definitions	of	Halal	Quality,”	102.	
1172	The	verses	of	the	Quran	that	support	this	practice	are:	2:173;	6:145;	16:115.	The	most	extensive	verses	in	the	
Quran	that	address	the	various	points	behind	halal	slaughter	are	5:3-4.	
1173	The	two	who	had	no	interest	in	keeping	halal	were	also	the	two	who	consumed	alcohol.	
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sacred, and completely religious. It was “vraiment primordial, sacrée, ça c’est très important.”1174 
It was so essential that some of my informants spoke about the fact that they would even decide 
where they would live based on the availability of halal meat.1175  
 The religious significance of the practice was also highlighted by the fact that trust was 
one of the most important aspects of keeping halal that my informants mentioned. Like my 
informants in Paris, most of my Montréal informants spoke about the fact that they had to trust 
the people who are selling them halal. Even if the sin is ultimately on the person selling the meat 
and not the person buying it, it was still essential that my informants knew that the meat was 
coming from a Muslim. These informants tended to trust a Muslim butcher more than the 
grocery store, and furthermore, they would have more trust in a Muslim butcher that they knew 
personally than just any Muslim butcher. Even though there is halal in the grocery stores, it is not 
good enough for many of my informants. For example, one informant explained that 
les grandes surfaces, malgré qu’ils disent halal, je garde une petite restriction. Même les 
boucheries, je n’achète pas chez n’importe qui. Il y a des bouchers, tout dépend des 
personnes. Tu sais, je n’ai pas confiance à n’importe quel boucher. S’il y a des bouchers 
que je connais…je vais acheter d’eux parce que je les connais et j’ai confiance.1176 
 
If keeping halal was simply a cultural practice, then where one bought the meat would not matter 
so deeply to so many people. The fact that one must fully trust the person who is telling them 
that the meat is halal, even if the blame would be on the seller and not the buyer, is a clear 
indication of how religiously significant this practice is for these informants. 
 One can see the cultural influence on this practice when one considers those who do not 
keep halal strictly. These informants tended to give three different answers for why they did not 
keep halal. The first reason was by “politesse.” This informant would not eat pork, would not 
drink alcohol, but saw halal as a bit more flexible. She told me that normally she keeps halal but 
if she is invited to a friend’s house who does not eat halal, she will eat out of politeness, even if it 
																																																						
1174	130430_001—“Really	crucial,	sacred,	it	is	very	important.”	
1175	“La	seule	raison	pourquoi	on	a	choisi	Montréal	[c’est	l’halal]—car	mon	frère	a	fait	ses	études	à	Trois	Rivières.	
Maintenant	je	sais	qu’il	y	a	halal	là-bas,	mais	avant,	à	l’époque	où	il	faisait	ses	études,	il	n’y	en	avait	pas;	il	faisait	
l’aller-retour	Montréal	pour	en	acheter”	(130529_003).		
1176	130520_001—“The	large	grocery	stores	,although	they	say	halal,	I	keep	a	niggling	restriction.	Even	the	butchers	
…	I	do	not	buy	from	just	any	butcher.	There	are	butchers,	everything	depends	on	the	person.	You	know,	I	don’t	
trust	just	any	butcher.	If	there	are	butchers	that	I	know,	I	will	buy	there;	because	I	know	them	and	I	trust	them”;	
also	mentioned	by	130731_002.	
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would shock people to know.1177 The second reason given for flexibility in this practice was 
because the definition has changed:  
C’est quoi le halal? Ça c’est un débat théologique. Donc on ne va pas rentrer ici. Je 
mange [tout]. Pour moi, la viande c’est la viande…la viande [en temps passé] c’est ce qui 
a été sacrifié en autre nom que Allah—quelqu’un a dit, au nom de bouddha, de Jésus, de 
Jean. Pour moi, je ne crois pas que, d’après mes connaissances, ça existe maintenant. Les 
gens qui travaillent dans les boucheries, ce sont des gens normaux. Ils font leur travail. Ils 
ne font rien [étrange], ils égorgent. Ça c’est un travail de routine.1178 
 
The third reason that informants would give for why halal was more flexible is because there is 
an excuse given in the Quran for eating non-halal meat. According to this argument, because 
there is a Quranic passage that says that if one is in extreme conditions and 
on n’a pas le choix, malgré que ce ne soit pas halal et on sait que ce n’est pas halal, on 
peut prononcer le nom bismillah, ça veut dire au nom de Dieu, et on consomme. La 
religion est faite pour faciliter la vie des humains, pas pour la compliquer.1179  
 
As I argued in Chapter 5, most of the verses that address the regulations around halal have 
provisions for “one who is driven by necessity,” in which case it is not a sin to consume such 
things.1180 Overall, there is some wiggle room to the religious obligation, whereas with 
something like pork there is never a time when it is acceptable to eat pork; there is never a 
loophole, or circumstance that allows for it. Some of my informants thought there is for halal. 
Interestingly, the part of the verse that is often used to justify consuming halal, “when driven by 
necessity,” is located within the same verses that forbid pork consumption, yet pork is practically 
never included in the list of things that one can consume when this “necessity” arises. Here again 
we may see the influence of culture on religion. 
 As is the case for all the other practices in this category, whether or not one used religious 
or cultural arguments to explain their practice, they often gave a secondary reason for the 
consumption of halal that was based in logic. The most important argument made in this regard 
																																																						
1177	130401_001.	
1178	130404_001—“What	is	halal?	That’s	a	theological	debate.	So	we	aren’t	going	to	enter	it	here.	I	eat	
[everything].	For	me,	meat	is	meat…	the	meat	[in	times	past]	that	was	sacrificed	to	another	name	than	Allah—
someone	said	in	the	name	of	Buddha,	or	Jesus,	or	John.	For	me,	I	do	not	believe,	according	to	my	knowledge,	that	
that	exists	now.	People	who	work	in	the	butcher	shops,	they	are	normal	people,	they	do	their	work.	They	don’t	do	
anything	[strange].	They	slaughter.	It’s	a	routine	job.”	
1179	130430_003—“We	do	not	have	a	choice,	although	it	is	not	halal	and	we	know	that	it	is	not	halal,	we	can	
pronounce	the	name	bismillah—that	means	in	the	name	of	God—and	we	eat.	The	religion	was	made	to	facilitate	
the	life	of	humans,	not	complicate	it.”		
1180	2:173;	5:3;	6:145;	16:115.	
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was that halal meat was healthier because it drained the animal of all of its blood, and they 
believed that the blood was where disease was housed. Again this is argued as “scientifically 
proven” by many of my informants: “scientifiquement, quand on égorge de cette manière-là, la 
bête dégage tout son sang…Et la viande devient plus saine au niveau de la consommation; 
beaucoup plus que celle où il y a du sang.”1181 Many others argue simply that meat without blood 
is better for your health than meat with blood without any real explanation as to why that may be 
the case. Some do posit why bloody meat is worse than bloodless meat, namely because “le sang, 
quand il reste à l’intérieur, il est vecteur de germes. C’est scientifiquement prouvé que lorsqu’on 
vide l’animal de son sang, la viande est plus saine.”1182 While these so-called facts are now only 
available in recent years, many of these informants would suggest that they were already known 
by Muhammad, through God’s revelation, and that is why this practice appears in the Quran. All 
Muslim religious practices have scientific grounding, according to these informants—not 
surprisingly, given the theological framework in which they imagine themselves in the world. 
	
8.4 Quranically-Documented but not Prescribed Food Practices 
 
We now come to the second category of food practice, that of the “Quranically-based but not 
prescribed” category. The clearest example in this category is the lamb of the Eid Al-Adha. The 
reason why it is placed in this category and not the first is that while it is a religious festival that 
most Muslims around the world do celebrate there is no real injunction in the Quran that one 
must eat lamb on this day. It is a religious act because it finds its grounding in a religious story 
and tradition; it is based on the story of Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice his son, which is an 
essential story in the Abrahamic religious traditions.1183  
 
 
																																																						
1181	130615_001—“Scientifically,	when	we	slaughter	in	this	manner,	the	animal	clears	all	of	its	blood…and	the	meat	
becomes	healthier	for	consumption;	much	more	than	the	one	that	had	blood.”	
1182	130520_002—“The	blood,	when	it	stays	inside,	it	is	a	vector	for	germs.	It’s	scientifically	proven	that	when	you	
rid	the	animal	of	its	blood,	the	meat	is	healthier”;	130424_001,	130430_004,	130517_002,	130520_001,	
130615_003,	130727_001	all	make	similar	arguments.	
1183	As	I	presented	in	Chapter	5,	the	verses	which	are	relevant	here	are:	(1)	The	verses	which	describe	the	story	of	
Abraham’s	willingness	to	sacrifice	his	son	Ishmael:	37:99-109;	(2)	the	verse	that	people	refer	to	in	support	of	the	
sacrifice	of	an	animal	at	the	end	of	the	pilgrimage:	22:27-29;	and	(3)	the	verse	which	addresses	the	Hajj,	to	which	
the	sacrifice	is	related:	2:196.	
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8.4.1 Eid Al-Adha Lamb 
This practice is essentially the clearest example of a religious food practice that my informants 
mentioned. For my informants, who generally gave cultural arguments for commonly understood 
religious practices, such as the four mentioned in the first category, the Eid lamb stood apart as 
something unique, something fully religious. One informant, when speaking of other, often 
understood, religious food practices, focused mostly on the cultural or traditional elements to the 
practice, but when it came to the Eid lamb she focussed on the religious. In response to this 
practice she exclaimed: “l’agneau de l’Eid c’est religieux.”1184 Another informant, when 
speaking about Islam and food, expressed that “la seule chose qui est religieux, c’est dans notre 
fête du mouton.”1185 It is not surprising my other informants, who were more prone to giving 
religious arguments for their food practices in general, also stressed the fact that slaughtering and 
eating the Eid lamb was a purely religious act; it was seen as something beyond culture.1186  
 One of the clearest reasons why this was a primarily religious food practice, according to 
my informants, is because of the fact that it was a universal practice: Muslims, they believe, 
engage in this practice no matter where they are in the world. After all, “ça, c’est la religion 
parce que même ici ou même en occident il y a les musulmans qui égorgent parce que c’est le 
Prophète, c’est la religion.”1187 Whether in the Maghreb, the West, the East, or elsewhere, all 
Muslims, my informants claim (with some measure of exaggeration, to be sure), acknowledge 
the practice of the sacrifice and consumption of the Eid lamb as a religious endeavour. Instead of 
being specific to a time and place, as cultural practices are, the sacrifice of the Eid lamb was 
thought to cross boundaries spatially and temporally. 
 Just because the practice is seen as universal and essentially religious, it did not mean, 
according to my informants, that the practice was obligatory for all Muslims to engage in, like 
those practices in the first category. There are those who cannot afford to partake in the practice, 
and they are not obligated to do so as a result. As one of my informants clarified,  
																																																						
1184	130401_001—“The	Eid	lamb	is	religious.”	
1185	130518_001—“The	only	thing	that	is	religious,	it	is	in	our	festival	of	sheep.”	
1186	130430_003;	130430_004;	130430_005;	130430_006;	130501_001;	130505_001;	130517_001;	130519_001;	
130520_002;	130529_003;	130612_001;	130615_001;	130615_002;	130615_003;	130723_001;	130727_001;	
130731_002;	130806_004;	130806_005;	130807_001.	
1187	130404_001—“That	is	the	religion	because,	whether	here	or	in	the	Occident,	there	are	Muslims	who	sacrifice	
because	it	is	the	Prophet,	it	is	the	religion.”	
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on doit égorger le mouton, selon les capacités de la personne financière bien sûr. Si la 
personne a le moyen, c’est une obligation de sacrifier le mouton. S’il ne l’a pas, ce sont 
des gens pauvres, ils ne sont pas dans l’obligation de sacrifier le mouton.1188 
 
Other informants suggested that, depending on the person’s means, it might not always be a lamb 
or sheep, but instead may be veal or a cow or some other sacrifice, but it was important to 
sacrifice something.1189 Another informant suggested that “ce n’est pas toutes les familles qui le 
font. Il y en a qui paye de l’argent. Nous, on a le choix d’égorger un mouton ou bien de payer le 
prix du mouton à des familles pauvres.”1190 Here an exception is made perhaps for those who do 
not wish to kill an animal but still want to participate in the religious festival—and those who 
live in places (like Canada and France) that forbid the killing of animals in public, and restrict 
the slaughter of animals in general to licensed butchers. 
 While the practice of killing and eating the Eid lamb is considered to be strictly religious 
by my informants there are still cultural influences on how the practice is played out. This 
became clear to me on the day of the Eid Al-Adha in Montréal. My host for the day explained 
the prophetic tradition of eating for the Eids. She explained that for the Eid that follows 
Ramadan, according to prophetic tradition, one is supposed to eat before the prayer. After a 
month of fasting it is important to eat right away. In comparison, for Eid Al-Adha the prophetic 
tradition is to not eat anything before one eats the lamb. Muhammad would do the morning 
prayer, pray over the lamb, sacrifice it and eat the liver immediately following. As a result, there 
would be no real time of fasting during this Eid, a practice that she explained is not allowed. She 
then explained that “back home” this practice was easy to follow. She explained that, like 
Muhammad, they would not eat anything until they ate from the sacrificed lamb. The problem is 
that in Canada the process of going to the farm and getting one’s sacrificed lamb was much more 
complicated and took so much longer that it led people to fasting all day long, which is forbidden 
on the days of festivals.1191 A conflict arises for the immigrant in Canada to follow two different 
																																																						
1188	130520_002—“We	must	slaughter	the	sheep,	depending	on	the	financial	capabilities	of	the	person,	of	course.	
If	the	person	has	the	means,	it’s	an	obligation	to	sacrifice	the	sheep.	If	he	doesn’t,	these	are	the	poor	people,	they	
are	not	obliged	to	sacrifice	the	sheep”;	also	mentioned	clearly	by	130723_002.	
1189	130424_001.	
1190	130517_001—“It	is	not	all	of	the	families	that	do	that.	There	are	some	who	pay	money.	We	have	a	choice	to	
kill	a	sheep	or	pay	the	price	of	a	sheep	to	give	to	poor	families.”	
1191	This	was	one	of	the	most	interesting	insights	that	I	learned	during	the	Eid.	It	speaks	directly	to	how	traditions	
have	to	change	based	on	the	immigrant	experience.	It	would	be	fascinating	to	see	how	the	Eid	works,	and	has	
evolved,	in	the	Maghreb	to	have	a	point	of	comparison	and	to	explore	the	effect	of	migration.	Perhaps	this	
prophetic	tradition	is	only	important	to	a	certain	community	of	which	this	informant	happened	to	be	a	part.	
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aspects of the tradition. To follow the tradition of not eating anything before the sacrificed lamb 
is consumed one almost has to fast. Because of the importance of not fasting on festival days, 
this tradition of not fasting seems to trump the tradition of eating the lamb meat first on the day 
of the Eid Al-Adha in Canada.1192 We can see in this example that alterations are made to a 
religious practice based on one’s cultural context. 
8.5 Sunnah-Inspired Food Practices 
	
Food practices that fall into this third category are based on a religious desire to imitate the life of 
Muhammad. The Sunnah is meant to guide the follower’s life, to reveal the best path for following 
what is presented in the Quran. One informant elucidated the importance of imitating the Prophet 
when she told me the following. 
On suit la Sunnah du Prophète, ce n’est pas obligatoire de le faire, mais on suit notre 
Prophète. C’est comme si le Prophète a fait cette chose-là. Ça veut dire que c’est bon pour 
nous, parce qu’on croit que notre Prophète ne fait pas des choses par lui-même. C’est Dieu 
qui le dirige par des actions ou des paroles.1193 
 
For this informant, and others like her,1194 one follows Muhammad’s lead because his way of life 
is clearly the closest way of living according to God’s perfect plan that one could find. So the 
food practices that the Prophet Muhammad engaged in, as represented in the Sunnah, become 
essential to the religious practice of many of my informants. 
8.5.1 Dates and Milk 
The third category of practice is best represented by the consumption of dates, and to a lesser 
extent milk, to break the fast during the month of Ramadan. Because the Prophet Muhammad 
																																																						
1192	Participant	Observation,	Field	Journal,	October	15,	2013.	Here	we	see	the	working	out	of	new,	negotiated	
foodways	because	of	the	context	in	which	a	religious	individual	finds	him/herself,	similar	to	those	which	Nora	L.	
Rubel	describes	in	her	““The	Feast	at	the	End	of	the	Fast:	The	Evolution	of	an	American	Jewish	Ritual,”	in	Religion,	
Food	&	Eating	in	North	America,	eds.	Benjamin	E.	Zeller,	Marie	W.	Dallam,	Reid	L.	Neilson	and	Nora	L.	Rubel	(New	
York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2014),	234-250.	For	an	overview	of	Eid	Al-Adha,	in	the	context	of	sacrificial	theory	
and	examples	of	lived	religion	across	the	world,	see	Michel	Desjardins	and	Aldea	Mulhern,	“Living	Sacrifice:	
Rethinking	Abrahamic	Religious	Sacrifice	using	Field	Narratives	of	Eid	ul-Adha,”	in	Not	Sparing	the	Child:	Human	
Sacrifice	in	the	Ancient	World	and	Beyond,	eds.	Vita	Daphna	Arbel,	Paul	C.	Burns,	J.	R.	C.	Cousland,	Richard	Menkis,	
and	Dietmar	Neufeld	(London:	Bloomsbury	T&T	Clark,	2015),	190-212.	
1193	130615_002—“We	follow	the	Sunnah	of	the	Prophet;	it	is	not	obligatory	to	do	but	we	follow	our	Prophet.	It’s	
as	if,	if	the	Prophet	did	that	thing,	that	means	that	it	is	good	for	us	because	we	believe	that	our	Prophet	did	not	do	
things	on	his	own.	It	is	God	that	guides	him	by	actions	or	words.”	
1194	130430_001;	130430_004;	130518_001;	130519_001;	130612_001;	130731_003;	130807_001.	
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broke the fast of Ramadan with dates (and, some argue, milk), dates are given religious 
significance in food practice.1195 Unlike the Eid lamb, which is mentioned in the Quran and thus 
has a strong religious undertone, the practice of eating dates during Ramadan comes from the 
Sunnah and has religious significance, but also allows for some flexibility in practice. There are 
those who see the practice as strictly religious: “Les dattes, c’est religieux.”1196 For these 
informants, because Muhammad consumed dates, and because this practice is located in the 
Sunnah, it is a universal religious food practice.1197 For other informants the practice of eating 
dates is “un peu religieux.”1198 These informants spoke about the muddled nature of labelling this 
practice either religious or cultural. While there is a “un petit lien entre cette pratique et la 
religion”1199 it was not as clear cut, not as universal, not as obligatory as some of the previously 
mentioned food practices. As one informant explained,  
je ne vais pas parler de choses et je vous dis: ça, c’est la religion à 100%. Je sais que notre 
Prophète, parce qu’il y a le Coran, il y a Sunnah [et] ça complète. Notre Prophète, il nous 
dit que c’est préférable de couper le jeûne avec les dattes et le lait. Je ne veux pas être 
formelle, ce n’est pas que…pas le faire c’est un péché. Mais il nous conseille de couper le 
jeûne avec les dattes et le lait.1200 
 
For these informants, the practice is religiously grounded in the sense that it is related to the life 
of Muhammad, but it does not have the same status as the practices mentioned in the previous 
two categories. 
 That being said, there is some understanding that there are universal practices and there 
are practices that change with time and context. While following “the Prophet” is seen as valid 
and worthwhile, if Muhammad were alive in the current era perhaps some food practices would 
																																																						
1195	The	commonly	cited	Hadith	that	supports	the	consumption	of	dates	during	Ramadan	is:	“The	Messenger	of	
God	used	to	break	his	fast	with	some	fresh	dates,	before	he	prayed;	if	there	were	none,	then	with	dried	dates	
(tamarat).	If	there	were	none	of	these	he	would	take	a	drink	of	water”	(Ibn	Hanbal,	Musnad,	III.164)	as	found	in	Ibn	
Qayyim	Al-Jawziyya,	Medicine	of	the	Prophet,	trans.	Penelope	Johnstone	(Cambridge:	The	Islamic	Texts	Society,	
1998),	224.	As	I	explained	in	Chapter	5,	although	many	of	my	informants	also	suggested	that	milk	was	an	
important	element	of	the	iftar,	I	could	not	find	a	specific	hadith	that	addresses	the	breaking	of	the	fast	with	milk.		
1196	130529_003—“Dates	are	religious.”	
1197	130430_003;	130430_005;	130501_001;	130703_004;	130727_001;	130731_002;	130806_005;	130505_001.	
1198	130615_001—“A	little	religious.”	
1199	130430_002—“A	small	link	between	this	practice	and	the	religion.”	
1200	130520_002—“I	am	not	going	to	speak	of	things	and	say	to	you	that	it	is	100%	the	religion.	I	know	that	our	
Prophet,	because	there	is	the	Quran,	there	is	the	Sunnah;	that	completes	it.	Our	Prophet,	he	told	us	that	it	is	
preferable	to	break	the	fast	with	dates	and	milk.	I	do	not	want	to	be	formal,	it’s	not	that	…	to	not	do	it	is	a	sin.	But	
he	counseled	us	to	break	the	fast	with	dates	and	milk.”	
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be different. This suggests that perhaps the essential is not what is consumed, perhaps not even 
how, but why. As one informant aptly expressed it to me,  
donc ils croient, les juristes, [que] le premier texte, la première autorité dans l’Islam, c’est 
le Coran. La deuxième, c’est la tradition du Prophète. Donc on [examine le] Coran, si on 
ne trouve pas [ce qu’on cherche]…si le Prophète a fait quelque chose [qu’on trouve dans 
la Sunnah], c’est la religion, il faut suivre ça. Moi, je ne crois pas en ça littéralement, mais 
c’est ça en général…Est-ce que je dois suivre le modèle prophétique à la lettre? Ou bien 
non? Si le Prophète ou une autre personnalité qui a vécu en ce temps-là, et qui est avec 
nous maintenant, est ce qu’il va faire la même chose ou bien il va changer beaucoup de 
choses? Pour moi, il va changer beaucoup de choses. Donc je vois la projection pour imiter 
quelqu’un. En général, je vois la projection de ça.1201 
 
This informant suggested that if Muhammad, and others who were with him, were alive in this 
day and age he may act differently; there may be different things highlighted in his actions. The 
result for this person? While the general idea to model one’s life on Muhammad’s, according to 
information found in the Sunnah, is valid, there has to be flexibility in understanding how that 
plays out. In this specific example, of the dates for Ramadan, if the Prophet was fasting in 
Canada in the twenty-first century, his eating habits may be completely different and he may 
break the fast in a completely different way. This is why, this informant notes, it is the idea of 
following the Prophet’s lead and not necessarily the food item itself that is important here. 
 The cultural effects on this practice can also be seen in the fact that, in spite of it being a 
food practice highlighted in the Sunnah, it is still not a universal practice for all Muslims. One 
informant postulated that “c’est traditionnel, [mais] je ne pense pas qu’en Indonésie ils font ça. 
Je pense que la datte c’est localisé. Je pense, je ne suis pas sûr.”1202 The fact that not all Muslims 
in all places break the fast with dates is one reason why this practice is seen as perhaps more 
traditional than religious. Another informant highlighted this by suggesting that even in the 
																																																						
1201	130404_001—“So	they	believe,	the	jurists,	[that]	the	primary	text,	the	primary	authority	in	Islam	is	the	Quran.	
The	secondary	is	the	tradition	of	the	Prophet.	So	we	[examine]	the	Quran,	if	we	do	not	find	[what	we	are	looking	
for]…if	the	Prophet	did	something	[that	we	find	in	the	Sunnah],	it’s	the	religion,	one	must	follow	that.	But	I	do	not	
believe	in	that	literally,	it’s	in	general…Do	I	have	to	follow	the	prophetic	model	to	the	letter?	Or	not?	If	the	Prophet	
or	another	personality	that	lived	at	that	time	and	who	is	with	us	now,	would	he	do	the	exact	same	thing	or	will	he	
change	many	things?	For	me,	he	will	change	many	things.	So	I	see	the	point	to	imitate	someone.	In	general,	I	see	
the	point	of	that.”	
1202		130806_004—“It’s	traditional.	I	do	not	think	that	in	Indonesia	they	do	that.	I	think	that	the	date	is	localized.	I	
think,	I	am	not	sure.”	
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Maghreb this was not always a popular religious practice, but came into effect with the Arab 
colonization of the Maghreb.1203 
Maintenant c’est une habitude. Est-ce que c’est dans la culture Magrébine, par exemple? 
Non. Nous l’avons acquise de la colonisation arabe. Je ne suis pas Arabe moi…Chez moi, 
par exemple, à la maison je n’ai jamais vu mon père, que Dieu ait son âme, prendre des 
dattes ou du lait…ce n’est pas culturel chez nous. Et après, au fur et à mesure que les gens 
ont commencé à fréquenter d’autres gens, d’autres pays, à visiter d’autres pays, donc c’est 
devenu maintenant une petite tradition qui s’est installé de plus en plus en Algérie. Je parle 
de mon pays.1204 
 
Still another informant suggested that it was more of a “psychological practice than a religious 
one” and that one could break the fast with coconut if that is what one had access to, since what 
was most important was the sugar in the food not the food itself.1205 In fact, some of my 
informants suggested that they engaged in this food practice not for religious reasons, but 
because of the logical health benefits of it.1206 
 Whether my informants saw the dates (and milk) as purely religious, as a little bit 
religious, or as strictly cultural, the “logical” reason behind eating dates was central to all of their 
responses. Informants spoke about the choice to break the fast with dates and milk as a religious 
choice, based on a desire to follow the practices of the Prophet, but then would go on to give 
“scientific” explanations for why this practice made sense. I had informants explain to me that 
“les dattes, c’est un fruit qui contient tout au point de vue nutritif: des sels minéraux, des sucres, 
des fibres,”1207 and because of this their religious practice was reinforced by a scientific truth. 
Like the other rationally-based arguments, these informants talk about the fact that people did 
																																																						
1203	While	the	Arab	colonization	begins	in	642	C.E	in	Egypt,	Arab	colonizers	do	not	have	a	great	deal	of	success	in	
securing	the	countries	of	the	Maghreb	in	the	first	3	decades	of	this	colonial	project.	They	finally	gain	some	control	
of	the	Maghreb	in	the	early	8th	Century	C.E.,	turning	the	Maghreb	into	a	province	of	the	Arab	Muslim	empire	and	
imparting	Arabization	and	Islamization	of	the	Berber	culture.	For	more	information	on	this	topic	see	Michael	Brett,	
Brian	H.	Warmington	and	Jamil	M.	Abun-nasr,	“North	Africa:	From	the	Arab	Conquest	to	1830,”	Encyclopaedia	
Britannica,	last	updated	May	19,	2015,	accessed	12	December	2016,	https://www.britannica.com/place/North-
Africa/From-the-Arab-conquest-to-1830.	
1204	130517_002—“Now,	it’s	a	habit.	Is	it	in	the	Maghrébine	culture	for	example?	No.	We	acquired	that	with	the	
Arab	colonization.	I	am	not	Arab	myself....	In	my	home	for	example	at	the	house,	I	never	saw	my	father	(may	God	
keep	his	soul)	take	dates	or	milk…it	is	not	cultural	for	us.	And	after,	gradually	people	started	to	associate	with	
other	people,	other	countries,	to	visit	other	countries,	so	it	became	now	a	little	tradition	that	is	installed	more	and	
more	in	Algeria;	I	speak	of	my	country.”	
1205	130706_001.	
1206	130517_002.	
1207	130430_002—“Dates	are	a	fruit	that	contain	everything	from	the	point	of	view	of	nutrition:	mineral	salts,	
sugars,	fibres”;	see	also	130430_003;	130723_002.		
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not know why these practices were beneficial, but now “it has been proven” scientifically.1208 In 
this, their religious practice is validated by science. 
 
8.6 “Cultural” Food Practices 
	
The final category of food practices that my informants spoke about is the “cultural” food 
practices. The first set of practices that fit into this category are the traditional dishes that are 
made for religious festivals, such as Ramadan and the Eids. Informants argue these food 
practices to be completely traditional, the evidence of which comes from the fact that everyone 
eats different “typical” dishes during these festivals. These differences were not only based on 
country of origin, but also on regional differences. When I asked one informant about the dishes 
that he ate during religious holidays he explained these nuances: 
Je ne vais pas dire que c’est religieux. C’est beaucoup plus attaché à la culture, à la région 
de laquelle je viens d’Algérie. En fait, ça n’a rien à voir avec la religion. Par exemple, au 
ramadan, on prépare certains plats typiques. Dans d’autres régions, ils mangent autre chose. 
Donc, on ne va pas dire qu’il y a un lien avec la religion.1209 
 
Unlike the dates and milk that would most likely be on most tables during Ramadan because of 
their religious position based on the Sunnah, these dishes vary in large degree. While they are 
consistent and constant within a family or regional group, across families and groups there is 
great variation. One may compare this to classic Christmas or Easter dishes enjoyed by Christian 
families during the holidays, or the foods associated with Jewish holidays. For me, Christmas 
would not be Christmas without my mom's apple cider enjoyed after the Christmas Eve church 
service. This food practice has taken up a central role in the religious experience of Christmas 
Eve for me and yet I would be hard pressed to find any religious significance in it. Just because it 
has become “religious” for me does not mean that it is a religious food practice. This is an 
important distinction that many, but not all, of my informants make. In fact, I had one informant 
who still considers these practices religious because they are linked to religious festivals. She 
explained that,  
																																																						
1208	130731_002;	130430_006.	
1209	130430_002—“I	am	not	going	to	say	that	it’s	religious.	It’s	more	attached	to	culture,	to	the	region	of	Algeria	
that	I	come	from.	In	fact,	that	has	nothing	to	do	with	religion.	For	example,	during	Ramadan,	we	prepare	certain	
typical	dishes,	in	other	regions	they	eat	other	things.	So	one	cannot	say	that	there	is	a	link	with	religion.”	Similarly,	
“non,	c’est	traditionnelle,	religieusement	parlant;	je	ne	pense	pas	que	tout	le	monde	mange	la	même	chose	dans	
tout	le	monde	arabe.	Et	dans	le	monde	islamique	ce	n’est	pas	la	même	chose	non	plus”	(130430_005).	
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pour moi, c’est religieux car on les prépare pour des fêtes religieuses en fonction du 
calendrier religieux. Cela peut être lié à la fin du ramadan, à l’Eid, ou encore à la fête de 
Muhammad ou encore Noël, puisque dans ma famille, on fête également la naissance de 
Jésus de la même manière que celle consacrée à Muhammad.1210 
 
What is important to note in this case is that this informant, who is stressing that the food that she 
eats during the festivals is religious for her, is the informant who considers herself a cultural 
Muslim. She does not engage in any of the traditionally understood religious practices, including 
abstention from pork, alcohol, consuming halal meat and fasting for Ramadan, etcetera, but here 
she is arguing on the side of religion for the practices that more “religious” Muslims all label as 
cultural. In this example one can see how complex is the issue of “culture versus religion.” 
 
8.6.1 Couscous 
One final food that adds complexity to the question of what is religious and what is cultural food 
practice for the Maghrébine Muslim immigrants in my study is couscous. We saw this with my 
Parisian informants, and we see it again in Montréal. For many, it is a marker of Maghrébine 
Muslim identity, both religiously and culturally. It is seen as Muslim at its base because even if 
other religious groups make it, the Jews for example, “il est très bon. Tu manges un couscous 
royal chez les Juifs, tu te régales: très riche, beaucoup de choses, mais ce n’est pas le vrai 
couscous.”1211 The “real couscous,” the “authentic couscous,” belongs to the Muslim 
community, according to this informant.  
 Not only is couscous seen as something that the community is known for—it is an 
identity marker for them—but some would argue it has more significance than just that. While it 
may be the case that “on est connu pour le couscous,”1212 it can also be much more. For example, 
one informant articulated this in the following manner. She explained that 
il y a vraiment une explication très profonde quand on mange le couscous. Ce n’est pas 
juste un plat quand on fait la Harira ou quelque chose comme ça; c’est un plat très spécial 
pour nous. Il faut le faire le vendredi, après la prière, et c’est la réunion familiale et après 
																																																						
1210	130706_001—“For	me,	it’s	religious	because	we	prepare	them	for	the	religious	festivals	according	to	the	religious	
calendar.	 That	might	be	 linked	 to	 the	end	of	Ramadan,	 to	 the	Eid	or	 to	 the	birthday	of	Mohammad	or	even	 to	
Christmas	 because	 in	 my	 family	 we	 celebrate	 equally	 the	 birth	 of	 Jesus	 in	 the	 same	 way	 as	 the	 holiday	 that	
consecrates	Mohammad.”	
1211	130401_001—“It	is	very	good.	You	eat	a	Couscous	Royal	with	the	Jews,	you	savour	it:	very	rich,	lots	of	things,	
but	it	is	not	the	real	couscous.”	
1212	130430_005—“We	are	known	for	couscous.”	
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c’est le weekend. C’est vraiment très relax. Il a une signification très profonde pour nous, 
le couscous.1213 
 
Couscous is more than just a traditional dish for this informant. In this community it is 
tied to religious practice (the Friday prayer) and brings the family together which is also 
foundational to Muslim culture. Here we see how “individual choice—the decision to distinguish 
certain practices from other, ordinary, practices”—influences how something is categorized; 
intention matters, such that the kind of cooking one does, for whom, in what circumstances, 
etcetera, makes it religious.1214 We can similarly see the impact of individual intention on 
religious categorization when looking at Courtney Bender’s Heaven’s Kitchen. In that work, 
Bender describes one of her informants who argued that her cooking at “God’s Love We 
Deliver” was a religious practice in comparison to just her regular everyday cooking.1215 Like my 
informants, whom I describe above, who see couscous on Fridays as religious versus couscous 
on any other day, Bender’s informants make ritual out of intention, as well as repetition. Mehta 
similarly explains that,  
while it is true that chocolate bunnies have little to do with the Resurrection, it is equally 
true that gefilte fish is not related to the Exodus, yet for many American Christians and 
American Jews, neither Easter nor Passover would be the same without those foods.1216 
 
Couscous, like these other commonly understood “cultural” foods, can take on religious 
significance.1217 
 Couscous is also seen as a perfect example of a Maghrébine dish, as something that 
Maghrébines are known for, as a cultural food expression. One informant illustrated the 
centrality of couscous for her cultural identity as follows: 
Je cuisine d’autres plats, mais le couscous c’est ma culture, c’est depuis que je suis né. Je 
suis venu ici à 24, 25 ans. Donc tu ne peux pas [oublier] 24 ans…ça veut dire que depuis 
que je suis petite je mange le couscous chaque vendredi au Maroc. A chaque vendredi il y 
a le plat couscous. Durant la semaine on sait c’est quoi les plats. Le vendredi c’est très 
important: [pour] les marocains c’est le couscous. Donc, quand je viens là, c’est la culture, 
																																																						
1213	130615_002—“It	really	has	a	very	deep	explanation	when	we	eat	couscous.	It	is	not	just	a	dish	when	we	make	
Harira	or	something	like	that;	it	is	a	very	special	dish	for	us.	You	have	to	make	it	on	Friday	after	the	prayer	and	it	is	
the	family	reunion	and	after	it	is	the	weekend.	It	is	really	relaxed.	It	has	a	very	deep	meaning	for	us,	couscous.”	
1214	McGuire,	Lived	Religion,	109.	
1215	Bender,	Heaven’s	Kitchen,	67.			
1216	Mehta,	“’I	Chose	Judaism,”	165.	
1217	We	can	see	another	example	of	this	process	of	making	cultural	foods	into	religious	ones	in	Hicks,	“An	Unusual	
Feast,”	134-153.	Hicks	suggests	that,	much	like	the	couscous	of	my	informants,	gumbo	takes	up	a	religious	place	in	
his	home	(Hicks,	“An	Unusual	Feast,”	135).	
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je ne peux pas changer ça. C’est très important pour moi. C’est quelque chose que je prends 
dans mes veines.1218 
 
Even though she also stressed the fact that couscous was consumed on Fridays, it was not the 
religious aspect that was important to her. Instead, it was the fact that it was the clearest example 
of a cultural tradition that was in her blood that she brought with her no matter where she would 
go. As she said, couscous is her culture. 
 
8.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter addressed how my informants defined and consequently interacted with culture and 
religion through the lens of their food practices. When considering food practice the lines 
between these two categories often become quite blurry. The informants in my study often spoke 
about a clear distinction between these two terms, whether based on arguments of universality 
versus specificity, or public versus private, or obligation versus flexibility. Like in Paris, a 
hierarchy of religious/cultural food practice emerged for my informants in Montréal as well. I 
presented how, as was the case in Paris, food practice generally fell into the categories of (1) the 
Quranically-documented and “prescribed” food practices, (2) the Quranically-based but not 
prescribed category, (3) the Sunnah inspired food practices, and (4) the purely “cultural” food 
practices. I broke down each of these categories and described my informants’ interactions with 
these various food practices as well as highlighting their cultural, scientific, and logical 
reasoning for why they engaged in each. 
I began by exploring the fast during Ramadan. In this section I showed how, like in 
France, this practice was considered the best example of a religious food practice, and was 
consequently the most practiced. Its place in the five pillars makes it especially important. 
Interestingly enough, I showed that even for those Muslims in my study who do not pray, or 
engage in some of the other five pillars, they still fast for Ramadan. So, for some in my study, 
not only was fasting important because it was one of the pillars of Islam, but it was considered to 
																																																						
1218	130518_001—“I	cook	other	dishes	but	couscous	is	my	culture,	it	is	there	since	I	was	born.	I	came	here	at	24,	25	
years	old.	So	you	cannot	[forget]	24	years…it	means	that	from	the	time	I	was	little	I	ate	couscous	every	Friday	in	
Morocco.	Each	Friday	there	is	the	plate	of	couscous.	During	the	week	we	know	what	are	the	dishes.	Friday	is	very	
important:	[for]	Moroccans	it’s	couscous.	So	when	I	go	there,	it’s	the	culture,	I	cannot	change	that.	It	is	very	
important	for	me.	It	is	something	I	carry	in	my	veins.”	
	 363	
be the most important Muslim practice. I also presented the idea that there seemed to be a 
tangible difference in the fasting experience for those who practice based on religious conviction 
versus cultural conviction (or in my case, “educational” conviction). My informants who fasted 
out of religious conviction presented an air of comfort, calm and centeredness throughout the 
day, even in those last difficult moments before the iftar. I, and my cultural Muslim informants, 
on the other hand, seemed to feel the ravenous hunger, and all its side effects, that one would 
expect from not eating for 16 hours.  
I then went on to explain two of the other practices located in the Quranically-
documented and “prescribed” category, namely, the abstention from eating pork and drinking 
alcohol. After presenting the various religious and cultural explanations for my informants’ 
engagement with these practices I discussed the difference in approach to the two. I showed the 
complexity of understanding and practice that exists within a given category. While both pork 
and alcohol abstentions are considered to be religious obligations, based on their position in the 
Quran, there is clearly a different approach to them on the ground. Most of my informants did 
not eat pork, nor could they think of any Muslims who ate it. While most of them did not 
consume alcohol either, they all knew Muslims who drank. Despite arguing that there was no 
difference between the two injunctions, that both were equally haram, my informants came up 
with possible explanations for why there seemed to be a difference in actual practice of some 
Muslims. Some suggested that it was the way that both injunctions were written about in the 
Quran that led to the apparent flexibility with which some approach the injunction around 
alcohol. Others suggested that there was a different level of cultural revulsion surrounding the 
two practices, with pork being continually culturally offensive and unavailable, and alcohol 
being culturally available and acceptable. These cultural realities thus had a clear impact on 
religious practice as was made evident through these differing practices. 
While many of my informants kept halal strictly, by only consuming halal meat, some did 
alter their practice in Montréal. In this we can see the effect of culture on religious practice yet 
again. Those informants who did not continue to eat exclusively halal meat gave three different 
types of reasons for this change in practice. First, they expressed that, to not offend a host who 
offered non-halal meat, they would consume whatever was on offer; it was a matter of good old 
fashioned Canadian politeness. The second reason was the understood shifting definition of what 
exactly halal was. The third, and final, reason was that there was a caveat given in the Quran 
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around eating halal meat which some of my informants argued applied to their situation as 
Muslims living in a non-Muslim-dominant land. Ultimately, whether my informants kept halal 
strictly or not, they all consumed halal meat to some extent, and, like in all of these categories of 
food practice, gave what they saw as scientific/logical reasons for why they did so. 
After addressing the four practices that are a part of the first category of food practice, I 
moved on to the second category and specifically the practice of sacrificing and eating the lamb 
for the Eid Al-Adha. What is curious about this practice is that although it is placed in the second 
category of food practices, it was seen as the most “purely religious” food practice of them all. 
The universality of the practice was one of the clearest reasons given for why the Eid lamb was 
“purely religious.” Because Muslims across the globe engaged in this practice, according to my 
informants’ understanding, it had to be religious. While it was universal, it was not necessarily 
obligatory, hence its placement in the Quranically-based but not prescribed category of food 
practice. I concluded this subsection by discussing the cultural influence on the practice of this 
tradition by showing how the Canadian context influences the actual consumption that is done on 
the day of the Eid Al-Adha. 
When exploring the third category of food practice, namely the Sunnah-inspired food 
practices, I showed how this category complicates the notion of religion versus culture 
particularly well. While there are religious motivations and convictions for imitating the life of 
Muhammad and accordingly for breaking the fast with dates as he is said to have done, my 
informants also suggested that the cultural reasons behind this practice could not be ignored. 
Some suggested that if Muhammad had lived in a different time and different context he may 
have broken the fast with something else, and so cultural context clearly had an affect on this 
practice. My informants argued that, whether one were to eat dates or not, there was a scientific 
or “logical” reason to break the fast in such a way. Again, these informants suggested that their 
religious food practice went beyond mere religious obligation, and they suggested that, as 
Muslims, they believed that God had clear, beneficial intentions for each action; breaking the fast 
by consuming dates was an excellent example of such divinely premeditated advice. 
Finally, I closed this chapter with a discussion of commonly understood “cultural” food 
practices, either food associated with religious festivals or the consumption of couscous. What 
was fascinating about this category is that although it is overwhelmingly understood to be strictly 
cultural, there were still people who gave these practices religious significance. One of my 
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informants, who sees herself as a cultural Muslim and eats pork, drinks alcohol and does not 
keep strict halal practices, argued that these food practices were, for her, religious. Some gave 
similar religious arguments for the practice of eating couscous as well, often because it was 
attached to the practice of the Friday prayers. More often than not, couscous was labelled as a 
perfect representation of a Maghrébine, cultural food practice, revealing the variation of 
definitions possible for any of the given food practices performed by my informants. 
Overall, because of the complicated history of church and state in Québec, the 
relationship to one’s religious and cultural practices gets worked out in fascinating ways on the 
ground in Montréal. For most of my informants, religious food practice was not only maintained 
in their move to Québec, but was in fact increased. There was no need to change their food 
practices in this context as one could find all the necessary ingredients and the necessary setting 
to feel as though these practices were acceptable. Because of the overall freedom to practice 
religion in Canada, my informants felt comfortable maintaining, and even increasing, all their 
religious, and cultural food practices in Québec.  
One can still see the influence of secular reasoning on these very practices. My 
informants did not shy away from labelling a practice religious, but almost always gave another, 
more scientific, or logical reason for why they engaged in such exercises. No matter which 
category of food practice we would discuss, whether documented in the Quran, Sunnah or 
Tradition, my informants explained that the practice was religious at base, but then would go on 
to explain why it also made logical sense to carry out that practice. True to Québec 
interculturalism, my informants kept their religious identities but also adjusted them and their 
reasoning and understanding of them to fit into the common culture of Québec. 
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Chapter 9: Comparison, Critique and Conclusion 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
Over the last eight chapters I have attempted to address the questions: How can food act as a 
means of reimagining, recreating, reaffirming, and expressing sometimes complicated and 
contested identities for minority immigrant communities in highly secular contexts? Does food 
emerge as a more “politically or culturally correct” avenue for religious expression than other 
religious practices? In secular contexts, where public signs of religiosity are often seen as 
problematic, could subtler or more private expressions of religious identity help the minority 
religious immigrant to engage with and express their identities in meaningful ways. Additionally, 
in contexts like France and Québec, which have strong and distinct food cultures, by taking up 
some of the foodways of the host context, or leaving some of the home food practices that are 
seen as especially in conflict with the host context behind (i.e. the restriction on alcohol and 
pork), could my participants claim and demonstrate their Québécois/French side of their 
transnational identity? Would they even want to? Finally, what is the impact of these societies’ 
unique and complex histories and interactions with colonialism, immigration, secularism, and 
nationalism on these foodways and their affiliated identities?  
My study shows not only that the host contexts have distinct histories and interactions 
with “the other” but that “the others” also have idiosyncratic responses to these contexts. Québec 
is not a Mini-France, or better, Montréal is not a Mini-Paris.  Furthermore, there is no unified 
way that Muslims across or even within cultures and contexts respond to the challenges to 
identity that they face. By choosing which religious and cultural food practices to continue and 
which ones to alter, by choosing to label these practices, by relegating these practices to 
particular places and times, the Maghrébine Muslim immigrants of my study show the varied 
ways that Muslims negotiate their identities in transnational contexts.  
 
9.2 Comparison Between Paris and Montréal Results 
 
When I started this project, I hypothesized that there would be a great deal of overlap between 
the experiences of my informants in Paris and those in Montréal. I assumed that they would be 
two case studies of similar phenomena, leading to two sites of support for whatever conclusions I 
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was going to reach. I expected that there would be variation in how my informants lived their 
daily religious lives and constructed their individual identities; after all, every individual has 
his/her own personal history and set of circumstances that influence such things. What I did not 
expect, and what came to be one of the most fruitful discoveries of my research, was how the 
two contexts of reception, or host societies, would have such a differing impact on my 
informants’ lives.  
I knew that the host societies’ histories would influence my informants. That could not be 
denied, but having bought into the myths of “Québec as a Mini-France,” and “Québec as distinct 
in Canada” (in this case in relation to its approach to immigrants), I assumed that their impact 
would be similar, perhaps with my Montréal informants feeling slightly more comfortable in 
their lives in Québec than my Parisian informants in France. In this next section I address some 
of my key findings of similarity and difference between my Paris and Montréal data to show how 
the context of reception impacted my informants’ identity negotiations in distinctive ways. 
 
9.2.1 The Effect of French Vs. Québécois Nationalism on Immigrant Identity1219 
In chapters 2 and 6 I explored the different approaches to nationalism present in both France and 
Québec. In Chapter 2 I argued that because of the emphasis on French national identity, and a 
distinct understanding of that identity, Muslims in France may need to make more concerted 
efforts to show that they too are “French,” and all that that entails. These efforts often include the 
outward manifestations of one’s identity, of which food is essential. In Québec, there is also a 
distinct national identity at work. As I argued in Chapter 6, the common culture that makes up 
the Québécois national identity consists of language and secular nationalism; thus, in general, 
Maghrébine Muslim immigrants would support one aspect of this national identity but not the 
other. Because of that Québécois reality I suggested that an “Islam du Québec” that fits with the 
intercultural model of Québécois nationalism might lead to Muslims in Québec de-emphasizing 
their religious identities, or even more so, giving them a Québécois flair, à la interculturalism. 
While my Paris data supports these ideas, the Montréal data provides a different picture, which I 
address below. 
																																																						
1219	Parts	of	this	(9.2.1)	section	and	the	next	(9.2.2)	section	have	been	published	in	Rachel	Brown,	“Bread	Beyond	
Borders:	Food	as	a	Lens	into	Thomas	Tweed’s	Theory	of	Religion,”	Bulletin	for	the	Study	of	Religion	(forthcoming	
2017).	
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France has a distinct relationship to food, with food playing a key role in the national 
identity; a national identity that is seen as essential, specific and unique. Because of a complex 
history of national development, to “be French” has specific connotations, and is seen as the 
most important identity for an individual in France to hold.1220 National identity takes 
precedence, and my informants knew this, felt this, and were impacted by this “fact.” My 
informants stressed that national identity is seen as the most important, the only worthwhile 
identity to mention in the French context.  
Moreover, I showed how there is an idea that there is a “French, French” identity, a form 
of national identity, to which only certain people have access. Because of this, only 16 of my 33 
Parisian informants claimed French identity, while 17 did not. Of the 16 who did claim it, it was 
not a straightforward identity claim. There were always qualifying “yes but…” explanations. As 
one of my informants expressed so clearly, “France is wine, cheese and baguette. I eat only the 
baguette. So there you go. I am not really French, French.”1221 This informant was French (she 
was born in France), and yet, because she did not fit into a specific food practice pattern of what 
it meant to “be French” she had a hard time claiming this side of her transnational identity.1222 
This was the case for many of my transnational informants in Paris.  Because of the particular 
concept of the nation and thus what it means to “be French,” as I described in Chapter 2, 
transnational identities are generally not encouraged or recognized. Trying to maintain a 
transnational identity in such a context will inevitably be worked out in distinct ways. 
In Montréal, on the other hand, the concept of nation and national identity is not as 
closed. While I assumed, based on the Québécois nationalism that I outlined in Chapter 6, that 
my informants would be interacting with and affected by the Québécois stance on nationalism, I 
was surprised to see that instead it was Canadian nationalism with which they were interacting. 
In fact, only two of my informants in Montréal even mentioned Québécois national identity. 
Because of this, when it came to national identity only 11 of my informants in Montréal did not 
claim Canadian identity. In those cases, it was not that they could not claim it, or that they did 
not want to, it was simply a matter of fact that they were not yet Canadian (usually meaning they 
																																																						
1220	For	works	that	highlight	the	importance	of	national	identity	in	France	see	Freedman,	Immigration	and	
Insecurity,	26.	
1221	120905_001.	
1222	For	the	place	food/drink	in	the	French	national	identity,	specifically	the	place	of	wine,	see	my	discussion	in	
Chapter	2,	section	2.5.1.	
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did not yet have Canadian citizenship). The other 21 all gladly professed this national identity, or 
professed their desire to claim it, even if they might not have Canadian citizenship. My 
informants suggested that Canadian identity is viewed as being open to everyone, as something 
that is accessible to all migrants, as inherently multicultural and thus as encouraging to the 
transnational experience. Many of my Montréal informants brought up the fact that this 
accessibility and acceptance of both sides of their transnational identity was based on the fact 
that in Canada “everyone is an immigrant.”  
Because “everyone is an immigrant” in Canada, transnational identity and behaviour is 
almost expected and is a focus for many of my informants’ daily actions. Because everyone is 
Canadian, the need to express this identity is not as visceral as the need to go back in family 
history and experience to explain one’s origins.  
For many of my Montréal informants, expressing their Maghrébine identities, and often 
their Muslim identities as well, was a means of displaying their Canadian identity. This is a 
distinct difference between the Canadian situation and the French situation. While in France the 
things that make you similar are the things that you must stress to show your national identity, in 
Canada it is one’s origins that make you different that ultimately make you fit with the national 
identity.  
The impact of these two approaches to nationalism on my transnational informants 
became obvious as I analysed my data and wrote up my ethnography. My informants in Paris, 
feeling as though French national identity was not really an option for them, did not attempt to 
claim it (hence the 16/17 split of national identity claims among my Parisian informants). In 
Montréal on the other hand, the fact that my informants believed that the Canadian national 
identity allowed for and even encouraged their other identities, made them want to claim this 
national identity even more (21claimed it wholeheartedly). Moreover, for my Paris informants 
who did claim French identity, it was always a complicated identity claim, and for my Montréal 
informants who did not claim Canadian identity it was an uncontested fact rather than a 
complicated claim. 
While the fear may be that by maintaining or even increasing practices that indicate 
difference, that highlight the “homeland” side of one’s transnational identity, immigrants may 
not integrate fully into the host culture, my research shows the exact opposite effect. By feeling 
free to fully express and engage both sides of one’s transnational identity, often thanks to 
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Canada’s official multiculturalism policy, my Montréal informants felt more Canadian, or had a 
greater desire to “be Canadian.” In France, the opposite was true.1223 Furthermore, my research 
provides indirect evidence for Micheline Milot’s claim that immigrants to Canada “out-
integrate” immigrants to the United States and other places that do not have a multiculturalism 
policy.1224 Finally, this conclusion gives ethnographic evidence to Susan Worbs’ findings that the 
“results in France are surprising in some aspects: The self-identification as French is not as 
widespread among migrant youngsters as should be expected judging by the strong assimilation 
efforts of the republican state.”1225 These differing approaches to nationalism not only had an 
effect on the national identity claims, or feelings of belonging, for my informants but also 
directly affected their daily practices. 
 
9.2.2 Differences in Levels of Practice in Paris and Montréal 
Because of the different approaches to nationalism present in France, Québec and Canada, my 
informants engaged with their transnational food practice in different ways. As I posited in 
chapters 4 and 6, to maintain connection to the homeland, and to feed one’s transnational 
identity, accessibility to the homeland is key, whether or not it is physical or symbolic 
accessibility. As I have expressed throughout this dissertation, food and food practice are some 
of the most strongly-held means of situating oneself spatially and temporally; they can help the 
immigrant to cross borders of time and space.1226 For my informants in Paris, where distances, 
between home and host land were smaller, and where acceptance of transnational identity was 
low, their “crossing” was physical, whereas their creation of homeland in host land, their 
“dwelling” practices, were less emphasized and more open to change. The feeding of the 
Maghrébine/Muslim identity was done largely through trips back home, “au bled” as they would 
say. Trips back home were frequent, at least once a year. These trips allowed my informants to 
																																																						
1223	James	A.	Beckford	comes	to	similar	conclusions	by	conducting	a	comparative	study	of	how	Muslims	in	British	
and	French	prisons	are	treated	and	what	that	reveals	about	the	treatment	of	religious	diversity	in	both	locations	in	
general.	I	use	food	as	the	lens	rather	than	prison	accommodations,	as	he	does,	but	both	studies	show	the	way	that	
France,	in	its	effort	to	emphasize	equality,	actually	undermines	it.	See	James	A.	Beckford,	“Public	Responses	to	
Religious	Diversity	in	Britain	and	France,”	in	Reasonable	Accommodation:	Managing	Religious	Diversity,	ed.	Lori	
Beaman	(Vancouver:	UBC	Press,	2012),	109-138.	
1224	Milot,	“Modus	Co-vivendi,”	117.	
1225	Worbs,	“Where	do	I	Belong?,”	54.	
1226	This	comes	out	of	Tweed’s	theory	of	religion	as	is	found	in	Tweed,	Crossing	and	Dwelling.	
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keep the ties with Algeria (or Morocco, or Tunisia) that are essential to their knowledge of 
themselves as Maghrébine.  
Beyond just emphasizing ties to the homeland, these trips were used strategically as well, 
mostly to bring food back to the host land. While many of my informants expressed the 
importance of living by rules, whether of society or Islam, they were willing to break rules in 
order to feed their transnational identities; they would bring back suitcases full of food. My 
informants stressed that, as much as one could access the necessary ingredients to make all their 
religious and cultural foods in the host land, there was a noted difference between the “host” 
ingredient and the “home” ingredient. All but one of my 33 informants in Paris mentioned that 
this difference was a difference in taste, or “goût.” Maintaining practices that give access to the 
“home ingredient” is essential for the transnational immigrant in Paris then. Whatever the 
argument was for why the “goût” was different, often meaning “better” in the Maghreb than in 
France, it became clear that it was important to try and get to as close as possible to the full 
“taste” of the homeland.1227 If one cannot go “home” to make the dish there, the next best thing 
is to make the dish from ingredients from “back home,” hence the emphasis on bringing food 
across the borders from the Maghreb to France. 
For my informants in Paris, highlighting their French identity, or de-emphasizing their 
difference, through food was a more essential process in the host land. Because they were close 
enough to access the homeland directly, or the home food directly, and because of the emphasis 
in France on “French identity,” the working out of transnational identity in the host land was 
much more focussed on the French national side. Because of notions of French universalism,1228 
and as a result because it was essential to highlight one’s French identity in France, or, if not 
French identity, simply not to highlight any other identity, my informants altered their 
Maghrébine/Muslim food practices to a great extent.  
First, it is important to note that for most of my informants their ethnic and religious 
identities were conflated. One was “born Muslim” because one was born in the Maghreb. One 
engaged in Muslim practices as a means of maintaining Maghrébine identity and vice versa. I 
																																																						
1227	In	her	article	in	a	special	issue	of	the	Donner	Institute’s	Scripta	Instituti	Donneriani	Aboensis,	Kershenovich	
Schuster	suggests	that	taste	is	culturally	and	socially	influenced,	and	consequently	one	can	see	how	the	exact	same	
food	tastes	better	“back	home”	or	when	made	with	“home	food.”	See	Kershenovich	Schuster,	“Habaneros	and	
Shwarma,”	297.	
1228	See	Scott,	Politics	of	the	Veil,	11-12	for	an	exploration	of	French	universalism.	
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had informants explain that it was important to maintain religious food practices as a means of 
maintaining their Maghrébine identity. They were Maghrébine/Muslim because they kept halal, 
did not eat pork and made couscous at home. The continuation of such practices was seen as an 
essential means of maintaining connection with the Maghreb. 
On the other hand, I had informants who claimed this identity but also ate pork and drank 
alcohol, did not keep halal and did not fast during Ramadan (or any variation of these practices). 
The conflation of religious and ethnic/cultural identity allowed a greater variation of practice.1229 
Because not eating pork was viewed as a cultural practice by many of my informants in Paris, it 
was more open to change, to be left behind in the French context.  In fact, concerning the 
conventionally understood Muslim food practice my Paris informants engaged them in the 
following way: Ramadan (24 strictly observed/ 5 practiced it from time to time/ 4 did not), pork 
(24 abstained/ 9 consumed it), alcohol (17 abstained/ 16 consumed it), halal (only 9 kept it 
strictly/ 24 did not). For most of these informants, to not eat pork, to fast during Ramadan, to eat 
the occasional couscous was enough to mark off their transnational identity. More importantly, 
to change those practices was a clear way of indicating their “integrated” French identity. 
The situation in Montréal was much different. Because people there could not as easily 
make trips home and bring back “home ingredients” (something they were generally not 
interested in anyway), they needed to “cross the divide” in different ways. For many of my 
informants in Montréal, memories of the homeland are tied to and evoked by foods and 
smells.1230 According to one of of them, accessing memories, whether through food or some 
other means, is an essential aspect of the immigrant experience. Engaging in certain food 
practices, making distinct dishes, seasoning with specific spices, gathering around a table that is 
set in a particular way, are all means of accessing “home” for the Maghrébine immigrant in 
Montréal. 
In Montréal where distances are much larger in terms of space, climate, and culture than 
they are between Paris and the Maghreb, their dwelling effort was much more deliberate. For 
many of my informants these dwelling practices (the process of finding place through mapping, 
																																																						
1229	My	theory	that	by	changing	the	label	of	a	food	practice	from	religious	to	cultural	the	individual	removes	some	
of	the	obligation	of	that	practice,	thus	leading	to	greater	flexibility	in	that	practice,	is	supported	by	Mehta,	“’I	
Chose	Judaism,”	156.	
1230	McGuire	suggests	that	“memory	resides	in	the	whole	body…that	means	that	memory	can	be	closely	connected	
with	our	senses	and	bodily	states,	including	experiences	of	which	we	are	not	even	conscious”	(McGuire,	Lived	
Religion,	99).	It	is	not	surprising	then	that	food	and	eating	pull	out	those	memories	resident	in	the	body.	
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building and inhabiting),1231 specifically making home food, help them to feel at home. One of 
these deliberate actions that many of informants took in Montréal was to organize and construct 
their living spaces in ways reminiscent of their living spaces in the Maghreb. By structuring their 
“outwardly appearing Canadian homes” in inward Maghrébine ways, these informants took 
deliberate steps to connect with the homeland.  
More important than the structure of their kitchen and living room was what food was 
prepared in those spaces. Because of the need to emphasize the Maghrébine aspect of their 
transnational identity, my informants ate the food from the homeland in larger percentage than 
host land food. Although they make food from outside the homeland from time to time, they eat 
“their” food primarily. While for some, cooking majority Maghrébine food is simply a matter of 
habit, many of my informants make the home food in larger percentage because they want to 
“remain attached” to their homeland. Finally, informants also stressed the importance of cooking 
the home food as a means of educating their children about the homeland. It was essential in 
passing on the Maghrébine side of one’s transnational identity in a context that was distant from 
the homeland. 
While one may not need to stress one’s Canadian identity through what one eats, not only 
because Canada does not have a distinct or narrowly-prescribed food culture, but also because 
the emphasis is often placed on the “other” side of one’s transnational identity, the need to stress 
one’s Maghrébine identity is strong. This is why there is not only consistency of food practice 
with what one did in the Maghreb, but an increase in homeland food traditions in Montréal. I had 
many informants suggest that religiously they were “more practicing” in Canada than they had 
been in the Maghreb. For these informants, their identities as “practicing Muslims” were only 
highlighted in the Canadian context; it would not have been an identity that they mentioned in 
the Maghreb, as there would have been no need to emphasize it in that context.1232 Furthermore, 
because, according to most of my informants, 99.99% of Maghrébines are Muslims, being more 
religious was also a way to connect with being more Maghrébine. Because of this conflation, 
examining the conventionally understood religious food practices, most were maintained by my 
																																																						
1231	Tweed,	Crossing	and	Dwelling,	59,	82.	
1232	In	Jennifer	Selby’s	Questioning	French	Secularism,	some	of	her	informants	reflected	this	kind	of	pattern	in	their	
experiences	in	the	suburb	of	Petit	Nanterre.	She	specifically	addresses	the	expectation	placed	on	young	women	
who	migrate	from	the	Maghreb	to	marry	men	in	Petit	Nanterre	to	be	even	more	practicing	than	they	were	in	the	
Maghreb.	Her	informants	express,	like	mine	do,	how	in	the	Maghreb	you	don’t	need	to	emphasize	certain	things,	
because	everyone	does	them,	but	in	France	you	have	to	because	it’s	what	makes	you	distinct	(164-165).	
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Montréal informants: Ramadan (31fast/ 1 does not), pork (31 abstained/ 1 consumed), alcohol 
(30 abstained/ 2 consumed), and halal (27 keep it strictly/ 3 keep it sometimes/ 2 did not care).  
Because religious identities are considered acceptable identities to hold in the Canadian context 
religious practices can be labeled as such and continued in the host land. 
In a context such as Montréal where these relatively well known religious food practices 
are not so contested, more drastic means of showing different identity were emphasized. For 
example, for many of my informants in Montréal, the avoidance of gelatin is a part of one’s 
religious food practice, and a part of what makes them Muslim in Canada. The discussion around 
gelatin was never mentioned by my Parisian informants but it played an important role in the 
religious food lives of my Montréal informants. Furthermore, because of this focus on taking the 
identity of practicing Muslim to the next level, many of my informants became obsessive 
ingredient verifiers, making sure that every single ingredient in every single product they 
purchased was halal. They became the community of “ingredient checkers” in a world 
surrounded by those laissez-faire shoppers who throw anything in their cart. Whereas in a place 
like Paris, the fact of keeping halal or not drinking alcohol was enough of a contested practice as 
to distinguish a particular identity, it was almost as if, in Montréal, my informants needed 
something even more distinct with which to identify themselves. 
Because of the different contexts of Paris and Montréal, specifically the way that nation 
and relatedly transnationalism are viewed, the immigrants with whom I interacted engaged in the 
essential processes of crossing and dwelling in different ways. In Paris, practices that emphasize 
any other national or religious identity other than “French” are kept to the homeland context, or 
changed in the host land context. In Montréal, on the other hand, one can easily engage one’s 
“other” side of transnational identity; it is in fact encouraged to do so. Because of this situation, 
transnational practices are deliberate in Montréal and even increased. In Paris, my informants 
relabeled their religious food practices as cultural to two ends: first, this relabelling allowed them 
to see this practice as more flexible and open to change, and second, if they did not stop these 
practices, this relabelling made their engagement in said practices more acceptable to the non-
Muslim French majority that surrounded them.1233 In Montréal, because my informants felt as 
																																																						
1233	This	falls	in	line	with	Mehta’s	work	when	she	suggests	that	focusing	on	the	ethnic	side	of	food	practice	can	
have	two	results:	first	that	the	practice	is	seen	as	more	flexible,	and	second	that	because	food,	in	its	very	nature,	
can	“be	easily	read	simply	as	ethnic,”	it	may	not	be	as	“threatening	to	perceived	religious	identities”	(Mehta,	“I	
choose	Judaism,”	156,	169).	
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though their religious food practices were an acceptable aspect of their multiple and varied 
identities in their host context, they did not feel the need to relabel commonly understood 
religious food practices as cultural. In fact, because these food practices were so acceptable, they 
often emphasized other, more obscure religious food practices as essential to their lives as 
Maghrébine Muslims in Montréal. 
Again, it is important to note that an increase in religious practice by my Montréal 
informants did not equate to more communautarisme; in fact, their ability to maintain 
religious/ethnic identity often led to them making more efforts to integrate into the host society. 
In Paris on the other hand, the effect on practice was generally of two sorts: either informants 
changed their food practice to show their integrated identity, or they maintained their practices 
(either relabelling them as cultural or not). In either case, most of my Parisian informants felt that 
the very fact of being Muslim (whether culturally or religiously so) and/or Maghrébine excluded 
them from being French, and as a result the community was fairly insular, and maintained a wary 
approach to outsiders, making integration difficult. 
 
9.2.2.1 The Disappearance vs. the Growth of Hospitality in the Host Context 
Another important distinction between my Montréal and Paris informants can be directly related 
to this feeling of acceptance or rejection of minority identities in the context of reception. Both 
groups discussed the importance of hospitality to their cultural and religious identities, but the 
way that hospitality was worked out on the ground was drastically different in the two settings.  
 As I discussed in Chapter 4, my Parisian informants argued that one of the most 
important distinctions between “us” and “them,” between the Maghrébine immigrant and the 
non-immigrant French society that surrounded them, was in their approach to hospitality. While 
Parisians have a reputation for being cold and distant, even with their inner circle contacts, the 
Maghrébine culture, they insisted, is one of warmth and closeness, of hospitality. My informants 
suggested that hospitality was essential and yet, as became clear when comparing my Paris data 
to my Montréal data, this hospitality seemed to be altered in the French context—Frenchified, if 
you will. Hospitality, as an outworking of religious identity must, like all other religious 
practices be kept private. This seemingly important approach of hospitality was not present 
unless you were already inside the “us.” 
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 My Montréal informants also stressed the importance of hospitality to their religious and 
cultural identities.1234 While this trait is somewhat altered in the community in Paris, it is alive 
and well in the community in Montréal. In Chapter 5, I argued that with the lack of emphasis on 
the need to integrate, as understood as “to assimilate,” immigrants to Montréal feel free to 
maintain practices that are essential to their religious and cultural lives in the homeland, i.e. 
hospitality. This trait allows for a higher level of integration, more reaching out between 
communities, and more of an emphasis of interacting with the "other" than one may expect. By 
being free to express one’s religious convictions while at the same time being a part of Canadian 
society, my Montréal informants felt as though there could be a greater reaching out to one’s 
neighbours of all backgrounds and identities. For these informants, welcoming someone into 
one’s house and providing the best of the best for them was essential to their religious practice, 
something that brought great blessing. Food was one of the essential ways that my Montréal 
informants expressed this hospitality; they offered the best and in abundance to neighbours, 
friends, family, and strangers alike. 
Because my informants were comfortably situated in their Canadian context, because 
they felt much freer to be both Canadian and Muslim and/or Maghrébine, the doors were much 
more easily opened to non-Muslims. Hospitality was in fact, according to one informant, a way 
to bring together “toutes les cultures, tous les gens. Même s’il y a des religions, des cultures 
différentes, on dit que l’être humain partout, c’est un être humain.”1235 Integration, in this 
context, is to interact with all human beings, no matter the culture or religion, to be open to all. 
That is the ideal that my Montréal informants expressed and that they made evident through their 
hospitality. 
 
9.2.3 The Importance of Logical Reasoning to Support Practice 
While I have been highlighting the differences between the two contexts of reception thus far, I 
would now like to discuss a similarity between the two data sets. In both Paris and Montréal, 
both highly secular contexts, my informants navigated this secular world by providing logical 
																																																						
1234	As	I	mentioned	in	Chapter	5,	many	of	my	informants	set	up,	or	constructed	their	kitchens	and	living	rooms	in	
such	a	way	as	to	make	hospitality	easy.	This	trait	was	not	just	expressed	by	my	informants,	but	evident	even	in	the	
material	stuff	of	their	lives.	
1235	130612_001—“All	cultures,	all	people.	Even	if	the	religions,	the	cultures	are	different,	we	say	that	a	human	
being	everywhere	is	a	human	being.”	
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reasons for their religious and cultural food practices. It became clear to me that, while the 
motivations for my informants’ practices were often religious or cultural in nature, they would 
try to provide logical, secular reasons for why they did what they did. It almost felt as though 
they needed to justify these practices to me—that as a Canadian, non-Muslim researcher I would 
expect a different justification for them. Even more, their responses often came across as 
rehearsed responses. They would describe their real motivations for, and engagement with, their 
religious practices, and then, almost on silent cue, tell me why it made logical sense to do 
whatever it was they were talking about at that time.1236 
In Paris, my informants spoke to me about the logic of Islam on a frequent basis. If other 
traditions or cultures did not seem “logical” they were somewhat discounted, and many of my 
informants took pride in what they considered the fact that Islam and its requirements were 
completely in line with scientific reasoning. It was almost as if they felt that they had to ground 
their reasoning for fasting during Ramadan (fasting cleanses the body and helps counteracts 
overeating), not drinking alcohol (alcohol breaks down body parts and creates social strains), not 
eating pork (pork has worms, the animal is dirty and disgusting in other ways), eating halal meat 
(blood in meat is unhealthy, killing animals with a knife blade is more humane), etcetera, in 
something beyond mere faith. My informants gave logical, often health/scientific reasons as one 
of the main justifications for why they practiced the way they did. They saw their food practices 
as logical, as serving some purpose for their health, and as worthwhile engaging in. 
In Montréal, there was a large effort by my informants to give more than just a religious 
reason for their practice as well. Food practices in our conversations would be neatly tucked into 
religious/cultural categories, but then they would also give more rational reasons for these 
																																																						
1236	While,	as	I	argue	below,	I	see	this	presentation	of	logical	reasoning	as	possibly	an	outworking	of	my	informants’	
experiences	in	Paris	and	Montréal,	this	effort	to	highlight	the	logical	coherence	of	Islam	may	be	located	in	the	
colonial	Salafi	revival	that	occurred	in	North	Africa	(and	elsewhere	in	the	colonial	world)	in	the	late	19th	and	early	
20th	centuries.	This	emphasis	on	the	logical	coherence	of	Islam	could	be	seen	as	a	response	to	the	European	
colonial	discourse	on	religion	and	Islam	which	tended	to	create	an	evolutionary	model	with	rational	monotheism	
at	the	top.	Orientalists	at	the	time,	such	as	Renan,	suggested	that	Islam	was	anti-rational	and	backward.	A	
defensive	discourse	consequently	arose	within	the	early	Salafi	movement	in	Egypt	and	Syria	to	show	how	Islam	
was	in	fact	coherent	and	rational,	and	had	been	since	the	time	of	the	Prophet.	This	discourse	then	spread	through	
the	Arab	world,	and	beyond,	and	was	taken	up	in	colonial	contexts	such	as	the	Maghreb.	This	discourse,	
encouraged	by	post-colonial	writers	such	as	Frantz	Fanon,	would	have	been	common	in	colonial	and	post-colonial	
Algeria,	Morocco	and	Tunisia	and	its	history	would	most	likely	have	an	effect	(often	unknown)	on	my	informants.	
For	a	full	description	of	the	development	of	this	discourse	see	Chapter	6	in	Michael	Muhammad	Knight,	Why	I	am	
a	Salafi	(Berkeley:	Soft	Skull	Press,	2015).	
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practices. No matter which category of food practice we would discuss, whether documented in 
the Quran, Sunnah or Tradition, my informants would explain that the practice was religious at 
base, but then would go on to explain why it made logical sense to do that practice as well. In 
this my informants seemed to be influenced by the intercultural outlook around them. They 
showed how the practices they engaged in were not only based on religious conviction, but had a 
“more solid scientific” grounding as well, keeping their religious identities but also adjusting 
them and their reasoning and understanding of them to fit into the common culture of Québec.  
 
9.3 Critique/Scholarly Context: Religion and Migration; Food and Religion 
 
As I have argued throughout this dissertation my informants use food and foodways to negotiate 
their transnational, immigrant religious identities in their host contexts. A work like this does not 
stand on its own and hopefully offers new insight into two fields of inquiry within religious 
studies, namely religion and migration, and food and religion. Both these fields are relatively 
new in the social scientific study of religion, so while general themes are beginning to emerge, 
there is still plenty of space for new studies, such as mine to offer insight and nuance to these 
exciting and emerging fields.  
 
9.3.1 Religion and Migration1237 
While studies of immigrant religion now abound, it was not that long ago that it was uncommon 
for both migration and religious studies scholars to take each other’s work into consideration.1238 
Studies of migration on the whole were not interested in religion as an influencing factor and 
studies of religion were not interested in migration as an influencing factor. That has now 
changed thanks mostly to three specific reasons, according to Paul Bramadat. First, there has 
been a “De-Christianization of society and a De-Europeanization of many of the major Christian 
communities in the west.”1239 This means that recent debates around religion and migration are 
																																																						
1237	Parts	of	this	section	are	based	on	the	journal	article	“How	Gelatin	Becomes	an	Essential	Symbol	of	Muslim	
Identity:	Food	Practice	as	a	Lens	into	the	Study	of	Religion	and	Migration,”	published	in	Religious	Studies	and	
Theology,	vol.	3,	no.	2	(2016):	89–113.	©	Equinox	Publishing	Ltd	2016.	The	author	gratefully	acknowledges	kind	
permission	of	Equinox	Publishing	to	reprint	here.	
1238	Connor,	Immigrant	Faith,	5.	Paul	Bramadat	similarly	states	that	while	migration	studies	are	by	no	means	new,	
the	prominence	of	religion	in	the	study	of	migration	is	a	recent	phenomenon.	See	Bramadat,	“Religious	Diversity,”	
1.	
1239	Bramadat,	“Religious	Diversity,”	3.	
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no longer just about Christianity and Judaism but now include Islam, Hinduism, Sikhism, 
Buddhism and Chinese religion. Second, he argues that the salience of religion has become more 
obvious to scholars in the last 15-20 years and especially post-9/11; scholars are faced with the 
“perplexing power of religion in the world.”1240 Finally, and relatedly, Bramadat suggests that 
“unidirectional and simplistic versions of the secularization hypothesis have begun to break 
down to reveal the far more complicated realities this hypothesis previously obscured.”1241 
Scholars can no longer assume that religion does not matter, is on the decline, and therefore is 
not a relevant aspect of any given subject, especially migration. There is consequently a large 
body of work which examines the many and varied intersections of religion and migration.1242 I 
																																																						
1240	Ibid.,	3.	
1241	Ibid.,	4.	
1242	For	an	overview	of	the	most	important	articles	written	in	the	field	of	religion	and	migration	see	James	A.	
Beckford,	Migration	and	Religion,	Vols	I	and	II	(London:	Edward	Elgar	Publishing,	2016).	Beckford	organizes	these	
articles	along	six	themes	in	Volume	I	and	seven	themes	in	Volume	II,	and	the	collection	addresses	a	wide	variety	of	
religious	traditions	in	many	different	contexts.	The	most	relevant	articles	to	a	project	such	as	this	are	those	found	
in	part	5	of	Volume	I,	namely	on	“Contexts	of	Reception.”	These	articles	include:	Connor,	“Contexts	of	Immigrant	
Receptivity,”	376-403;	Elena	Fiddian-Qasmiyeh	and	Yousif	M.	Qasmiyeh,	“Muslim	Asylum-Seekers	and	Refugees:	
Negotiating	Identity,	Politics	and	Religion	in	the	UK,”	Journal	of	Refugee	Studies,	vol.	23,	no.	3	(2010):	294–314;	
Foner	and	Alba,	“Immigrant	Religion,”	360–392;	Mooney,	“Religion	as	a	Context	of	Reception,”	99–112;	Dianna	J.	
Shandy,	“Nuer	Christians	in	America,”	Journal	of	Refugee	Studies,	vol.	15,	no.	2	(2002):	213–221.		
Other	relevant	articles	to	a	study	such	as	mine	that	are	found	in	Beckford’s	anthology	are:	Florence	
Bergeaud-Blackler,	“New	Challenges	for	Islamic	Ritual	Slaughter:	A	European	Perspective,”	Journal	of	Ethnic	and	
Migration	Studies	vol.	33,	no.	6	(August	2007):	965–980;	John	R.	Bowen,	“Beyond	Migration:	Islam	as	a	
Transnational	Public	Space,”	Journal	of	Ethnic	and	Migration	Studies,	vol.	30,	no.	5	(September	2004):	879–94;	
John	Eade,	“Religion,	Home-Making	and	Migration	Across	A	Globalising	City:	Responding	to	Mobility	in	London,”	
Culture	and	Religion,	vol.	13,	no.	4	(December	2012):	469–483;	David	Garbin,	“Marching	for	God	in	the	Global	City:	
Public	Space,	Religion	and	Diasporic	Identities	in	a	Transnational	African	Church,”	Culture	and	Religion,	vol.	13,	no.	
4	(December	2012):	425–447;	Matthias	Koenig,	“Incorporating	Muslim	Migrants	in	Western	Nation	States:	A	
Comparison	of	the	United	Kingdom,	France,	and	Germany,”	Journal	of	International	Migration	and	Integration,	vol.	
6,	no.	2	(Spring	2005):	219–234;	Levitt,	““You	Know,	Abraham,”	847–73;	Valerie	A.	Lewis	and	Ridhi	Kashyap,	“Piety	
in	a	Secular	Society:	Migration,	Religiosity,	and	Islam	in	Britain,”	International	Migration,	vol.	51,	no.	3	(June	2013):	
57–66;	Douglas	S.	Massey	and	Monica	Espinosa	Higgins,	“The	Effect	of	Immigration	on	Religious	Belief	and	
Practice:	A	Theologizing	or	Alienating	Experience?,”	Social	Science	Research,	vol.	40,	no.	5	(September2011):	1371–
1389;	Marcel	Maussen,	“Islamic	Presence	and	Mosque	Establishment	in	France:	Colonialism,	Arrangements	for	
Guest	Workers	and	Citizenship,”	Journal	of	Ethnic	and	Migration	Studies,	vol.	33,	no.	6,	(August	2007):	981–1002;	
Celia	McMichael,	“‘Everywhere	is	Allah's	Place’:	Islam	and	the	Everyday	Life	of	Somali	Women	in	Melbourne,	
Australia,”	Journal	of	Refugee	Studies,	15	(2)	(2002):	171–188;	Miki	Talebi	and	Michel	Desjardins,	“The	Immigration	
Experience	of	Iranian	Baha'is	in	Saskatchewan:	The	Reconstruction	of	Their	Existence,	Faith,	and	Religious	
Experience,”	Journal	of	Religion	and	Health,	vol.	51,	no.	2	(June	2012):	293–309.	
Outside	of	Beckford’s	anthology	a	few	other	works	have	been	important	for	my	thinking	about	religion	
and	migration	for	this	work,	specifically	those	that	address	transnationalism.	Gafaiti	Hafid,	Patricia	M.E.	Lorcin,	and	
David	G.	Troyansky,	eds.,	Transnational	Spaces	and	Identities	in	the	Francophone	World	(Lincoln:	University	of	
Nebraska	Press,	2009)	is	an	anthology	of	articles	addressing	the	experience	of	transnational	immigrants	in	
Francophone	contexts—Shepard	and	Sussman’s	chapters	are	particularly	useful.	Vic	Satzewich	and	Lloyd	L.	Wong,	
eds.,	Transnational	Identities	and	Practices	in	Canada	(Vancouver:	University	of	British	Columbia	Press,	2006)	
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deal here with the work of a few key scholars in the field and show how my own research fits 
with or challenges these scholars’ conclusions about the role of religion for the immigrant, or in 
the process of migration.  
Phillip Connor, in his book Immigrant Faith, outlines four of the major ways that 
immigrant religion functions in the various stages and aspects of the immigrant experience. By 
examining quantitative data across religious traditions and host contexts Connor argues that his 
work gives big picture patterns and broad-based conclusions.1243 Looking at the United States, 
Canada and Western Europe means that his study is inevitably comparative in nature but he 
suggests that his use of comparison is not meant to display the distinctive characteristics of 
destination (or host) contexts but rather underlines overall patterns that remain consistent across 
contexts.1244 With this metaphor he is attempting to provide a view of the full tapestry and not 
just one part of the cloth.1245 My work stands in stark contrast to Connor’s in this methodological 
vein. While Connor focusses on quantitative methods and overarching cross-cultural 
conclusions, I use qualitative methods and make context-specific conclusions. While he uses 
comparison to find the breadth, I use it to find the depth. He does state in Immigrant Faith that 
he uses vignettes to make sense of statistical patterns,1246 and he calls for research to disentangle 
the exceptions to the rule.1247 I see my work as functioning in these ways; my work serves as a 
larger vignette which highlights the themes that Connor outlines in his work, and it also offers 
some insight into those exceptions that Connor mentions. 
 Connor addresses four themes in the study of religion and migration: (1) moving faith, 
(2) changing faith, (3) integrating faith, and (4) transferring faith.1248 In what follows I tackle 
each of these in turn and discuss how my work acts a vignette of these trends, as well as how it 
challenges the conclusions that Connor presents in each.  
																																																						
addresses	transnationalism	in	Canada—specifically	Micheline	Labelle,	Francois	Rocher,	and	Ann-Marie	Field,	
“Contentious	Politics	and	Transnationalism	from	Below:	The	Case	of	Ethnic	and	Racialized	Minorities	in	Québec,”	
111-129,	and	Sedef	Arat-Koc,	“Whose	Transnationalism?	Canada,	“Clash	of	Civilizations”	Discourse,	and	Arab	and	
Muslim	Canadians,”	216-240.	
1243	Connor,	Immigrant	Faith,	5-6.	
1244	Ibid.,	6.		
1245	Ibid.,	5.		
1246	Ibid.,	6.	
1247	Ibid.,	8.	
1248	Ibid.,	5.	
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First, Connor addresses the various ways that immigrant religion plays a role in the 
migration process itself. He explores the decisions that immigrants make about migration and 
suggests some trends for who migrates, where they migrate, why they migrate, and what role 
religion plays in all these decisions.1249 He shows that the religious identities of immigrants are 
different depending on the receiving context. The majority of immigrants to the United States are 
Christian, in Western Europe there is a fairly even split between Christian and Muslim 
immigrants, and in Canada there is a slight majority of Christian immigrants with sizable shares 
of other traditions and “no religion” represented.1250 Connor explores the various reasons for 
these religious backgrounds in these contexts; that is, he discusses the “cumulative causation” for 
these immigrants’ migration.1251 He explains that religious minorities often migrate to places 
where their faith is the majority, as we can see in Christian migration to the United States.1252 He 
discusses the role of past colonial relationships on the migration of Muslims to Western Europe 
which results in immigrants being equated with Muslims in these contexts.1253 And one may 
posit that the lack of religious preference and colonial history that underlies Canadian history 
may reflect the diversity of religious backgrounds that make up immigrants to Canada, although 
the country’s generic Christian heritage may lead Christian minority groups to migrate to 
Canada.1254  
My study emerged out of the assumption that Connor highlights here, namely, that in 
Western Europe, specifically, France, “immigrant” is equated with “Muslim” based on the sheer 
concentration of Muslim immigrants there.1255 His work provides the quantitative support for the 
idea that, on the one hand, in contexts where the religious background of the immigrant is 
reflective of or in line with that of the general non-immigrant population, that population tends to 
“categorize immigrants by their racial or ethnic heritage.”1256 On the other hand, in contexts 
where the religious background of the immigrant is different from that of the general non-
immigrant population, that population tends to highlight those religious identities and often not 
																																																						
1249	Connor,	Immigrant	Faith,	9.		
1250	Ibid.,	19-20.	
1251	Ibid.,	23.	
1252	Ibid.,	26-27.	
1253	Ibid.,	22,	27.	
1254	Ibid.,	26.	
1255	Casanova	also	highlights	the	equation	of	immigrant	with	Muslim	in	the	European	setting	in	his	article	“Religion,	
European	Secular	Identities	and	European	Integration.”	
1256	Ibid.,	21.	
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recognize the immigrant’s nationality of ethnic group.1257 My work illustrates these patterns 
quite well. As I described in Chapter 4, my Parisian informants spoke about the conflation of 
“immigrant” and “Muslim.” On the other side of the equation, in Chapter 7, I showed how my 
Montréal informants highlighted their ethnic identities, seemingly in line with what they thought 
“non-immigrant” Canadians (a term that does not really apply to many Canadians according to 
my informants) expected of them.  
The other aspect of immigrant religion as “moving faith” that is essential to a study such 
as mine is the impact of the context of reception, or host society, on the immigrant’s future.1258 
Connor argues that while “the boundary line marking differences between immigrant and non-
immigrant groups seems to be religious in Europe,” it is an ethnic line in the U.S.1259 In fact he 
goes on to suggest that while in the U.S. being religious falls in line with being American, in 
Europe, clinging to religious practices makes you non-European; Canada apparently has 
attributes of both.1260 These general attitudes towards the place of religion in society have a real 
effect on how the majority non-immigrant population responds to and welcomes immigrants in 
these contexts of reception. Connor presents the attitude of receptivity in the various host 
societies in one of his tables (1.4). Using the 2006 World Values Survey he shows the 
percentages of people not wanting neighbours who are either immigrants or neighbours of a 
different religion.1261 When examining France and Canada, Connor’s table shows that in France 
43 percent of informants suggested they would not want an immigrant neighbour; in Canada, the 
response was only five percent. Furthermore, only two percent of Canadian informants said they 
would not want neighbours who were of a different religion; in France, 30 percent would not.1262 
																																																						
1257	Connor,	Immigrant	Faith,	21.	
1258	Ibid.,	35.	Cesari	uses	the	concept	of	“Destination	Effects”	to	show	how	the	context	of	reception	will	inevitably	
influence	the	immigrant’s	experience.	Cesari,	“Islam,	immigration	and	France,”	212-218.	
1259	Connor,	Immigrant	Faith,	35.	
1260	Ibid.,	39.	
1261	The	fact	that	this	data	comes	from	the	2006	World	Values	Survey	is	important	to	consider.	A	great	deal	of	
discussion	and	conflict	around	immigration,	and	particularly	Muslim	immigration,	has	arisen	over	the	past	10	years	
since	this	survey.	The	rise	of	ISIS,	related	terrorist	attacks	across	the	world,	ongoing	Western	attacks	on	Muslim-
dominant	countries	such	as	Libya,	Mali,	Iraq,	and	Afghanistan,	and	the	current	refugee	crisis	(as	just	a	few	
examples)	will	inevitably	have	an	affect	on	the	sentiments	reflected	in	this	survey.	Because	much	of	my	data	
collection	took	place	before	many	of	these	significant	events	occurred,	the	results	from	the	2006	World	Values	
Survey	are	still	comparatively	relevant	for	my	findings.	
1262	Connor,	Immigrant	Faith,	37.	
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These figures paint a picture of Canada being a potentially more welcoming context of reception 
to religious minority immigrants than France.  
My work supports this picture. As I made clear throughout this dissertation, and 
highlighted in section 9.2, this difference in context of reception has a significant impact on the 
lives, identities and practices of immigrants in those countries. For example, several of my 
Parisian informants suggested that no matter the efforts they made to show their “French” 
identity, they always felt as though, as Muslim immigrants, they would never quite be accepted 
as French. My Montréal informants all expressed sentiments reflective of the picture of Canada 
being a more welcoming context of reception than other places, especially in comparison to 
France.1263 For numerous informants in Montréal this had to do with the fact that in Canada 
“everyone is an immigrant” and they felt that one’s minority identities (whether religious, 
cultural, ethnic, etc.) were not only accepted but encouraged. 
Before continuing with Connor’s other points, let me turn to another essential work in the 
field of religion and migration which addresses the contexts of reception, and specifically their 
governance of religious diversity: Paul Bramadat and Matthias Koenig’s edited volume 
International Migration and the Governance of Religious Diversity, to which I’ve already 
referred.1264 Unlike Connor’s work, which highlights the commonalities across contexts, the 
authors in this volume highlight the distinctive characteristics of various host societies in the so 
called “West” in their approaches to interacting with and governing the religious diversity that is 
present thanks mostly to recent immigration.  
Bramadat in his introductory chapter suggests that there are three mitigating factors in 
any given context of reception’s approach to the governance of religious diversity within their 
borders. 
First, the individual historical paths followed by each of these states as they entered the 
contemporary era have set up distinctive social, political, and economic conditions that 
have, in turn, strongly influenced the way religious diversity is interpreted and governed 
by policy-makers in each state.1265 
 
																																																						
1263	While	my	data	paints	a	much	rosier	picture	of	Canada	than	France,	and	points	to	surprisingly	positive	
perceptions	on	the	part	of	Muslim	immigrants	to	Montréal,	Canada	as	a	whole,	including	Québec,	is	not	without	its	
deep	prejudices	in	dealing	with	Muslim	and	non-White	immigrants,	as	well	as	its	Native	communities.	In	section	
6.1	I	highlight	some	of	the	events	that	have	occurred	in	the	recent	past	in	Québec	which	may	support	a	more	
uncomfortable	situation	for	Muslims	in	the	province.	
1264	Bramadat	and	Koenig,	International	Migration.	
1265	Bramadat,	“Religious	Diversity,”	7.	
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Second, he argues that each state has its own relationship to, and history of, 
contemporary migration and colonialism, and each state has particular demographics in relation 
to migration because of these factors.1266 My agreement with Bramadat regarding these two 
mitigating factors is obvious in that I dedicated two chapters of this dissertation to presenting 
these very histories in France and Québec. I see these histories and their resultant policies and 
attitudes as especially relevant to how immigrants live their daily lives in these states.  
The third mitigating factor that Bramadat proposes is that policies which govern religious 
diversity are not only influenced by these national forces but also by global or transnational 
forces.1267 The way a given context of reception understands and responds to religious diversity 
can be influenced by the way other states do or to the particularities of immigrant religions found 
in other contexts across the globe. States do not operate within a vacuum. For my research, for 
example, one cannot ignore the violence inspired by radical forms of Islam, or the colonial 
violence imposed on Muslim nations by various colonial powers, which has led to fear and 
mistrust on multiple fronts. Moreover, as Cesari suggests, any understanding of the Muslim 
minority in the West must take the phenomenon of global Islam into account as well.1268 
With these three factors in mind, the authors in this volume address the histories of the 
context of reception and the global and transnational forces at work which influence the 
receptivity of immigrant religion in each.1269 This dissertation has taken a similar appraoch to the 
chapters found in this volume, just at much greater length, and with much more ethnographic 
depth. Furthermore, although Cesari and Milot both address the impact of the context of 
																																																						
1266	Bramadat,	“Religious	Diversity,”	7.	
1267	Ibid.,	8.	
1268	Cesari,	“Islam,	immigration	and	France,”	202.	
1269	Two	chapters	which	are	relevant	for,	and	related	to,	my	own	work	are	Jocelyne	Cesari,	“Islam,	immigration	and	
France,”195-224	and	Micheline	Milot,	“Modus	Co-vivendi,”	105-129.	Cesari	explores	the	various	histories	of	
interaction	with	and	resultant	policies	around	the	governance	of	one	particular	immigrant	religion	in	France,	
namely,	Islam.	She	breaks	this	issue	down	into	(1)	“origin	effects,”	the	things,	both	psychological/philosophical	and	
physical,	that	immigrants	bring	with	them	from	their	home	contexts,	and	(2)	“destination	effects,”	factors	relating	
to	French	and	European	culture.	She	shows	how	the	combination	of	these	two	creates	the	setting	within	which	
Muslim	immigrants	to	France	must	live	out	their	lives.	Milot,	in	her	chapter,	focusses	on	three	components	of	
political	life	that	she	argues	affect	the	expression	and	governance	of	religious	diversity	in	Canada.	These	three	
components	are:	(1)	Canada’s	official	Multiculturalism	Policy,	(2)	the	Charter	of	Rights	and	Freedoms,	as	
embedded	in	the	Constitution,	and	(3)	the	bi-national	history	of	Canada	(105).	By	exploring	these	three	policies	she	
shows	how	immigrants	to	Canada	tend	to	“out-integrate”	immigrants	to	other	Western	contexts	without	such	
policies	in	place.	These	two	chapters,	along	with	all	the	chapters	in	Bramadat	and	Koenig’s	work,	illustrate	that	the	
contexts	of	reception	clearly	have	an	effect	on	the	daily	lives	of	religious	immigrants	within	their	borders.	This	is	
also	a	main	conclusion	of	my	dissertation.	
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reception on the immigrant individual in this book, neither of them addresses the central role of 
food in the immigrant experience. 
These contexts of reception have a direct influence on the second theme that Connor 
explores in his work: changing faith. In the chapter that examines this theme he shows the 
various ways in which immigrant religion is not static. Connor, in another article, presents two 
possible hypotheses about the host’s receptivity level and its effect on immigrant religion’s 
changing faith: (1) welcoming contexts provide the space for religious immigrants to engage in 
higher religiosity than the host population, and (2) less welcoming contexts create an “us” versus 
“them” scenario that triggers hyper-religiosity.1270 In this article, and throughout Immigrant 
Faith, he suggests that when it comes to Muslim immigrants, less welcoming contexts, such as 
those found in Europe, lead to higher religiosity and religious outcomes in that community, while 
“more welcoming contexts are associated with lower immigrant Muslim religious outcomes.”1271 
His findings with regards to Muslim immigrants thus challenge his first hypothesis but support 
his second. Unlike Muslims in Europe, who do not seem to be religiously adapting, Connor 
suggests that, in general, other “immigrants begin, on average, to resemble the new country’s 
population, becoming more or less religious over time, depending on the national and local 
context.”1272 So, for example, Christian immigrants to France would become less religious over 
time, while non-religious immigrants to the U.S would become more religious over time.  
My findings regarding Muslim immigrants in both Paris and Montréal directly challenge 
and complicate these conclusions. While it may be true that Muslim immigrants in the banlieues 
(suburbs) of Paris, specifically second and third generation individuals, may be responding to the 
unwelcoming context of reception with hyper-religiosity,1273 this was not the case for several of 
my informants. In fact, most of my Parisian informants were making adjustments in their 
religious identities and practices that reflected the national and local norm, as Connor suggested 
was normal for immigrants who were not Muslim.1274 Some would only decrease some practices 
																																																						
1270	Connor,	“Contexts	of	Immigrant	Receptivity,”	381.	
1271	Connor,	“Contexts	of	Immigrant	Receptivity,”	394;	Connor,	Immigrant	Faith,	60-61.	
1272	Connor,	Immigrant	Faith,	55.	
1273	This	was	a	trend	I	did	not	directly	encounter	amidst	my	informants,	but	as	I	discussed	in	the	Paris	case	study	
chapters,	some	spoke	about	the	“problem”	of	2nd	and	3rd	generation	youth	in	the	banlieues.	My	informants	
suggested	that	when	in	a	position	where	one	is	not	accepted	as	neither	French	nor	Maghrébine	(Moroccan,	
Algerian	or	Tunisian),	some	of	these	youth	deal	with	their	inevitable	conflicts	of	identity	by	grasping	on	to	the	one	
identity	that	is	not	questioned:	i.e.	Muslim	identity.	
1274	Connor,	Immigrant	Faith.	
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and maintain others, while others would stop practicing all together, some would simply alter the 
way they engaged with certain practices, or they would change the way they labelled them. 
Furthermore, in Québec/Canada, where immigrants are seen as welcome, my informants were 
not decreasing their practice to reflect the norm (especially the norm in Québec), but in fact were 
increasing it, or upping the identification ante as I argue, to show their religious identity. In fact, 
in a context such as Canada where the relatively well known practices (fasting for Ramadan, not 
eating pork, not drinking alcohol) are less contested than some other locations, other practices 
move to the forefront of practice and identity; hence, when avoiding gelatin becomes a 
significant aspect of religious identity for some Muslims in Montréal. Whereas in a place like 
France, the fact of keeping halal or not drinking alcohol was enough of a contested practice as to 
distinguish a particular identity, it was almost as if, in Canada, my informants needed something 
even more distinct with which to identify themselves, something more distinct to draw the line 
between “us” and “them.” Therefore, in contrast to Connor’s conclusion that Muslim immigrants 
would become “less religious” in more welcoming contexts, and “more religious” in less 
welcoming contexts, my examination of “Muslim food practices” shows that my informants in 
Paris (a less welcoming reception context) actually alter and leave behind their practices to a 
large extent and my informants in Montréal (a more welcoming context of reception) increase 
their religious practices and stress their religious identities even more in the Canadian setting. 
As I argued in section 9.2 above, this receptivity may lead to an increase in religious 
practice/identity, but it also leads to an increase in national identification as well. While France 
may assume that by denying the religious identities of immigrants in the public sphere, those 
immigrants will integrate more successfully into French society, my work shows the opposite to 
be the case. In spite of the changes that my Parisian informants were making to their religious 
food practices and related identities, they still felt as though they were on the outside of the 
“French” identity. This often led them to conflicts of identity and relationship that simply were 
not present for my Montréal informants. In fact, my Montréal informants, because they felt as 
though their minority religious identities were accepted, not only highlighted more specific 
religious food practices as a means of presenting their religious identities, but also felt more 
“Canadian” and consequently more invested in this side of their multifaceted identities. In 
agreement with Margarita Mooney’s argument, “greater recognition of immigrants’ religious 
identities and organizations would probably improve the cultural and structural incorporation of 
	 387	
immigrants in France.”1275 By comparing the experiences of Maghrébine Muslim immigrants in 
Paris and Montréal through the lens of food practice, we can see that more welcoming contexts 
of reception can actually lead to “more incorporation” of minority religious immigrants, and less 
welcoming contexts of reception can actually lead to minority religious immigrants distancing 
themselves further from the majority groups and identities. While France may assume that by 
denying the religious identities of immigrants in the public sphere those immigrants more 
successfully integrate into French society, my work shows the opposite to be the case.  
Connor’s third theme addresses the topic of “integrating faith.” He discusses how 
immigrant religion can act as both a help and a hindrance to integration, again often dependent 
on the context of reception in which the immigrant finds him/herself.1276 He highlights the role of 
religion in providing the three Rs made famous by Charles Hirschman: Refuge, Respect and 
Resources.1277 In another article he suggests that religions provide “psychological refuge for 
immigrants facing cultural and other stresses, public respectability through opportunities for 
leadership, and finally resources in helping immigrants start businesses, get leads on jobs, and 
increase language proficiency.”1278 While immigrant religion may be able to provide the three Rs 
and consequent integration, this is unfortunately not always the case, or at least not always 
uniformly the case. While for most immigrants religion may provide refuge, especially 
psychological, in the migration process, respect and resources may be further from reach. Connor 
states that, in fact, 
Western Europe and the United States are two extremes of immigrant societies where 
religion plays either a hindering (Europe) or helping (United States) role for immigrant 
integration. But not all countries fall so neatly into this categorization. Canada, for 
																																																						
1275	Mooney,	“Religion	as	a	Context	of	Reception,”	110.	Mooney’s	article	is	just	one	in	a	special	issue	of	
International	Migration	titled	“Incorporating	Faith:	Religion	and	Immigrant	Incorporation	in	the	West,”	which	
addresses,	among	other	things,	the	role	of	contexts	of	reception	on	immigrant	religion.	The	other	article	that	
directly	addresses	this	issue	is	Wendy	Cadge	et	al.’s	work	on	“Religious	Dimensions	of	Contexts	of	Reception”	
(Cadge	et	al.,	“Religious	Dimensions,”	84-98).	I	place	my	work	in	line	with	these	articles	as	I	believe	that	it	is	these	
contexts	of	reception	that	have	the	largest	impact	on	the	immigrant	religious	experience.	Because	of	this	I	would	
also	place	my	dissertation	in	Part	V	“Contexts	of	Reception”	in	Volume	I	of	James	A.	Beckford’s	anthology	
Migration	and	Religion	that	I	mention	above.	
1276	One	of	the	weaknesses	of	Connor’s	work	in	Immigrant	Faith	is	that	he	sets	it	up	as	a	comparative	study	which	
reveals	broad	patterns	that	are	applicable	to	all	contexts,	and	not	the	unique	aspects	of	the	host	countries,	and	yet	
most	of	his	themes	reveal	a	stark	difference	between	immigrant	experience	in	the	U.S,	Canada	and	Western	
Europe.	
1277	Charles	Hirschman,	“The	Role	of	Religion	in	the	Origins	and	Adaptation	of	Immigrant	Groups	in	the	United	
States,”	The	International	Migration	Review,	vol.	28,	no.	3	(2004):	1206-1234.	
1278	Connor,	“Introduction,”	5.	
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example, provides a middle case where elements of both the American and the European 
contexts are simultaneously present.1279 
 
My work clearly supports this categorization of religion’s role in the integration process. 
I argued that in Paris, religion and religious practice were generally seen as hindrances to 
integration, at least, when integration is understood as assimilation. Furthermore, in support of 
this idea, my informants spoke of and engaged in transformations of their religious identities and 
practices as a means of showing their integration. Since religion became a hindrance, the 
removal of religion was a tool that my informants could use. Conversely, religion served as both 
a help and a hindrance in the Montréal context, showing the middle ground approach that Connor 
suggests is present in Canada. It was a hindrance to claiming secular national identity in 
Montréal and at the same time through the religious emphasis on hospitality allowed the 
immigrant to interact with and be transformed by his or her non-immigrant neighbours, an 
essential element to integration in Québec. 
 Finally, the last theme of religion and migration that Connor presents in his work is that 
of “transferring faith.” He shows how immigrant faith is often not transferred perfectly to the 
next generation.1280 One can, consequently, understand why many immigrants go to such lengths 
to attempt to transfer at least some aspects of their faith to their children.  
For my informants, food practices were an essential means of this transference. For some, 
this was the main reason why they maintained, and often increased, their religious food practices 
in the host context. Doing so was a means of transferring not only religion but also ethnicity, 
since these two things often went hand in hand. Connor shows how, rather than following a 
pattern of decline in religiosity as is found from first to second generation in other traditions and 
contexts, second generation Muslim immigrants in Europe tend to stay in faith and practice as 
much as their parents do.1281 Since most of my work, focusses on first generation, I cannot 
directly support or critique this finding.1282 
Connor’s work addresses the role of immigrant religion in migration but only in the host 
context, as a means of integrating into one’s new home. While he does point to the field of 
																																																						
1279	Connor,	Immigrant	Faith,	74.	
1280	Ibid.,	112.	
1281	Ibid.,	114.	
1282	My	informants	did	speak	about	the	increased	religiosity	of	third	generation	youth	living	in	the	banlieues	in	
Paris.	They	spoke	about	the	fact	that	not	only	was	there	no	decline	in	religiosity,	but	in	fact	younger	generations	
were	becoming	more	religious	than	their	first-generation	parents	and	grandparents.	
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transnational immigrant religion in his conclusion, he does not address it in any depth. Peggy 
Levitt, another important scholar in the field of religion and migration, fills this gap by 
highlighting the role of religion in transnational migration. While Connor addresses how 
immigrant religion plays a role in moving, changing, integrating and transferring faith for the 
immigrant in their host context, he does not address how immigrants’ moves are often not 
unidirectional, and often involve movements back and forth between home and host land, 
whether these moves are made in the real world or in the imagination. Levitt, in her work, does 
just that and consequently shows “the ways in which religious identities and practices also enable 
migrants to sustain memberships in multiple locations.”1283 Connor, like other scholars of 
immigration, focusses on immigrant incorporation (what many call integration), while Levitt, 
and other transnational scholars like her, seeks to challenge the focus on integration by revealing 
that individuals stay connected to their home land communities even as they establish “homes” 
in their host society.1284 One way in which they do this is by using religion as a means of 
crossing and dwelling in both home and host land. Echoing Tweed and his theory of religion, 
Levitt argues that  
religion is the ultimate boundary crosser. God needs no passport because faith traditions 
give their followers symbols, rituals, and stories they use to create alternative sacred 
landscapes…religion also transcends the boundaries of time because it allows followers 
to feel part of a chain of memory, connected to a past, a present, and a future.1285  
 
But there are more than just home and host land influences at work; religious immigrants are also 
in constant communication with, and in the process of creating, global religions. Levitt suggests 
that “the study of transnational migration and religion, therefore, provides an empirical window 
onto one way in which religious globalization actually gets done.”1286 It shows the ways in which 
immigrants negotiate their transnational identities in a global context. 
 While some people think that “one land, one membership card, and one identity is a 
secular version of the Holy Trinity,”1287 as I argue in the case in Paris, the truth of the matter is 
that most immigrants do not fit within this Trinity. They interact with nationalism and citizenship 
in vast and varied ways and religion plays a significant role in each. Levitt, in her work God 
																																																						
1283	Levitt,	“‘You	Know,	Abraham,”	847.	
1284	Ibid.,	849.	
1285	Levitt,	God	Needs	No	Passport,	12-13.	
1286	Levitt,	“You	know,	Abraham,”	849.	
1287	Levitt,	God	Needs	No	Passport,	67.	
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Needs No Passport, outlines six of these possible national responses.1288 She asks: “if people 
have lots of food in their pantries, what are the main ingredients they cook with every day, and 
what do they use only occasionally? How do the recipes they prepare change as a result?”1289 as 
a means of symbolically describing the various identification processes that people may go 
through. While she uses this question, and the resultant descriptions as mere illustrations of these 
larger processes at work, my research shows that food is not just an illustration, but is at the heart 
of these negotiations. 
 The first national identity that immigrants may choose, according to Levitt, is the 
“American” identity; to apply her typology beyond the American context we could call it “the 
host land” identity. An immigrant who claims this identity sees him/herself as a non-hyphenated, 
fully [insert host country identity here] individual.1290 As Levitt states, this immigrant is the first 
person to bring apple pie to the Fourth of July picnic.1291  
The second possibility is the “homeland” national citizen. This individual also claims 
non-hyphenated national identity and emphasizes that no matter how long he or she is gone from 
the homeland he or she will always be [insert home country identity here].1292 These immigrants 
are those who bring “samosas to the Indian Independence Day,”1293 or, in the case of my 
research, those who bring chorba or harira to the iftar.  
The third national identity that Levitt presents is the “ethnic national” identity. For these 
immigrants being ethnic is what being American is all about. They claim both sides of their 
transnational identity, but they interact with both sides in a very particular way. It is an 
Americanism that is infused with ethnic culture and an ethnic culture that is made in America. It 
has nothing to do with the outworking of the ethnic culture in the homeland and everything to do 
																																																						
1288	Similar	to	Levitt,	Akhtar,	in	his	Immigration	and	Acculturation,	presents	various	ways	that	immigrants	negotiate	
their	identities	in	their	host	contexts.	I	use	his	typology	in	Chapter	4	of	this	dissertation.	Briefly,	his	four	identity	
consolidation	possibilities	are:	(1)	ethnocentric	identity,	(2)	hyperassimilated	identity,	(3)	Alienated	identity,	(4)	
Bicultural	identity	(189-192).	
1289	Levitt,	God	Needs	No	Passport,	67.	
1290	Ibid.,	70.	This	is	somewhat	in	line	with	Akhtar’s	hyperassimilated	identity	(Akhtar,	Immigration	and	
Acculturation,	191).	
1291	Levitt,	God	Needs	No	Passport,	67.	None	of	my	informants	claimed	this	sort	of	identity.	They	all	maintained	
some	form	of	identification	with	their	homeland	identity.	
1292	Ibid.,	72-73.	Akhtar’s	ethnocentric	identity	would	be	a	representation	of	this	(Akhtar,	Immigration	and	
Acculturation,	191).	
1293	Levitt,	God	Needs	No	Passport,	67.	This	was	a	much	more	common	response	for	my	informants,	especially	in	
France.	While	they	were	still	comfortable	creating	homes	for	themselves	in	Paris,	they	did	not	want	to,	or	believed	
they	could	not	claim	French	identity	(the	host	land	identity).		
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with the experience of being [insert homeland identity here] in the United States.1294 Adding 
masala to ketchup on their hamburger would be a food move that ethnic nationals would engage 
in;1295 my Montréal informant who added Maghrébine spices to shepherd’s pie was engaging an 
ethnic national identity, according to Levitt.  
A fourth approach, which highlights both sides of the transnational identity, is the “dual 
national.” The dual national immigrant identifies strongly with both the home and host land, 
feeling at home in both, and engaging in life in both contexts.1296 A table at the dual national’s 
Fourth of July celebration may have both apple pie and samosas on it; on the Eid dessert table in 
Montréal, there was lemon meringue pie alongside Maghrébine sweets.1297  
The fifth identity that Levitt examines is the “cosmopolitan.” She argues that these 
immigrants blur the lines between all borders and are at home wherever they may be. They either 
see home as portable, moving from place to place but always having a similar set of possessions 
and acquaintances, or they see home as having roots. While they can be home anywhere, they are 
selective about where that may be.1298 For cosmopolitan identifiers no cuisine dominates their 
pantry, and consequently “they eat from the world’s table and are proud of it.”1299  
The sixth and final national identity that Levitt describes is the “religious global citizen.” 
The religious rules and rulers matter most to these identifiers, and they consequently take their 
cues from those leaders and rule books.1300 This does not mean that political, national and other 
forms of belonging do not matter to these identifiers. In fact, religious global citizenship can be 
complementary to other forms of belonging. Levitt states, concerning this group: 
																																																						
1294	Ibid.,	75.	
1295	Ibid.,	68.	
1296	Ibid.,	77.	I	call	this	transnational,	and	Akhtar	calls	it	bi-cultural	identity	(Akhtar,	Immigration	and	Acculturation,	
192).	
1297	Levitt	points	out	that	while	ethnic	nationals	and	dual	nationals	share	some	things	in	common	there	are	two	
important	distinctions	between	these	groups:	(1)	the	home	national	identity	in	ethnic	nationalism	is	shaped	by	
being	that	ethnicity	in	the	host	land	context—not	influenced	by	or	even	interested	in	home	country	affairs;	(2)	
where	they	direct	their	energies:	ethnic	nationals	“dedicate	themselves	to	helping	their	immigrant	community	in	
the	United	States,”	while	Dual	Nationals	are	concerned	about	the	immigrant	community	AND	their	homeland	one	
(Levitt,	God	Needs	No	Passport,	78).	Most	of	my	informants	in	both	Paris	and	Montréal	would	fall	into	the	dual	
national	identity.	
1298	Levitt,	God	Needs	No	Passport,	79-81.	
1299	Ibid.,	68.	Two	of	my	Parisian	informants	called	themselves	“citoyens	du	monde”	and	yet	when	we	spoke	about	
their	food	practices,	they	fell	much	more	in	line	with	the	“dual	national”	identity	described	above.	They	maybe	ate	
more	varied	food	than	the	rest	of	my	informants,	but	both	French	and	Maghrébine/Muslim	foods	and	food	
practices	still	oriented	much	of	their	daily	lives.		
1300	Ibid.,	68.	
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It was not that they were oblivious to their surroundings or the salience of political 
borders. It was that they thought of themselves as living in an alternative topography, 
with residents, rules, and landmarks that mattered more to them than their secular 
equivalents.1301 
 
Religious global citizens, then, fast during Lent, or feast on lamb for the Eid based on religious 
calendars and rules. An excellent example of this identity at work is the story of my Parisian 
informants looking to the religious leaders in the Maghreb for the start date of Ramadan (who 
base that date on what is happening in Mecca) rather than to the official French date, as 
represented by the leaders of the Grande Mosquée. My informants wanted to make sure that they 
were acting in line with their fellow religious global citizens and not just performing an ethnic 
national version of their Islam.  
Overall, Levitt argues that where people place themselves within these national identities 
depends largely on “how people think of themselves racially, ethnically, or religiously”; these 
factors strongly influence “how they see themselves as citizens, how they perceive their right and 
obligations, how they participate in the public sphere, and why.”1302 The kinds of faiths that all 
of these various identifiers bring with them into these identities are far from monolithic and are 
being constantly recreated and redefined.1303 Even within these different national identities, there 
is wide variation of the kinds of immigrant religion at work.1304 She argues, because of these 
variations in religiosity, nationalism and citizenship, and the constant influence of global and 
																																																						
1301	Ibid.,	83.	
1302	Ibid.,	90-91.	
1303	Ibid.,	94.	
1304	Levitt	provides	an	overview	of	the	various	ways	that	her	informants	enacted	“being	religious,”	in	Chapter	4.	
These	ways	of	“being	religious”	are:	(1)	the	strict	faithful—tall,	impermeable	boundaries,	theology	and	practice	is	
given,	god-directed,	goodness	is	set	in	stone,	right	and	wrong	remain	no	matter	one’s	national	context	(God	Needs	
No	Passport,	97)—my	Parisian	Grande	Mosquée	informants	would	mostly	fall	in	line	with	this,	as	well	as	some	of	
my	highly	devout	Québécois	informants.	(2)	The	questioning	faithful—they	believe	and	act	in	correspondence	to	
the	traditions	set	out	in	their	faith,	but	also	believe	that	“traditions	change	and	have	to	be	adapted.”	There	is	a	
continuum	of	how	much	they	grapple	and	what	can	be	negotiated	(99)—most	of	my	informants	would	probably	lie	
in	this	category.	Interestingly,	when	Levitt	was	describing	this	category	she	stated	that	many	of	her	Muslim	
informants	would	list	the	five	pillars	of	Islam	as	the	basic	tenants	of	their	faith.	She	then	goes	on	to	list	the	five	
pillars	as:	“pray	five	times	a	day,	fast	during	the	holy	month	of	Ramadan,	give	to	charity,	refrain	from	eating	pork,	
and	go	on	hajj	or	to	Mecca,	if	possible”	(100).	What	is	note-worthy	here	is	that	she	replaces	the	shahada	with	the	
injunction	against	pork,	as	one	of	my	informants	did	as	well	which	I	describe	in	Chapter	4	(section	4.4.1).	(3)	The	
Golden	Rule	faithful	do	not	see	significant	differences	between	their	faith	and	what	others	believe,	give	the	same	
answers,	not	big	on	practice	(103-104).	(4)	The	Symbolic	faithful—“people	who	used	religious	symbols	to	express	
feelings	of	religiosity	and	identification,	without	participating	regularly	in	religious	culture	or	celebrations.”	(104)—
those	of	my	informants	who	saw	themselves	as	cultural	Muslims	could	be	placed	in	this	category.	Finally,	(5)	the	
self-help	faithful—using	faith	in	their	own	personal	service	and	development	(107).	
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transnational networks on all of the above, that global religiosity requires new religious 
organizational architecture, and ultimately “major changes in business as usual.”1305 Both 
religious individuals and organizations, she says, need to engage in new and creative ways to 
meet the needs of their personal and collective selves within these complex transnational and 
global worlds.  
I argue that food is one such way to creatively navigate the rough waters. My work 
answers the call that Levitt proposes in her influential article “You know, Abraham was really 
the first immigrant,” where she states that 
many more studies are needed to flesh out how migrants’ transnational religious practices 
are actually enacted, what their impacts are, what explains the variations between them, 
how transnational religious life differs from transnational life in other social arenas, and 
what these dynamics mean for home- and host-country life.1306 
 
By showing how immigrants’ transnational religious practices are enacted, specifically through 
food, I have proposed responses to most of Levitt’s inquires above. 
 
9.3.1.1 Religion and Migration Summary 
In this section I have discussed some foundational works in the field of religion and migration 
and have shown how my work complements or challenges the conclusions found within them. 
After a brief overview of the three reasons why religion and migration is now an important field 
within religious studies, as outlined by Paul Bramadat, I outlined Phillip Connor’s quantitative 
study of immigrant faith and showed how my project acts as qualitative support for many of his 
findings.  
As “moving faith” Connor shows how the relationship between the immigrant’s faith and 
the context of reception can impact the future of the immigrant in that context. My work 
highlights this aspect of Connor’s work and emphasizes the significant impact of the context of 
reception on the lives, identities and practices of immigrants. Because of this, I also addressed 
Bramadat and Koenig’s edited volume International Migration and the Governance of Religious 
Diversity to show how others have approached the discussion of context of reception and 
immigrant religion. In regards to “changing faith” I presented Connor’s argument that 
immigrants tend to become less religious in more welcoming contexts, and more religious in less 
																																																						
1305	Levitt,	God	Needs	No	Passport,	128.	
1306	Levitt,	“You	know,	Abraham,”	868.	
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welcoming ones, and furthermore, that immigrant faith starts to reflect the non-immigrant faith 
represented in the host context. I then discussed how my research directly challenges these 
conclusions. In Paris, a less welcoming context, my Parisian informants were making 
adjustments in their religious identities and practices that reflected the national norm. While, in 
Montréal, a more welcoming context, my informants were not decreasing their practice to reflect 
the norm (especially the norm in Québec), but in fact were increasing it to show their religious 
identity. I then showed how my work supports Connor’s “integrating faith” category; in Paris, 
religion is a hindrance to integration, while in Montréal, it can be a help. Finally, I discussed how 
my work acts as a vignette of Connor’s “transferring faith” by showing that food practices were 
an essential means of this transference.  
After exploring Connor’s work, I then presented Peggy Levitt’s work on transnational 
religion. Levitt’s work shows how immigrants’ moves are often not unidirectional and often 
involve movements back and forth between home and host land, whether real or imagined. In 
this, I showed how Levitt presents six different options for national identities for the 
transnational migrant. I outlined the six possibilities and used food as an illustration of each. 
Overall, I argued that food and food practice can be a means of creatively navigating the rough 
waters of transnational experience; my work serves as evidence that food can provide insight into 
the kinds of negotiations at work that Levitt suggests are present throughout her work. 
 
9.3.2 Food and Religion 
Like the study of religion and migration, the study of food and religion is also a relatively new 
field of investigation in the social scientific study of religion. Like the situation I described above 
regarding religion and migration, both food studies and religious studies have long and complex 
histories of research attached to them but neither has taken the other’s subject matter as 
particularly relevant until very recently. Early anthropologists of food did examine some of the 
religious elements of people’s food practices, particularly people’s food relationships with their 
gods including feasts and sacrifices, taboos and injunctions. But, as Sidney Mintz explains in his 
Tasting Food, Tasting Freedom, most of the food work (gathering and preparation) was being 
done by women and most of the anthropologists were men who were not interested in the real 
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stuff of food practices.1307 For that reason, “it would probably be accurate to say that food and 
eating got much less attention in their own rights as anthropological subjects than they really 
deserved.”1308  
This is no longer the case. In this section I examine two volumes that address food and 
religion, comprised of scholars who pay a great deal of attention to food and eating in their own 
right, to situate this dissertation within recent work done in this field.1309 Although some 
																																																						
1307	Michel	Desjardins	in	his	“Religious	Studies	that	Really	Schmecks,”	suggests	that	by	exploring	religious	food	
practice	we	locate	the	missing	voices	of	women	from	much	of	religious	studies	(147-156).	Meredith	McGuire	
similarly	posits	that	“when	we	allow	that	food	preparation	and	eating	can	be	highly	meaningful	spiritual	practices,	
we	can	have	a	different	appreciation	of	women’s	religious	roles”	(McGuire,	Lived	Religion,	106).	
1308	Sidney	Mintz,	Tasting	Food,	Tasting	Freedom:	Excursions	into	Eating,	Culture,	and	the	Past	(Boston:	Beacon	
Press,	1996),	3.	
1309	While	there	are	many	other	important	texts	in	the	study	of	food	and	religion	space	does	not	allow	for	a	full	
exploration	of	them	all.	By	focusing	on	the	most	recent	collections	one	can	gain	a	current	view	of	the	kinds	of	
questions	scholars	who	are	working	in	this	field	are	answering	and	the	kinds	of	issues	that	still	need	to	be	
addressed,	or	further	explicated.	I	draw	the	reader’s	attention	to	the	key	works	with	which	many	of	the	scholars	
who	are	currently	addressing	religion	and	food	interact	and	which	set	the	stage	for	the	field	as	a	whole.	For	
example,	probably	the	most	foundational	work	in	the	field,	which	opened	up	the	exploration	of	food	and	religion	
in	new	ways	is	Daniel	Sack,	Whitebread	Protestants:	Food	and	Religion	in	American	Culture	(New	York:	St	Martin’s,	
2000).	
For	early	works	exploring	the	historical	accounts	of	the	various	ways	that	religious	food	practices	have	
come	to	be	see,	Rudolph	M.	Bell,	Holy	Anorexia	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1985);	Marvin	Harris,	Good	
to	Eat:	Riddles	of	Food	and	Culture	(New	York:	Simon	and	Schuster,	1985);	Caroline	Walker	Bynum,	Holy	Feast,	and	
Holy	Fast:	The	Religious	Significance	of	Food	to	Medieval	Women	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	1987).	
For	some	excellent	cultural	histories,	which	primarily	address	food	but	also	include	some	exploration,	albeit	
sometimes	quite	brief,	of	religion	see:	Hasia	Diner	Hungering	for	America:	Italian,	Irish,	and	Jewish	Foodways	in	the	
Age	of	Migration	(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	2001);	Robert	C.	Fuller,	Religion	and	Wine:	A	Cultural	
History	of	Wine	Drinking	in	the	United	States	(Knoxville:	University	of	Tennessee	Press,	1996);	Franca	Iacovetta,	
Valerie	Korinek,	and	Marlene	Epp,	eds.,	Edible	Histories,	Cultural	Politics:	Towards	a	Canadian	Food	History	
(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	2012)—for	chapters	which	directly	address	religion	see	chapter	3,	10	and	11;	
for	chapters	that	address	food	and	ethnicity	see	chapters	7,	8,	9	and	12.	For	historical	explorations	of	specific	
religious	traditions	and	their	foodways	see	Kenneth	Albala	and	Trudy	Eden,	eds.,	Food	and	Faith	in	Christian	
Culture	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2011);	Desjardins	and	Desjardins,	“The	Role	of	Food,”	70-82;	
Leonard	J.	Greenspoon,	Ronald	A.	Simkins,	and	Gerald	Shapiro,	eds.,	Food	and	Judaism	(Omaha:	Creighton	
University	Press,	2005).		
For	foundational	religious	studies	texts,	which	have	some	mention	of	food	to	elucidate	larger	themes,	see	
Karen	McCarthy	Brown’s	Mama	Lola:	A	Vodou	Priestess	in	Brooklyn	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	1991);	
Robert	A.	Orsi,	The	Madonna	of	115th	Street:	Faith	and	Community	in	Italian	Harlem,	1880-1950	(New	Haven:	Yale	
University	Press,	1985).	In	fact,	my	first	foray	into	the	study	of	religion	and	food	was	a	conference	paper	that	I	
wrote	exploring	of	the	place	of	food	in	Orsi’s	Madonna	of	115th	Street.	For	explorations	of	the	ways	that	religious	
food	rules	affect	relationships	between	and	amongst	religious	communities	see,	Desjardins	and	Mulhern,	“Living	
Sacrifice,”	190-210;	Claudine	Fabre-Vassas,	The	Singular	Beast:	Jews,	Christians,	&	the	Pig,	trans.	Carol	Volk	(New	
York:	Columbia	University	Press,	1997);	David	M.	Freidenreich,	Foreigners	and	their	Food:	Constructing	Otherness	
in	Jewish,	Christian,	and	Islamic	Law	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	2011).	For	the	first	collection	of	
articles	written	about	food	and	religion	in	the	community	of	the	American	Academy	of	Religion,	which	set	the	
stage	for	the	growing	field,	see	the	special	edition	of	Journal	of	the	American	Academy	of	Religion,	vol.	63,	no.	3	
(Fall	1995).	
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common themes and threads are present in the two, they present distinctive pictures of the field. 
Someone picking up Zeller et al.’s edited volume Religion, Food and Eating in North 
America1310 may have a different understanding of what the field looks like than someone who 
just read the special “Food and Religion” issue of Scripta Instituti Donneriani Aboensis.1311 I 
address each of these volumes in turn, describing the picture that arises of the field of food and 
religion in each, and situating my work in both. 
 Religion, Food and Eating in North America arose out of the “Religion, Food and Eating 
in North America” seminar, which met at the Annual Meeting of the American Academy of 
																																																						
For	important	works	on	halal	and	Muslim	food	practices	see,	Bergeaud-Blackler,	“Social	Definitions	of	
halal	Quality,”	94-107;	Marjo	Buitelaar,	“Living	Ramadan:	Fasting	and	Feasting	in	Morocco,”	in	The	Taste	Culture	
Reader,	ed.	Carolyn	Korsmeyer	(Oxford,	New	York:	Berg,	2007),	175-180;	Johan	Fischer,	The	Halal	Frontier:	Muslim	
Consumers	in	a	Globalized	Market	(New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2011);	Richard	C.	Foltz,	Animals	in	Islamic	
Tradition	and	Muslim	Cultures	(Oxford:	Oneworld,	2006);	Peter	Heine,	Food	Culture	in	the	Near	East,	Middle	East	
and	North	Africa	(Westport,	CN:	Greenwood	Press,	2004)—while	Heine	focusses	on	Muslim	food	practices	in	this	
work,	he	also	addresses	Jewish	and	Christian	holidays	and	food	practices.		
For	another	work	that	deals	directly	with	food	and	religion	in	the	North	American	context	see	R.	Marie	
Griffith,	Born	Again	Bodies:	Flesh	and	Spirit	in	American	Christianity	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	2004).	
Related	to	a	project	such	as	this,	for	a	work	that	addresses	food	as	one	of	the	principle	elements	of	everyday	
religion	see	Graham	Harvey,	Food,	Sex	and	Strangers:	Understanding	Religion	as	Everyday	Life	(London	and	New	
York:	Routledge,	2013).		
For	important	works	that	address	the	role	of	food	in	identity	formation	and	maintenance	see	Anderson,	
Everyone	Eats,	especially	Chapter	10	where	he	directly	addresses	food	and	religion;	Demossier,	Wine	Drinking	
Culture;	Donna	R.	Gabaccia,	We	are	what	we	eat:	Ethnic	Food	and	the	making	of	Americans	(Cambridge,	MA:	
Harvard	University	Press,	1998);	Linda	Keller	Brown	and	Kay	Mussell,	eds.,	Ethnic	and	Regional	Foodways	in	the	
United	States:	The	Performance	of	Group	Identity	(Knoxville:	University	of	Tennessee	Press,	1984);	Leon	Rappoport,	
How	We	Eat:	Appetite,	Culture,	and	the	Psychology	of	Food	(Toronto:	ECW	Press,	2003);	Peter	Scholliers,	ed.,	Food,	
Drink	and	Identity:	Cooking,	Eating	and	Drinking	in	Europe	since	the	Middle	Ages	(Oxford:	Berg,	2001)—chapters	
which	are	especially	relevant	to	my	work	are	Kolleen	M.	Guy,	“Wine,	Champagne	and	the	Making	of	French	
Identity	in	the	Belle	Epoque,”	163-178	and	Willy	Jansen,	“French	Bread	and	Algerian	Wine:	Conflicting	Identities	in	
French	Algeria,”	195-218.	For	an	exploration	of	the	role	of	food	in	the	migrant	experience	see,	Anne	J.	Kershen,	
ed.,	Food	in	the	Migrant	Experience	(Burlington,	VT:	Ashgate,	2002);	Jeffrey	M.	Piltcher,	Food	in	World	History	
(New	York	&	London:	Routledge,	2006)—especially	Chapter	9,	“Migrant	Cuisines”;	Desjardins	and	Desjardins,	
“Food	that	Builds.”	
Finally,	the	work	of	two	anthropologists	have	thoroughly	shaped	the	way	many	scholars	of	food	and	
religion	think	about	the	subject.	First,	Sidney	W.	Mintz	shows	how	“food	and	eating	afford	us	a	remarkable	arena	
in	which	to	watch	how	the	human	species	invests	basic	activity	with	social	meaning”	(7)	in	his	Tasting	Food,	
Tasting	Freedom;	Mintz’	overview	of	the	anthropology	of	food	and	eating	in	Sweetness	and	Power:	The	Place	of	
Sugar	in	Modern	History	(New	York:	Penguin	Books,	1985)	is	also	foundational.	Anyone	who	studies	food	and	
religion	cannot	help	but	also	be	informed	by	Mary	Douglas’s	work,	specifically	Mary	Douglas,	Purity	and	Danger:	
An	Analysis	of	Concepts	of	Pollution	and	Taboo	(New	York:	Praeger,	1966)	and	Mary	Douglas,	ed.,	Food	in	the	Social	
Order:	Studies	of	Food	and	Festivities	in	Three	American	Communities	(New	York:	Russell	Sage	Foundation,	1984).		
1310	Benjamin	E.	Zeller,	Marie	W.	Dallam,	Reid	L.	Neilson	and	Nora	L.	Rubel,	eds.,	Religion,	Food	&	Eating	in	North	
America	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2014).	
1311	“Religion	and	Food,”	Scripta	Instituti	Donneriani	Aboensis,	Vol	26	(2015),	accessed	March	28,	2016,	
http://ojs.abo.fi/index.php/scripta/issue/view/74/showToc	
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Religion (AAR) between 2008 and 2012.1312 This is important to note, as this book’s providence 
offers an insight into the potential for an unbalanced presentation of traditions that Marie Dallam 
addresses in her introductory chapter. Self-selection is one part of this equation, but as Dallam 
describes there does tend to be an imbalance in the North American context which examines 
Christianity and Judaism and mostly in the context of the United States.1313 Dallam states that 
this book is in fact a call for other works which are set in Mexico, Canada, and the Caribbean, 
and works that address traditions outside of Judaism and Christianity. I take up this call with this 
current work as it addresses the Canadian context and Islam. 
 The book is broken up into four thematic sections, namely, Theological Foodways, 
Identity Foodways, Negotiated Foodways, and Activist Foodways. In the Theological Foodways 
section, articles address the religious rules and spiritual inspiration for the religious foodways of 
a variety of Christian communities who practice vegetarianism in some way or another. The 
authors, through an exploration of theological imperative, show the development of (Grumett) 
and the consequent impact on religious foodways for members of these communities (Primiano), 
often describing the ways in which individual believers enact their religious lives through the 
dietary restrictions that they practice (Rapport, Blazer).  
In the Identity Foodways section, authors show how individuals and groups have 
constructed and maintained both individual and group religious identity through their foodways. 
In these chapters the reader is presented with the various ways, across traditions, in which 
religious actors tap into shared histories, e.g., via cookbooks (Gross) and ceremonies (Crawford 
O’Brien), and come to understand and consequently present, their religious and ethnic identities, 
i.e. via gumbo (Hicks) and Christmas cookies (Mehta).  
The Negotiated Foodways section consists of four chapters that reveal the complicated 
negotiations that often occur between “ideal” and “lived” religious foodways. In these chapters 
the reader gets a view into the ways that people navigate their religious lives through what they 
eat and how they eat it. The authors show how, when one looks outside the rule books of a 
tradition, commonly understood rules, philosophies and practices are altered or reimagined to fit 
with the lives of religious practitioners. Religious rituals are transformed by lived religion, as we 
																																																						
1312	This	seminar	meeting	is	one	of	the	foundational	moments	in	my	scholarly	career.	It	was	in	my	attendance	of	
this	seminar	at	the	AAR	in	2009	where	I	discovered	that	religion	and	food	was	a	viable,	and	in	fact	vibrant,	area	of	
study.	
1313	Dallam,	“Introduction,”	xxiii.	
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see in Perez’s chapter; food becomes a focus where it was not before, as we see in Holbrook’s 
chapter; traditional religious concepts are altered because of foodways, as we see in Wilson’s 
chapter; and new religious foodways are created, at the expense of traditional ones in light of 
cultural influences on the community, as we see in Rubel’s chapter.  
Finally, in the Activist Foodways section the authors show how religious individuals and 
communities can use food as a means of effecting change in the world, using food as a tool for 
social activism. Levasseur addresses this by looking at the social justice activity taken up by a 
Christian community in the American south, revealing the challenges of this kind of food 
activism. Robinson enters the conversation by describing the efforts of a Chicago Muslim 
organization to expand the definition of halal beyond just ritual slaughter to include socially just 
food practices and the problems that that move brought to the organization. Finally, in an 
interesting twist, Zeller takes the reader outside of the realm of commonly labelled “religions” to 
show how normally understood secular American foodways function as “quasi-religions” in their 
activist initiatives. 
Across these themes, there are subthemes which many of the articles address. A main 
goal of the book is to “look across traditions to find commonalities in the expression of the 
relationship of both food to religion and eating to religion.”1314 Dallam outlines these 
commonalities in her introductory chapter and suggests that food and religion, as they are 
presented in this book, cross the larger thematic boundaries via subthemes of foodlore, 
distinction, abundance, conversion, politics and comparison.1315 The essays in this volume show 
how people create stories around their food practices (foodlore), how foodways can act as 
boundary marking symbols distinguishing “us” from “them” (distinction), how many religious 
foodways act as a means of counterbalancing the North American (mostly American) pursuit of 
abundance (abundance), how religious actors reveal changes in their religious outlook via 
foodways (conversion), how food can be a means of individual and local power (politics) and 
how the food practices of one group can illuminate the experiences of another group 
(comparison). 
Taking all these themes and subthemes into consideration, the book illuminates the many 
ways that the food practices of individuals and communities reveal a great deal about what it 
																																																						
1314	Dallam,	“Introduction,”	xxiii.	
1315	Ibid.,	xxiv-xxvi.	
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means to be religious in North America. As Mintz states, eating is never a “purely biological” 
activity,1316 and in this case it acts as a strong symbol of meaning making. For that reason, and 
many others, this work shows that food should be taken seriously in the study of religion.1317 
My work could easily be placed into Zeller et al.’s work in either the Identity Foodways 
section or the Negotiated Foodways section. First, throughout this dissertation I have shown how 
my informants use food and foodways to understand themselves and to present those identities in 
their immigrant contexts. Like Derek Hicks and Samira Mehta I show how by eating certain 
foods my informants place themselves alongside other individuals and groups who also eat those 
things. For Hicks, this was gumbo, for Mehta, Christmas cookies, and for my informants it was 
couscous, the Eid lamb, dates during Ramadan, etcetera. Hicks argues that by eating or not 
eating certain foods the food actor is able “to communicate messages about cultural identity” on 
at least three levels. The individual can, through their foodways, (1) focus on the host context 
identity and reject the home; (2) aggressively maintain traditional home identity; or (3) blend the 
two.1318 These categories relate to Akhtar’s typology of identity consolidation possibilities that I 
use in Chapter 4 to describe the ways in which my Parisian informants use food to negotiate and 
present their identities.1319 So for Hicks, and for my Parisian informants, food is a powerful 
means of expressing identities. 
Furthermore, like Hicks and Mehta, I also complicated the categories of religion, culture, 
ethnicity, etcetera, throughout this work. Just as gumbo took up a religious place in Hicks’ 
home,1320 couscous took up a religious place in the lives of many of my informants. By using 
commonly understood cultural food practices as means of expressing religious identity, my 
informants show how the line between culture and religion, or religion and ethnicity, is often 
																																																						
1316	Mintz,	Tasting	Food,	7.	
1317	A	piece	that	addresses	the	value	of	adding	food	to	the	study	of	religions	is	Desjardins,	“Religious	Studies	that	
Really	Schmecks,”	147-156.	In	this	chapter	Desjardins	suggests	that	food	highlights	the	“fluidity	and	functionality	of	
categories”	that	become	too	often	ignored	in	the	study	of	religion	(particularly	in	the	study	of	Christian	origins).	He	
also	suggests	that	by	looking	at	food	one	moves	the	study	of	religion	outside	of	the	study	of	Christianity	in	content	
and	in	who	is	conducting	that	research.	Finally,	this	chapter	is	useful,	as	I	noted	above,	in	highlighting	the	
importance	of	studying	food	and	religion	as	a	means	of	locating	the	voice	and	experience	of	women.	Desjardins	
suggests	that	by	studying	leaders,	and	the	writers	of	texts,	and	rule	books,	we	only	find	men.	But	by	looking	at	
food,	women	abound.	
1318	Hicks,	“Unusual	Feast,”	145.	
1319	(1)	Relates	to	the	hyperassimilated	identity,	(2)	the	ethnocentric	identity,	and	(3)	the	bicultural	identity.	There	
is	no	example	in	Hicks	of	Akhtar’s	alienated	identity.	
1320	Hicks,	“Unusual	Feast,”	135.	
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blurred and highly dependent on individual experience and history. It reveals, as Ahmed insists is 
necessary, “the human and historical phenomenon” of a tradition.1321 Mehta also shows how 
culturally-significant foods are taken up in religious communities, and in the minds of outsiders, 
as symbols of religious events and identities, even if they have no place in the texts and traditions 
of the religion.1322 For my informants, ethnic components of their Muslim culture also become 
associated with Islam as a whole, so that Friday prayers would not be Friday prayers without 
couscous, or the Eid al-Fitr would not be the Eid without baklava.  
Another of my conclusions comes to light when reading Mehta’s chapter. She suggests 
that labelling a food practice as traditional, cultural or ethnic rather than religious can lead to two 
important outcomes. First, that practice can be seen as more flexible or not as strict.1323 I directly 
address this in chapter 5 and 8 when I present my spectrum of religion versus culture as it relates 
to the food practices of my informants. I showed how my informants engage this relabelling 
process to allow them to alter their commonly understood religious food practices to fit with 
their lives in their host societies. The second and related outcome that Mehta expresses is that 
food, in its very nature, can “be easily read simply as ethnic and is therefore not threatening to 
perceived religious identities”1324 or, I would add, national identities. Because food has the 
ability to cross the often-blurred boundaries between ethnicity, culture and religion, focussing on 
one side of this triple symbolism can allow the individual to present an “acceptable” identity to 
others. My informants could engage in religious food practices more than other religious 
practices because those food practices could be argued away as ethnic/cultural practices and thus 
were not seen as threatening to the secular national identity present in both Paris and Montréal. 
 My work could also fall into the Negotiated Identities section of Religion, Food, and 
Eating in North America as it addresses the ways in which “lived religious foodways are distinct 
from the ideal religious foodways we might expect to see.”1325 Like the groups which Holbrook 
examines in her chapter, the Nation of Islam and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints,1326 my informants highlight what some may see as secondary religious values and 
practices over the more commonly understood central tenets and practices of the faith. Some of 
																																																						
1321	Ahmed,	What	is	Islam,	116.	
1322	Mehta,	“’I	Chose	Judaism,”	165.	
1323	Ibid.,	156.	
1324	Ibid.,	169.	
1325	Dallam,	‘Introduction,”	xxviii.	
1326	Holbrook,	“Good	to	Eat,”	195-213.	
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my informants do this to such an extent that they replace some of the five pillars of Islam with 
religious foodways (i.e. replacing the shahada with the injunction against pork).1327 For some, it 
is these practices that make them Muslim. While many may assume that the daily prayers, the 
belief in one God and Mohammad as his Prophet, and other such things are the foundation of all 
Muslims lives as Muslims, my informants show how it is often more mundane practices which 
take up the place of utmost importance in their religious lives.  
This situation can sometimes involve the creation of new religious food practices as well, 
similar to the feast which Nora Rubel describes in her chapter.1328 My informants, when faced 
with cultural and logistical challenges to enacting the traditions around the Eid al-Adha in 
Montréal (i.e. by having to go out to a farm and wait all day to perform one’s sacrifice of the 
lamb), create new traditions which sometimes even go against commonly understood religious 
traditions (i.e. not fasting on a feast day trumps the tradition of eating from the sacrificed lamb 
before anything else on the day of the Eid al-Adha). By emphasizing uncommon practices in 
uncommon ways, religious individuals and groups are living their religious lives through 
negotiated foodways.  
 While these negotiated foodways are perhaps different from the “common” religious 
practices (food or otherwise) of these communities they do not necessarily contradict them. Jeff 
Wilson, in his chapter, comes closest to addressing the issue of people acting in contradictory 
ways to the values or practices of a given religious tradition. He shows how writers on and 
practitioners of “mindful eating” engage in a very un-Buddhist Buddhist practice. He states that 
mindful eating acts as a  
religious technique that has been largely stripped of its original religious context, then 
repackaged as a universal panacea that delivers all sorts of practical benefits, especially 
ones relating to health issues. Because mindfulness is said to deliver practical benefits—
such as weight loss and better health—it is enthusiastically picked up by Buddhists and 
non-Buddhists alike.1329 
 
																																																						
1327	Something	which	Levitt	does	as	well	in	her	work	God	Needs	No	Passport,	100.	
1328	Nora	L.	Rubel,	““The	Feast	at	the	end	of	the	Fast:	The	Evolution	of	an	American	Jewish	Ritual,”	in	Religion,	Food	
&	Eating	in	North	America,	eds.	Benjamin	E.	Zeller,	Marie	W.	Dallam,	Reid	L.	Neilson	and	Nora	L.	Rubel	(New	York:	
Columbia	University	Press,	2014),	234-250.	
1329	Jeff	Wilson,	“Mindful	Eating:	American	Buddhists	and	Worldly	Benefits,”	in	Religion,	Food	&	Eating	in	North	
America,	eds.	Benjamin	E.	Zeller,	Marie	W.	Dallam,	Reid	L.	Neilson	and	Nora	L.	Rubel	(New	York:	Columbia	
University	Press,	2014),	230-231.	
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While some of my informants, who act in contradictory ways in relation to religious food 
practices, argue away their contradictory behaviour by removing the religious element to the 
practice, like those mindful eaters whom Wilson describes, most act in contradictory ways 
without removing the religious implications. For example, they know that the injunction against 
alcohol is a religious one, but they drink alcohol. Or they know that eating strictly halal meat is a 
religious foodway, and yet they order potentially non-halal chicken when out for a meal at a 
restaurant. My work fills a gap in this section of Religion, Food, & Eating in North America by 
adding ways in which religious individuals negotiate the rules and values of their traditions in 
their daily lives in sometimes directly contradictory ways. 
 The second recent collection on religion and food is found in the special issue of Scripta 
Instituti Donneriani Aboensis. Some important distinctions between this and Zeller et al.’s 
Religion, Food, & Eating in North America are obvious from the outset in looking at the content 
list. First, there is very little overlap in authorship. Arising out of a conference held by the 
Donner Institute in Finland in June 2014,1330 the collection has an immediate international flair 
that is missing in Zeller et al.’s work. The authors in the Donner Institute’s anthology come from 
a vast array of backgrounds and their subject matter is equally vast. While the AAR volume 
focuses primarily on Judaism and Christianity, the Donner volume covers a variety of religious 
traditions, albeit with a slight emphasis on Judaism (four of the eighteen articles discuss Jewish 
foodways). While the AAR anthology purposefully restricted its scope geographically, culturally 
and temporally (twentieth and twenty-first centuries),1331 the Donner anthology chose to cover  
the whole span of human history, from antiquity and all the way up until today, from several 
different theoretical and methodological points of view, exploring several different 
religious traditions.1332 
 
 If someone outside of the field were to pick up the AAR volume they might assume that 
food and religion was mostly about Christians and Jews trying to sort out their lives in America 
in the last one hundred years. If that person were to pick up the Donner volume, the picture 
would become a bit more flavourful, giving insight into the ways in which religious individuals 
																																																						
1330	Zeller	was	a	visiting	fellow	at	the	Donner	Institute	at	the	time	and	actually	encouraged	them	to	host	the	
conference.	
1331	Dallam,	“Introduction,”	xxiii.	
1332	Ruth	Illman	and	Bjorn	Dahla,	“Editorial:	Religion	and	Food,”	Scripta	Instituti	Donneriani	Aboensis,	Vol.	26	
(2015):	7.	
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outside of the American context, and in many religious traditions, also use, or have used in the 
long ago past, food in similar ways to those presented in Religion, Food & Eating. In fact, one 
can see the Donner volume as an answer to the call that Dallam makes in her introduction to 
Religion, Food & Eating in North America for work outside of the U.S context and outside of 
Christianity and Judaism. 
 While there are no separate thematic sections in the Donner anthology the articles are 
organized according to general approach. First, after a brief editorial, the volume opens with two 
theoretical articles that show how foodways can provide answers for, and explanations of, what 
is religion/religious studies. For example, Zeller’s article complicates the very idea of “religion” 
by examining quasi-religious foodways such as veganism, gluten-free, and Paleolithic diets 
revealing that “one finds religion not only in churches, synagogues, mosques and temples. One 
also finds it at the grocery store.”1333 Graham Harvey relatedly challenges previous held ideas of 
what constitutes religion, and suggests that food take up a fundamental role in our understanding 
of religious studies itself. In fact, he posits that “perhaps religion (as a locus of scholarly 
attention) ought to be defined not as believing but as eating.”1334 Believing food to be some of 
the essential “stuff” of religion, my work falls in line with these theoretical positions, arguing 
that by examining what and how individuals eat or do not eat we as scholars of religion can gain 
insight into many other arenas of religious life. 
 After two chapters with a theological focus, Desjardins’ exploration of the historical 
Jesus through the lens of current, anthropological food data, and Pihkala’s exploration of 
ecotheology and Christian theological approaches to food and eating, four historical chapters 
follow. In these chapters the authors (Moragas & Mazzetto, Filocamo, Gutierrez and Malieckal) 
present historical accounts of different religious food practices from different time periods and 
contexts. These articles show how food has historically acted as a means of connecting with the 
spirits and gods, is a symbol of religious proportions, acts as an identity marker for religious 
groups, and can be a means of enacting power.  
 Following these historical accounts are six articles (by Soderlind, Abu Salem, Walsh, 
Plank, Zamorska, and de Souza) that present more contemporary, ethnographic studies of food 
																																																						
1333	Benjamin	E.	Zeller,	““Totem	and	Taboo	in	the	Grocery	Store:	Quasi-religious	Foodways	in	North	America,”	
Scripta	Instituti	Donneriani	Aboensis,	Vol.	26	(2015):	27.	
1334	Harvey,	“Respectfully	Eating,”	32.	
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and religion. They too address the role of food in spiritual communion, its use as religious 
symbol, its ability to delineate group and individual identity, and its function as a source of 
power. Furthermore, they address the ways in which food is used by various individuals and 
communities in the negotiations that individuals go through in the modern, global, often 
transnational contexts of their lives. 
 The volume closes with four articles that present Jewish perspectives on religion and 
food. By separating these articles into their own section, the editors draw attention to the 
emphasis on this tradition in the anthology. This separation leaves the reader wondering, “what is 
so special or different about Judaism that it requires its own subsection of this work?” 
Regardless, these articles present views into the role of food in transnational identity negotiations 
(Kershenovich Schuster), in ecological activism (Krone), in definitions of religion and religious 
practice (Mulhern) and in memory (Kasstan). 
 Other than supporting the theoretical musings presented by Zeller and Harvey, my work 
falls most in line with the ethnographic articles that make up the bulk of this collection. Much 
like Paulette Kershenovich Schuster, my work shows how my informants are negotiating their 
transnational identities through foodways. Whether through food fusion, “the trend of combining 
foods from more than one culture in the same dish”1335 (such as my informants who added 
Maghrébine spices to shepherd’s pie), or parallel eating, the trend of eating dishes from different 
cultures at the same meal, but not in the same dish1336 (my informant who had lemon meringue 
pie on the Eid table alongside Maghrébine sweets), my informants were “actively engaging in a 
reconstruction of an ideal and identity, a home in limbo.”1337 Furthermore, my informants were 
able to not only define this identity but to proclaim it, both to themselves and to others through 
their consumption practices. My work is in agreement with Kershenovich Schuster in that we 
both show that “food plays a central part in their construction of religious, spiritual and cultural 
identity, which was constructed in a multiethnic and transnational context through everyday 
social interactions, cooking and eating practices.”1338 Like the habaneros and shwarma that were 
																																																						
1335	Kershenovich	Schuster,	“Habaneros	and	Shwarma,”	287.	This	food	fusion	is	a	good	example	of	the	way	that	the	
“ethnic	nationals,”	presented	by	Levitt	above,	engage	with	their	food	practices	(Levitt,	God	Needs	No	Passport,	68,	
75).	
1336	Kershenovich	Schuster,	“Habaneros	and	Shwarma,”	290.	Parallel	eating	can	be	used	to	describe	the	process	
undertaken	by	“dual	nationals”	according	to	Levitt	(Levitt,	God	Needs	No	Passport,	77).	
1337	Kershenovich	Schuster,	“Habaneros	and	Shwarma,”	297.	
1338	Ibid.,	297.	
	 405	
representative of Kershenovich Schuster’s Jewish Mexican informants, the harissa-spiced 
shepherd’s pies, and couscous with baguettes were representative of my Maghrébine Muslim 
informants. Like the other works in this anthology this dissertation addresses themes of 
“tradition, memory and nostalgia; boundaries, identity, and control; symbolism, authenticity, and 
fluidity; and consumption and abstention.”1339 
 
9.3.2.1 Food and Religion Summary 
In this section I situated my research within the field of Food and Religion. While there were 
many sources I could have addressed, I focused on the two most recent anthologies on the study 
of religion and food to show the current state of the field and to place myself within it. First, I 
presented an overview of Zeller et al.’s edited work Religion, Food and Eating in North 
America. After discussing the four subsections of this work: Theological Foodways, Identity 
Foodways, Negotiated foodways, and Activist foodways, I showed how my work best fits into 
the Identity and Negotiated foodways sections.  
In agreement with the authors in the Identity Foodways section, my work shows how 
food is a powerful means of expressing identities. It also complicates previously held notions of 
religious and cultural identifications and shows how the flexibility of foodways to be relabelled 
in these ways can aid the religious actor in their national identifications. I also described how my 
work could fall in line with those authors who contributed to the Negotiated Foodways section, 
showing how everyday religious practice can sometimes conflict with the ideals we may be 
expecting to see. While the authors in this section discussed the ways that people highlight 
surprising foodways, none really addressed how people can act in directly contradictory ways to 
religious food ideals. I suggested that my work can help to fill this gap by discussing situations 
where my informants acted in blatantly contradictory ways to the religious “norms.”  
After discussing Zeller et al.’s work I then gave an overview of the special issue of 
Scripta Instituti Donneriani Aboensis on religion and food. I argued that the Donner Institute’s 
work addressed the call made in Zeller et al.’s work for more studies in food and religion outside 
of the U.S. and outside of Christian/Jewish traditions; while there was still an emphasis on 
Jewish foodways in this anthology. Instead of a thematic approach the Donner volume was 
divided, for the most part, into methodological approach: theoretical, theological, historical, 
																																																						
1339	Illman	and	Dahla,	“Editorial:	Religion	and	Food,”	7.	
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ethnographic, and then, strangely, four articles with a specific focus on Judaism. In this 
methodological visioning, I placed my work alongside the other ethnographic articles. I 
specifically drew lines between my work and Kershenovich Schuster’s work on Jewish Mexican 
transnational immigrants, showing how my informants were actively reconstructing identity in 
their transnational contexts through their foodways. 
 
9.4 Limitations 
 
While I have attempted to present a fair and accurate depiction of what the daily lived religion of 
Maghrébine Muslim immigrants in Paris and Montréal looks like, and the effect of these 
religious lives on my informants’ self-understandings as transnational immigrants, the project 
inevitably suffers from some limitations that impacted the collection of my data as well as its 
presentation in this dissertation. As much as we may wish to think that we perform perfect work, 
no project is faultless, or complete. I turn now to some of the limitations that I faced in the field 
and in the writing of my ethnography. 
 
9.4.1 Method: Access/Time, Snowball, Field Work 
First, my time in the field was limited to roughly six months in each location. While this is a 
significant amount of time for a current PhD project, more time in the field would have allowed 
me greater access to the communities I was studying and could have significantly changed the 
outcome of my project. This is especially true of my Paris fieldwork. Because of the suspicious 
attitude against which I was working for most of my time in the field in Paris, especially in the 
early days, it took a great deal of time to build rapport and to convince my informants that I had 
good intentions and was not, in fact, a journalist who would likely misrepresent them later in 
public. I found that by the end of my time in the field the doors were beginning to open for me 
and people were starting to trust me enough to pass on my name to their friends and family. My 
interview schedule picked up in pace significantly in the last month in the field and I am sure I 
could have gained some more important voices had I had another month or two in that field 
setting.  
For example, my Paris data is missing the voices of older informants. While I have 
middle aged men and women, and younger men and women, my access to eldery men and 
women, the early, post-war immigrants to France was limited. I was just beginning to make 
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connections with families and gaining enough trust within these circles to provide this access 
when I had to leave. My data set is thus skewed to the younger, first generation immigrant 
experience in Paris.  
Furthermore, while I had a couple of informants who invited me into their homes and 
allowed me this close access to their real, everyday lived experiences, this access was restricted 
as well. By the end of my six months in Paris, I was finally making inroads into some other 
circles and probably could have increased this “Islam at home” experience, but unfortunately six 
months was just not enough time to break that barrier of mistrust. 
 In Montréal, on the other hand, my work got underway quickly and I gained access to the 
inner realms of my informants lives from very early on. Again, more time would have allowed 
for more data and more access to different people, but in Montréal my stream of interviews and 
experiences was a never-ending flow of rich ethnographic material. Building rapport was easy, 
hesitation was not ever on the table, and thus I was able to gain easier and more intimate access 
in Montréal than I could in Paris. The result is a Paris – Montréal comparison that is uneven in 
breadth and depth. 
 Moreover, my data collection was limited by the fieldwork process itself and by the 
method I employed to recruit informants. Trying to restrict my influence on the data I was 
collecting as much as possible, I followed a snowball method for recruiting my interviewees. 
While this allows the data to develop along a natural, informant-led line, it inevitably affects the 
people and thus the type of data to which I had access. In Paris, while this snowball began at the 
Grande Mosquée, and with generally more traditional and conservative Muslim informants, as 
soon as one of those informants introduced me to a “cultural Muslim,” one of the flows of 
informants easily continued along that line. If I had never met a so-called “cultural Muslim” I 
probably would have not met others and my comparison with the Montréal informants may not 
have been as different as what it was. Similarly, my snowball effect in Montréal began in two 
places which affected the two strands of informants to which I had access. One strand began at 
another well-established mosque with fairly devout, traditional and conservative Muslim 
informants and continued along that line. Another began with an acquaintance of one of my Paris 
informants, who saw herself as less traditional, although as I argued in Chapter 5 would fit 
within many definitions of “traditionally religious” in spite of her self-understanding as quite 
liberal. This strand of the snowball led me to other informants who did not go to the mosque on a 
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regular basis and who lived their religious lives purely in their daily lives, outside of the 
institutional setting of Islam in Québec. Finally, this method most likely meant that I was also 
limited in the sectarian differences that might influence my informants in both Paris and 
Montréal. Again, while I did not ask my informants about their sectarian background, by 
following a snowball method I inevitably narrowed the kinds of views that would be present in 
my data set. 
 Despite these limitations, the field provided me with valuable though complicated access 
to the lives of my informants. By engaging in participant observation, I sometimes encountered 
problematic and conflicting information to what my informants told me in our interviews. I was 
able to get glimpses into their lives, that I would not have had access to if I had done skype 
interviews, or flown in, did a series of interviews back to back and flown back out again, or built 
my data primarily from surveys. By building the necessary rapport, even if it took me months 
and months, by showing up every day, by observing even the minute moments of my informants’ 
lives, I was able to gain a more nuanced picture than I could have based on interviews alone. 
Ethnographic fieldwork has limits, but it also offers opportunities to access to parts of my 
informants lives in their immigrant context that I would not have had access to if it were not for 
the time I spent in the field. 
 
9.4.2 Home Context 
While this time in the field gave me privileged access to the intricacies of my informants’ lives 
as immigrants in Paris and Montréal I did not have the opportunity to see what those lives looked 
like “au bled.” The scope of this project is such that I could only look at one side of the 
transnational experience, namely the experience of transnational immigrants in the host society. 
Levitt suggests that one important aspect of any transnational study is to consider how the 
migration of certain individuals has an affect on those individuals who stay back home: 
“sometimes migration is as much about the people who stay behind as it is about people who 
move.”1340 By focusing solely on the immigrant in his/her host society I do not have insight into 
the effect of transnational migration on those still in the homeland.  
Furthermore, all the information I do have about the home land context I have second 
hand; I learned everything about what life was like “back home” from people who no longer 
																																																						
1340	Levitt,	God	Needs	No	Passport,	23.	
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physically lived in those homes, and consequently had to take them at their word.  It is quite 
possible, as I learned through the process of fieldwork, that my informants were telling me one 
thing about life in the Maghreb but the “actual” life of the Maghreb might be quite different. In 
this dissertation I address the changes in practice and identity which my informants engage in 
from home land to host land, but these documented changes are fully based on the word of these 
informants. It is possible that my informants did not change their practice or identity at all from 
what it was in the homeland, but they simply told me that they did. Without any previous 
knowledge of the Maghrébine context I have no way of knowing how “true” these accounts are. I 
do not actually know if “halal is a given” or if there is “alcohol but never pork,” or if “everyone 
sacrifices a lamb in their backyard,” in the Maghreb.  
Whether these statements are factually “true” or not is not particularly important for my 
study. My concern is with the way that my informants understand themselves and their practices 
as immigrants, how they see themselves as changed or not through the process of migration, 
regardless of the ways that things “actually” happen or do not in the homeland. I took my 
informants at their word, even if I sometimes did not fully understand the full import of their 
words. 
 
9.4.3 Language 
This brings me to the final limitation that I highlight here: language. The issue of what language 
to use in this project was prevalent throughout my entire ethnographic experience. I was acutely 
aware of the language question before I even entered in to the field, over and over again in the 
fieldwork context, and while I was writing up the ethnography that is presented here. I knew that 
to conduct this project I was going to need to use a language other than my own primary mode of 
discourse.  
As I discussed in Chapter 1, Spradley argues that learning the language of your 
informants is the “first and most important step to achieving the primary goal of ethnography—
to describe a culture on its own terms.”1341 In one sense, I did learn the language of my 
informants; I was strong in French but not strong enough to have preconceived notions of what 
words my informants “should be” using to describe any given thing. I was able to learn the 
French that my informants used in their immigrant context. For some of my informants French 
																																																						
1341	Spradley,	The	Ethnographic	Interview,	18.	
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was their first language, and for most others it was a secondary language, often being spoken at 
home or at work. Some of my informants knew French better than Arabic, and it was generally 
the most common language amongst myself and my informants. All but two of my informants, 
one in France and one in Montréal, spoke French fluently, so my interviews were generally able 
to go off without a hitch.1342  
The problem arose in participant observation. Not knowing Maghrébine Arabic left me 
sometimes on the outside of the conversation and thus on the outside of the experience. While 
my informants would mostly speak French when I was around, I know that there were moments 
missed and good data that was lost in the moments where my informants would break off into an 
Arabic/French blend and I could not fully understand the conversation. This happened often in 
the kitchen of the Grande Mosquée in my early days in Paris, and continued to happen in my 
informants’ living rooms in Montréal. It is hard to say exactly what I missed in those moments, 
but I am certain that my ethnographic account would have been even richer had I been able to 
understand the Arabic terms and expressions that my informants used; I would have been able to 
more fully understand the world that was unfolding around me (perhaps even allowing myself to 
be more prepared for the marriage proposals that seemingly came out of no where). Beyond just 
getting the data, knowing Arabic could have possibly helped me to build rapport in those early 
days in the field.  
I remember when I was nearing the end of my time in the field in Montréal, sitting in the 
living room with some of my informants as they got caught up in conversation and thus switched 
from full French to the common Arabic/French blend that they would speak when I was not in 
the room. I sat quietly, listening, following what I could. When my host noticed that they had 
gotten carried away, she quickly apologized and switched back to full French. I told her not to 
worry and then proceeded to tell her what I had understood of the conversation. I will never 
forget the look on her face, and the others in the room when they thought that I had learned their 
language; they were so excited and so proud. I was getting there, the blend of French with the 
Arabic helped me for sure, but I was not quite there yet. I am sure with more time in the field I 
could have learned more, and would not have missed out on some of these moments. 
																																																						
1342	In	the	case	of	the	two	informants	who	did	not	speak	French	fluently	I	was	able	to	use	a	translator	for	their	
interviews.	While	I	trust	the	translators,	there	is	inevitably	something	missed	when	using	a	third	party	in	the	
interview	process.	I	cannot	be	sure	that	the	nuance	of	my	informants’	responses	in	these	two	cases	are	exactly	
what	I	have	in	my	transcriptions.	
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9.5 Future Research 
 
My project was limited by the logistics that I described above, but it was also limited in content. 
With a year in the field, and two field sites, there was only so much that I could examine and 
only in particular ways. The data that I gathered from July 2012 until October 2013, in Paris and 
in Montréal, led to the very specific findings that I have presented in this dissertation, but it also 
has led me to posit the possible avenues for future research that could grow out of a project such 
as this.  
First, as I mentioned above I did not have access to the homeland context for this project. 
I am unaware of what the transnational immigrant experience does to those left behind, and to 
their own negotiations of identity and lived religious experiences. Furthermore, I do not know 
how people in the Maghreb negotiate their identities and live their religious lives in general. I do 
not know how many of my conclusions about transnational experience actually has to do with 
the migration experience itself and how much it has to do with the specific contexts and histories 
of those who migrate. It would be valuable to do a similar project to this one in the Maghreb to 
explore the ways that Muslims in the Maghreb negotiate their identities through food and how 
that compares to the data that I found in this project. This could reveal potentially helpful 
insights into the role of food in the migration and integration process itself, as well as the role of 
food in identity construction itself. If food was not highlighted in the Maghreb, if people did not 
use it as a means of identifying themselves as Muslim or Maghrébine, this could give support to 
the idea found in this dissertation that food acts as a particularly strong symbol and hence as a 
tool for the transnational migrant in creating and maintaining his/her transnational identity. It 
would also allow for an opportunity to explore Levitt’s suggestion that migration is often about 
those left behind, giving me the chance to see how the interactions with those making return trips 
from France or Québec influence the daily food practice of those “left behind.” 
 Another possible future avenue of research that grows out of the conclusions of this data 
is to explore the role of food in the immigrant experience in other “secular” contexts. Having 
lived in Victoria, British Columbia, for the past two years I have become acutely aware of what 
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it is like to live in an area populated by “religious nones.”1343 I would be curious to see how the 
dynamics that I describe in this dissertation would get worked out in this secular context. In 
comparison to locations like France and Québec that both have complex histories with religion, 
both being highly Catholic dominated contexts having undergone drastic secularization 
processes, what sorts of pressures might be imposed on an immigrant from a religious minority 
in a different kind of secular context like British Columbia? How might members of religious 
minorities in a secular context that is characterized by a religious illiteracy rather than a direct 
antagonism negotiate their identities? What role might food play in these negotiations? Would 
religious immigrants begin to relabel their religious practices as cultural to fit in with their 
“none” neighbours? This kind of project could reveal the real implications of various types of 
secularism on the lived religious experiences of religious minorities. 
 The question of re-labelling and re-identification of people and practices as cultural rather 
than religious is another fruitful research path to explore out of this project. As I described in 
Chapter 4 of this work, a surprising number of my informants labelled themselves as cultural 
Muslims. In highly secular and globalized contexts individuals are creating and discovering new 
ways to “be religious” and to live out the traditions that are affiliated with those identities. 
Foodways are often the only maintained affiliated practice with the more traditional religious 
practices by “culturally religious” people. Because this category was only prevalent amongst my 
Paris informants (my Québec informants almost exclusively saw themselves as “Religious 
Muslims”) I posit that the host context has a large effect on this category. Future work that 
examines the category of “cultural religion” across different contexts and religious traditions 
would be highly valuable. Because of the position of foodways for the individuals who claimed 
this identity in my study, I believe that examining the food practices of individuals who claim 
this identity is the best way in to understanding this new and exciting realm of religious 
identification. 
 Finally, the timeline of my fieldwork inevitably led to a certain picture of the experience 
of Maghrébine Muslim immigrants in Paris and Montréal. By picking up this dissertation the 
																																																						
1343	Those	who	when	asked	what	their	religion	is	would	say	“none.”	In	British	Columbia,	nearly	half	of	the	
population	(44	percent)	identifies	this	way	according	to	the	2011	National	Household	Survey.	“National	Household	
Survey”	Statistics	Canada,	accessed	March	7,	2016,	http://www12.statcan.ca/nhs-enm/2011/dp-
pd/prof/details/page.cfm?Lang=E&Geo1=PR&Code1=59&Data=Count&SearchText=British%20Columbia&SearchTy
pe=Begins&SearchPR=01&A1=Religion&B1=All&Custom=&amp;TABID=1).	
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reader may assume that life is quite comfortable for Muslims in Montréal and even that life is not 
all that uncomfortable for Muslims in Paris, as long as one is willing to adjust some of their 
practices to fall in line with French secularism and nationalism. Unfortunately, a few major 
events have happened in both settings that have drastically impacted the daily lives of my 
informants, and I am sure many of their compatriots.  
First, I finished my fieldwork in Montréal roughly a week before the Charter of Québec 
Values gained popular media attention in Québec. The Charter, as proposed by the PQ 
government at the time under the leadership of Pauline Marois, sought to address the controversy 
around “reasonable accommodation” in Québec by emphasizing state neutrality, most precisely 
through limiting the wearing of “conspicuous” religious symbols in the public sphere.1344 My 
informants went from giving me very pleasant pictures of their lives in Québec, to writing me 
emails, distraught, and confused as to what was happening in the province that they called home. 
In fact, in the time since I conducted this fieldwork my informants have expressed feeling not as 
“at home” as they used to feel, and have described unfortunate situations of discrimination that 
they have experienced in their daily lives in Montréal. Ultimately, it has become clear to me that 
the situation of discrimination felt by Muslims in Québec ebbs and flows dependent on what is 
happening in the world, and in Québec at the time. My research was conducted in a moment 
where the tide had ebbed, and the picture presented here is accordingly fairly rosy. If I were to 
have conducted it a year later, it is unclear as to whether the “Mini-France” that I was expecting 
to see would have in fact appeared.  
 In France, multiple acts of terrorism have had an impact on the lives of my Muslim 
informants and others like them in Paris. The attacks on the Charlie Hebdo office in January 
2015, the November 2015 attacks, including the massacre at the Bataclan theatre, and the 2016 
Bastille Day attacks in Nice, heightened the fear of Islamic extremism in France, and many 
feared that these events could lead to further marginalization of Muslims in France. While it is 
hard to know how much the aftermath of such events is a product of the media and how much is 
true, one cannot help but wonder what the effect of such events might be on the daily lives of 
Muslims in France. Would these events, and the general increase in awareness of and activity by 
a group such as ISIS, increase the pressure that my informants felt to alter their identities and 
																																																						
1344	Specifically	limiting	all	public-sector	employees	from	wearing	any	“conspicuous”	religious	symbols,	as	well	as	
making	it	mandatory	to	show	one’s	face	when	either	providing	or	receiving	public	services.	
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their related food practices in France? Would these kinds of events make French national identity 
even more elusive? Internal French politics also plays a role in such matters, and if experience 
can be used as a guide, the upcoming French presidential cycle is likely to fan the flames of 
intolerance and fear. 
Accordingly, what is needed to gain a deeper understanding of these French and 
Canadian communities would be a series of studies over time, ideally longitudinal studies, that 
could reveal the lived religious lives of North African Muslims in Paris and Montréal. 
 
9.6 Conclusion 
 
This dissertation is motivated by two research questions: (1) how can food act as a means of 
reimagining, recreating, reaffirming, and expressing, sometimes complicated and contested 
identities for minority religious immigrant communities in highly secular contexts? (2) What 
impact does the context of reception, particularly the host society’s unique and complex history 
and interaction with colonialism, immigration, secularism, and nationalism, have on these 
identity negotiations? In examining these two principal questions my research has arrived at 
three key findings: (a) that food is an effective and prevalent tool for the minority religious 
immigrant to use in their inevitable identity negotiation and integration efforts; (b) that altering 
how one interacts with, labels, and practices these foodways can change the way an individual 
enacts their religion and culture, and, relatedly, that the very definitions of religion and culture 
can be muddied by examining the foodways of religious individuals and finally, (c) that the 
context of reception has a significant impact on the daily lived religious practices and identities 
of religious minority immigrants. 
 First, in regards to finding (a): that food is an effective and prevalent tool for the minority 
religious immigrant to use in his/her inevitable identity negotiation and integration efforts, I 
show throughout the dissertation how food is often the most important symbol of identity 
engaged by my informants. I argue that food may be a more politically or culturally correct 
symbol of religious identification in highly secular contexts like Montréal and Paris. In secular 
contexts, where public signs of religiosity are often seen as problematic, I found that subtler and 
more private expressions of religious identity help the minority religious immigrant to engage 
with and express their identities in meaningful ways. Additionally, in contexts like France and 
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Québec, which have strong and distinct food cultures, by taking up some of the foodways of the 
host context, and/or leaving some of the home food practices that are seen as especially in 
conflict with the host context behind (i.e. the restriction on alcohol and pork), my participants 
claim and demonstrate their Québécois or French side of their transnational identity. 
 This lays the ground work for finding (b): that altering how one interacts with, labels and 
practices these foodways can change the way an individual enacts their religion and culture and 
can muddy the waters, so to speak, regarding the definitions of religion and culture themselves. 
While I entered the field expecting to find fairly consistent definitions, and understandings of, 
religious and cultural food practices, I quickly realized that these topics were not as clear cut as 
scholars might like to imagine. In presenting my fourfold typology of food practice in Chapter 5 
and Chapter 8, I showed the varied ways that my informants enacted and understood these 
practices and therefore complicated the very categorization that I set out to make. By choosing to 
alter the way that they labelled certain practices, some of my informants revealed the difficulty in 
delimiting the lines of definition for any practice or identity. For example, while not eating pork 
is often viewed as a religious foodway, for some of my informants, particularly some in Paris, it 
was a cultural one. On the other end of the religious/cultural spectrum, couscous was most often 
understood as a cultural foodway that had nothing to do with religion, and yet I had informants in 
both Paris and Montréal who gave it religious significance. For them, “L’eau, la semoule 
[couscous] et la respiration. On a besoin que de ça en l’Islam.”1345 Furthermore, some of my 
informants seemingly changed the label of a given foodway from religious to cultural to make 
that practice less obligatory and therefore easier to alter, e.g., not drinking alcohol became a 
cultural practice instead of a religious one in order for some informants to enjoy a drink with 
their friends after work. In fact, in Paris, my informants relabeled their religious food practices as 
cultural to two ends: first, this relabelling allowed them to see this practice as more flexible and 
open to change, and second, if they did not stop these practices, this relabelling made their 
engagement in said practices more acceptable to the non-Muslim French majority that 
surrounded them. They consequently presented malleable definitions of both culture and 
religion, using these categories as a means to continually engage in important foodway practices 
in light of the tension they faced.  
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In Montréal, there was not the same felt pressure to alter the definitions of the terms 
culture and religion. They stressed that there was in fact often a difference between the two, but 
there was general consensus on which foodways belonged to which category. In fact, because 
these “religious” and “cultural” food practices were so acceptable, and uncontested, they often 
emphasized other, more obscure religious food practices as essential to their lives as Maghrébine 
Muslims in Montréal, i.e. gelatin. Emphasizing the avoidance of gelatin as a “religious” food 
practice again, further complicates the definitions of these terms. While my Montréal informants 
would be comfortable labelling a religious food practice as religious, they still often revealed an 
influence from the Québécois intercultural context to provide cultural, logical, or “scientific” 
reasons for their religious practices. 
 This brings me to my final, and most significant finding, finding (c): that the context of 
reception has a significant impact on the daily lived religious practices and identities of religious 
minority immigrants. In line with scholarship in religion and migration, I demonstrate throughout 
this dissertation how a context of reception directly influences the practices and identities of its 
immigrant communities. In Chapter 2 and Chapter 6, I describe those contexts of reception in 
depth, particularly related to the most influential factors that shape how immigrants from 
religious minorities are received in both locales. I show how the differing histories of, and 
interactions with, colonialism, immigration, secularism and nationalism in both France and 
Québec provide distinct settings with which any resident must interact and construct their 
identities in relation to. Then throughout the data chapters, Chapters 3-5 and 7-8, I show how 
these histories have real effects on the lived religion of my informants.  
For example, in Paris, my informants were clearly responding to the post-colonial, 
immigrant, secular, nationalistic situation which surrounds them. Consequently, they expressed a 
wide variety of identities such as “born Muslim,” “double culture,” “cultural Muslim,” “French,” 
etcetera, which they represented through the food that they ate and did not eat and the ways that 
they altered these foodways in Paris. Furthermore, because of the context of reception, and my 
informants’ interactions with it, a kind of transnational identity emerged for my Parisian 
informants which I discussed in Chapter 4. There was a clear dichotomy presented between “us” 
and “them” which framed my informants’ thinking about, and acting in relation to, integration 
and transnationalism. For my Parisian informants, foodways played an essential role in defining 
the differences between “us” and “them,” as a tool for or against integration, and in representing 
	 417	
the multiple sides of their transnational identity. Specifically, because of the “French only” 
approach to nationalism found in France, I argue that members of religious, ethnic or cultural 
minorities feel excluded from the French national identity and as a result often remain on the 
margins of that identity. Even those who make efforts to fit within the French national identity 
frame, that I describe throughout the Paris data chapters, often still feel as though they can never 
quite claim French identity. Although the French secular national approach is meant to remove 
distinction, my data shows in fact that it can increase difference and communautarisme. 
While my Montréal informants were affected by the Québécois context of reception in 
some ways, they also seemingly bypassed the Québécois context and placed themselves more 
within the Canadian context as a whole. This led to a much more uniform response from my 
informants in Montréal in regards to identity and practice, than what emerged from my Paris 
data. In Chapter 7, I showed how my Montréal informants saw themselves as in conversation 
with Canadian identity, more than Québécois, and because to them, “Canada is a country of 
immigrants,” and because “what makes you distinct is what makes you Canadian,” my 
informants stressed the identities which made them different from their non-immigrant, non-
Maghrébine, non-Muslim neighbours. Again, food acted as an important symbol and practice 
that represented these identities for my Montréal informants.  
What was particularly revealing in the Montréal context was the fact that, because my 
informants felt as though they could comfortably express their religious identities in Montréal, 
more specific religious food practices became an important part of their daily religious lives and 
identities. Because not eating pork, not drinking alcohol, fasting, etcetera, were accepted, non-
problematic practices in which to engage, my informants seemed to feel as though they needed 
something even more distinct with which to represent themselves; gelatin and ingredient 
verifying consequently took up an important place in my informants’ foodways in Montréal. 
Being comfortable with expressing multiple identities, my informants were able to fully engage 
their transnational identities in Montréal. Both sides of the transnational identity were respected, 
promoted and nourished in the Montréal context and foodways were essential in accessing and 
presenting these transnational identities. 
These differences present a culturally and socially important finding of this dissertation, 
namely, while the fear may be that by maintaining or even increasing practices that indicate 
difference, that highlight the “homeland” side of one’s transnational identity, immigrants may 
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not integrate fully into the host culture, my research shows the exact opposite effect. In Canada, 
within multi- and inter-cultural contexts, my Montréal informants felt more Canadian or had a 
greater desire to “be Canadian,” and on the whole felt free to express and engage their individual 
identities, whether religious, ethnic or cultural, In France, the opposite was true. I use food 
throughout as the lens to reveal that France’s universalistic and assimilationist immigration 
policies undermine its efforts to emphasize equality. 
Ultimately, by emphasizing how the host society’s approach to, and interaction with, 
immigrants drastically impacts those individuals’ daily religious lives and self-understandings, 
my work falls in line with other scholars in the field of religion and migration who highlight the 
distinct characteristics of the contexts of reception of their informants. Furthermore, since most 
work conducted in religion and migration is undertaken by sociologists, and mostly with 
quantitative methods, my work, as a qualitative ethnography, fills a gap in the literature by 
showing how the general trends that these sociologists find, i.e. Phillip Connor, get worked out 
on the ground. 
My work also fills a gap in the highly Judeo-Christian focussed field of Food and 
Religion, that I described in section 9.3.2 above. By providing a picture of the daily negotiations 
of identity that people engage in through their use of food, my work, like many of the articles in 
both Zeller et al’s work and the Donner Institute’s special volume on Religion and Food, 
highlights the essential role of food in the lived religious experience of global and transnational 
religious actors. My work shows how food can be one of the most important expressions of a 
variety identities for immigrants in highly secular, often hostile environments.  
It is my hope that this work supports the importance of this new, but rapidly increasing 
field of inquiry, and will lead others to assess people’s foodways as an essential aspect of those 
individual’s religious lives, whether majority or minority, immigrant or non-immigrant, women 
or men, etcetera. Brillat-Savarin famously stated, “we are what we eat.” My work shows how by 
modifying, reimagining and redefining, what we eat we can modify, reimagine and redefine who 
we are, thus providing a strong tool to the minority immigrant in their inevitable identity 
negotiations in contexts such as Paris and Montréal.  
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Appendix A 
 
 
James Spradley’s 12 Step Ethnographic Interview Sequence 
 
1. Greetings 
2. Giving Ethnographic explanations 
2.1 Giving project explanations 
2.2 Giving question explanations 
2.3 Giving recording explanations 
2.4 Giving native language explanations 
2.5 Giving interview explanations 
3. Asking ethnographic questions 
3.1 Asking descriptive questions 
3.2 Asking structural questions 
3.3 Asking contrast questions 
4. Asymmetrical turn taking 
5. Expressing interest 
6. Expressing cultural ignorance 
7. Repeating 
8. Restating Informants’ terms 
9. Incorporating informants’ terms 
10. Creating hypothetical situations 
11. Asking friendly questions 
12. Taking leave 
 
Source: James P. Spradley, The Ethnographic Interview (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1979), 67. 
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Appendix B 
 
REB Approved Research Questions 
 
 
Exemple du questionnaire en français 
 
Intégration et Ingestion: aliments, boissons et identités religieuses dans les 
communautés maghrébines musulmanes à Paris et à Montréal 
 
1. Pourriez-vous me donner une idée sur votre lieu d’origine? Êtes-vous né en France 
(Québec), ou ailleurs? 
 
2. Là d’où je viens au Canada les personnes s’identifient de façons très différente, surtout en 
fonction du lieu où ils vivent, ou de leur pays d'origine, ou de leur appartenance ethnique, ou de 
leur religion. Ils sont, par exemple, Torontolais, ou Irlandaise ou Aborigène, ou Catholique. Et 
vous: comment voulez-vous que je vous identifie? 
 
3. Je suppose que vous êtes musulman/e. Est-ce correct? [Yes; if No, the interview possibly 
ends, but sometimes a “No” can really mean “I’m not a good Muslim,” so a few other questions 
can be asked to tease out a proper response]. Pourriez-vous me parler du type d'Islam que 
vous pratiquez?  
(a) Allez-vous à la mosquée pour la prière du vendredi ou pour lire Le Coran ou pour 
des célébrations religieuses?  
(b) Mangez-vous des aliments halal? Tout le temps? 
(c) Avez-vous jeûné pendant le ramadan? Ou en d'autres occasions?  
(d) Combien de fois priez-vous par jour? 
(e) Vous habillez-vous d'une manière que vous considérez islamique, sur une base 
régulière? 
 
4. Pensez à votre vie religieuse, à la fois à la maison et dans d'autres endroits, et maintenant 
penser à la nourriture dans ces contextes. Quels sont les exemples qui viennent à l'esprit? 
 
5. Permettez-moi d'explorer un peu plus loin ce lien entre l'alimentation et votre vie religieuse. 
La nourriture fait une partie de notre vie de façons différentes, comme faire la cuisine, manger, 
et célébrer. La plupart d'entre nous utilisent aussi la nourriture spéciale pour les événements 
religieux spéciaux. Je suis intéressé par toutes ces choses, en particulier en ce qui concerne les 
liens à votre vie et l'identité religieuses.  
  
(a) Lorsque vous mangez des aliments, chaque jour, est-ce que votre religion guide ce que 
vous mangez? (Si oui, comment?) 
 
(b) Y a-t-il certains aliments que vous ne mangent pas du tout, ou que vous éviter à certains 
moments, parce que vous êtes musulman/e? 
 
(c) Est-ce que vous préparez votre nourriture vous-même? Y a-t-il des moyens particuliers à 
préparer votre nourriture de manière musulman?  
 
(Or if the interviewee does not prepare food:) Est-ce qu’il est important pour vous, à 
l'égard de votre religion, qui prépare la nourriture et / ou comment il est préparé? 
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(d) S'il vous plaît donner quelques exemples d'aliments que vous préparez et mangez pour des 
occasions religieuses. Est ce que ces aliments ont une signification particulière pour ces 
manifestations religieuses? 
 
(e) Y a-t-il des choses que vous mangez qui sont difficiles à préparer, à Paris [Montréal], qui 
étaient faciles à préparer dans votre pays d’origine? Si oui, lesquels? Pourquoi / Comment? 
 
(f) Pensez-vous que votre nourriture d’origine Maghrébine traverse une transformation à la 
française [Canadien]? Si oui, comment? Si non, pourquoi pas? 
 
(g) Trouver-vous que les Français [Canadiens] non-musulmans vous obligent ou pas, à changer 
vos coutumes de nourriture? Si oui, à quel niveau?    
 
(h) Quelle place occupe la nourriture d’origine Maghrébine à Paris [Montréal], dans votre avis? 
  
(i) Est-il important pour vous de manger de la nouriture halal? Si oui, pourquoi? Si non, pourquoi 
pas? 
 
(j) Trouvez-vous qu'il est difficile de trouver de la viande halal à Paris [Montréal]? Craignez-vous 
que les viandes halal que vous achetez ne sont pas réellement halal? 
 
(k) Buvez-vous de l’alcool? Pourquoi ou pourquoi pas? Connaissez-vous des musulmans qui 
boivent de l’alcool? 
 
(l) Pensez-vous que la nourriture que vous mangez et la façon dont vous le mangez ont un effet 
sur vos interactions avec les non-musulmans français (québécois/es)? 
 
6. Lorsque vous entendez le mot «intégration» de quoi pensez-vous? Est-ce que vous vous 
voyez « intégré? » dans la société française? Vous souciez-vous de cela? 
 
 
Sample Interview Questions (English) 
 
Integration and Ingestion: Food, Drink and Religious Identity in Maghrébine Muslim 
Communities in Paris and Montréal 
	
 
The following set of questions forms the scope of issues that I want to explore.  Beyond # 1 and 
#2, they do not have to be asked in this order, and if participants volunteer the information 
pertaining to a particular question, then I do not need to ask it.  However, each question 
represents only an opening, and would be followed by probes to encourage further details, 
stories, descriptions, meanings or explanations on areas where it may be warranted. 
 
1. Could you tell me something about your background? Were you born in France (Québec), or 
somewhere else? 
 
2. Where I grew up in Canada people identified themselves in a lot of different ways, for 
example according to the place in which they lived, or their country of origin, their ethnicity, or 
their religion. I heard people call themselves, for example, Torontonians, or Irish, or Aboriginal, 
or Catholic. How would you identify yourself?  
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3. I assume that you are a Muslim. Is this correct? [Yes; if No, the interview possibly ends, but 
sometimes a “No” can really mean “I’m not a good Muslim,” so a few other questions can be 
asked to tease out a proper response]. Please tell me a bit about the type of Islam that you 
practice. 
(a) Do you attend Mosque for Friday prayers, Quran readings or other religious 
ceremonies? 
(b) Do you eat halal food? All the time? 
(c) Do you fast during Ramadan? Or on other occasions? 
(d) How often do you pray? 
(e) Do you dress in a way that you would consider Islamic on a regular basis? 
 
4. Think of your religious life, both at home and in other places and now think about food in 
those contexts?  What examples come to mind?  (Objective: to determine the first thing people 
think of when confronted with this question.) 
 
5. Let me explore this connection between food and your religious life. Food is part of our lives 
in many different ways, like cooking, eating, and celebrating. Most of us also use special food 
for special events. I am interested in all these things as they are related to your religious life and 
identity.  
  
(a) When you eat food, on a daily basis, does your religion guide what you eat? (If so, how?) 
 
(b) Are there certain foods that you don’t eat at all (if this has not been brought up yet), or that 
you avoid at certain times?   
 
(c) Do you prepare food yourself?  Are there ways of preparing food that matter with respect to 
your religion?  Does it matter who prepares the food?   
 
(Or if the interviewee does not prepare food:) Does it matter to you, with respect to your 
religion, who prepares your food and/or how it is prepared? 
 
(d) Please give some examples of foods that you prepare and eat for religious occasions. Do 
these foods have any special meaning for these religious events? 
 
(e) Are there things that you eat that are difficult to prepare in Paris [Montréal] that were easy to 
prepare in your homeland? If yes, which ones? Why/How? 
 
(f) Do you think that your Maghrébine food has gone through a transformation toward being 
more French [Québécois]? If yes, how? If no, why not? 
 
(g) Do you find that the non-Muslim French [Québécois] expect you to change your food 
customs in France [Montréal]? If yes, to what level/extent?    
 
(h) What place do you think Maghrébine or Muslim food holds in Paris [Montréal], in your 
opinion? 
 
(i) Is it important for you to eat halal meat? If so, why? If not, why not? 
 
(j) Do you find it difficult to find halal meat in Paris [Montréal]? Do you ever worry that the meat 
that you buy is not actually halal? 
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(k) Do you drink alcohol? Why or why not? Do you know people who drink alcohol? 
 
(l)  Do you think that the food you eat and the way you eat it has an affect on your interactions 
with non-Muslim French? 
 
6. When you hear the word “integration” what do you think of? Do you see yourself as 
“integrated?” Do you care?  
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